Search results for 'David John Chalmers' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. David John Chalmers (2010). The Character of Consciousness. Oxford University Press.score: 1230.0
    What is consciousness? How does the subjective character of consciousness fit into an objective world? How can there be a science of consciousness? In this sequel to his groundbreaking and controversial The Conscious Mind, David Chalmers develops a unified framework that addresses these questions and many others. Starting with a statement of the "hard problem" of consciousness, Chalmers builds a positive framework for the science of consciousness and a nonreductive vision of the metaphysics of consciousness. He replies (...)
     
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  2. John Chalmers David (1998). [Book Review] the Conscious Mind, in Search of a Fundamental Theory. [REVIEW] Science and Society 62 (4).score: 900.0
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  3. David John Chalmers, David Manley & Ryan Wasserman (eds.) (2009). Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology. Oxford University Press.score: 870.0
    This volume concerns the status and ambitions of metaphysics as a discipline.
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  4. Martin Rudwick, Naomi Oreskes, David Oldroyd, David Philip Miller, Alan Chalmers, John Forge, David Turnbull, Peter Slezak, David Bloor, Craig Callender, Keith Hutchison, Steven Savitt & Huw Price (1996). Review Symposia. Metascience 5 (1):7-85.score: 870.0
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  5. Gareth B. Matthews New, Andrew Bailey, Sarah Buss, Steven M. Cahn, Howard Caygill, David J. Chalmers, John Christman, Michael Clark, David E. Cooper & Simon Critchley (2002). Books for Review and for Listing Here Should Be Addressed to Emily Zakin, Review Editor, Department of Philosophy, Miami University, Oxford, OH 45056. Teaching Philosophy 25 (4):403.score: 810.0
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  6. David Turnbull, Henry Krips, Val Dusek, Steve Fuller, Alan Sokal, Jean Bricmont, Alan Frost, Alan Chalmers, Anna Salleh, Alfred I. Tauber, Yvonne Luxford, Nicolaas Rupke, Steven French, Peter G. Brown, Hugh LaFollette, Peter Machamer, Nicolas Rasmussen, Andy J. Miller, Marya Schechtman, Ross S. West, John Forge, David Oldroyd, Nancy Demand, Darrin W. Belousek, Warren Schmaus, Sungook Hong, Rachel A. Ankeny, Peter Anstey, Jeremy Butterfield & Harshi Gunawardena (2000). Clarity, Charity and Criticism, Wit, Wisdom and Worldliness: Avoiding Intellectual Impositions. [REVIEW] Metascience 9 (3):347-498.score: 810.0
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  7. David Oldroyd, Phil Dowe, Adrian Mackenzie, Alison Bashford, Geoffrey C. Bowker, Alan Chalmers, I. J. Crozier, John Dargavel, Wendy Riemens & Andrew Dowling (1997). A Miller's Tale. Metascience 6 (1):105-184.score: 810.0
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  8. David J. Chalmers (1999). Materialism and the Metaphysics of Modality. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (2):473-96.score: 480.0
    This appeared in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59:473-93, as a response to four papers in a symposium on my book The Conscious Mind . Most of it should be comprehensible without having read the papers in question. This paper is for an audience of philosophers and so is relatively technical. It will probably also help to have read some of the book. (There is a corresponding precis of the book, written for the symposium.) The papers I’m responding to are: Chris (...)
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  9. David J. Chalmers, On ``Consciousness and the Philosophers''.score: 450.0
    John Searle's review of my book The Conscious Mind appeared in the March 6, 1997 edition of the New York Review of Books. I replied in a letter printed in their May 15, 1997 edition, and Searle's response appeared simultaneously. I set up this web page so that interested people can see my reply to Searle in turn, and to give access to other relevant materials.
     
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  10. David J. Chalmers (2004). Imagination, Indexicality, and Intensions. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):182-90.score: 450.0
    John Perry's book Knowledge, Possibility, and Consciousness is a lucid and engaging defense of a physicalist view of consciousness against various anti-physicalist arguments. In what follows, I will address Perry's responses to the three main anti-physicalist arguments he discusses: the zombie argument (focusing on imagination), the knowledge argument (focusing on indexicals), and the modal argument (focusing on intensions).
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  11. David J. Chalmers (1992). Subsymbolic Computation and the Chinese Room. In J. Dinsmore (ed.), The Symbolic and Connectionist Paradigms: Closing the Gap. Lawrence Erlbaum. 25--48.score: 450.0
    More than a decade ago, philosopher John Searle started a long-running controversy with his paper “Minds, Brains, and Programs” (Searle, 1980a), an attack on the ambitious claims of artificial intelligence (AI). With his now famous _Chinese Room_ argument, Searle claimed to show that despite the best efforts of AI researchers, a computer could never recreate such vital properties of human mentality as intentionality, subjectivity, and understanding. The AI research program is based on the underlying assumption that all important aspects (...)
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  12. David J. Chalmers (1997). Response to Searle. New York Review of Books 44 (8).score: 450.0
    In my book _The Conscious Mind_ , I deny a number of claims that John Searle finds "obvious", and I make some claims that he finds "absurd". But if the mind/body problem has taught us anything, it is that nothing about consciousness is obvious, and that one person's obvious truth is another person's absurdity. So instead of throwing around this sort of language, it is best to examine the claims themselves and the arguments that I give for them, to (...)
     
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  13. Michael Esfeld (2013). Contemporary Metaphysics: Review of David J. Chalmers, Constructing the World, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2012, 494 Pages; John Heil, The Universe as We Find It, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2012, 311 Pages; and Theodore R. Sider, Writing the Book of the World, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2011, 318 Pages. [REVIEW] Metaphysica 14 (1):143-148.score: 435.0
    Metaphysics is definitely back on the agenda of contemporary philosophy. It is a metaphysics in the full traditional sense, seeking to provide the means to gain knowledge that covers being as a whole, not just parts of it (such as the metaphysics of mind, the metaphysics of values, etc.). Oxford University Press published three books in 2011 and 2012 each of which spells out that ambition. The present review sums up the main topics covered in these books and offers some (...)
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  14. Frank Jackson, Graham Priest & David Lewis (2004). How Many Lives Has Schrodinger's Cat? The Estate of David Kellogg Lewis. Thanks for Valuable Comments Are Due to David Albert, DM Armstrong, Phillip Bricker, Jeremy Butterfield, David Chalmers, John Collins, Adam Elga, Alan Hajek, Richard Hanley, Rae Langton, Peter Lewis, Stephanie Lewis, Barry Loewer, Jonathan Schaffer, Bas van Fraassen, Steven Weinstein, and Sam Wheeler. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1):3-22.score: 414.0
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  15. David J. Chalmers (2006). The Foundations of Two-Dimensional Semantics. In Manuel Garcia-Carpintero & Josep Macia (eds.), Two-Dimensional Semantics: Foundations and Applications. Oxford University Press. 55-140.score: 360.0
    Why is two-dimensional semantics important? One can think of it as the most recent act in a drama involving three of the central concepts of philosophy: meaning, reason, and modality. First, Kant linked reason and modality, by suggesting that what is necessary is knowable a priori, and vice versa. Second, Frege linked reason and meaning, by proposing an aspect of meaning (sense) that is constitutively tied to cognitive signi?cance. Third, Carnap linked meaning and modality, by proposing an aspect of meaning (...)
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  16. Eileen John (2008). Review of David Davies, Aesthetics and Literature. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008 (9).score: 360.0
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  17. Michael A. Bishop, J. D. Trout, L. Johannes Brandl, Marian David, Leopold Stubenberg, Herman Cappelen & Ernie Lepore (2005). Appearance in This List Neither Guarantees nor Precludes a Future Review of the Book. Agamben, Giorgio, Trans. Kevin Attell, State of Exception, London and Chicago: Univer-Sity of Chicago Press, 2005, Pp. Vii+ 95,£ 8.50, $12.00. Aiken, William and John Haldane (Eds), Philosophy and Its Public Role, Exeter, UK and Charlottesville, VA: Imprint Academic, 2004, Pp. Vi+ 272,£ 14.95, $29.90. [REVIEW] Mind 114:454.score: 360.0
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  18. Cohen Ga, If You’re an Egalitarian, Crocker Robert, Reason Religion, Crockett Clayton, DUPRÉ John & Human Nature (2002). CHARLES David and William Child (Eds): Wittgensteinian Themes: Essays. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 10 (2):325-330.score: 360.0
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  19. Robert John & Sheffler Manning (1990). David Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion: Otherness in History and in Text. Religious Studies 26 (3):415.score: 360.0
  20. David J. Chalmers & Frank Jackson (2001). Conceptual Analysis and Reductive Explanation. Philosophical Review 110 (3):315-61.score: 300.0
    Is conceptual analysis required for reductive explanation? If there is no a priori entailment from microphysical truths to phenomenal truths, does reductive explanation of the phenomenal fail? We say yes (Chalmers 1996; Jackson 1994, 1998). Ned Block and Robert Stalnaker say no (Block and Stalnaker 1999).
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  21. David J. Chalmers (2009). The Two-Dimensional Argument Against Materialism. In Brian P. McLaughlin & Sven Walter (eds.), Oxford Handbook to the Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press.score: 300.0
    A number of popular arguments for dualism start from a premise about an epistemic gap between physical truths about truths about consciousness, and infer an ontological gap between physical processes and consciousness. Arguments of this sort include the conceivability argument, the knowledge argument, the explanatory-gap argument, and the property dualism argument. Such arguments are often resisted on the grounds that epistemic premises do not entail ontological conclusion. My view is that one can legitimately infer ontological conclusions from epistemic premises, if (...)
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  22. David J. Chalmers (2004). Phenomenal Concepts and the Knowledge Argument. In Peter Ludlow, Yujin Nagasawa & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), There's Something About Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument. MIT Press. 269.score: 300.0
    *[[This paper is largely based on material in other papers. The first three sections and the appendix are drawn with minor modifications from Chalmers 2002c (which explores issues about phenomenal concepts and beliefs in much more depth, mostly independently of questions about materialism). The main ideas of the last three sections are drawn from Chalmers 1996, 1999, and 2002a, although with considerable revision and elaboration. ]].
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  23. David J. Chalmers & Brian Rabern (2014). Two-Dimensional Semantics and the Nesting Problem. Analysis 74 (2):210-224.score: 300.0
    Graeme Forbes (2011) raises some problems for two-dimensional semantic theories. The problems concern nested environments: linguistic environments where sentences are nested under both modal and epistemic operators. Closely related problems involving nested environments have been raised by Scott Soames (2005) and Josh Dever (2007). Soames goes so far as to say that nested environments pose the “chief technical problem” for strong two-dimensionalism. We call the problem of handling nested environments within two-dimensional semantics “the nesting problem”. We show that the two-dimensional (...)
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  24. David J. Chalmers, Scott Soames' Two-Dimensionalism.score: 300.0
    Scott Soames’ Reference and Description contains arguments against a number of different versions of two-dimensional semantics. After early chapters on descriptivism and on Kripke’s anti-descriptivist arguments, a chapter each is devoted to the roots of twodimensionalism in “slips, errors, or misleading suggestions” by Kripke and Kaplan, and to the two-dimensional approaches developed by Stalnaker (1978) and by Davies and Humberstone (1981). The bulk of the book (about 200 pages) is devoted to “ambitious twodimensionalism”, attributed to Frank Jackson, David Lewis, (...)
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  25. David J. Chalmers (1998). On the Search for the Neural Correlate of Consciousness. In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A.C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness II. MIT Press. 2--219.score: 300.0
    *[[This paper appears in _Toward a Science of Consciousness II: The Second Tucson Discussions and Debates_ (S. Hameroff, A. Kaszniak, and A.Scott, eds), published with MIT Press in 1998. It is a transcript of my talk at the second Tucson conference in April 1996, lightly edited to include the contents of overheads and to exclude some diversions with a consciousness meter. A more in-depth argument for some of the claims in this paper can be found in Chapter 6 of my (...)
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  26. Chalmers John, Quintana Daniel, Abbott Maree & Kemp Andrew (2013). The Impact of Anxiety on Heart Rate Variability at Rest and Under Stress. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 7.score: 280.0
  27. Chalmers John, Quintana Daniel, Abbott Maree & Kemp Andrew (2013). The Impact of Anxiety and its Disorders on Heart Rate Variability: A Meta-Analysis. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 7.score: 280.0
  28. Andy Clark & David J. Chalmers (1998). The Extended Mind. Analysis 58 (1):7-19.score: 240.0
    Where does the mind stop and the rest of the world begin? The question invites two standard replies. Some accept the demarcations of skin and skull, and say that what is outside the body is outside the mind. Others are impressed by arguments suggesting that the meaning of our words "just ain't in the head", and hold that this externalism about meaning carries over into an externalism about mind. We propose to pursue a third position. We advocate a very different (...)
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  29. David J. Chalmers (2003). Consciousness and its Place in Nature. In Stephen P. Stich & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell. 102--142.score: 240.0
    Consciousness fits uneasily into our conception of the natural world. On the most common conception of nature, the natural world is the physical world. But on the most common conception of consciousness, it is not easy to see how it could be part of the physical world. So it seems that to find a place for consciousness within the natural order, we must either revise our conception of consciousness, or revise our conception of nature. In twentieth-century philosophy, this dilemma is (...)
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  30. David J. Chalmers (2002). Does Conceivability Entail Possibility? In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility. Oxford University Press. 145--200.score: 240.0
    There is a long tradition in philosophy of using a priori methods to draw conclusions about what is possible and what is necessary, and often in turn to draw conclusions about matters of substantive metaphysics. Arguments like this typically have three steps: first an epistemic claim (about what can be known or conceived), from there to a modal claim (about what is possible or necessary), and from there to a metaphysical claim (about the nature of things in the world).
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  31. David J. Chalmers (1995). Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness. Consciousness and Emotion in Cognitive Science: Conceptual and Empirical Issues 2 (3):200-19.score: 240.0
    To make progress on the problem of consciousness, we have to confront it directly. In this paper, I first isolate the truly hard part of the problem, separating it from more tractable parts and giving an account of why it is so difficult to explain. I critique some recent work that uses reductive methods to address consciousness, and argue that such methods inevitably fail to come to grips with the hardest part of the problem. Once this failure is recognized, the (...)
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  32. David Chalmers, Zombies on the Web.score: 240.0
    Zombies are hypothetical creatures of the sort that philosophers have been known to cherish. A zombie is physically identical to a normal human being, but completely lacks conscious experience. Zombies look and behave like the conscious beings that we know and love, but "all is dark inside." There is nothing it is like to be a zombie.
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  33. David J. Chalmers (2007). Phenomenal Concepts and the Explanatory Gap. In Torin Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. Oxford University Press.score: 240.0
    Confronted with the apparent explanatory gap between physical processes and consciousness, there are many possible reactions. Some deny that any explanatory gap exists at all. Some hold that there is an explanatory gap for now, but that it will eventually be closed. Some hold that the explanatory gap corresponds to an ontological gap in nature.
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  34. David J. Chalmers (2004). The Representational Character of Experience. In Brian Leiter (ed.), The Future for Philosophy. Oxford University Press. 153--181.score: 240.0
    Consciousness and intentionality are perhaps the two central phenomena in the philosophy of mind. Human beings are conscious beings: there is something it is like to be us. Human beings are intentional beings: we represent what is going on in the world.Correspondingly, our specific mental states, such as perceptions and thoughts, very often have a phenomenal character: there is something it is like to be in them. And these mental states very often have intentional content: they serve to represent the (...)
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  35. David J. Chalmers (1995). The Puzzle of Conscious Experience. Scientific American 273 (6):80-86.score: 240.0
    Conscious experience is at once the most familiar thing in the world and the most mysterious. There is nothing we know about more directly than consciousness, but it is extraordinarily hard to reconcile it with everything else we know. Why does it exist? What does it do? How could it possibly arise from neural processes in the brain? These questions are among the most intriguing in all of science.
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  36. David J. Chalmers (1995). Absent Qualia, Fading Qualia, Dancing Qualia. In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Ferdinand Schoningh. 309--328.score: 240.0
    It is widely accepted that conscious experience has a physical basis. That is, the properties of experience (phenomenal properties, or qualia) systematically depend on physical properties according to some lawful relation. There are two key questions about this relation. The first concerns the strength of the laws: are they logically or metaphysically necessary, so that consciousness is nothing "over and above" the underlying physical process, or are they merely contingent laws like the law of gravity? This question about the strength (...)
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  37. David J. Chalmers (2011). The Nature of Epistemic Space. In Andy Egan & Brian Weatherson (eds.), Epistemic Modality. Oxford University Press.score: 240.0
    There are many ways the world might be, for all I know. For all I know, it might be that there is life on Jupiter, and it might be that there is not. It might be that Australia will win the next Ashes series, and it might be that they will not. It might be that my great-grandfather was my great-grandmother's second cousin, and it might be that he was not. It might be that copper is a compound, and it (...)
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  38. David J. Chalmers (1998). The Problems of Consciousness. In H. Jasper, L. Descarries, V. Castellucci & S. Rossignol (eds.), Consciousness: At the Frontiers of Neuroscience. Lippincott-Raven. 29 - 59.score: 240.0
    This paper is an edited transcription of a talk at the 1997 Montreal symposium on "Consciousness at the Frontiers of Neuroscience". There's not much here that isn't said elsewhere, e.g. in "Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness" and "How Can We Construct a Science of Consciousness?"]].
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  39. David J. Chalmers (2006). Strong and Weak Emergence. In P. Davies & P. Clayton (eds.), The Re-Emergence of Emergence. Oxford University Press.score: 240.0
    The term ‘emergence’ often causes confusion in science and philosophy, as it is used to express at least two quite different concepts. We can label these concepts _strong_ _emergence_ and _weak emergence_. Both of these concepts are important, but it is vital to keep them separate.
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  40. David J. Chalmers (1996). The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory. Oxford University Press.score: 240.0
    The book is an extended study of the problem of consciousness. After setting up the problem, I argue that reductive explanation of consciousness is impossible (alas!), and that if one takes consciousness seriously, one has to go beyond a strict materialist framework. In the second half of the book, I move toward a positive theory of consciousness with fundamental laws linking the physical and the experiential in a systematic way. Finally, I use the ideas and arguments developed earlier to defend (...)
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  41. David J. Chalmers, The First Person and Third Person Views (Part I).score: 240.0
    Intro to what "first person" and "third person" mean. (outline the probs of the first person) (convenience of third person vs absoluteness of first person) (explain terminology) Dominance of third person, reasons. (embarassment with first person) (division of reactions) (natural selection - those who can make the most noise) (analogy with behaviourism) Reductionism, hard line and soft line Appropriation of first person terms by reductionists.
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  42. David J. Chalmers (2011). Propositions and Attitude Ascriptions: A Fregean Account. Noûs 45 (4):595-639.score: 240.0
    When I say ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’, I seem to express a proposition. And when I say ‘Joan believes that Hesperus is Phosphorus’, I seem to ascribe to Joan an attitude to the same proposition. But what are propositions? And what is involved in ascribing propositional attitudes?
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  43. David J. Chalmers (2006). Perception and the Fall From Eden. In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press. 49--125.score: 240.0
    In the Garden of Eden, we had unmediated contact with the world. We were directly acquainted with objects in the world and with their properties. Objects were simply presented to us without causal mediation, and properties were revealed to us in their true intrinsic glory.
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  44. Timothy J. Bayne & David J. Chalmers (2003). What is the Unity of Consciousness? In Axel Cleeremans (ed.), The Unity of Consciousness. Oxford University Press.score: 240.0
    At any given time, a subject has a multiplicity of conscious experiences. A subject might simultaneously have visual experiences of a red book and a green tree, auditory experiences of birds singing, bodily sensations of a faint hunger and a sharp pain in the shoulder, the emotional experience of a certain melancholy, while having a stream of conscious thoughts about the nature of reality. These experiences are distinct from each other: a subject could experience the red book without the singing (...)
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  45. David J. Chalmers, Is the Continuum Hypothesis True, False, or Neither?score: 240.0
    Thanks to all the people who responded to my enquiry about the status of the Continuum Hypothesis. This is a really fascinating subject, which I could waste far too much time on. The following is a summary of some aspects of the feeling I got for the problems. This will be old hat to set theorists, and no doubt there are a couple of embarrassing misunderstandings, but it might be of some interest to non professionals.
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  46. David J. Chalmers, What is It Like to Be a Thermostat? (Commentary on Dan Lloyd, "What is It Like to Be a Net?&Quot;).score: 240.0
    The project that Dan Lloyd has undertaken is admirable and audacious. He has tried to boil down the substrate of information-processing that underlies conscious experience to some very simple elements, in order to gain a better understanding of the phenomenon. Some people will suspect that by considering a model as simple as a connectionist network, Dan has thrown away everything that is interesting about consciousness. Perhaps there is something to that complaint, but I will take a different tack. It seems (...)
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  47. David J. Chalmers, How Cartesian Dualism Might Have Been True.score: 240.0
    We could have been characters in a huge computer simulation. It is a familiar idea that the whole world might be simulated on a computer, and things would seem exactly the same to us (and indeed, who is to say that we are not).
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  48. David J. Chalmers (1999). Precis of The Conscious Mind. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (2):435-438.score: 240.0
  49. David J. Chalmers (1993). Self-Ascription Without Qualia: A Case-Study. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):35-36.score: 240.0
    In Section 5 of his interesting article, Goldman suggests that the consideration of imaginary cases can be valuable in the analysis of our psychological concepts. In particular, he argues that we can imagine a system that is isomorphic to us under any functional description, but which lacks qualitative mental states, such as pains and color sensations. Whether or not such a being is empirically possible, it certainly seems to be logically possible, or conceptually coherent. Goldman argues from this possibility to (...)
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  50. David J. Chalmers (2000). What is a Neural Correlate of Consciousness? In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Neural Correlates of Consciousness. MIT Press. 17--39.score: 240.0
    The search for neural correlates of consciousness (or NCCs) is arguably the cornerstone in the recent resurgence of the science of consciousness. The search poses many difficult empirical problems, but it seems to be tractable in principle, and some ingenious studies in recent years have led to considerable progress. A number of proposals have been put forward concerning the nature and location of neural correlates of consciousness. A few of these include.
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