18 found
Sort by:
  1. David L. Thompson, What, If Anything, is Represented? Objects in Their Worlds.
    Up to David L. Thompson's Homepage Outline by Section: I INTRODUCTION II A COLOURED ILLUSTRATION III THE NATURE OF WORLDS #1. Generalization from colour to all perceived #2. Chess as a model world. #3. Worlds depend on supervenience #4. Supervenience #5. Supervenience applied to worlds #6. Five dependencies #6. Interrelationships between the five #7. The enactive approach to transformation #8. The transformation of worlds #9. A world is a condensed history #10. A shared world defined by individuals #11. Summary VI (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. David L. Thompson, A Brief History of Mind.
    My aim is to give an overview of what minds are and how they came to be. Minds are a product of billions of years of evolution so it is a daunting task to summarize this history in 45 minutes. My attempt will involve vast oversimplifications, highly speculative and condensed “just so” stories, and a great amount of hand waving. In particular, I will presuppose the theory of evolution and will not attempt to either explain it or justify it.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. David L. Thompson, Body as the Unity of Action.
    About thirty years ago, I suffered from severe back pain. For some weeks I lay in a body cast, dazed by pain-killers and muscle-relaxants. When I was recovering, I decided one day that I needed exercise. Very gingerly I got on my bike and, feeling rather sorry for myself, rode slowly up Mundy Pond Road. I drew abreast of a group of boys going home from school for lunch. One of them was holding a stick, and he suddenly turned and (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. David L. Thompson, Thought and Image.
    "Imagination", says Aristotle, "is the process by which we say that an image is presented to us."1 While the OED accepts at least five other entries for the word -- including, for instance, poetic genius -- its first entry refers to the production of mental images. So in this paper, the one and only way I will use the term imagination is in reference to images.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. David L. Thompson, The Body As the Active Principle in the Constitution of Perceptual Space.
    My thesis is that modern neurological discoveries overthrow the classical dualism which assigns all the constitutive activity of perception to the mind and leaves the body a purely passive role. The paper is in four parts: first I will present the traditional theory, using Berkeley's concept of activity as the key; then I will summarize the relevant aspects of contemporary neurology; third, the incompatibility of these two approaches will be discussed; finally, I will propose that we must reject the materialistic (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. David L. Thompson, Constructing Responsibility.
    Two twelve-year old boys, Jerry and David, break into a shed, just for the fun of it. Jerry steals a hammer. David takes a screwdriver. Afterwards, Jerry continues to steal things and ends up as a criminal, spending time in jail. David doesn't steal again but in contrast becomes an honest person. He pursues an academic career and ends up as a professor of philosophy.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. David L. Thompson, Intuition by Whom? Epistemic Responsibility and the Role of the Self.
    Intuition. Originally an alleged direct relation, analogous to visual seeing, between the mind and something abstract and so not accessible to the senses. What are intuited (which can be derivatively called 'intuitions') may be abstract objects, like numbers or properties, or certain truths regarded as not accessible to investigation through the senses or calculation; the mere short circuiting of such processes in 'bank managers intuition' would not count as intuition for philosophy. Kant talks of our intuiting space and time, in (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. David L. Thompson, What Makes Us Essentially Different?
    Difference and sameness -- or identity -- are correlated concepts: to understand one is to understand the other. I will distinguish two accounts of sameness and difference: first, an essentialist account of sameness against which an understanding of difference is presented as derivative; secondly, a contextualist account which relates both sameness and difference to a more fundamental horizon or context. I will contrast two kinds of horizons, synchronic and diachronic, and within diachronic contexts I will discuss the biological horizon and (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. David L. Thompson (2003). Are There Really Appearances? Dennett and Husserl on Seemings and Presence. In Richard Feist & William Sweet (eds.), Husserl and Stein. The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy.
  10. Andrew Brook, Don Ross & David L. Thompson (eds.) (2000). Dennett's Philosophy: A Comprehensive Assessment. MIT Press.
    The essays in this collection step back to ask: Do the complex components of Dennett’s work on intentionality, consciousness, evolution, and ethics themselves ..
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Don Ross, Andrew Brook & David L. Thompson (eds.) (2000). Dennett's Philosophy: A Comprehensive Assessment. MIT Press.
    The essays in this collection step back to ask: Do the complex components of Dennett's work on intentionality, consciousness, evolution, and ethics themselves ...
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. David L. Thompson (2000). Phenomenology and Heterophenomenology: Husserl and Dennett on Reality and Science. In Andrew Brook, Don Ross & David L. Thompson (eds.), Dennett's Philosophy: A Comprehensive Assessment. MIT Press.
  13. David L. Thompson (1993). Charles D. Laughlin, Jr, John McManus and Eugene G. D'Aquili, Brain, Symbol and Experience Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 13 (5):241-244.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. David L. Thompson, The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness.
    Outline by Section: I. INTRODUCTION: METHOD OF PHENOMENOLOGY II. REDUCTION FROM DOGMAS III. EXAMPLES OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL DESCRIPTION OF A. SENTENCE B. MELODY C. DIAGRAM OF TIME IV. MODIFICATIONS AS MODES OF TEMPORAL STRUCTURE V. RETENTION VI. CONSTITUTION OF EXTERNAL TIME Time present and time past.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. David L. Thompson (1987). AL Wigan, The Duality of the Mind: Proved by the Structure, Functions, and Diseases of the Brain and by the Phenomena of Mental Derangement, and Shown to Be Essential to Moral Responsibility (Ed. JE Bogan) Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 7 (1):43-45.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. David L. Thompson (1986). Intentionality and Causality in John Searle. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 16 (March):83-97.
    Intentionality, as Brentano originally introduced the term in modern philosophy, was meant to provide a distinctive characteristic definitively separating the mental from the physical.(1) Mental states have an intrinsic relationship to an object, to that which they are "about." Physical entities just are what they are, they cannot, by their very essence, refer to anything, they have no "outreach", as one might put it. Mental states have, as it were, an incomplete essence, they cannot exist at all unless they are (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. David L. Thompson, On Naturalizing Intentionality.
    Outline by Section: INTRODUCTION HUSSERL'S TRANSCENDENTAL POSITION Brentano's Notion of Intentionality Frege's Notion of Sinn Husserl's Transcendental Position Intentional Relations are not Causal. Realism is Wrong, Objects must be Meaningful Psychological States are Empirical. Meanings cannot be In-Themselves, but always for an Ego SEARLE'S THEORY OF INTENTIONALITY CONFRONTATION OF SEARLE'S THEORY WITH THE FOUR THESES Searle Intentionalizes or Trivializes Causation Searle is still a Realist Visual Experience is a Thing-In-Itself Intentional States Presented as Stopping Points CONCLUSION.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. David L. Thompson (1965). Can a Machine Be Conscious? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 16 (May):33-43.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation