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Profile: David Rosenthal (CUNY Graduate Center)
  1. E. M. Anscombe, R. Rhees & David M. Rosenthal, Consciousness.
    One phenomenon pertains roughly to being awake. A person or other creature is conscious when it's awake and mentally responsive to sensory input; otherwise it's unconscious. This kind of consciousness figures most often in everyday discourse.
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  2. G. E. M. Anscombe, R. Rhees & David M. Rosenthal, The Mind and Its Expression.
    pain' and ┌I think that p┐ express the pain and the thought that p, themselves. The book is most impressive. It is packed with careful argument, and addresses a remarkable range of important issues about the mind. I have very much enjoyed studying it.
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  3. David M. Rosenthal, Consciousness, Plans, and Language: Commentary on Bridgeman on Consciousness.
    There is much in Bridgeman's account that I find congenial and compelling, especially appealing is Bridgeman's application of his thesis to the tie between consciousness and language. Nonetheless, I want to raise some questions about whether the tie he finds between plans and consciousness actually does hold. Not all memory and attention is conscious. Although attention and accessing of memories are required to execute plans, we need not be at all conscious of the relevant states of memory and attention. Nor (...)
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  4. David M. Rosenthal, Explicarea Conştiinţei.
    Dintre fenomenele mentale, nici unul nu pare să reziste atât de bine explicaţiei precum conştiinţa. Parţial, dificultatea se datorează faptului că folosim termenul „conştient” şi alţii înrudiţi să dea seama de anumite fenomene distincte ale căror legături nu sunt întotdeauna clare. Iar acest lucru duce adesea la amestecarea acestor fenomene distincte. De aceea, orice încercare de a explica conştiinţa trebuie să înceapă prin a distinge diferitele lucruri pe care le numim conştiinţă. Un astfel de fenomen este strâns legat de simplul (...)
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  5. David M. Rosenthal, The Kinds of Consciousness.
    I begin by considering Ned Block's widely accepted distinction between phenomenal and access consciousness. I argue that on Block's official characterization a mental state's being access conscious is not a way the state's being conscious in any intuitive sense; that if phenomenal consciousness itself corresponds to an intuitive way of a state's being conscious, it literally implies access consciousness; and that Block misconstrues the theoretical significance of the commonsense distinction. These considerations point to the view that mental states' being conscious (...)
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  6. David M. Rosenthal, Will and the Theory of Judgment.
    Contemporary discussions typically give somewhat sort shrift to the theory of judgment Descartes advances in the Fourth Meditation.' One reason for this relative neglect is presumably the prima facie implausibility of the theory. It sounds odd to say that, in believing something, one's mental affirmation is an act of free will, on a par with freely deciding what to do. In addition, Descartes advances the theory as a way to explain the possibility of human error, which doubtless strikes many as (...)
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  7. David M. Rosenthal, Consciousness (.
    (1) Most commonly these terms are used to describe people. People and other creatures are conscious if they are awake and responsive to sensory stimulation. Because this is a property of creatures, we can call it creature consciousness. An individual lacks such consciousness if it is asleep, in a coma, anesthetized, and so forth. Creature consciousness demands a mainly biological explanation, as against an explanation in mainly psychological terms.
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  8. William G. Lycan & David M. Rosenthal (forthcoming). Editor's booknotes. Cogito.
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  9. David M. Rosenthal (forthcoming). Philosophy of Mind. Social Research.
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  10. David M. Rosenthal (2010). Consciousness, the Self and Bodily Location. Analysis 70 (2):270-276.
    (No abstract is available for this citation).
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  11. David M. Rosenthal (2006). Experience and the Physical. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (10-11):117-28.
    Strawson’s challenging and provocative defence of panpsychism1 begins by sensibly insisting that physicalism, properly understood, must unflinchingly countenance the occurrence of conscious experiences. No view, he urges, will count as ‘real physicalism’ (p. 4) if it seeks to get around or soften that commitment, as versions of socalled physicalism sometimes do. Real physicalism (hereinafter physicalism tout court) must accordingly reject any stark opposition of mental and physical, which is not only invoked by many followers of Descartes, but even countenanced by (...)
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  12. David M. Rosenthal & Gerhard Preyer (2006). B. Referate Uber Fremdsprachige Neuerscheinungen-Consciousness and Mind. Philosophischer Literaturanzeiger 59 (3):310.
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  13. David M. Rosenthal (2005). Consciousness and Mind. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
    The first four essays develop various aspects of that theory.The next three essays present Rosenthal's homomorphism theory of mental qualities and qualitative ...
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  14. David M. Rosenthal (2005). Sensory Qualities, Consciousness, and Perception. In Consciousness and Mind. Clarendon Press. 175-226.
     
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  15. David M. Rosenthal (2004). Being Conscious of Ourselves. The Monist 87 (2):161-184.
  16. David M. Rosenthal (2004). Review: Subjective Character and Reflexive Content. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):191 - 198.
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  17. David M. Rosenthal (2004). Review: The Nature of Consciousness. [REVIEW] Mind 113 (451):581-588.
  18. David M. Rosenthal (2004). Subjective Character and Reflexive Content. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):191-198.
    I. Zombies and the Knowledge Argument John Perry.
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  19. David M. Rosenthal (2004). The Nature of Consciousness. Mind 113 (451):581-588.
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  20. David M. Rosenthal (2003). Unity of Consciousness and the Self. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 103 (3):325-352.
    The so-called unity of consciousness consists in the compelling sense we have that all our conscious mental states belong to a single conscious subject. Elsewhere I have argued that a mental state's being conscious is a matter of our being conscious of that state by having a higher-order thought (HOT) about it. Contrary to what is sometimes argued, this HOT model affords a natural explanation of our sense that our conscious states all belong to a single conscious subject. HOTs often (...)
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  21. David M. Rosenthal (2002). Consciousness and Higher-Order Thought. In L. Nagel (ed.), Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. Macmillan.
    The problem of consciousness is to say what it is for some of our thoughts, feelings, and sensations to be conscious, given that others are not. This is different from saying what it is for a person to be conscious or not conscious. Even when people are conscious, many of their thoughts and sensations typically are not. And there's nothing problematic about a person's being conscious; it's just the person's being awake and responsive to sensory input.
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  22. David M. Rosenthal (2002). Consciousness and the Mind. Jerusalem Philosophical Quarterly 51 (July):227-251.
    Everyone — or almost everyone — was agreed that what is [mental] … has a common quality in which its essence is expressed: namely the quality of being conscious — unique, indescribable, but needing no description. All that is conscious … is [mental], and conversely all that is [mental] is conscious; that is self-evident and to contradict it is nonsense.
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  23. David M. Rosenthal (2002). Explaining Consciousness. In David J. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Oxford University Press. 109-131.
  24. David M. Rosenthal (2002). How Many Kinds of Consciousness? Consciousness and Cognition 11 (4):653-665.
    Ned BlockÕs influential distinction between phenomenal and access consciousness has become a staple of current discussions of consciousness. It is not often noted, however, that his distinction tacitly embodies unargued theoretical assumptions that favor some theoretical treatments at the expense of others. This is equally so for his less widely discussed distinction between phenomenal consciousness and what he calls reflexive consciousness. I argue that the distinction between phenomenal and access consciousness, as Block draws it, is untenable. Though mental states that (...)
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  25. David M. Rosenthal (2002). Persons, Minds, and Consciousness. In R. E. Auxier & L. E. Hahn (eds.), The Philosophy of Marjorie Grene. La Salle, Illinois: Open Court. 199-220.
     
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  26. David M. Rosenthal (2002). The Higher-Order Model of Consciousness. In Rita Carter (ed.), Consciousness. Weidenfeld & Nicolson.
    All mental states, including thoughts, feelings, perceptions, and sensations, often occur consciously. But they all occur also without being conscious. So the first thing a theory of consciousness must do is explain the difference between thoughts, feelings, perceptions, and sensations that are conscious and those which are not.
     
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  27. David M. Rosenthal (2002). The Timing of Conscious States. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):215-20.
    Striking experimental results by Benjamin Libet and colleagues have had an impor- tant impact on much recent discussion of consciousness. Some investigators have sought to replicate or extend Libet’s results (Haggard, 1999; Haggard & Eimer, 1999; Haggard, Newman, & Magno, 1999; Trevena & Miller, 2002), while others have focused on how to interpret those findings (e.g., Gomes, 1998, 1999, 2002; Pockett, 2002), which many have seen as conflicting with our commonsense picture of mental functioning.
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  28. David M. Rosenthal (2001). Consciousness and Sensation. In N. J. Smelser & B. Baltes (eds.), International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences.
     
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  29. David M. Rosenthal (2001). Color, Mental Location, and the Visual Field. Consciousness and Cognition 10 (1):85-93.
    Color subjectivism is the view that color properties are mental properties of our visual sensations, perhaps identical with properties of neural states, and that nothing except visual sensations and other mental states exhibits color properties. Color phys- icalism, by contrast, holds that colors are exclusively properties of visible physical objects and processes.
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  30. David M. Rosenthal (2000). Consciousness, Content, and Metacognitive Judgments. Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):203-214.
    Because metacognition consists in our having mental access to our cognitive states and mental states are conscious only when we are conscious of them in some suitable way, metacognition and consciousness shed important theoretical light on one another. Thus, our having metacognitive access to information carried by states that are not conscious helps con?rm the hypothesis that a mental state.
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  31. David M. Rosenthal (2000). Consciousness, Interpretation, and Consciousness. Protosociology 14:67-84.
  32. David M. Rosenthal (2000). Introspection and Self-Interpretation. Philosophical Topics 28 (2):201-33.
  33. David M. Rosenthal (2000). Addendum to Introduction. In Materialism and the Mind-Body Problem. Hackett.
    Mind-body materialism is at its most inviting in the context of trying to give a unified treatment of the natural world. And the principle challenge it faces is to do justice to the distinguishing features of mental phenomena, which set them off from nonmental, physical reality. This challenge it not easy to meet. In 1971 I suggested that the difficulty in meeting it makes especially appealing the eliminative materialism of Feyerabend and Rorty. If adopting the materialist view that mental (...)
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  34. David M. Rosenthal (2000). Metacognition and Higher-Order Thoughts. Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):231-242.
    Because there is a fair amount of overlap in the points by Balog and Rey, I will organize this response topically, referring specifically to each commentator as rele- vant. And, because much of the discussion focuses on my higher-order-thought (HOT) hypothesis independent of questions about metacognition, I will begin by addressing a cluster of issues that have to do with the status, motivation, and exact formulation of that hypothesis.
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  35. David M. Rosenthal (1999). Sensory Quality and the Relocation Story. Philosophical Topics 26 (1/2):321-350.
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  36. David M. Rosenthal (1999). The Colors and Shapes of Visual Experiences. In Denis Fisette (ed.), Consciousness and Intentionality: Models and Modalities of Attribution. Kluwer. 95--118.
    red and round. According to common sense, the red, round thing we see is the tomato itself. When we have a hallucinatory vision of a tomato, however, there may be present to us no red and round phys- ical object. Still, we use the words 'red' and 'round' to describe that situation as well, this time applying them to the visual experience itself. We say that we have a red, round visual image, or a visual experience of a red disk, (...)
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  37. David M. Rosenthal (1998). Consciousness and Its Expression. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 22 (1):294-309.
  38. David M. Rosenthal (1998). Consciousness and Metacognition. In Dan Sperber (ed.), Metarepresentation. Oxford University Press.
  39. David M. Rosenthal (1998). Dualism. In E. Craig (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Routledge.
    Dualism is the view that mental phenomena are, in some respect, nonphysical. The best-known version is due to Descartes, and holds that the mind is a nonphysical substance. Descartes argued that, because minds have no spatial properties and physical reality is essentially extended in space, minds are wholly nonphysical. Every human being is accordingly a composite of two objects: a physical body, and a nonphysical object that is that human being's mind. On a weaker version of dualism, which contemporary thinkers (...)
     
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  40. David M. Rosenthal (1998). Introspection. In Robert A. Wilson & Frank F. Keil (eds.), Mit Encyclopedia of the Cognitive Sciences (Mitecs). Mit Press.
  41. David M. Rosenthal, Kinds of Consciousness.
  42. John P. Carriero, Peter J. Markie, Stephen Schiffer, Robert Delahunty, Frederick J. O'Toole, David M. Rosenthal, Fred Feldman, Anthony Kenny, Margaret D. Wilson, John Cottingham & Jonathan Bennett (1997). Descartes's Meditations: Critical Essays. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
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  43. David M. Rosenthal (1997). Apperception, Sensation, and Dissociability. Mind and Language 2 (2):206-23.
    Recent writing on consciousness has increasingly stressed ways in which the terms.
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  44. David M. Rosenthal (1997). A Theory of Consciousness. In Ned Block, Owen J. Flanagan & Guven Guzeldere (eds.), The Nature of Consciousness. Mit Press.
     
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  45. David M. Rosenthal (1997). Perceptual and Cognitive Models of Consciousness. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association 45.
  46. David M. Rosenthal (1997). Phenomenal Consciousness and What It's Like. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):156--57.
    be realized. Whatever gets access to phenomenal awareness (to consciousness and P-consciousness are almost always present or P-consciousness as described by Block) is represented within this absent together.
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  47. David M. Rosenthal, State Consciousness and What It's Like.
  48. David M. Rosenthal (1995). Multiple Drafts and the Facts of the Matter. In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Ferdinand Schoningh. 275--290.
  49. David M. Rosenthal (1995). Moore's Paradox and Consciousness. Philosophical Perspectives 9:313-33.
  50. David M. Rosenthal (1995). Self-Knowledge and Moore's Paradox. Philosophical Studies 77 (2-3):195 - 209.
    As G. E. Moore famously observed, sentences such as 'It's raining but I don't think it is', though they aren't contradictory, cannot be used to make coherent assertions.' The trouble with such sentences is not a matter of their truth conditions; such sentences can readily be true. Indeed, it happens often enough with each of us that we think, for example, that it isn't raining even though it is. This shows that such sentences are not literally contradictory. But even though (...)
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