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  1. David K. Lewis (1973). Counterfactuals. Blackwell Publishers.
    Counterfactuals is David Lewis' forceful presentation of and sustained argument for a particular view about propositions which express contrary to fact conditionals, including his famous defense of realism about possible worlds and his theory of laws of nature.
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  2. David K. Lewis (1986). On the Plurality of Worlds. Blackwell Publishers.
    This book is a defense of modal realism; the thesis that our world is but one of a plurality of worlds, and that the individuals that inhabit our world are only ...
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  3.  87
    David Lewis (1969). Convention: A Philosophical Study. Harvard University Press.
    _ Convention_ was immediately recognized as a major contribution to the subject and its significance has remained undiminished since its first publication in 1969. Lewis analyzes social conventions as regularities in the resolution of recurring coordination problems-situations characterized by interdependent decision processes in which common interests are at stake. Conventions are contrasted with other kinds of regularity, and conventions governing systems of communication are given special attention.
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  4. David Lewis (1996). Elusive Knowledge. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):549 – 567.
    David Lewis (1941-2001) was Class of 1943 University Professor of Philosophy at Princeton University. His contributions spanned philosophical logic, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, philosophy of science, metaphysics, and epistemology. In On the Plurality of Worlds, he defended his challenging metaphysical position, "modal realism." He was also the author of the books Convention, Counterfactuals, Parts of Classes, and several volumes of collected papers.
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  5.  89
    David Lewis (1991). Parts of Classes. Blackwell.
  6. David K. Lewis (1983). Philosophical Papers. Oxford University Press.
    This is the second volume of philosophical essays by one of the most innovative and influential philosophers now writing in English. Containing thirteen papers in all, the book includes both new essays and previously published papers, some of them with extensive new postscripts reflecting Lewis's current thinking. The papers in Volume II focus on causation and several other closely related topics, including counterfactual and indicative conditionals, the direction of time, subjective and objective probability, causation, explanation, perception, free will, and rational (...)
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  7. David Lewis (1983). New Work for a Theory of Universals. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (December):343-377.
  8. David Lewis (1986). Philosophical Papers Vol. II. Oxford University Press.
  9.  89
    David K. Lewis (1999). Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology. Cambridge, Uk ;Cambridge University Press.
    This volume is devoted to Lewis's work in metaphysics and epistemology. Topics covered include properties, ontology, possibility, truthmaking, probability, the mind-body problem, vision, belief, and knowledge. The purpose of this collection, and the volumes that precede and follow it, is to disseminate more widely the work of an eminent and influential contemporary philosopher. The volume will serve as a useful work of reference for teachers and students of philosophy.
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  10. David Lewis (1994). Humean Supervenience Debugged. Mind 103 (412):473--490.
    Tn this paper I explore and to an extent defend HS. The main philosophical challenges to HS come from philosophical views that say that nomic concepts-laws, chance, and causation-denote features of the world that fail to supervene on non-nomic features. Lewis rejects these views and has labored mightily to construct HS accounts of nomic concepts. His account of laws is fundamental to his program, since his accounts of the other nomic notions rely on it. Recently, a number of philosophers have (...)
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  11. David Lewis (1993). Many, but Almost One. In Keith Cambell, John Bacon & Lloyd Reinhardt (eds.), Ontology, Causality, and Mind: Essays on the Philosophy of D. M. Armstrong. Cambridge University Press 23-38.
  12. David Lewis (1973). Causation. Journal of Philosophy 70 (17):556-567.
  13. David Lewis (1979). Scorekeeping in a Language Game. Journal of Philosophical Logic 8 (1):339--359.
  14. David Lewis (2000). Causation as Influence. Journal of Philosophy 97 (4):182-197.
  15. David Lewis (1979). Counterfactual Dependence and Time's Arrow. Noûs 13 (4):455-476.
  16. David Lewis (1997). Finkish Dispositions. Philosophical Quarterly 47 (187):143-158.
    Many years ago, C.B. Martin drew our attention to the possibility of ‘finkish’ dispositions: dispositions which, if put to the test would not be manifested, but rather would disappear. Thus if x if finkishly disposed to give response r to stimulus s, it is not so that if x were subjected to stimulus r, x would give response z; so finkish dispositions afford a counter‐example to the simplest conditional analysis of dispositions. Martin went on to suggest that finkish dispositions required (...)
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  17. David Lewis (1970). An Argument for the Identity Theory. Journal of Philosophy 63 (2):17-25.
  18. David Lewis (1979). Attitudes de Dicto and de Se. Philosophical Review 88 (4):513-543.
    t f I hear the patter of little feet around the house, I expect Bruce. What I expect is a cat, a particular cat. If I heard such a patter in another house, I might expect a cat but no particular cat. What I expect then seems to be a Meinongian incomplete cat. I expect winter, expect stormy weather, expect to shovel snow, expect fatigue — a season, a phenomenon, an activity, a state. I expect that someday mankind will inhabit (...)
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  19. Frank Jackson, Graham Priest & David Lewis (2004). How Many Lives Has Schrodinger's Cat? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1):3-22.
  20. David Lewis (1984). Putnam's Paradox. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62 (3):221 – 236.
  21. David Lewis (1972). Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (December):249-58.
  22. David Lewis (2001). Truthmaking and Difference-Making. Noûs 35 (4):602–615.
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  23. David Lewis (2009). Ramseyan Humility. In David Braddon-Mitchell & Robert Nola (eds.), Conceptual Analysis and Philosophical Naturalism. MIT Press 203-222.
  24. David Lewis (1970). How to Define Theoretical Terms. Journal of Philosophy 67 (13):427-446.
  25. David Lewis (1978). Truth in Fiction. American Philosophical Quarterly 15 (1):37--46.
    It is advisable to treat some sorts of discourse about fiction with the aid of an intensional operator "in such-And-Such fiction...." the operator may appear either explicitly or tacitly. It may be analyzed in terms of similarity of worlds, As follows: "in the fiction f, A" means that a is true in those of the worlds where f is told as known fact rather than fiction that differ least from our world, Or from the belief worlds of the community in (...)
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  26. David Lewis (1981). Are We Free to Break the Laws? Theoria 47 (3):113-21.
    I insist that I was able to raise my hand, and I acknowledge that a law would have been broken had I done so, but I deny that I am therefore able to break a law. To uphold my instance of soft determinism, I need not claim any incredible powers. To uphold the compatibilism that I actually believe, I need not claim that such powers are even possible. My incompatibilist opponent is a creature of fiction, but he has his prototypes (...)
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  27. David Lewis (2001). Sleeping Beauty: Reply to Elga. Analysis 61 (3):171–76.
  28. Rae Langton & David Lewis (1998). Defining 'Intrinsic'. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (2):333-345.
    Something could be round even if it were the only thing in the universe, unaccompanied by anything distinct from itself. Jaegwon Kim once suggested that we define an intrinsic property as one that can belong to something unaccompanied. Wrong: unaccompaniment itself is not intrinsic, yet it can belong to something unaccompanied. But there is a better Kim-style definition. Say that P is independent of accompaniment iff four different cases are possible: something accompanied may have P or lack P, something unaccompanied (...)
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  29. David Lewis (2004). Void and Object. In John Collins, Ned Hall & L. A. Paul (eds.), Causation and Counterfactuals. MIT Press 277-290.
    The void is deadly. If you were cast into a void, it would cause you to die in just a few minutes. It would suck the air from your lungs. It would boil your blood. It would drain the warmth from your body. And it would inflate enclosures in your body until they burst}.
     
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  30. Michael Smith, David Lewis & Mark Johnston (1989). Dispositional Theories of Value. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 63:89-174.
  31. David Lewis (1970). General Semantics. Synthese 22 (1-2):18--67.
  32. David Lewis (1980). Index, Context, and Content. In Stig Kanger & Sven Öhman (eds.), Philosophy and Grammar. Reidel 79-100.
  33. David Lewis (2002). Tensing the Copula. Mind 111 (441):1-14.
    A solution to the problem of intrinsic change for enduring things should meet three conditions. It should not replace monadic intrinsic properties by relations. It should not replace the having simpliciter of properties by standing in some relation to them . It should not rely on an unexplained notion of having an intrinsic property at a time. Johnston's solution satisfies the first condition at the expense of the second. Haslanger's solution satisfies the first and second at the expense of the (...)
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  34. David K. Lewis (1968). Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic. Journal of Philosophy 65 (5):113-126.
  35. David Lewis (1976). The Paradoxes of Time Travel. American Philosophical Quarterly 13 (2):145-152.
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  36. David Lewis (1976). Probabilities of Conditionals and Conditional Probabilities. Philosophical Review 85 (3):297-315.
  37. David Lewis & Stephanie Lewis (1970). Holes. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 48 (2):206 – 212.
  38. David Lewis (1994). Reduction of Mind. In Samuel Guttenplan (ed.), Companion to the Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell 412-431.
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  39. David Lewis (1975). Languages and Language. In Keith Gunderson (ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science. University of Minnesota Press 3-35.
  40.  8
    David Lewis & Rae Langton (2014). Defining ‘Intrinsic’. In Robert M. Francescotti (ed.), Companion to Intrinsic Properties. De Gruyter 17-30.
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  41. David Lewis (1981). Causal Decision Theory. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 59 (1):5 – 30.
    Newcomb's problem and similar cases show the need to incorporate causal distinctions into the theory of rational decision; the usual noncausal decision theory, though simpler, does not always give the right answers. I give my own version of causal decision theory, compare it with versions offered by several other authors, and suggest that the versions have more in common than meets the eye.
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  42. David Lewis (1976). Survival and Identity. In Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (ed.), The Identities of Persons. University of California Press 17-40.
  43. David Lewis (1980). A Subjectivist's Guide to Objective Chance. In Richard C. Jeffrey (ed.), Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability. University of California Press 83--132.
  44. David Lewis (1980). Mad Pain and Martian Pain. In Ned Block (ed.), Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology. Harvard University Press 216-222.
  45.  93
    David Lewis (1972). Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (3):249-258.
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  46. David Lewis (1990). What Experience Teaches. In William G. Lycan (ed.), Mind and Cognition. Blackwell 29--57.
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  47. David Lewis (1996). ``Elusive Knowledge&Quot. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74:549-567.
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  48. David Lewis (1986). Causal Explanation. In Philosophical Papers Vol. Ii. Oxford University Press 214-240.
  49. David Lewis (1974). Radical Interpretation. Synthese 27 (July-August):331-344.
    What knowledge would suffice to yield an interpretation of an arbitrary utterance of a language when such knowledge is based on evidence plausibly available to a nonspeaker of that language? it is argued that it is enough to know a theory of truth for the language and that the theory satisfies tarski's 'convention t' and that it gives an optimal fit to data about sentences held true, Under specified conditions, By native speakers.
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  50. David Lewis (1986). Against Structural Universals. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64 (1):25 – 46.
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