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David K. Henderson [27]David Konstan Henderson [1]
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Profile: David Henderson (University of Nebraska, Lincoln)
Profile: David Henderson (University of Warwick)
Profile: David Henderson (University of Nebraska, Lincoln)
  1.  28
    David K. Henderson & Terence Horgan (2011). The Epistemological Spectrum: At the Interface of Cognitive Science and Conceptual Analysis. OUP Oxford.
    Henderson and Horgan set out a broad new approach to epistemology. They defend the roles of the a priori and conceptual analysis, but with an essential empirical dimension. 'Transglobal reliability' is the key to epistemic justification. The question of which cognitive processes are reliable depends on contingent facts about human capacities.
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  2. David K. Henderson (1994). Epistemic Competence and Contextualist Epistemology: Why Contextualism is Not Just the Poor Person's Coherentism. Journal of Philosophy 91 (12):627-649.
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  3.  5
    David K. Henderson (1993). Interpretation and Explanation in the Human Sciences. State University of New York Press.
    Refutes the methodological separatists who hold that the logic of explanation and testing in the human sciences is fundamentally different than in the natural sciences, and develops complementary accounts for interpretation and explanation, ...
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  4. David K. Henderson & John Greco (eds.) (2015). Epistemic Evaluation: Purposeful Epistemology. Oxford University Press Uk.
    Epistemic Evaluation aims to explore and apply a particular methodology in epistemology. The methodology is to consider the point or purpose of our epistemic evaluations, and to pursue epistemological theory in light of such matters. Call this purposeful epistemology. The idea is that considerations about the point and purpose of epistemic evaluation might fruitfully constrain epistemological theory and yield insights for epistemological reflection. Several contributions to this volume explicitly address this general methodology, or some version of it. Others focus on (...)
     
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  5.  89
    David K. Henderson (1987). The Principle of Charity and the Problem of Irrationality (Translation and the Problem of Irrationality). Synthese 73 (2):225 - 252.
    Common formulations of the principle of charity in translation seem to undermine attributions of irrationality in social scientific accounts that are otherwise unexceptionable. This I call the problem of irrationality. Here I resolve the problem of irrationality by developing two complementary views of the principle of charity. First, I develop the view (ill-developed in the literature at present) that the principle of charity is preparatory, being needed in the construction of provisional first-approximation translation manuals. These serve as the basis for (...)
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  6.  11
    David K. Henderson (1991). Philosophy of Science Association. In Richard Boyd, Philip Gasper & J. D. Trout (eds.), The Philosophy of Science. MIT Press 58--4.
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  7.  71
    Terence E. Horgan & David K. Henderson (2005). What Does It Take to Be a True Believer? Against the Opulent Ideology of Eliminative Materialism. In Mind as a Scientific Object. Oxford University Press
               Eliminative materialism, as William Lycan (this volume) tells us, is materialism plus the claim that no creature has ever had a belief, desire, intention, hope, wish, or other “folk-psychological†state. Some contemporary philosophers claim that eliminative materialism is very likely true. They sketch certain potential scenarios, for the way theory might develop in cognitive science and neuroscience, that they claim are fairly likely; and they maintain that if such scenarios (...)
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  8.  9
    David K. Henderson (2015). A Critical Perspective on a Critical Perspective on Social Science. Metascience 24 (3):457-461.
    Yoshida considers two broad understandings of how social scientists can and should “describe and explain other cultures or their aspects under concepts of rationality” . In the one corner is a family of approaches that Yoshida finds deeply flawed: cultural interpretivist approaches. Five authors representative of this family are given fine chapter length examinations: Winch, Taylor, Geertz, Sahlins, and Obeyesekere. In the other corner is Yoshida’s favored approach: critical rationalism. This approach is associated with the intellectual descendants of Karl Popper—notably (...)
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  9.  19
    David K. Henderson (1996). Simulation Theory Versus Theory Theory: A Difference Without a Difference in Explanations. Southern Journal of Philosophy 34 (S1):65-93.
  10.  27
    David K. Henderson (1987). Winch and the Constraints on Interpretation: Versions of the Principle of Charity. Southern Journal of Philosophy 25 (2):153-173.
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  11.  18
    David K. Henderson (1994). Epistemic Competence. Philosophical Papers 23 (3):139-167.
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  12.  26
    David K. Henderson (1994). Account for Macro-Level Causation. Synthese 101 (2):129-156.
    By a macro-level feature, I understand any feature that supervenes on, and is thus realized in, lower-level features. Recent discussions by Kim have suggested that such features cannot be causally relevant insofar as they are not classically reducible to lower-level features. This seems to render macro-level features causally irrelevant. I defend the causal relevance of some such features. Such features have been thought causally relevant in many examples that have underpinned philosophical work on causality. Additionally, in certain typical biological cases, (...)
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  13.  31
    David K. Henderson (1990). An Empirical Basis for Charity in Interpretation. Erkenntnis 32 (1):83 - 103.
    In codifying the methods of translation, several writers have formulated maxims that would constrain interpreters to construe their subjects as (more or less) rational speakers of the truth. Such maxims have come to be known as versions of the principle of charity. W. V. O. Quine suggests an empirical, not purely methodological, basis for his version of that principle. Recently, Stephen Stich has criticized Quine's attempt to found the principle of charity in translation on information about the probabilities of various (...)
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  14.  24
    David K. Henderson (1991). On the Testability of Psychological Generalizations (Psychological Testability). Philosophy of Science (December) 586 (December):586-606.
    Rosenberg argues that intentional generalizations in the human sciences cannot be law-like because they are not amenable to significant empirical refinement. This irrefinability is said to result from the principle that supposedly controls in intentional explanation also serving as the standard for successful interpretation. The only credible evidence bearing on such a principle would then need conform to it. I argue that psychological generalizations are refinable and can be nomic. I show how empirical refinement of psychological generalizations is possible by (...)
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  15.  21
    David K. Henderson (1995). One Naturalized Epistemological Argument Against Coherentist Accounts of Empirical Knowledge. Erkenntnis 43 (2):199 - 227.
    The argument I present here is an example of the manner in which naturalizing epistemology can help address fairly traditional epistemological issues. I develop one argument against coherentist epistemologies of empirical knowledge. In doing so, I draw on BonJour (1985), for that account seems to me to indicate the direction in which any plausible coherentist account would need to be developed, at least insofar as such accounts are to conceive of justification in terms of an agent (minimally) possessing articul able (...)
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  16.  17
    David K. Henderson (1987). A Solution to Davidson's Paradox of Irrationality. Erkenntnis 27 (3):359 - 369.
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  17. David K. Henderson & Terence Horgan (2000). The Role of the Empirical in Epistemology. University of Memphis, Dept. Of Philosophy.
     
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  18.  15
    David K. Henderson (1996). Comments on Rosenberg's Paper. Southern Journal of Philosophy 34 (S1):205-216.
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  19.  11
    David K. Henderson (1995). Simulation Theory Versus Theory Theory. Southern Journal of Philosophy 34 (Supplement):65-93.
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  20. David K. Henderson & Terence E. Horgan (2000). Simulation and Epistemic Competence. In H. Kobler & K. Steuber (eds.), Empathy and Agency: The Problem of Understanding in the Social Sciences. Westview
    Epistemology has recently come to more and more take the articulate form of an investigation into how we do, and perhaps might better, manage the cognitive chores of producing, modifying, and generally maintaining belief-sets with a view to having a true and systematic understanding of the world. While this approach has continuities with earlier philosophy, it admittedly makes a departure from the tradition of epistemology as first philosophy.
     
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  21.  9
    David K. Henderson (1989). The Role and Limitations of Rationalizing Explanation in the Social Sciences. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 19 (2):267 - 287.
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  22.  3
    David Konstan Henderson, Ralph Rosen, Jeffrey Rusten & W. Niall (unknown). The Birth of Comedy. The Classical Review 62 (2).
  23.  3
    David K. Henderson (1991). Rationalizing Explanation, Normative Principles, and Descriptive Generalizations. Behavior and Philosophy 19 (1):1 - 20.
  24. David K. Henderson (2014). Brennan, Geoffrey; Eriksson, Lina; Goodin, Robert E.; and Southwood, Nicholas.Explaining Norms.Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. Pp. 290. $55.00. [REVIEW] Ethics 124 (4):882-888.
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  25. David K. Henderson (1994). Epistemic Competence And Contextualist Epistemology: Why Contextualism Is Not Just The Poor Person's Coherentism. Journal of Philosophy 91 (12):627-649.
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  26. David K. Henderson (1991). On the Testability of Psychological Generalizations. Philosophy of Science 58 (4):586-606.
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  27. David K. Henderson & Terence Horgan (2011). The Epistemological Spectrum: At the Interface of Cognitive Science and Conceptual Analysis. Oxford University Press Uk.
    David Henderson and Terence Horgan set out a broad new approach to epistemology, which they see as a mixed discipline, having both a priori and empirical elements. They defend the roles of a priori reflection and conceptual analysis in philosophy, but their revisionary account of these philosophical methods allows them a subtle but essential empirical dimension. They espouse a dual-perspective position which they call iceberg epistemology, and introduce the notion of transglobal reliability as the mark of the cognitive processes that (...)
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  28. Terence E. Horgan & David K. Henderson (2005). What Does It Take to Be a True Believer? Against the Opulent Ideology of Eliminative Materialism. In Christina E. Erneling & D. Johnson (eds.), Mind As a Scientific Object. Oxford University Press
     
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