6 found
See also:
Profile: David Owens (University of Chicago)
Profile: David Owens (Kings College)
  1. David J. Owens (2003). Does Belief Have an Aim? Philosophical Studies 115 (3):283-305.
    The hypothesis that belief aims at the truth has been used to explain three features of belief: (1) the fact that correct beliefs are true beliefs, (2) the fact that rational beliefs are supported by the evidence and (3) the fact that we cannot form beliefs.
    Direct download (10 more)  
    Export citation  
    My bibliography   39 citations  
  2.  83
    David J. Owens (1996). A Lockean Theory of Memory Experience. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (2):319-32.
    The paper aims to provide an account of the phenomenological differences between perception, recognition and recall. In the first section, recall is distinguished from non-experiential forms of memory. In the second section, it is argued that we can't distinguish perceptual experience from the experience of recall by means of perception's present tense content because it is possible to perceive as well as to recall the past. The Lockean theory of recall as a revival of previous perceptual experience is then introduced, (...)
    Direct download (13 more)  
    Export citation  
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  3.  70
    David J. Owens (2003). Knowing Your Own Mind. Dialogue 42 (4):791-798.
    What is it to “know your own mind”? In ordinary English, this phrase connotes clear headed decisiveness and a firm resolve but in the language of contemporary philosophy, the indecisive and the susceptible can know their own minds just as well as anybody else. In the philosopher’s usage, “knowing your own mind” is just a matter of being able to produce a knowledgeable description of your mental state, whether it be a state of indecision, susceptibility or even confusion. What exercises (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
    Export citation  
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  4.  55
    David J. Owens (1999). The Authority of Memory. European Journal of Philosophy 7 (3):312-29.
    [FIRST PARAGRAPHS] Nothing is more common than for us to continue to believe without rehearsing the reasons which led us to believe in the first place. It is hard to see how it could be otherwise. Were we obliged constantly to re-trace our cognitive steps, to reassure ourselves that we are entitled to our convictions, how could we ever move forward? We have probably forgotten why we adopted many of our current beliefs and even if we could dredge the evidence (...)
    Direct download (11 more)  
    Export citation  
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  5.  90
    David J. Owens & Brian P. McLaughlin (2000). Self-Knowledge, Externalism and Scepticism: II--David Owens, Scepticisms: Descartes and Hume. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 74 (74):119-142.
    [FIRST PARAGRAPHS]The role of Professor McLaughlin's sceptic is to introduce certain 'sceptical hypotheses', hypotheses which imply the falsity of most of what we believe about the world. Professor McLaughlin asks whether these hypotheses are coherent and thus whether they can tell us anything about what are entitled to believe, or to claim to know. He concludes that, semantic externalism notwithstanding, these hypotheses are both coherent and threatening. I shall not question this conclusion but I do wonder whether the fate of (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
    Export citation  
    My bibliography  
  6. David J. Owens (2003). Externalis, Davidson, and Knowledge of Comparative Content. In Susana Nuccetelli (ed.), New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge. MIT Press