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  1. David N. Stamos (2008). Evolution and the Big Questions: Sex, Race, Religion, and Other Matters. Wiley-Blackwell.
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  2. David N. Stamos (2007). Popper, Laws, and the Exclusion of Biology From Genuine Science. Acta Biotheoretica 55 (4).
    The primary purpose of this paper is to argue that biologists should stop citing Karl Popper on what a genuinely scientific theory is. Various ways in which biologists cite Popper on this matter are surveyed, including the use of Popper to settle debates on methodology in phylogenetic systematics. It is then argued that the received view on Popper—namely, that a genuinely scientific theory is an empirically falsifiable one—is seriously mistaken, that Popper’s real view was that genuinely scientific theories have the (...)
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  3. David N. Stamos (2006). Darwin and the Nature of Species. State University of New York Press.
    Examines Darwin’s concept of species in a philosophical context.
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  4. David N. Stamos (2005). Pre-Darwinian Taxonomy and Essentialism – a Reply to Marywinsor. Biology and Philosophy 20 (1):79-96.
    Mary Winsor (2003) argues against the received view that pre-Darwinian taxonomy was characterized mainly by essentialism. She argues, instead, that the methods of pre-Darwinian taxonomists, in spite of whatever their beliefs, were that of clusterists, so that the received view, propagated mainly by certain modern biologists and philosophers of biology, should at last be put to rest as a myth. I argue that shes right when it comes to higher taxa, but wrong when it comes the most important category of (...)
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  5. David N. Stamos (2003). The Species Problem: Biological Species, Ontology, and the Metaphysics of Biology. Lexington Books.
     
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  6. David N. Stamos (2002). Species, Languages, and the Horizontal/Vertical Distinction. Biology and Philosophy 17 (2):171-198.
    In addition to the distinction between species as a category and speciesas a taxon, the word species is ambiguous in a very different butequally important way, namely the temporal distinction between horizontal andvertical species. Although often found in the relevant literature, thisdistinction has thus far remained vague and undefined. In this paper the use ofthe distinction is explored, an attempt is made to clarify and define it, andthen the relation between the two dimensions and the implications of thatrelation are examined. (...)
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  7. David N. Stamos (2001). Quantum Indeterminism and Evolutionary Biology. Philosophy of Science 68 (2):164-184.
    In "The Indeterministic Character of Evolutionary Theory: No 'Hidden Variables Proof' But No Room for Determinism Either," Brandon and Carson (1996) argue that evolutionary theory is statistical because the processes it describes are fundamentally statistical. In "Is Indeterminism the Source of the Statistical Character of Evolutionary Theory?" Graves, Horan, and Rosenberg (1999) argue in reply that the processes of evolutionary biology are fundamentally deterministic and that the statistical character of evolutionary theory is explained by epistemological rather than ontological considerations. In (...)
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  8. David N. Stamos (2000). Robert Hall Haynes, in Memoriam: 1931–1998. [REVIEW] Biology and Philosophy 15 (5):633-639.
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  9. David N. Stamos (1999). Darwin's Species Category Realism. History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 21 (2):137 - 186.
    Ever since Charles Darwin's On the Origin of Species was published, the received view has been that Darwin literally thought of species as not extra-mentally real. In 1969 Michael Ghiselin upset the received view by interpreting Darwin to mean that species taxa are indeed real but not the species category. In 1985 John Beatty took Ghiselin's thesis a step further by providing a strategy theory to explain why Darwin would say one thing (his repeated nominalistic definition of species) and do (...)
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  10. David N. Stamos (1998). Buffon, Darwin, and the Non-Individuality of Species – a Reply to Jean Gayon. Biology and Philosophy 13 (3):443-470.
    Gayon's recent claim that Buffon developed a concept of species as physical individuals is critically examined and rejected. Also critically examined and rejected is Gayon's more central thesis that as a consequence of his analysis of Buffon's species concept, and also of Darwin's species concept, it is clear that modern evolutionary theory does not require species to be physical individuals. While I agree with Gayon's conclusion that modern evolutionary theory does not require species to be physical individuals, I disagree with (...)
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  11. David N. Stamos (1997). A New Theory on Philo's Reversal. International Studies in Philosophy 29 (2):73-94.
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  12. David N. Stamos (1996). Popper, Falsifiability, and Evolutionary Biology. Biology and Philosophy 11 (2):161-191.
    First, a brief history is provided of Popper's views on the status of evolutionary biology as a science. The views of some prominent biologists are then canvassed on the matter of falsifiability and its relation to evolutionary biology. Following that, I argue that Popper's programme of falsifiability does indeed exclude evolutionary biology from within the circumference of genuine science, that Popper's programme is fundamentally incoherent, and that the correction of this incoherence results in a greatly expanded and much more realistic (...)
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  13. David N. Stamos (1996). Was Darwin Really a Species Nominalist? Journal of the History of Biology 29 (1):127 - 144.
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