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David M. Armstrong [59]David Malet Armstrong [8]
  1. David M. Armstrong (2010). The Causal Theory of Properties. Philosophical Topics 26 (1/2):25-37.
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  2. David M. Armstrong (2009). Questions About States of Affairs. In M. Reicher (ed.), States of Affairs. Ontos Verlag. 30--39.
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  3. David M. Armstrong (2007). &Quot;how Do Particulars Stand to Universals?&Quot;. In Dean W. Zimmerman (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics. Oup Oxford.
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  4. David M. Armstrong (2006). Minimal Consciousness. In Maureen Eckert (ed.), Theories of Mind: An Introductory Reader. Rowman and Littlefield. 213.
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  5. David M. Armstrong (2005). Four Disputes About Properties. Synthese 144 (3):1-12.
    In considering the nature of properties four controversial decisions must be made. (1) Are properties universals or tropes? (2) Are properties attributes of particulars, or are particulars just bundles of properties? (3) Are properties categorical (qualitative) in nature, or are they powers? (4) If a property attaches to a particular, is this predication contingent, or is it necessary? These choices seem to be in a great degree independent of each other. The author indicates his own choices.
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  6. David M. Armstrong (2004). In Defence of the Cognitivist Theory of Perception. Harvard Review of Philosophy 12 (1):19-26.
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  7. David M. Armstrong (2004). Mental Concepts: Casual Analysis. In R. L. Gregory (ed.), The Oxford Companion to the Mind. Oxford University Press. 572--574.
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  8. David M. Armstrong (2004). Théorie combinatoire revue et corrigée. In Jean-Maurice Monnoyer (ed.), La Structure du Monde. Vrin, Paris. 185--198.
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  9. David M. Armstrong (2003). Resemblance Nominalism: A Solution to the Problem of Universals. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (2):285-286.
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  10. David M. Armstrong (2002). Vérifacteurs pour des vérités modales. Revue de Métaphysique Et de Morale (2):491-507.
    Revenant sur la question des vérifacteurs, D. Armstrong demande ici d'abord comment concilier le maximalisme (toute vérité a un vérifacteur) et la relation de nécessitation (toute vérité contingente peut servir de vérifacteur pour une vérité nécessaire quelconque). L'A. examine quel sens métaphysique donner à la notion d'implication, et s'il y a un sens à admettre une contingence de re. Il traite à ce niveau des possibilités pures, examine le cas des aliens chez <span class='Hi'>David</span> Lewis, puis pose la question de (...)
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  11. David M. Armstrong (2001). Review of Lewis (1999). [REVIEW] Philosophical Review 110 (1):77-79.
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  12. David M. Armstrong (2000). The 'Thermometer' View of Knowledge. In Sven Bernecker & Fred I. Dretske (eds.), Knowledge: Readings in Contemporary Epistemology. Oup Oxford.
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  13. David M. Armstrong (1999). Reply to Ellis. In Howard Sankey (ed.), Causation and Laws of Nature. Kluwer. 43--48.
  14. David M. Armstrong (1999). The Mind-Body Problem: An Opinionated Introduction. Westview Press.
    The emphasis is always on the arguments used, and the way one position develops from another. By the end of the book the reader is afforded both a grasp of the state of the controversy, and how we got there.
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  15. David M. Armstrong (1999). The Open Door: Counterfactual Versus Singularist Theories of Causation. In. In Howard Sankey (ed.), Causation and Laws of Nature. Kluwer. 175--185.
  16. David Malet Armstrong (1999). The Causal Theory of Properties: Properties According to Shoemaker, Ellis, and Others. Philosophical Topics 26 (1/2):25-37.
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  17. Hyun-Soo Ahn, Lilli Alanen, Raphael Cohen Almagor, David M. Armstrong, Rudolph Bernet, Paul Blum, Miles Burnyeat, Alan Carter, Neus Torbisco Casals & Roberto Casati (1998). Visiting Professors From Abroad, 1998-99. Review of Metaphysics 52:249-257.
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  18. David M. Armstrong (1996). Dispositions as Categorical States. In Tim Crane (ed.), Dispositions: A Debate. New York: Routledge. 15--18.
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  19. David M. Armstrong (1996). Qualia Ain't in the Head. Psyche 2:31--4.
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  20. David M. Armstrong (1995). Reacting to Meinong. Grazer Philosophische Studien 50:615-627.
    1. Some reasons are given for rejecting the view that there are entities that do not exist. 2. It is suggested, nevertheless, that this view has some plausibility when we consider unrealized empirical possibilities. 3. Even if non-existent entities are rejected, there remains Meinong's distinction between object and objectives, roughly: things and facts. The author would analyze objects in terms of objectives, yielding a world of facts.
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  21. David M. Armstrong (1993). Priroda Duha. Theoria 36 (3-4):69-80.
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  22. David M. Armstrong (1993). Reply to Campbell. In John Bacon, Keith Campbell & Lloyd Reinhardt (eds.), Ontology, Causality and Mind: Essays in Honour of D M Armstrong. New York: Cambridge University Press.
     
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  23. David M. Armstrong (1993). Reply to Jackson's "Block's Challenge". In John Bacon, Keith Campbell & Lloyd Reinhardt (eds.), Ontology, Causality and Mind: Essays in Honour of D.M. Armstrong. New York: Cambridge University Press.
     
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  24. David M. Armstrong (1992). Properties. In. In Kevin Mulligan (ed.), Language, Truth and Ontology. Kluwer. 14--27.
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  25. David M. Armstrong (1991). Intentionality, Perception, and Causality. In John Searle and His Critics. Cambridge: Blackwell.
     
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  26. David M. Armstrong (1991). John Searle and His Critics. Cambridge: Blackwell.
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  27. David M. Armstrong (1991). Searle's Neo-Cartesian Theory of Consciousness. Philosophical Issues 1:67-71.
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  28. David Malet Armstrong (1991). What Makes Induction Rational? Dialogue 30 (04):503-11.
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  29. David Malet Armstrong (1989). C. B. Martin, Counterfactuals, Causality and Conditionals. In J. Heil (ed.), Cause, Mind and Reality; Essays Honoring C. B. Martin. Kluwer. 7-15.
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  30. David M. Armstrong (1988). Discussion: Reply to Van Fraassen. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 66:224-229.
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  31. David M. Armstrong (1987). Smart and the Secondary Qualities. In Philip Pettit, Richard Sylvan & J. Norman (eds.), Metaphysics And Morality. Blackwell.
     
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  32. David M. Armstrong (1986). Czy naturalista może wierzyć w uniwersalia? Studia Filozoficzne 245 (4).
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  33. David M. Armstrong (1984). Self-Profile. In R. J. Bogdan (ed.), D. M. Armstrong. Reidel. 3-51.
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  34. David M. Armstrong & Norman Malcolm (1984). Consciousness and Causality: A Debate on the Nature of Mind. Blackwell.
  35. David M. Armstrong (1983). Contemporary Philosophy: A New Survey. The Hague: Nijhoff.
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  36. David M. Armstrong (1983). Recent Work on the Relation of Mind and Brain. In Contemporary Philosophy: A New Survey. The Hague: Nijhoff.
     
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  37. David M. Armstrong (1982). Metaphysics and Supervenience. Critica 42 (42):3-17.
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  38. David M. Armstrong (1981). The Causal Theory of the Mind. In David J. Chalmers (ed.), The Nature of Mind and Other Essays. Cornell University Press.
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  39. David M. Armstrong (1981). What is Consciousness? In John Heil (ed.), The Nature of Mind. Cornell University Press.
     
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  40. David M. Armstrong (1979). Brain and Mind. (Ciba Foundation Symposium 69).
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  41. David M. Armstrong (1979). Three Types of Consciousness. In Brain and Mind. (Ciba Foundation Symposium 69). 235.
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  42. David Malet Armstrong (1979). Perception, Sense-Data, and Causality. In Graham Macdonald (ed.), Perception and Identity: Essays Presented to A.~J. Ayer with His Replies. Macmillan.
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  43. David M. Armstrong (1978). Universals and Scientific Realism: A Theory of Universals Vol. Ii. Cambridge University Press.
  44. David M. Armstrong (1978). Universals and Scientific Realism: Nominalism and Realism Vol. I. Cambridge University Press.
  45. David Malet Armstrong (1978). A Theory of Universals. Universals and Scientific Realism Volume Ii. Cambridge University Press.
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  46. David Malet Armstrong (1978). Nominalism and Realism. Universals and Scientific Realism Volume I. Cambridge University Press.
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  47. David M. Armstrong (1976). Incorrigibility, Materialism, and Causation. Philosophical Studies 30 (August):125-28.
  48. David M. Armstrong (1976). Immediate Perception. In. In R. S. Cohen, P. K. Feyerabend & M. Wartofsky (eds.), Essays in Memory of Imre Lakatos. Reidel. 23--35.
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  49. David M. Armstrong (1975). Beliefs and Desires as Causes of Actions: A Reply to Donald Davidson. Philosophical Papers 4 (May):1-7.
  50. David M. Armstrong (1973). Epistemological Foundations for a Materialist Theory of Mind. Philosophy of Science 40 (June):178-93.
    A philosophy might take its general inspiration from (1) commonsense; (2) careful observation; (3) philosophical argumentation; (4) the sciences; (5) "higher" sources of illumination. It is argued in this paper that it is bedrock commonsense, and the sciences, which are the most reliable foundations for a philosophy. This result is applied to the discussion and defense of a materialist theory of the mind.
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