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David O. Brink [52]David Owen Brink [3]
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Profile: David Brink (University of California, San Diego)
  1. David O. Brink, A Puzzle About Moral Motivation.
    Our puzzle about moral motivation can be seen as a tension that we encounter when we try to reconcile intellectual and practical aspects of morality. Cognitivists interpret moral judgments as expressing cognitive attitudes, such as belief. Moral judgments ascribe properties – axiological, deontic, and aretaic – to persons, actions, institutions, and policies. Internalists believe that moral judgments necessarily engage the will and motivate. We expect people to be motivated to act in accord with their moral judgments and would find it (...)
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  2. David O. Brink, Bookreviews.
    Allan Gibbard’s book Thinking How to Live is an important sequel to his earlier and very in uential book Wise Choices, Apt Feelings. His earlier book defended a conception of morality as involving distinctive moral feelings of guilt, shame, and resentment that it is rational for someone to have and went on to defend an expressivist conception of rationality according to which judgments of rationality involve acceptance of norms for behavior and feeling. Though Gibbard offered a novel conception of the (...)
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  3. David O. Brink, Handout #5: Anti-Rationalism and Internalism About Practical Reason.
    Given these worries about strategic ethical egoism, we might conclude that morality and rationality are two independent points of view. We might agree that morality is impartial but insist that practical reason is instrumental or prudential. If so, we can see how there might be conflicts between practical reason and other-regarding morality, because other-regarding duties need not always advance the agent's own aims and interests. If there can be such conflicts, then immoral action is not necessarily irrational. If so, we (...)
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  4. David O. Brink, Handout #3: Moral Motivation and Externalism.
    This argument would show weak internalism to be a conceptual truth. But this argument is not compelling. Sometimes when we say that I have a reason to φ, we mean • (a) There is a behavioral norm that enjoins φ-ing and applies to me. In this sense of reason, moral norms do imply reasons. There are as many kinds of reasons as there are norms, including moral reasons, legal reasons, reasons of etiquette. But we often have something more in mind (...)
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  5. David O. Brink, Handout #6: Normative Authority and Nagelian Rationalism.
    Thomas Nagel's The Possibility of Altruism (1970) is one of the few sustained attempts to reject instrumental and prudential conceptions of practical reason and to defend the possibility of practical reason that is impartial or altruistic. Nagel makes claims about both moral motivation and practical reason, and each claim has both negative and positive constituents.
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  6. David O. Brink, Handout #7: Normative Authority and Korsgaardian Rationalism.
    In The Sources of Normativity (1996) Christine Korsgaard provides a dialectical examination of different conceptions of the sources of normativity or reasons -- conceptions that appeal to voluntarism, realism, and reflective endorsement -- that culminates in her own Kantian or neo- Kantian conception of normativity that is grounded in autonomy. Her method is dialectical (Dialectical) inasmuch as her neo-Kantian conception is supposed to reveal the truth or grain of truth in each of the three prior conceptions. Korsgaard begins Lecture 1 (...)
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  7. David O. Brink, Handout #8: Normative Authority and Metaphysical Egoism.
    Doubts about the adequacy of appeals to impartial practical reason give those with rationalist sympathies reason to explore the metaphysical, and not merely strategic, reconciliation of prudence and altruism contained in metaphysical egoism. Even if we recognize impartial practical reason, the supremacy of moral demands may depend upon the plausibility of metaphysical egoism. For as long as we recognize the demands of prudence, the conflict between altruism and prudence will threaten altruism's supremacy. We might consider one version of metaphysical egoism (...)
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  8. David O. Brink, Phil 260; Spring 2007 the Normativity of Ethics.
    Write a short paper, approximately 6-8 pages, on one of the following topics. (Some of these topics could also be considered for the longer paper. Some might be better suited for a short paper and some might be better suited for a long paper, but most could be adapted (narrowed or expanded) to work for either purpose.) It is possible to write on another topic, if you prefer, but it is necessary to meet with me in advance and to agree (...)
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  9. David O. Brink, Syllabus: Topics and Readings.
    This is probably an overly ambitious Syllabus for a ten week seminar. I regard the early part of the Syllabus (roughly, §§1-9) as pretty fixed. We may have to choose among the later topics (§§10- 12), and I welcome student input on these decisions. Required readings are preceded by `(A)`; recommended readings are preceded by `(B)`. Full references are available on the Select Bibliography. Most of the required readings come from the required texts. Required readings not found in the required (...)
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  10. David O. Brink (2013). First Acts, Last Acts, and Abandonment. Legal Theory 19 (2):114-123.
    This contribution reconstructs and assesses Gideon Yaffe’s claims in his book Attempts about what constitutes an attempt, what can count as evidence that an attempt has been made, whether abandonment is a genuine defense, and whether attempts should be punished less severely than completed crimes. I contrast Yaffe’s account of being motivated by an intention and the completion of an attempt in terms of the truth of the completion counterfactual with an alternative picture of attempts as temporally extended decision trees (...)
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  11. David O. Brink (2013). Responsibility, Incompetence, and Psychopathy. In The Lindley Lecture. University of Kansas.
    This essay articulates a conception of responsibility and excuse in terms of the fair opportunity to avoid wrongdoing and explores its implications for insanity, incompetence, and psychopathy. The fair opportunity conception factors responsibility into conditions of normative competence and situational control and factors normative competence into cognitive and volitional capacities. This supports a conception of incompetence that recognizes substantial impairment of either cognitive or volitional capacities as excusing, provided the agent is not substantially responsible for her own incompetence. This conception (...)
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  12. David O. Brink (2013). Situationism, Responsibility, and Fair Opportunity. Social Philosophy and Policy (1-2):121-149.
    The situationist literature in psychology claims that conduct is not determined by character and reflects the operation of the agent’s situation or environment. For instance, due to situational factors, compassionate behavior is much less common than we might have expected from people we believe to be compassionate. This article focuses on whether situationism should revise our beliefs about moral responsibility. It assesses situationism’s implications against the backdrop of a conception of responsibility that is grounded in norms about the fair opportunity (...)
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  13. David O. Brink (2013). The Lindley Lecture. University of Kansas.
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  14. David O. Brink & Dana K. Nelkin (2013). Fairness and the Architecture of Responsibility. Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility 1:284-313.
    This essay explores a conception of responsibility at work in moral and criminal responsibility. Our conception draws on work in the compatibilist tradition that focuses on the choices of agents who are reasons-responsive and work in criminal jurisprudence that understands responsibility in terms of the choices of agents who have capacities for practical reason and whose situation affords them the fair opportunity to avoid wrongdoing. Our conception brings together the dimensions of normative competence and situational control, and we factor normative (...)
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  15. David Owen Brink (2013). Mill's Progressive Principles. Oxford University Press.
    David O. Brink offers a reconstruction and assessment of John Stuart Mill's contributions to the utilitarian and liberal traditions.
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  16. David O. Brink (2012). Retributivism and Legal Moralism. Ratio Juris 25 (4):496-512.
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  17. David O. Brink (2011). Prospects for Temporal Neutrality. In Craig Callender (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Time. Oup Oxford.
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  18. David O. Brink (2008). The Significance of Desire. Oxford Studies in Metaethics 3:5-45.
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  19. David O. Brink (2007). „The Autonomy of Ethics “. In Michael Martin (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Atheism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 149--65.
  20. David O. Brink (2006). Self-Realization and the Common Good : Themes in T.H. Green. In Maria Dimova-Cookson & W. J. Mander (eds.), T.H. Green: Ethics, Metaphysics, and Political Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
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  21. David O. Brink (2005). Some Forms and Limits of Consequentialism. In David Copp (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory. Oup Usa.
     
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  22. David O. Brink (2003). Prudence and Authenticity: Intrapersonal Conflicts of Value. Philosophical Review 112 (2):215-245.
    Prudence and authenticity are sometimes seen as rival virtues. Prudence,as traditionally conceived, is temporally neutral. It attaches no intrinsic significance to the temporal location of benefits or harms within the agent’s life; the prudent agent should be equally concerned about all parts of her life. But people’s values and ideals often change over time, sometimes in predictable ways, as when middle age and parenthood often temporize youthful radicalism or spontaneity with concerns for comfort,security, and predictability. In situations involving diachronic, intrapersonal (...)
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  23. David O. Brink (2003). Prudence and Authenticity. Philosophical Review 112 (2):215 - 245.
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  24. David Owen Brink (2003). Perfectionism and the Common Good: Themes in the Philosophy of T.H. Green. Oxford University Press.
    David Brink presents a study of T. H. Green's Prolegomena to Ethics (1883), a classic of British idealism. Green develops a perfectionist ethical theory that brings together the best elements in the ancient and modern traditions and that provides the moral foundations for Green's own influential brand of liberalism. Brink's book situates the Prolegomena in its intellectual context, examines its main themes, and explains Green's enduring significance for the history of ethics and contemporary ethical theory.
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  25. David O. Brink (2001). Legal Interpretation, Objectivity and Morality. In Brian Leiter (ed.), Objectivity in Law and Morals. Cambridge University Press. 12--65.
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  26. David O. Brink (2001). Millian Principles, Freedom of Expression, and Hate Speech. Legal Theory 7 (2):119-157.
    Hate speech employs discriminatory epithets to insult and stigmatize others on the basis of their race, gender, sexual orientation, or other forms of group membership. The regulation of hate speech is deservedly controversial, in part because debates over hate speech seem to have teased apart libertarian and egalitarian strands within the liberal tradition. In the civil rights movements of the 1960s, libertarian concerns with freedom of movement and association and equal opportunity pointed in the same direction as egalitarian concerns with (...)
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  27. David O. Brink (2001). Realism, Naturalism, and Moral Semantics. Social Philosophy and Policy 18 (02):154-.
  28. David O. Brink (2001). Impartiality and Associative Duties. Utilitas 13 (02):152-.
    Consequentialism is often criticized for failing to accommodate impersonal constraints and personal options. A common consequentialist response is to acknowledge the anticonsequentialist intuitions but to argue either that the consequentialist can, after all, accommodate the allegedly recalcitrant intuitions or that, where accommodation is impossible, the recalcitrant intuition can be dismissed for want of an adequate philosophical rationale. Whereas these consequentialist responses have some plausibility, associational duties represent a somewhat different challenge to consequentialism, inasmuch as they embody neither impersonal constraints nor (...)
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  29. Judith Andre, Marcia Baron, Margaret Battin, Tom Beauchamp, Lawrence Blum, Peta Bowden, George Brenkert, Thomas Brickhouse, David O. Brink & Dan Brock (2000). Manuscript Referees for The Journal of Ethics (1999–2000). Journal of Ethics 4:423-424.
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  30. David O. Brink (2000). Making a Necessity of Virtue. Philosophical Review 109 (3):428-434.
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  31. David O. Brink (1999). Review: Engstrom & Whiting, Aristotle, Kant, and the Stoics. Philosophical Review 108 (4):576-582.
  32. David O. Brink (1999). Aristotle, Kant, and the Stoics. Philosophical Review 108 (4):576-582.
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  33. David O. Brink (1999). Eudaimonism, Love and Friendship, and Political Community. Social Philosophy and Policy 16 (01):252-.
  34. David O. Brink (1999). Objectivity and Dialectical Methods in Ethics. Inquiry 42 (2):195 – 212.
    A cognitivist interpretation of moral inquiry treats it, like other kinds of inquiry, as aiming at true belief. A dialectical conception of moral inquiry represents the justification for a given moral belief as consisting in its intellectual fit with other beliefs, both moral and nonmoral. The essay appeals to semantic considerations to defend cognitivism as a default metaethical view; it defends a dialectical conception of moral inquiry by examining Sidgwick's ambivalence about the probative value of appeal to common moral beliefs (...)
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  35. David O. Brink (1999). Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law:A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law. Ethics 109 (3):673-675.
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  36. Elizabeth S. Anderson, F. R. Berger, David O. Brink, D. G. Brown, Amy Gutmann, Peter Railton, J. O. Urmson & Henry R. West (1997). Mill's Utilitarianism: Critical Essays. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
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  37. David O. Brink (1997). Moral Motivation. Ethics 108 (1):4-32.
  38. David O. Brink (1997). Rational Egoism and the Separateness of Persons. In J. Dancy (ed.), Reading Parfit. Blackwell. 96--134.
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  39. David O. Brink (1997). Rights, Welfare, and Mill's Moral Theory. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (3):713-717.
  40. David O. Brink (1997). Self-Love and Altruism. Social Philosophy and Policy 14 (1):122-157.
  41. David O. Brink (1994). Common Sense and First Principles in Sidgwick's Methods. Social Philosophy and Policy 11 (1):179-201.
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  42. David O. Brink (1994). Moral Conflict and its Structure. Philosophical Review 103 (2):215-247.
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  43. David O. Brink (1994). Review: A Reasonable Morality. [REVIEW] Ethics 104 (3):593 - 619.
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  44. David O. Brink (1994). A Reasonable Morality:Human Morality. Samuel Scheffler. Ethics 104 (3):593-.
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  45. David O. Brink (1992). A Puzzle About the Rational Authority of Morality. Philosophical Perspectives 6:1-26.
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  46. David O. Brink (1992). Mill's Deliberative Utilitarianism. Philosophy and Public Affairs 21 (1):67-103.
  47. David Owen Brink (1989). Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics. Cambridge University Press.
    This book is a systematic and constructive treatment of a number of traditional issues at the foundations of ethics. These issues concern the objectivity of ethics, the possibility and nature of moral knowledge, the relationship between the moral point of view and a scientific or naturalist world-view, the nature of moral value and obligation, and the role of morality in a person's rational lifeplan. In striking contrast to traditional and more recent work in the field, David Brink offers an integrated (...)
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  48. David O. Brink (1988). Legal Theory, Legal Interpretation, and Judicial Review. Philosophy and Public Affairs 17 (2):105-148.
    I argue that disputes within constitutional theory about whether recent supreme court decisions exceed the scope of legitimate judicial review and disputes within legal theory about the nature and determinacy of law are best seen and assessed as disputes over the nature of legal interpretation. I criticize the interpretive assumptions on which these disputes generally depend and defend a theory of interpretation which tends to vindicate the determinacy of law even in hard cases and the style of recent court decisions (...)
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  49. David O. Brink (1988). Sidgwick's Dualism of Practical Reason. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 66 (3):291 – 307.
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  50. David O. Brink (1987). Rawlsian Constructivism in Moral Theory. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 17 (1):71 - 90.
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