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Profile: David Liebesman (Boston University)
  1. David Liebesman (2014). Necessarily, Sherlock Holmes Is Not a Person. Analytic Philosophy 54 (4):306-318.
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  2. David Liebesman (2014). We Do Not Count by Identity. :1-22.
    We do not count by identity. . ???aop.label???. doi: 10.1080/00048402.2014.936023.
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  3. David Liebesman (2013). Converse and Identity. Dialectica 67 (2):137-155.
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  4. David Liebesman (2011). Causation and the Canberra Plan. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (2):232-242.
    David Lewis has a general recipe for analysis: the Canberra Plan. His analyses of mind, color, and value all proceed according to the plan. What is curious is that his analysis of causation – one of his seminal analyses – doesn't. It doesn't and according to Lewis it can't. Lewis has two objections against using the Canberra Plan to analyze causation. After presenting Lewis' objections I argue that they both fail. I then draw some lessons from their failure.
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  5. David Liebesman (2011). Simple Generics. Noûs 45 (3):409-442.
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  6. David Liebesman (2010). Jeffrey C. King, The Nature and Structure of Content. [REVIEW] Philosophical Review 119 (2):246-250.
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  7. David Liebesman & Matti Eklund (2007). Sider on Existence. Noûs 41 (3):519–528.
    In (2001), (2003), and elsewhere, Ted Sider presents two arguments concerning the existential quantifier which are justly central to the recent discussion of metaontology. What we will call Sider's indeterminacy argument is an attempted reductio of the suggestion that the existential quantifier might be semantically indeterminate. What we will call Sider's naturalness argument is an argument for the claim that the semantic value of the existential quantifier is the most eligible existence-like meaning there is, à la David Lewis' eligibility theory (...)
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