72 found
Order:
See also:
Profile: David Henderson (University of Nebraska, Lincoln)
Profile: David Henderson (University of Warwick)
Profile: David Henderson (University of Nebraska, Lincoln)
Profile: David Henderson (Middlesex University)
  1.  21
    David K. Henderson & Terence Horgan (2011). The Epistemological Spectrum: At the Interface of Cognitive Science and Conceptual Analysis. OUP Oxford.
    Henderson and Horgan set out a broad new approach to epistemology. They defend the roles of the a priori and conceptual analysis, but with an essential empirical dimension. 'Transglobal reliability' is the key to epistemic justification. The question of which cognitive processes are reliable depends on contingent facts about human capacities.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  2.  11
    David Henderson (2013). Entitlement in Gutting's Epistemology of Philosophy: Comments on What Philosophers Know. Southern Journal of Philosophy 51 (1):121-132.
    In What Philosophers Know, Gary Gutting provides an epistemology of philosophical reflection. This paper focuses on the roles that various intuitive inputs are said to play in philosophical thought. Gutting argues that philosophers are defeasibly entitled to believe some of these, prior to the outcome of the philosophical reflection, and that they then rightly serve as significant (again defeasible) anchors on reflection. This paper develops a view of epistemic entitlement and applies it to argue that many prephilosophical convictions of the (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  3.  34
    David Henderson (2009). Motivated Contextualism. Philosophical Studies 142 (1):119 - 131.
    The concept of knowledge is used to certify epistemic agents as good sources (on a certain point or subject matter) for an understood audience. Attributions of knowledge and denials of knowledge are used in a kind of epistemic gate keeping for (epistemic or practical) communities with which the attributor and interlocutors are associated. When combined with reflection on kinds of practical and epistemic communities, and their situated epistemic needs for gate keeping, this simple observation regarding the point and purpose of (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  4.  6
    David Henderson (2011). Gate-Keeping Contextualism. Episteme 8 (1):83-98.
    This paper explores a position that combines contextualism regarding knowledge with the idea that the central point or purpose of the concept of knowledge is to feature in attributions that keep epistemic gate for contextually salient communities. After highlighting the main outlines and virtues of the suggested gate-keeping contextualism, two issues are pursued. First, the motivation for the view is clarified in a discussion of the relation between evaluative concepts and the purposes they serve. This clarifies why one's sense for (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  5.  27
    David Henderson & Terence Horgan (2000). Iceberg Epistemology. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (3):497-535.
    Accounts of what it is for an agent to be justified in holding a belief commonly carry commitments concerning what cognitive processes can and should be like. A concern for the plausibility of such commitments leads to a multi-faceted epistemology in which elements of traditionally conflicting epistemologies are vindicated within a single epistemological account. The accessible and articulable states that have been the exclusive focus of much epistemology must constitute only a proper subset of epistemologically relevant processing. The interaction of (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   10 citations  
  6. David Henderson & Terry Horgan (2001). The A Priori Isn’T All That It Is Cracked Up to Be, But It Is Something. Philosophical Topics 29 (1/2):219-250.
    Alvin Goldman’s contributions to contemporary epistemology are impressive—few epistemologists have provided others so many occasions for reflecting on the fundamental character of their discipline and its concepts. His work has informed the way epistemological questions have changed (and remained consistent) over the last two decades. We (the authors of this paper) can perhaps best suggest our indebtedness by noting that there is probably no paper on epistemology that either of us individually or jointly have produced that does not in its (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  7. David Henderson & Terry Horgan (2007). Some Ins and Outs of Transglobal Reliabilism. In Sanford Goldberg (ed.), Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology. Oxford University Press 100.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  8.  28
    David Henderson (2008). Testimonial Beliefs and Epistemic Competence. Noûs 42 (2):190–221.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  9.  51
    Sanford Goldberg & David Henderson (2006). Monitoring and Anti-Reductionism in the Epistemology of Testimony. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (3):600 - 617.
    One of the central points of contention in the epistemology of testimony concerns the uniqueness (or not) of the justification of beliefs formed through testimony--whether such justification can be accounted for in terms of, or 'reduced to,' other familiar sort of justification, e.g. without relying on any epistemic principles unique to testimony. One influential argument for the reductionist position, found in the work of Elizabeth Fricker, argues by appeal to the need for the hearer to monitor the testimony for credibility. (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  10. Charlene Haddock Seigfried, Marilyn Fischer, V. Denise James, David Graham Henderson, Robert W. King, Joshua August Skorburg, Saskia Sassen, Sharon M. Meagher, Larry A. Hickman & Eduardo Mendieta (2013). 1. Front Matter Front Matter (Pp. I-Iii). The Pluralist 8 (3).
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  11.  2
    David K. Henderson (1993). Interpretation and Explanation in the Human Sciences. State University of New York Press.
    Refutes the methodological separatists who hold that the logic of explanation and testing in the human sciences is fundamentally different than in the natural sciences, and develops complementary accounts for interpretation and explanation, ...
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   7 citations  
  12.  8
    Mark Brady, Williamson M. Evers, David Henderson & John Majewski Be (2006). The Politically Incorrect Guide to American History. By Thomas E. Woods, Jr. Washington: Regnery, 2004. Journal of Libertarian Studies 20 (2):65-86.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  13.  58
    David Henderson, Terry Horgan & Matjaž Potrč (2007). Transglobal Evidentialism-Reliabilism. Acta Analytica 22 (4):281-300.
    We propose an approach to epistemic justification that incorporates elements of both reliabilism and evidentialism, while also transforming these elements in significant ways. After briefly describing and motivating the non-standard version of reliabilism that Henderson and Horgan call “transglobal” reliabilism, we harness some of Henderson and Horgan’s conceptual machinery to provide a non-reliabilist account of propositional justification (i.e., evidential support). We then invoke this account, together with the notion of a transglobally reliable belief-forming process, to give an account of doxastic (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  14.  33
    David Henderson & Terence E. Horgan (2001). Practicing Safe Epistemology. Philosophical Studies 102 (3):227 - 258.
    Reliablists have argued that the important evaluative epistemic concept of being justified in holding a belief, at least to the extent that that concept is associated with knowledge, is best understood as concerned with the objective appropriateness of the processes by which a given belief is generated and sustained. In particular, they hold that a belief is justified only when it is fostered by processes that are reliable (at least minimally so) in the believer’s actual world.[1] Of course, reliablists typically (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  15.  68
    David Henderson (2000). What Is a Priori and What Is It Good For? Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (S1):51-86.
    The doctrine is familiar. In a sentence, a priori truths are those that are knowable on the basis of reflection alone (independent of experience) by anyone who has acquired the relevant concepts. This expresses the classical conception of the a priori. Of course, there are those who despair of finding any truths that fully meet these demands. Some of the doubters are convinced, however, that the demands, are somewhat inflated by an epistemological tradition that was nevertheless on to something of (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  16.  9
    David Henderson & Terence Edward Horgan (2006). Transglobal Reliabilism. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 17:171-195.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  17.  6
    David K. Henderson (1991). Philosophy of Science Association. In Richard Boyd, Philip Gasper & J. D. Trout (eds.), The Philosophy of Science. MIT Press 58--4.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  18.  15
    David Henderson (2005). Norms, Invariance, and Explanatory Relevance. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 35 (3):324-338.
    Descriptions of social norms can be explanatory. The erotetic approach to explanation provides a useful framework. I describe one very broad kind of explanation-seeking why-question, a genus that is common to the special sciences, and argue that descriptions of norms can serve as an answer to such why-questions. I draw upon Woodward’s recent discussion of the explanatory role of generalizations with a significant degree of invariance. Descriptions of norms provide what is, in effect, a generalization regarding the kind of historically (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  19.  70
    David K. Henderson (1994). Epistemic Competence and Contextualist Epistemology: Why Contextualism is Not Just the Poor Person's Coherentism. Journal of Philosophy 91 (12):627-649.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  20.  8
    David Henderson (2015). On the Real Workings of Social Construction. Metascience 24 (2):271-274.
    This book provides a thorough and compelling argument for a realist form of moderate social constructionism. It argues that social scientists should provide an explanatory account of the construction of various elements of the social world. Such accounts should be realist because, “social construction is a real process and a process whose products are real” . The argument here furthers a tradition that includes work by Bhaskar and Searle. The book is a pleasure to read. Elder-Vass writes in an admirably (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  21.  68
    David K. Henderson (1987). The Principle of Charity and the Problem of Irrationality (Translation and the Problem of Irrationality). Synthese 73 (2):225 - 252.
    Common formulations of the principle of charity in translation seem to undermine attributions of irrationality in social scientific accounts that are otherwise unexceptionable. This I call the problem of irrationality. Here I resolve the problem of irrationality by developing two complementary views of the principle of charity. First, I develop the view (ill-developed in the literature at present) that the principle of charity is preparatory, being needed in the construction of provisional first-approximation translation manuals. These serve as the basis for (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  22.  17
    David Henderson & Terry Horgan (2006). Transglobal Reliabilism. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 6 (2):171-195.
    We here propose an account of what it is for an agent to be objectively justified in holding some belief. We present in outline this approach, which we call transglobal reliabilism, and we discuss how it is motivated by various thought experiments. While transglobal reliabilism is an externalist epistemology, we think that it accommodates traditional internalist concerns and objections in a uniquely natural and respectful way.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  23.  83
    David Henderson (2010). Explanation and Rationality Naturalized. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 40 (1):30-58.
    Familiar accounts have it that one explains thoughts or actions by showing them to be rational. It is common to find that the standards of rationality presupposed in these accounts are drawn from what would be thought to be aprioristic sources. I advance an argument to show this must be mistaken. But, recent work in epistemology and on rationality takes a less aprioristic approach to such standards. Does the new (psychological or cognitive scientific) realism in accounts of rationality itself significantly (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  24.  4
    David Henderson & Terry Horgan (2000). Editors' Introduction. Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (Supplement):15-15.
    No categories
    Direct download (12 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  25.  15
    David K. Henderson (1996). Simulation Theory Versus Theory Theory: A Difference Without a Difference in Explanations. Southern Journal of Philosophy 34 (S1):65-93.
  26.  4
    David K. Henderson (forthcoming). A Critical Perspective on a Critical Perspective on Social Science. Metascience:1-5.
    Yoshida considers two broad understandings of how social scientists can and should “describe and explain other cultures or their aspects under concepts of rationality” . In the one corner is a family of approaches that Yoshida finds deeply flawed: cultural interpretivist approaches. Five authors representative of this family are given fine chapter length examinations: Winch, Taylor, Geertz, Sahlins, and Obeyesekere. In the other corner is Yoshida’s favored approach: critical rationalism. This approach is associated with the intellectual descendants of Karl Popper—notably (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  27.  9
    Pam McGrath, David Henderson & Hamish Holewa (2006). Patient-Centred Care: Qualitative Findings on Health Professionals' Understanding of Ethics in Acute Medicine. [REVIEW] Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 3 (3):149-160.
    In recent years the literature on bioethics has begun to pose the sociological challenge of how to explore organisational processes that facilitate a systemic response to ethical concerns. The present discussion seeks to make a contribution to this important new direction in ethical research by presenting findings from an Australian pilot study. The research was initiated by the Clinical Ethics Committee of Redland Hospital at Bayside Health Service District in Queensland, Australia, and explores health professionals’ understanding of the nature of (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  28.  30
    David Henderson (2002). Norms, Normative Principles, and Explanation: On Not Getting is From Ought. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 32 (3):329-364.
    It seems that hope springs eternal for the cherished idea that norms (or normativeprinciples) explain actions or regularities in actions. But it also seems thatthere are many ways of going wrong when taking norms and normative principlesas explanatory. The author argues that neither norms nor normative principles—insofar as they are the sort of things with normative force—is explanatoryof what is done. He considers the matter using both erotetic and ontic models ofexplanation. He further considers various understandings of norms. Key Words: (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  29.  7
    David Henderson, American Wilderness Philosophy. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    American Wilderness Philosophy Wilderness has been defined in diverse ways, but most famously in the Wilderness Act of 1964, which describes it “in contrast with those areas where man and his own works dominate the landscape … as an area where the earth and its community of life are untrammeled by man, where man himself is […].
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  30.  68
    Terence E. Horgan & David K. Henderson (2005). What Does It Take to Be a True Believer? Against the Opulent Ideology of Eliminative Materialism. In Mind as a Scientific Object. Oxford University Press
               Eliminative materialism, as William Lycan (this volume) tells us, is materialism plus the claim that no creature has ever had a belief, desire, intention, hope, wish, or other “folk-psychological†state. Some contemporary philosophers claim that eliminative materialism is very likely true. They sketch certain potential scenarios, for the way theory might develop in cognitive science and neuroscience, that they claim are fairly likely; and they maintain that if such scenarios (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  31.  5
    David Henderson & Terry Horgan (2004). What Does It Take to Be a True Believer? In Christina E. Erneling & David Martel Johnson (eds.), Mind As a Scientific Object: Between Brain and Culture. Oxford University Press 211.
    Eliminative materialism, as William Lycan (this volume) tells us, is materialism plus the claim that no creature has ever had a belief, desire, intention, hope, wish, or other “folk-psychological” state. Some contemporary philosophers claim that eliminative materialism is very likely true. They sketch certain potential scenarios, for the way theory might develop in cognitive science and neuroscience, that they claim are fairly likely; and they maintain that if such.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  32.  23
    David K. Henderson (1994). Account for Macro-Level Causation. Synthese 101 (2):129-156.
    By a macro-level feature, I understand any feature that supervenes on, and is thus realized in, lower-level features. Recent discussions by Kim have suggested that such features cannot be causally relevant insofar as they are not classically reducible to lower-level features. This seems to render macro-level features causally irrelevant. I defend the causal relevance of some such features. Such features have been thought causally relevant in many examples that have underpinned philosophical work on causality. Additionally, in certain typical biological cases, (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  33.  18
    David K. Henderson (1987). Winch and the Constraints on Interpretation: Versions of the Principle of Charity. Southern Journal of Philosophy 25 (2):153-173.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  34. David K. Henderson & Terence E. Horgan (2000). Simulation and Epistemic Competence. In H. Kobler & K. Steuber (eds.), Empathy and Agency: The Problem of Understanding in the Social Sciences. Westview
    Epistemology has recently come to more and more take the articulate form of an investigation into how we do, and perhaps might better, manage the cognitive chores of producing, modifying, and generally maintaining belief-sets with a view to having a true and systematic understanding of the world. While this approach has continuities with earlier philosophy, it admittedly makes a departure from the tradition of epistemology as first philosophy.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  35.  8
    David Henderson & Terry Horgan (2013). Conceptually Grounded Necessary Truths. In Albert Casullo & Joshua C. Thurow (eds.), The a Priori in Philosophy. OUP Oxford 111.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  36.  11
    David K. Henderson (1994). Epistemic Competence. Philosophical Papers 23 (3):139-167.
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  37.  11
    David Henderson & Terence Horgan (2014). Relies to Our Critics. Philosophical Studies 169 (3):549-564.
    We respond to the central concerns raised by our commentators to our book, The Epistemological Spectrum. Casullo believes that our account of what we term “low-grade a priori” justification provides important clarification of a kind of philosophical reflection. However he objects to calling such reflection a priori. We explain what we think is at stake. Along the way, we comment on his idea of that there may be an epistemic payoff to making a distinction between assumptions and presumptions. In the (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  38.  42
    David Henderson (1988). The Importance of Explanation in Quine's Principle of Charity in Translation. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 18 (3):355-369.
  39.  14
    David Henderson (2012). Neuraths Boat Will Take You Where You Want to Go: On Naturalized Epistemology and Historicism. Journal of the Philosophy of History 6 (3):389-414.
    Naturalized epistemology is not a recent invention, nor is it a philosophical invention. Rather, it is a cognitive phenomena that is pervasive and desirable in the way of human epistemic engagement with their world. It is a matter of the way that one’s cognitive processes can be modulated by information gotten from those same or wider cognitive processes. Such modulational control enhances the reliability of one’s cognitive processes in many ways ‐ and judgments about objective epistemic justification consistently evince a (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  40.  11
    David Henderson & Terry Horgan (2013). Risk Sensitive Animal Knowledge. Philosophical Studies 166 (3):599-608.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  41.  22
    David Henderson (2011). Lets Be Flexible: Our Interpretive/Explanatory Toolbox, or In Praise of Using a Range of Tools. Journal of the Philosophy of History 5 (2):261-299.
    This paper explores the role and limits of cognitive simulation in understanding or explaining others. In simulation, one puts one's own cognitive processes to work on pretend input similar to that one supposes that the other plausibly had. Such a process is highly useful. However, it is also limited in important ways. Several limitations fall out from the various forms of cognitive diversity. Some of this diversity results from cultural differences, or from differences in individuals' cognitive biographies. Such diversity is (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  42.  3
    David Konstan Henderson, Ralph Rosen, Jeffrey Rusten & W. Niall (unknown). The Birth of Comedy. The Classical Review 62 (2).
  43.  27
    David K. Henderson (1990). An Empirical Basis for Charity in Interpretation. Erkenntnis 32 (1):83 - 103.
    In codifying the methods of translation, several writers have formulated maxims that would constrain interpreters to construe their subjects as (more or less) rational speakers of the truth. Such maxims have come to be known as versions of the principle of charity. W. V. O. Quine suggests an empirical, not purely methodological, basis for his version of that principle. Recently, Stephen Stich has criticized Quine's attempt to found the principle of charity in translation on information about the probabilities of various (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  44.  23
    David Henderson (2003). Review of Martin Kusch, Knowledge by Agreement: The Programme of Communitarian Epistemology. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2003 (1).
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  45.  19
    David K. Henderson (1991). On the Testability of Psychological Generalizations (Psychological Testability). Philosophy of Science (December) 586 (December):586-606.
    Rosenberg argues that intentional generalizations in the human sciences cannot be law-like because they are not amenable to significant empirical refinement. This irrefinability is said to result from the principle that supposedly controls in intentional explanation also serving as the standard for successful interpretation. The only credible evidence bearing on such a principle would then need conform to it. I argue that psychological generalizations are refinable and can be nomic. I show how empirical refinement of psychological generalizations is possible by (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  46.  20
    David K. Henderson (1995). One Naturalized Epistemological Argument Against Coherentist Accounts of Empirical Knowledge. Erkenntnis 43 (2):199 - 227.
    The argument I present here is an example of the manner in which naturalizing epistemology can help address fairly traditional epistemological issues. I develop one argument against coherentist epistemologies of empirical knowledge. In doing so, I draw on BonJour (1985), for that account seems to me to indicate the direction in which any plausible coherentist account would need to be developed, at least insofar as such accounts are to conceive of justification in terms of an agent (minimally) possessing articul able (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  47.  11
    David Graham Henderson (2009). The Possibility of Managing for Wilderness. Environmental Ethics 31 (4):413-429.
    Wilderness is often understood as land untouched by people. On this reading, wilderness management seems to be a simple contradiction, but it is in fact a thriving and functional practice. Wilderness is not simply an absence of human influence, but the presence of something else. Wilderness is land characterized by the flourishing of natural purpose. When this is understood, wilderness management becomes intelligible and several recent criticisms of wilderness preservation are defused.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  48.  5
    David Graham Henderson (2013). Bugbee's Wilderness: Metaphysical and Montanan. The Pluralist 8 (3):46-54.
    Our true home is wilderness, even the world of everyday.—Henry G. Bugbee, Jr.Henry Bugbee was Born in New York City in 1915. This may not seem the most fortuitous birthplace for an interpreter of the wild rivers of Montana, but we might also remember that John Muir, interpreter of the High Sierras, was born in Scotland. Perhaps the movement west is an important prelude for such a vocation. Bugbee studied philosophy at Princeton and then at Berkeley, but before he could (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  49.  12
    David K. Henderson (1987). A Solution to Davidson's Paradox of Irrationality. Erkenntnis 27 (3):359 - 369.
    No categories
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  50.  8
    David K. Henderson (1995). Simulation Theory Versus Theory Theory. Southern Journal of Philosophy 34 (Supplement):65-93.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
1 — 50 / 72