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Profile: David Michael Kaplan (Macquarie University)
Profile: David Michael Kaplan (Washington University in St. Louis)
Profile: David Kaplan (University of California, Los Angeles)
  1. Joseph Almog, John Perry, Howard K. Wettstein & David Kaplan (eds.) (1989). Themes From Kaplan. Oxford University Press, USA.
    This anthology of essays on the work of David Kaplan, a leading contemporary philosopher of language, sprang from a conference, "Themes from Kaplan," organized by the Center for the Study of Language and Information at Stanford University.
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  2. David Kaplan (1977/1989). Demonstratives. In Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.), Themes From Kaplan. Oxford University Press 481-563.
  3. David Michael Kaplan & Carl F. Craver (2011). The Explanatory Force of Dynamical and Mathematical Models in Neuroscience: A Mechanistic Perspective. Philosophy of Science 78 (4):601-627.
    We argue that dynamical and mathematical models in systems and cognitive neuro- science explain (rather than redescribe) a phenomenon only if there is a plausible mapping between elements in the model and elements in the mechanism for the phe- nomenon. We demonstrate how this model-to-mechanism-mapping constraint, when satisfied, endows a model with explanatory force with respect to the phenomenon to be explained. Several paradigmatic models including the Haken-Kelso-Bunz model of bimanual coordination and the difference-of-Gaussians model of visual receptive fields are (...)
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  4. David M. Kaplan & William Bechtel (2011). Dynamical Models: An Alternative or Complement to Mechanistic Explanations? Topics in Cognitive Science 3 (2):438-444.
    Abstract While agreeing that dynamical models play a major role in cognitive science, we reject Stepp, Chemero, and Turvey's contention that they constitute an alternative to mechanistic explanations. We review several problems dynamical models face as putative explanations when they are not grounded in mechanisms. Further, we argue that the opposition of dynamical models and mechanisms is a false one and that those dynamical models that characterize the operations of mechanisms overcome these problems. By briefly considering examples involving the generation (...)
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  5. David Kaplan (1968). Quantifying In. Synthese 19 (1-2):178-214.
  6. David Kaplan (1990). Words. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 64:93 - 119.
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  7.  94
    David Michael Kaplan (2012). How to Demarcate the Boundaries of Cognition. Biology and Philosophy 27 (4):545-570.
    Advocates of extended cognition argue that the boundaries of cognition span brain, body, and environment. Critics maintain that cognitive processes are confined to a boundary centered on the individual. All participants to this debate require a criterion for distinguishing what is internal to cognition from what is external. Yet none of the available proposals are completely successful. I offer a new account, the mutual manipulability account, according to which cognitive boundaries are determined by relationships of mutual manipulability between the properties (...)
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  8.  76
    David Michael Kaplan (2011). Explanation and Description in Computational Neuroscience. Synthese 183 (3):339-373.
    The central aim of this paper is to shed light on the nature of explanation in computational neuroscience. I argue that computational models in this domain possess explanatory force to the extent that they describe the mechanisms responsible for producing a given phenomenon—paralleling how other mechanistic models explain. Conceiving computational explanation as a species of mechanistic explanation affords an important distinction between computational models that play genuine explanatory roles and those that merely provide accurate descriptions or predictions of phenomena. It (...)
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  9. David Kaplan (1979). On the Logic of Demonstratives. Journal of Philosophical Logic 8 (1):81 - 98.
  10. David Kaplan (1975). How to Russell a Frege-Church. Journal of Philosophy 72 (19):716-729.
  11. David Kaplan (2005). Reading ‘on Denoting’ on its Centenary. Mind 114 (456):933-1003.
    Part 1 sets out the logical/semantical background to ‘On Denoting’, including an exposition of Russell's views in Principles of Mathematics, the role and justification of Frege's notorious Axiom V, and speculation about how the search for a solution to the Contradiction might have motivated a new treatment of denoting. Part 2 consists primarily of an extended analysis of Russell's views on knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description, in which I try to show that the discomfiture between Russell's semantical and (...)
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  12. Alex Rosenberg & David Michael Kaplan (2005). How to Reconcile Physicalism and Antireductionism About Biology. Philosophy of Science 72 (1):43-68.
    Physicalism and antireductionism are the ruling orthodoxy in the philosophy of biology. But these two theses are difficult to reconcile. Merely embracing an epistemic antireductionism will not suffice, as both reductionists and antireductionists accept that given our cognitive interests and limitations, non-molecular explanations may not be improved, corrected or grounded in molecular ones. Moreover, antireductionists themselves view their claim as a metaphysical or ontological one about the existence of facts molecular biology cannot identify, express, or explain. However, this is tantamount (...)
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  13.  6
    David Michael Kaplan (forthcoming). Moving Parts: The Natural Alliance Between Dynamical and Mechanistic Modeling Approaches. Biology and Philosophy:1-30.
    Recently, it has been provocatively claimed that dynamical modeling approaches signal the emergence of a new explanatory framework distinct from that of mechanistic explanation. This paper rejects this proposal and argues that dynamical explanations are fully compatible with, even naturally construed as, instances of mechanistic explanations. Specifically, it is argued that the mathematical framework of dynamics provides a powerful descriptive scheme for revealing temporal features of activities in mechanisms and plays an explanatory role to the extent it is deployed for (...)
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  14.  29
    David Kaplan (1973). Bob and Carol and Ted and Alice. In Jaakko Hintikka (ed.), Approaches to Natural Language. D. Reidel Publishing 490--518.
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  15. David Kaplan (1978). Dthat. In Peter Cole (ed.), Syntax and Semantics. Academic Press 221--243.
  16.  46
    David Kaplan (2011). An Idea of Donnellan. In Joseph Almog & Paolo Leonardi (eds.), Having In Mind: The Philosophy of Keith Donnellan. Oxford, but (C) David Kaplan 122-175.
    This is a story about three of my favorite philosophers—Donnellan, Russell, and Frege—about how Donnellan’s concept of having in mind relates to ideas of the others, and especially about an aspect of Donnellan’s concept that has been insufficiently discussed: how this epistemic state can be transmitted from one person to another.
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  17. David Kaplan (1989). Afterthoughts. In J. Almog, J. Perry & H. Wettstein (eds.), Themes From Kaplan. Oxford University Press 565-614.
  18.  56
    David M. Kaplan (2009). What Things Still Don't Do. [REVIEW] Human Studies 32 (2):229 - 240.
    This paper praises and criticizes Peter-Paul Verbeek’s What Things Do ( 2006 ). The four things that Verbeek does well are: (1) remind us of the importance of technological things; (2) bring Karl Jaspers into the conversation on technology; (3) explain how technology “co-shapes” experience by reading Bruno Latour’s actor-network theory in light of Don Ihde’s post-phenomenology; (4) develop a material aesthetics of design. The three things that Verbeek does not do well are: (1) analyze the material conditions in which (...)
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  19.  11
    Wayne Wu, David Kaplan, Pete Mandik & Thomas Schenk, Symposium on W. Wu, "Against Division". Mind and Language Symposia at the Brains Blog.
  20. David Kaplan (2011). Words on Words. Journal of Philosophy 108 (9):504-529.
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  21.  29
    David Kaplan (1979). On the Logic of Demonstratives. Journal of Philosophical Logic 8 (1):81-98.
  22.  37
    David Kaplan (1999). What is Russell's Theory of Descriptions? In A. . D. Irvine (ed.), Bertrand Russell: Critical Assessments. Routledge 151--62.
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  23.  31
    Kit Fine, David Kaplan, D. A. Martin, Derk Pereboom, David Sanson & Luca Struble (2009). Production and Necessity. Philosophical Review 118 (2).
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  24.  62
    Rolf Eberle, David Kaplan & Richard Montague (1961). Hempel and Oppenheim on Explanation. Philosophy of Science 28 (4):418-428.
    Hempel and Oppenheim, in their paper 'The Logic of Explanation', have offered an analysis of the notion of scientific explanation. The present paper advances considerations in the light of which their analysis seems inadequate. In particular, several theorems are proved with roughly the following content: between almost any theory and almost any singular sentence, certain relations of explainability hold.
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  25.  16
    Gaurav H. Patel, David M. Kaplan & Lawrence H. Snyder (forthcoming). Topographic Organization in the Brain: Searching for General Principles. Trends in Cognitive Sciences.
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  26. David M. Kaplan (2009). How to Read Technology Critically. In Jan Kyrre Berg Olsen Friis, Evan Selinger & Søren Riis (eds.), New Waves in Philosophy of Technology. Palgrave Macmillan
     
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  27. David Kaplan (1964). Foundations of Intensional Logic. Dissertation, UCLA
  28.  70
    David Kaplan (1961). Explanation Revisited. Philosophy of Science 28 (4):429-436.
    In 'Hempel and Oppenheim on Explanation', (see preceding article) Eberle, Kaplan, and Montague criticize the analysis of explanation offered by Hempel and Oppenheim in their 'Studies in the Logic of Explanation'. These criticisms are shown to be related to the fact that Hempel and Oppenheim's analysis fails to satisfy simultaneously three newly proposed criteria of adequacy for any analysis of explanation. A new analysis is proposed which satisfies these criteria and thus is immune to the criticisms brought against the earlier (...)
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  29.  1
    David M. Kaplan (2003). Ricoeur's Critical Theory. State University of New York Press.
    The first book-length treatment of Paul Ricoeur's conception of philosophy as critical theory.
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  30.  16
    Carl F. Craver & David M. Kaplan (2011). Towards a Mechanistic Philosophy of Neuroscience. In Steven French & Juha Saatsi (eds.), Continuum Companion to the Philosophy of Science. Continuum 268.
  31.  2
    David Kaplan (1969). Review: Newton Garver, Varieties of Use and Mention. [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 34 (1):145-145.
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  32.  0
    David M. Kaplan (2006). Paul Ricoeur and the Philosophy of Technology. Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy 16 (1/2):42-56.
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  33.  42
    David Michael Kaplan (2012). Perception and Cognition: Essays in the Philosophy of Psychology. Philosophical Psychology 25 (3):463-468.
    Philosophical Psychology, Volume 0, Issue 0, Page 1-6, Ahead of Print.
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  34.  62
    David Kaplan (1971). Meeting of the Association for Symbolic Logic Los Angeles 1971. Journal of Symbolic Logic 36 (3):581-592.
  35.  14
    David M. Kaplan (2013). The Complex Interplay Between Three-Dimensional Egocentric and Allocentric Spatial Representation. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (5):553-554.
    Jeffery et al. characterize the egocentric/allocentric distinction as discrete. But paradoxically, much of the neural and behavioral evidence they adduce undermines a discrete distinction. More strikingly, their positive proposal reflects a more complex interplay between egocentric and allocentric coding than they acknowledge. Properly interpreted, their proposal about three-dimensional spatial representation contributes to recent work on embodied cognition.
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  36. David Kaplan (1989). Demonstratives, Typescript, UCLA 1977;(Re) Printed in Almog, J., Perry, J., Wettstein, H. In John Perry, J. Almog & Howard K. Wettstein (eds.), Themes From Kaplan. Oxford University Press
     
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  37.  9
    David Kaplan (1966). Review: Saul A. Kripke, Semantical Analysis of Modal Logic I. Normal Modal Propositional Calculi. [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 31 (1):120-122.
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  38.  27
    David M. Kaplan (2005). What's Wrong With Genetically Modified Food? Journal of Philosophical Research 30 (Supplement):69-80.
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  39. David Kaplan (1973). Bob and Ted and Carol and Alice. In Jaakko Hintikka (ed.), Approaches to Natural Language. D. Reidel Publishing
  40.  25
    David Kaplan (2007). What's Wrong with Functional Foods? Journal of Philosophical Research 32 (Supplement):177-187.
    A “functional food” is a food-based product that provides a demonstrable physiological benefit beyond its dietary or nutritional value. This class of foods for specific health uses are designed to assist in the prevention or treatment of disease, or to enhance and improve human capacities. They include products like vitamin-fortified grains, energy bars, low-fat or low-sodium foods, and sports drinks. Three sets of concerns about functional foods deserve attention. 1) Their health benefits are greatly exaggerated and, in many cases, non-existent; (...)
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  41.  42
    David M. Kaplan (2007). Paul Ricoeur and the Nazis. Research in Phenomenology 37 (2):219-236.
    Richard Wolin questions the connection between the philosophy and politics of Paul Ricoeur to make three charges: 1) Ricoeur's version of hermeneutics slides into a relativism of incommensurable perspectives; 2) Ricoeur's "covert agenda" in his recent work, Memory, History, Forgetting is to come to terms with the regrettable choices he made in his youth; 3) Ricoeur left us a written record of his pro-Vichy sympathies that raise questions about the political implications of hermeneutics. Each claim is, however, far from true. (...)
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  42. David Kaplan (1967). Transworld Heir Lines. In Michael J. Loux (ed.), The Possible and the Actual. Cornell University Press
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  43.  15
    Herbert Feigl, Carl G. Hempel, Richard C. Jeffrey, W. V. Quine, A. Shimony, Yehoshua Bar-Hillel, Herbert G. Bohnert, Robert S. Cohen, Charles Hartshorne, David Kaplan, Charles Morris, Maria Reichenbach & Wolfgang Stegmüller (1970). Homage to Rudolf Carnap. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1970.
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  44.  4
    David Kaplan (1967). Review: R. A. Sharpe, Validity and the Paradox of Confirmation. [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 32 (2):251-251.
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  45.  4
    Rani George & David Kaplan (1998). A Structural Model of Parent and Teacher Influences on Science Attitudes of Eighth Graders: Evidence From NELS: 88. Science Education 82 (1):93-109.
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  46.  1
    David Kaplan (1969). Review: Ronald Jager, Russell's Denoting Complex. [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 34 (1):144-144.
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  47.  9
    David M. Kaplan (2013). What's Wrong with Artificial Additives? The Philosophers' Magazine 61 (61):87-93.
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  48. David Kaplan & Richard Montague (1960). ``A Paradox Regained&Quot. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 1:79-90.
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  49.  2
    David Kaplan (1969). Review: John R. Searle, Russell's Objections to Frege's Theory of Sense and Reference. [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 34 (1):142-143.
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  50.  13
    David Kaplan (2004). Book Review: What Makes Us Think?: A Neuroscientist and a Philosopher Argue About Ethics, Human Nature, and the Brain. [REVIEW] Journal of Moral Philosophy 1 (1):115-118.
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