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Profile: David Papineau (King's College London)
  1.  21
    David Papineau (2016). Against Representationalism. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 24 (3):324-347.
    It is very natural to suppose that conscious sensory experience is essentially representational. However this thought gives rise to any number of philosophical problems and confusions. I shall argue that it is quite mistaken. Conscious phenomena cannot be constructed out of representational materials.
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  2. David Papineau (1993). Philosophical Naturalism. Blackwell.
  3. David Papineau (2002). Thinking About Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
    The relation between subjective consciousness and the physical brain is widely regarded as the last mystery facing science. Papineau argues that consciousness seems mysterious not because of any hidden essence, but only because we think about it in a special way. He exposes the resulting potential for confusion, and shows that much scientific study of consciousness is misconceived.
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  4. David Papineau (2001). The Rise of Physicalism. In Carl Gillett & Barry M. Loewer (eds.), Physicalism and its Discontents. Cambridge University Press
    In this paper I want to discuss the way in which physical science has come to claim a particular kind of hegemony over other subjects in the second half of this century. This claim to hegemony is generally known by the name of "physicalism". In this paper I shall try to understand why this doctrine has come to prominence in recent decades. By placing this doctrine in a historical context, we will be better able to appreciate its strengths and weaknesses.
     
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  5.  26
    David Papineau (1987). Reality and Representation. B. Blackwell.
  6. David Papineau (2013). There Are No Norms of Belief. In T. Chan (ed.), The Aim of Belief.
    This paper argues that there is no distinctive species of normativity attaching to the adoption of beliefs.
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  7. David Papineau (1998). Editorial. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 (4):787-788.
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  8. David Papineau (2006). Phenomenal and Perceptual Concepts. In Torin Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. Oxford University Press 111--144.
    1 Introduction 2 Perceptual Concepts 2.1 Perceptual Concepts are not Demonstrative 2.2 Perceptual Concepts as Stored Templates 2.3 Perceptual Semantics 2.4 Perceptually Derived Concepts 3 Phenomenal Concepts.
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  9. David Papineau (2011). What Exactly is the Explanatory Gap? Philosophia 39 (1):5-19.
    It is widely agreed among contemporary philosophers of mind that science leaves us with an ‘explanatory gap’—that even after we know everything that science can tell us about the conscious mind and the brain, their relationship still remains mysterious. I argue that this agreed view is quite mistaken. The feeling of a ‘explanatory gap’ arises only because we cannot stop ourselves thinking about the mind–brain relation in a dualist way.
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  10.  29
    David Papineau (2013). In the Zone. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 73:175-196.
    On the Friday afternoon of the 3 rd test at Trent Bridge in 2001, the series was in the balance. The Australians had won the first two tests easily, but England now found themselves in a position of some strength. They had restricted Australia to a first-innings lead of just 5 runs, and had built a lead of 120 with six wickets in hand. Mark Ramprakash was in and had been batting steadily for well over an hour. Even though this (...)
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  11. David Papineau (2009). The Poverty of Analysis. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 83 (1):1-30.
    I argue that philosophy is like science in three interesting and non-obvious ways. First, the claims made by philosophy are synthetic, not analytic: philosophical claims, just like scientific claims, are not guaranteed by the structure of the concepts they involve. Second, philosophical knowledge is a posteriori, not a priori: the claims established by philosophers depend on the same kind of empirical support as scientific theories. And finally, the central questions of philosophy concern actuality rather than necessity: philosophy is primarily aimed (...)
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  12.  93
    David Papineau (2014). The Presidential Address: Sensory Experience and Representational Properties. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 114 (1pt1):1-33.
    This paper is about the nature of conscious sensory properties. My initial thesis is that these properties should not be equated with representational properties. I argue that any such representationalist view is in danger of implying that conscious sensory properties are constituted by relations to propositions or other abstract objects outside space and time; and I add that, even if this implication can be avoided, the broadness of representational properties in any case renders them unsuitable to constitute conscious properties. In (...)
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  13. David Papineau, Kripke's Proof That We Are All Intuitive Dualists.
     
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  14. David Papineau (2013). Causation is Macroscopic but Not Irreducible. In Sophie C. Gibb & Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson (eds.), Mental Causation and Ontology. Oxford University Press 126.
    In this paper I argue that causation is an essentially macroscopic phenomenon, and that mental causes are therefore capable of outcompeting their more specific physical realizers as causes of physical effects. But I also argue that any causes must be type-identical with physical properties, on pain of positing inexplicable physical conspiracies. I therefore allow macroscopic mental causation, but only when it is physically reducible.
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  15. Pierre Cruse & David Papineau (2002). Scientific Realism Without Reference. In Michele Marsonet (ed.), The Problem of Realism. Ashgate 174--189.
     
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  16.  86
    Philip Goff & David Papineau (2014). What's Wrong with Strong Necessities? Philosophical Studies 167 (3):749-762.
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  17. David Spurrett & David Papineau (1999). A Note on the Completeness of "Physics". Analysis 59 (1):25-29.
  18. David Papineau & Víctor Durà-Vilà (2009). A Thirder and an Everettian: A Reply to Lewis's 'Quantum Sleeping Beauty'. Analysis 69 (1):78-86.
    Since the publication of Elga's seminal paper in 2000, the Sleeping Beauty paradox has been the source of much discussion, particularly in this journal. Over the past few decades the Everettian interpretation of quantum mechanics 1 has also been much debated. There is an interesting connection between the way these two topics raise issues about subjective probability assignments.This connection is often alluded to, but as far as we know Peter J. Lewis's ‘Quantum Sleeping Beauty’ is the first attempt to examine (...)
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  19. David Papineau (1999). Normativity and Judgment. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 73 (73):16-43.
    It is widely assumed that the normativity of conceptual judgement poses problems for naturalism. Thus John McDowell urges that 'The structure of the space of reasons stubbornly resists being appropriated within a naturalism that conceives nature as the realm of law' (1994, p 73). Similar sentiments have been expressed by many other writers, for example Robert Brandom (1994, p xiii) and Paul Boghossian (1989, p 548).
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  20. Helen Beebee & David Papineau (1997). Probability as a Guide to Life. Journal of Philosophy 94 (5):217-243.
  21. Barbara Montero & David Papineau (2005). A Defense of the Via Negativa Argument for Physicalism. Analysis 65 (287):233-237.
  22. David Papineau (1998). Mind the Gap. Philosophical Perspectives 12 (S12):373-89.
    On the first page of The Problem of Consciousness , Colin McGinn asks "How is it possible for conscious states to depend on brain states? How can technicolour phenomenology arise from soggy grey matter?" Many philosophers feel that questions like these pose an unanswerable challenge to physicalism. They argue that there is no way of bridging the "explanatory gap" between the material brain and the lived world of conscious experience , and that physicalism about the mind can therefore provide no (...)
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  23. David Papineau (2010). Can Any Sciences Be Special? In Graham Macdonald & Cynthia Macdonald (eds.), Emergence in Mind. Oxford University Press 179--197.
     
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  24.  62
    David Papineau, Naturalism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    The term ‘naturalism’ has no very precise meaning in contemporary philosophy. Its current usage derives from debates in America in the first half of the last century. The self-proclaimed ‘naturalists’ from that period included John Dewey, Ernest Nagel, Sidney Hook and Roy Wood Sellars. These philosophers aimed to ally philosophy more closely with science. They urged that reality is exhausted by nature, containing nothing ‘supernatural’, and that the scientific method should be used to investigate all areas of reality, including the (...)
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  25.  9
    David Papineau (2012). Can We Be Harmed After We Are Dead? Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 18 (5):1091-1094.
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  26. David Papineau (2003). Theories of Consciousness. In Quentin Smith & Aleksandar Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford: Clarendon Press 353.
    My target in this paper is "theories of consciousness". There are many theories of consciousness around, and my view is that they are all misconceived. Consciousness is not a normal scientific subject, and needs handling with special care. It is foolhardy to jump straight in and start building a theory, as if consciousness were just like electricity or chemical valency. We will do much better to reflect explicitly on our methodology first. When we do this, we will see that theories (...)
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  27. David Papineau (1998). Teleosemantics and Indeterminacy. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (1):1-14.
    The aim of this paper is to defend the teleological theory of representation against an objection by Jerry Fodor. I shall argue that previous attempts to answer this objection fail to recognize the importance of belief-desire structure for the teleological theory of representation.
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  28.  77
    David Papineau & Víctor Durà-Vilà (2009). Reply to Lewis: Metaphysics Versus Epistemology. Analysis 69 (1):89-91.
    Peter J. Lewis argued that the Everettian interpretation of quantum mechanics implies the unpopular halfer position in the Sleeping Beauty debate. We retorted that it is perfectly coherent to be an Everettian and an ordinary thirder. In a recent reply to our paper Lewis further clarifies the basis for his thinking. We think this brings out nicely where he goes wrong: he underestimates the importance of metaphysical considerations in determining rational credences.
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  29. David Papineau (2006). Comments on Galen Strawson: Realistic Monism: Why Physicalism Entails Panpsychism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (10-11):100-109.
    Galen Strawson (2006) thinks it is 'obviously' false that 'the terms of physics can fully capture the nature or essence of experience' (p. 4). He also describes this view as 'crazy' (p. 7). I think that he has been carried away by first impressions. It is certainly true that 'physicSalism', as he dubs this view, is strongly counterintuitive. But at the same time there are compelling arguments in its favour. I think that these arguments are sound and that the contrary (...)
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  30.  68
    David Papineau (1984). Representation and Explanation. Philosophy of Science 51 (December):550-72.
    Functionalism faces a problem in accounting for the semantic powers of beliefs and other mental states. Simple causal considerations will not solve this problem, nor will any appeal to the social utility of semantic interpretations. The correct analysis of semantic representation is a teleological one, in terms of the biological purposes of mental states: whereas functionalism focuses, so to speak, only on the structure of the cognitive mechanism, the semantic perspective requires in addition that we consider the purposes of the (...)
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  31. David Papineau (2001). The Status of Teleosemantics, or How to Stop Worrying About Swampman. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (2):279-89.
  32. David Papineau (2004). David Lewis and Schrödinger's Cat. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1):153 – 169.
    In 'How Many Lives Has Schrödinger's Cat?' David Lewis argues that the Everettian no-collapse interpretation of quantum mechanics is in a tangle when it comes to probabilities. This paper aims to show that the difficulties that Lewis raises are insubstantial. The Everettian metaphysics contains a coherent account of probability. Indeed it accounts for probability rather better than orthodox metaphysics does.
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  33.  76
    David Papineau (1996). Theory-Dependent Terms. Philosophy of Science 63 (1):1-20.
    The main puzzle about theoretical definitions is that nothing seems to decide which assumptions contribute to such definitions and which do not. I argue that theoretical definitions are indeed imprecise, but that this does not normally matter, since the definitional imprecision does not normally produce indeterminacy of referential value. Sometimes, however, the definitional imprecision is less benign, and does generate referential indeterminacy. In these special cases, but not otherwise, it is necessary to refine the term's definition.
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  34. David Papineau (2007). Kripke's Proof is Ad Hominem Not Two-Dimensional. Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):475–494.
    Identity theorists make claims like ‘pain = C-fibre stimulation’. These claims must be necessary if true, given that terms like ‘pain’ and ‘C-fibre stimulation’ are rigid. Yet there is no doubt that such claims appear contingent. It certainly seems that there could have been C-fibre stimulation without pains or vice versa. So identity theorists owe us an explanation of why such claims should appear contingent if they are in fact necessary.
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  35. David Papineau (2003). Why You Don’T Want to Get in the Box with Schrödinger's Cat. Analysis 63 (277):51–58.
    By way of an example, Lewis imagines your being invited to join Schrödinger’s cat in its box for an hour. This box will either fill up with deadly poison fumes or not, depending on whether or not some radioactive atom decays, the probability of decay within an hour being 50%. The invitation is accompanied with some further incentive to comply (Lewis sets it up so there is a significant chance of some pretty bad but not life-threatening punishment if you don’t (...)
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  36.  85
    Frank Jackson, Graham Priest & David Papineau (2004). David Lewis and Schrödinger's Cat. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1):153 – 169.
    In 'How Many Lives Has Schrödinger's Cat?' David Lewis argues that the Everettian no-collapse interpretation of quantum mechanics is in a tangle when it comes to probabilities. This paper aims to show that the difficulties that Lewis raises are insubstantial. The Everettian metaphysics contains a coherent account of probability. Indeed it accounts for probability rather better than orthodox metaphysics does.
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  37. David Papineau (2002). Thinking About Consciousness. Oxford University Press Uk.
    The relation between subjective consciousness and the physical brain is widely regarded as the last mystery facing science. David Papineau argues that there is no real puzzle here. Consciousness seems mysterious, not because of any hidden essence, but only because we think about it in a special way. Papineau exposes the confusion, and dispels the mystery: we see consciousness in its place in the material world, and we are on the way to a proper understanding of the mind.
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  38.  90
    David Papineau (1996). Many Minds Are No Worse Than One. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 47 (2):233-241.
  39.  84
    David Papineau (1995). Probabilities and the Many Minds Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics. Analysis 55 (4):239-246.
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  40.  94
    David Papineau (1993). Physicalism, Consciousness, and the Antipathetic Fallacy. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71 (2):169-83.
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  41. David Papineau (2011). Phenomenal Concepts and the Private Language Argument. American Philosophical Quarterly 48 (2):175.
    In this paper I want to consider whether the 'phenomenal concepts' posited by many recent philosophers of mind are consistent with Wittgenstein’s private language argument. The paper will have three sections. In the first I shall explain the rationale for positing phenomenal concepts. In the second I shall argue that phenomenal concepts are indeed inconsistent with the private language argument. In the last I shall ask whether this is bad for phenomenal concepts or bad for Wittgenstein.
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  42. David Papineau (1989). Why Supervenience? Analysis 49 (2):66-71.
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  43. Andreas Hüttemann & David Papineau (2005). Physicalism Decomposed. Analysis 65 (285):33–39.
    In this paper we distinguish two issues that are often run together in discussions about physicalism. The first issue concerns levels. How do entities picked out by non-physical terminology, such as biological or psychological terminology, relate to physical entities? Are the former identical to, or metaphysically supervenient on, the latter? The second issue concerns physical parts and wholes. How do macroscopic physical entities relate to their microscopic parts? Are the former generally determined by the latter? We argue that views on (...)
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  44.  56
    David Papineau (2003). Is Representation Rife? Ratio 16 (2):107-123.
    This paper applies a teleosemantic perspective to the question of whether there is genuine representation outside the familiar realm of belief‐desire psychology. I first explain how teleosemantics accounts for the representational powers of beliefs and desires themselves. I then ask whether biological states which are simpler than beliefs and desires can also have representational powers. My conclusion is that such biologically simple states can be ascribed representational contents, but only in a system‐relative way: such states must be ascribed varying contents (...)
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  45. David Papineau (1992). Reliabilism, Induction and Scepticism. Philosophical Quarterly 42 (166):1-20.
  46.  63
    David Papineau (forthcoming). Can We Really See A Million Colours. In Paul Coates & Sam Coleman (eds.), The Nature of Phenomenal Qualities. OUP
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  47. Graham Macdonald & David Papineau (2006). Introduction: Prospects and Problems for Teleosemantics. In Graham Macdonald & David Papineau (eds.), Teleosemantics: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press 1--22.
     
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  48. David Papineau (2003). Reply to Kirk and Melnyk. SWIF Philosophy of Mind 9.
    I am lucky to have two such penetrating commentators as Robert Kirk and Andrew Melnyk. It is also fortunate that they come at me from different directions, and so cover different aspects of my book. Robert Kirk has doubts about the overall structure of my enterprise, and in particular about my central commitment to a distinctive species of phenomenal concepts. Andrew Melnyk, by contrast, offers no objections to my general brand of materialism. Instead he focuses specifically on my discussion of (...)
     
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  49.  60
    David Papineau (1997). Uncertain Decisions and the Many-Minds Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics. The Monist 80 (1):97-117.
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  50. David Papineau (2002). Introduction to Thinking About Consciousness. In Thinking About Consciousness. Oxford University Press
     
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