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David M. Armstrong [60]David Malet Armstrong [8]
  1. David M. Armstrong (1968). A Materialist Theory of the Mind. Routledge.
    This classic work of recent philosophy was first published in 1968, and remains the most compelling and comprehensive statement of the view that the mind is material or physical. In A Materialist Theory of the Mind , D. M. Armstrong provided insight into the debate surrounding the relationship of the mind and body. He put forth a detailed materialist account of all the main mental phenomena, including perception, sensation, belief, the will, introspection, mental images, and consciousness. This (...)
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  2. David M. Armstrong (2007). How Do Particulars Stand to Universals? In Dean W. Zimmerman (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics. OUP Oxford
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  3. David Malet Armstrong (1978). A Theory of Universals. Universals and Scientific Realism Volume Ii. Cambridge University Press.
  4.  45
    David M. Armstrong & Norman Malcolm (1984). Consciousness and Causality: A Debate on the Nature of Mind. Blackwell.
  5. David M. Armstrong (2005). Four Disputes About Properties. Synthese 144 (3):1-12.
    In considering the nature of properties four controversial decisions must be made. (1) Are properties universals or tropes? (2) Are properties attributes of particulars, or are particulars just bundles of properties? (3) Are properties categorical (qualitative) in nature, or are they powers? (4) If a property attaches to a particular, is this predication contingent, or is it necessary? These choices seem to be in a great degree independent of each other. The author indicates his own choices.
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  6. David M. Armstrong (1970). The Nature of Mind. In Clive V. Borst (ed.), The Mind/Brain Identity Theory. Macmillan
  7. David M. Armstrong (1999). The Mind-Body Problem: An Opinionated Introduction. Westview Press.
    The emphasis is always on the arguments used, and the way one position develops from another. By the end of the book the reader is afforded both a grasp of the state of the controversy, and how we got there.
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  8.  26
    David M. Armstrong (1961). Perception And The Physical World. Humanities Press.
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  9.  68
    David Malet Armstrong (1999). The Causal Theory of Properties: Properties According to Shoemaker, Ellis, and Others. Philosophical Topics 26 (1/2):25-37.
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  10. David Malet Armstrong (1978). Nominalism and Realism. Universals and Scientific Realism Volume I. Cambridge University Press.
  11.  22
    David M. Armstrong (1968). The Nature of Mind and Other Essays. Humanities Press.
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  12. David M. Armstrong (1999). The Open Door: Counterfactual Versus Singularist Theories of Causation. In Howard Sankey (ed.), Causation and Laws of Nature. Kluwer 175--185.
  13. David M. Armstrong (1963). Is Introspective Knowledge Incorrigible? Philosophical Review 62 (4):417-32.
  14. David M. Armstrong (1996). Qualia Ain't in the Head. Psyche 2 (1):31--4.
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  15.  83
    David M. Armstrong (1962). Bodily Sensations. Routledge.
  16. David Malet Armstrong (1991). What Makes Induction Rational? Dialogue 30 (4):503-11.
  17. David Malet Armstrong (1968). The Headless Woman Illusion and the Defence of Materialism. Analysis 29 (2):48--9.
    The paper tries to rebut an objection to materialism. Anti-Materialists have argued that mental processes do not appear to be mere physical processes in the brain, And that secondary qualities such as sounds do not appear to be mere vibrations in the air. So materialists must admit that introspection and perception involve at least the illusion of the falsity of materialism. Using the headless woman illusion as a model, It is shown how the illusion is generated, And that it is (...)
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  18. David M. Armstrong (1979). Three Types of Consciousness. In Brain and Mind. (Ciba Foundation Symposium 69) 235.
  19.  40
    David M. Armstrong (2010). The Causal Theory of Properties. Philosophical Topics 26 (1/2):25-37.
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  20. David M. Armstrong (1981). What is Consciousness? In John Heil (ed.), The Nature of Mind. Cornell University Press
  21. David M. Armstrong (1987). Smart and the Secondary Qualities. In Philip Pettit, Richard Sylvan & J. Norman (eds.), Metaphysics And Morality. Blackwell
     
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  22.  61
    David Malet Armstrong (1969). Dispositions Are Causes. Analysis 30 (1):23-26.
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  23. David M. Armstrong (1981). The Causal Theory of the Mind. In David J. Chalmers (ed.), The Nature of Mind and Other Essays. Cornell University Press
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  24. David M. Armstrong (1973). Epistemological Foundations for a Materialist Theory of Mind. Philosophy of Science 40 (June):178-93.
    A philosophy might take its general inspiration from (1) commonsense; (2) careful observation; (3) philosophical argumentation; (4) the sciences; (5) "higher" sources of illumination. It is argued in this paper that it is bedrock commonsense, and the sciences, which are the most reliable foundations for a philosophy. This result is applied to the discussion and defense of a materialist theory of the mind.
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  25. David M. Armstrong (1991). Searle's Neo-Cartesian Theory of Consciousness. Philosophical Issues 1:67-71.
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  26.  50
    David M. Armstrong (2004). In Defence of the Cognitivist Theory of Perception. Harvard Review of Philosophy 12 (1):19-26.
  27.  2
    David M. Armstrong (2005). Four Disputes About Properties. Synthese 144 (3):309-320.
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  28. David M. Armstrong (1978). Universals and Scientific Realism: Nominalism and Realism Vol. I. Cambridge University Press.
  29.  20
    David M. Armstrong (1992). Properties. In Kevin Mulligan (ed.), Language, Truth and Ontology. Kluwer 14--27.
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  30. David M. Armstrong (1978). Universals and Scientific Realism: A Theory of Universals Vol. II. Cambridge University Press.
  31.  83
    David M. Armstrong (1968). The Headless Woman and the Defense of Materialism. Analysis 29:48-49.
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  32. David M. Armstrong (2000). The 'Thermometer' View of Knowledge. In Sven Bernecker & Fred I. Dretske (eds.), Knowledge: Readings in Contemporary Epistemology. OUP Oxford
     
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  33. David Malet Armstrong (1989). C. B. Martin, Counterfactuals, Causality and Conditionals. In J. Heil (ed.), Cause, Mind and Reality; Essays Honoring C. B. Martin. Kluwer 7-15.
     
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  34.  45
    David M. Armstrong (1975). Beliefs and Desires as Causes of Actions: A Reply to Donald Davidson. Philosophical Papers 4 (May):1-7.
  35.  43
    David M. Armstrong (1982). Metaphysics and Supervenience. Critica 42 (42):3-17.
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  36.  70
    David M. Armstrong (1955). Illusions of Sense. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 33 (August):88-106.
  37.  18
    David M. Armstrong (1956). Discussion: Berkeley's New Theory of Vision. Journal of the History of Ideas 17 (1):127-129.
    Most of the New Theory of Vision is an argument for a negative answer to Molyneux's question.// re primacy of vision in spatial perception: "most rational philosopher on this topic is Berkeley, whose New Theory of Vision presents in cogent detail the argument" (from Bennett 1966, p. 30, in note cites 41ff.).// Berkeley's criticisms of Locke: "If we really abstract from colour and hardness and all that 'belongs to sensation', so far from being left with 'pure' notions of extension and (...)
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  38.  64
    David M. Armstrong (1959). Mr Arthadeva and Naive Realism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 37 (May):67-70.
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  39.  61
    David M. Armstrong (1963). Max Deutscher and Perception. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 41 (August):246-249.
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  40.  36
    David M. Armstrong (2002). Vérifacteurs pour des vérités modales. Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 2 (4):491-507.
    Revenant sur la question des vérifacteurs, D. Armstrong demande ici d'abord comment concilier le maximalisme et la relation de nécessitation. L'A. examine quel sens métaphysique donner à la notion d'implication, et s'il y a un sens à admettre une contingence de re. Il traite à ce niveau des possibilités pures, examine le cas des aliens chez David Lewis, puis pose la question de savoir s'il est contingent de dire qu'il y a de l'être plutôt que rien. L'exposé le conduit à (...)
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  41.  47
    David M. Armstrong (1976). Incorrigibility, Materialism, and Causation. Philosophical Studies 30 (August):125-28.
  42.  45
    David M. Armstrong (1964). Vesey on Bodily Sensations. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 42 (August):247-248.
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  43.  28
    David M. Armstrong (1963). Vesey on Sensations of Heat. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 41 (December):359-362.
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  44.  14
    David M. Armstrong (1995). Reacting to Meinong. Grazer Philosophische Studien 50:615-627.
    1. Some reasons are given for rejecting the view that there are entities that do not exist. 2. It is suggested, nevertheless, that this view has some plausibility when we consider unrealized empirical possibilities. 3. Even if non-existent entities are rejected, there remains Meinong's distinction between object and objectives, roughly: things and facts. The author would analyze objects in terms of objectives, yielding a world of facts.
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  45.  10
    David M. Armstrong (2003). Resemblance Nominalism: A Solution to the Problem of Universals. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (2):285-286.
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  46. David M. Armstrong (1991). John Searle and His Critics. Cambridge: Blackwell.
     
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  47. David M. Armstrong (1969). Colour Realism and the Argument From Microscopes. In R. Brown & C. D. Rollins (eds.), Contemporary Philosophy in Australia. Humanities Press 301-323.
  48. David M. Armstrong (1996). Dispositions as Categorical States. In Tim Crane (ed.), Dispositions: A Debate. New York: Routledge 15--18.
     
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  49. David M. Armstrong (1979). Brain and Mind. (Ciba Foundation Symposium 69).
     
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  50.  4
    David M. Armstrong (1993). Priroda Duha. Theoria 36 (3-4):69-80.
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