- David W. Harker (forthcoming). How to Split a Theory: Scientific Realism and a Defence of Convergence Without Proximity. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
- David William Harker (2013). Discussion Note: McCain on Weak Predictivism and External World Scepticism. Philosophia 41 (1):195-202.
- David Harker (2012). A Surprise for Horwich (and Some Advocates of the Fine-Tuning Argument (Which Does Not Include Horwich (as Far as I Know))). Philosophical Studies 161 (2):247-261.
- David W. Harker (2011). Review of Eric Barnes' The Paradox of Predictivism. [REVIEW] British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 62.
- David Harker (2010). Two Arguments for Scientific Realism Unified. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41 (2):192-202.
- David Harker (2008). On the Predilections for Predictions. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (3):429-453.
- David Harker (2008). P. Kyle Stanford:Exceeding Our Grasp: Science, History, and the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives,:Exceeding Our Grasp: Science, History, and the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives. Philosophy of Science 75 (2):251-253.
- David Harker (2006). Accommodation and Prediction: The Case of the Persistent Head. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (2):309-321.
- Greg Frost-Arnold, J. Brian Pitts, John Norton, John Manchak, D. Tulodziecki, P. D. Magnus, David Harker & Kyle Stanford, Synopsis and Discussion. Workshop: Underdetermination in Science 21-22 March, 2009. Center for Philosophy of Science.
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