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  1. David Merli (2013). Michael Brady (Ed.), New Waves in Metaethics (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2011), 300 Pp. ISBN 9780230251625 (Pbk). [REVIEW] Journal of Moral Philosophy 10 (6):793-795.
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  2. David Merli & Joshua A. Smith (2013). Reconceiving the Therapeutic Obligation. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 39 (1):jht057.
    The “therapeutic obligation” (TO) is a physician’s duty to provide his patients with what he believes is the best available treatment. We begin by discussing some prominent formulations of the obligation before raising two related considerations against those formulations. First, they do not make sense of cases where doctors are permitted to provide suboptimal care. Second, they give incorrect results in cases where doctors are choosing treatments in challenging epistemic environments. We then propose and defend an account of the therapeutic (...)
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  3. David Merli (2009). Possessing Moral Concepts. Philosophia 37 (3):535-556.
    Moral discourse allows for speakers to disagree in many ways: about right and wrong acts, about moral theory, about the rational and conative significance of moral failings. Yet speakers’ eccentricities do not prevent them from engaging in moral conversation or from having (genuine, not equivocal) moral disagreement. Thus differences between speakers are compatible with possession of moral concepts. This paper examines various kinds of moral disagreements and argues that they provide evidence against conceptual-role and informational atomist approaches to understanding our (...)
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  4. David Merli (2008). Expressivism and the Limits of Moral Disagreement. Journal of Ethics 12 (1):25 - 55.
    This paper argues that expressivism faces serious difficulties giving an adequate account of univocal moral disagreements. Expressivist accounts of moral discourse understand moral judgments in terms of various noncognitive mental states, and they interpret moral disagreements as clashes between competing (and incompatible) attitudes. I argue that, for various reasons, expressivists must specify just what mental states are involved in moral judgment. If they do not, we lack a way of distinguishing moral judgments from other sorts of assessment and thus for (...)
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  5. David Merli (2007). Moral Convergence and the Univocity Problem. American Philosophical Quarterly 44 (4):297 - 313.
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  6. David Merli (2004). Review: Moral Realism: A Defence. [REVIEW] Mind 113 (452):778-782.
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  7. David Merli (2002). Return to Moral Twin Earth. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 32 (2):207 - 240.
    Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons's 'moral twin earth argument' raises doubts about the naturalistic realist's ability to make sense of genuine disagreement. I offer three arguments the realist's behalf. First, I argue that the example at the heart of their argument is underdescribed; when fully developed, it loses its intuitive force. Second, I suggest that taking the stipulations of the Horgan-Timmons example seriously gives us reason to revise our initial judgments. Third, I propose combining naturalistic realism about moral judgments with (...)
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