Search results for 'David Phiroze Christensen' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. David Christensen (2004). Putting Logic in its Place: Formal Constraints on Rational Belief. Oxford University Press.score: 870.0
    What role, if any, does formal logic play in characterizing epistemically rational belief? Traditionally, belief is seen in a binary way - either one believes a proposition, or one doesn't. Given this picture, it is attractive to impose certain deductive constraints on rational belief: that one's beliefs be logically consistent, and that one believe the logical consequences of one's beliefs. A less popular picture sees belief as a graded phenomenon.
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  2. David Phiroze Christensen & Jennifer Lackey (eds.) (2013). The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays. Oxford University Press.score: 870.0
    This is a collective study of the epistemic significance of disagreement: twelve contributors explore rival responses to the problems that it raises for philosophy.
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  3. Kate T. Christensen (1997). Felicia Ackerman, Ph. D., is Professor of Philosophy in, the Department of Philosophy, Brown University, Providence, Rhode Island. A Recipient of an O'Henry Award, Many of Her Published Short Stories Deal with Issues in Med-Ical Ethics. David A. Buehler, M. Div., MA, is Founder of Bioethika Online Publishers And. [REVIEW] Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 6:253-254.score: 360.0
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  4. Wayne David Christensen & Cliff A. Hooker (2001). Self-Directed Agents. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31 (Supplement):19-52.score: 300.0
    Wayne D. Christensen and Cliff A. Hooker.
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  5. Jerome Christensen (1987). Practicing Enlightenment: Hume and the Formation of a Literary Career. University of Wisconsin Press.score: 300.0
    In this highly original study, Jerome Christensen reconstructs the career of a representative Enlightenment man of letters, David Hume. In doing so, Christensen develops a prototype for a post-structuralist biography. Christensen motivates the interplay between Hume’s texts as arguments and as symbolic acts by conceiving of Hume’s literary career as an adaptive discursive practice, the projected and performed narrative of his social life. Students and scholars of eighteenth-century English and French literature, feminist studies, political theory and (...)
     
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  6. David R. Massey & Carol A. Christensen (1990). Student Teacher Attitudes to Sex Role Stereotyping: Some Australian Data. Educational Studies 16 (2):95-107.score: 280.0
    The sex role attitudes of 461 teacher education students were measured on a 32‐item questionnaire. Chi‐square analyses produced significant effects for gender on 22 of the items, showing that the females were more egalitarian than the males. However, most of the students adopted an egalitarian stance on many, though not all, of the items. Responses to some items suggest that some traditional stereotypes may be particularly resistant to change. The data also suggest that students may adopt egalitarian attitudes out of (...)
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  7. David Christensen (2009). Disagreement as Evidence: The Epistemology of Controversy. Philosophy Compass 4 (5):756-767.score: 240.0
    How much should your confidence in your beliefs be shaken when you learn that others – perhaps 'epistemic peers' who seem as well-qualified as you are – hold beliefs contrary to yours? This article describes motivations that push different philosophers towards opposite answers to this question. It identifies a key theoretical principle that divides current writers on the epistemology of disagreement. It then examines arguments bearing on that principle, and on the wider issue. It ends by describing some outstanding questions (...)
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  8. David Christensen (2007). Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News. Philosophical Review 116 (2):187-217.score: 240.0
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  9. David Christensen (2010). Higher-Order Evidence. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):185-215.score: 240.0
    Sometimes we get evidence of our own epistemic malfunction. This can come from finding out we’re fatigued, or have been drugged, or that other competent and well-informed thinkers disagree with our beliefs. This sort of evidence seems to seems to behave differently from ordinary evidence about the world. In particular, getting such evidence can put agents in a position where the most rational response involves violating some epistemic ideal.
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  10. David Christensen (2011). Disagreement, Question-Begging, and Epistemic Self-Criticism. Philosophers' Imprint 11 (6).score: 240.0
    Responding rationally to the information that others disagree with one’s beliefs requires assessing the epistemic credentials of the opposing beliefs. Conciliatory accounts of disagreement flow in part from holding that these assessments must be independent from one’s own initial reasoning on the disputed matter. I argue that this claim, properly understood, does not have the untoward consequences some have worried about. Moreover, some of the difficulties it does engender must be faced by many less conciliatory accounts of disagreement.
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  11. David Christensen (2009). Introduction: The Epistemology of Disagreement. Episteme 6 (3):231-232.score: 240.0
    One of the most salient features of forming beliefs in a social context is that people end up disagreeing with one another. This is not just an obvious fact about belief-formation; it raises interesting normative questions, especially when people become aware of the opinions of others. How should my beliefs be affected by the knowledge that others hold contrary beliefs? In some cases, the answer seems easy. If I have reason to think that my friend is much better informed than (...)
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  12. David Christensen (1992). Confirmational Holism and Bayesian Epistemology. Philosophy of Science 59 (4):540-557.score: 240.0
    Much contemporary epistemology is informed by a kind of confirmational holism, and a consequent rejection of the assumption that all confirmation rests on experiential certainties. Another prominent theme is that belief comes in degrees, and that rationality requires apportioning one's degrees of belief reasonably. Bayesian confirmation models based on Jeffrey Conditionalization attempt to bring together these two appealing strands. I argue, however, that these models cannot account for a certain aspect of confirmation that would be accounted for in any adequate (...)
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  13. David Christensen (2010). Rational Reflection. Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):121-140.score: 240.0
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  14. David Christensen (2007). Epistemic Self-Respect. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (1pt3):319-337.score: 240.0
  15. David Christensen & Hilary Kornblith (1997). Testimony, Memory and the Limits of the a Priori. Philosophical Studies 86 (1):1-20.score: 240.0
    A number of philosophers, from Thomas Reid1 through C. A. J. Coady2, have argued that one is justified in relying on the testimony of others, and furthermore, that this should be taken as a basic epistemic presumption. If such a general presumption were not ultimately dependent on evidence for the reliability of other people, the ground for this presumption would be a priori. Such a presumption would then have a status like that which Roderick Chisholm claims for the epistemic principle (...)
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  16. David Christensen (1996). Dutch-Book Arguments Depragmatized: Epistemic Consistency for Partial Believers. Journal of Philosophy 93 (9):450-479.score: 240.0
    The most immediately appealing model for formal constraints on degrees of belief is provided by probability theory, which tells us, for instance, that the probability of P can never be greater than that of (P v Q). But while this model has much intuitive appeal, many have been concerned to provide arguments showing that ideally rational degrees of belief would conform to the calculus of probabilities. The arguments most frequently used to make this claim plausible are the so-called "Dutch Book" (...)
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  17. David Christensen (1994). Conservatism in Epistemology. Noûs 28 (1):69-89.score: 240.0
  18. David Christensen (1999). Measuring Confirmation. Journal of Philosophy 96 (9):437-461.score: 240.0
  19. David Christensen (2000). Diachronic Coherence Versus Epistemic Impartiality. Philosophical Review 109 (3):349-371.score: 240.0
    It is obvious that we would not want to demand that an agent' s beliefs at different times exhibit the same sort of consistency that we demand from an agent' s simultaneous beliefs; there' s nothing irrational about believing P at one time and not-P at another. Nevertheless, many have thought that some sort of coherence or stability of beliefs over time is an important component of epistemic rationality.
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  20. David Christensen (1991). Clever Bookies and Coherent Beliefs. Philosophical Review 100 (2):229-247.score: 240.0
  21. David Christensen (2014). Conciliation, Uniqueness and Rational Toxicity. Noûs 49 (2):n/a-n/a.score: 240.0
    Conciliationism holds that disagreement of apparent epistemic peers often substantially undermines rational confidence in our opinions. Uniqueness principles say that there is at most one maximally rational doxastic response to any given batch of total evidence. The two views are often thought to be tightly connected. This paper distinguishes two ways of motivating conciliationism, and two ways that conciliationism may be undermined by permissive accounts of rationality . It shows how conciliationism can flourish under certain strongly permissive accounts of rationality. (...)
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  22. David Christensen (2007). Does Murphy's Law Apply in Epistemology? Self-Doubt and Rational Ideals. Oxford Studies in Epistemology 2:3-31.score: 240.0
    Formally-inclined epistemologists often theorize about ideally rational agents--agents who exemplify rational ideals, such as probabilistic coherence, that human beings could never fully realize. This approach can be defended against the well-know worry that abstracting from human cognitive imperfections deprives the approach of interest. But a different worry arises when we ask what an ideal agent should believe about her own cognitive perfection (even an agent who is in fact cognitively perfect might, it would seem, be uncertain of this fact). Consideration (...)
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  23. David Christensen (1997). What is Relative Confirmation? Noûs 31 (3):370-384.score: 240.0
    It is commonly acknowledged that, in order to test a theoretical hypothesis, one must, in Duhem' s phrase, rely on a "theoretical scaffolding" to connect the hypothesis with something measurable. Hypothesis-confirmation, on this view, becomes a three-place relation: evidence E will confirm hypothesis H only relative to some such scaffolding B. Thus the two leading logical approaches to qualitative confirmation--the hypothetico-deductive (H-D) account and Clark Glymour' s bootstrap account--analyze confirmation in relative terms. But this raises questions about the philosophical interpretation (...)
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  24. David Christensen (2001). Preference-Based Arguments for Probabilism. Philosophy of Science 68 (3):356-376.score: 240.0
    Both Representation Theorem Arguments and Dutch Book Arguments support taking probabilistic coherence as an epistemic norm. Both depend on connecting beliefs to preferences, which are not clearly within the epistemic domain. Moreover, these connections are standardly grounded in questionable definitional/metaphysical claims. The paper argues that these definitional/metaphysical claims are insupportable. It offers a way of reconceiving Representation Theorem arguments which avoids the untenable premises. It then develops a parallel approach to Dutch Book Arguments, and compares the results. In each case (...)
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  25. David Christensen (1983). Glymour on Evidential Relevance. Philosophy of Science 50 (3):471-481.score: 240.0
    Glymour's "bootstrap" account of confirmation is designed to provide an analysis of evidential relevance, which has been a serious problem for hypothetico-deductivism. As set out in Theory and Evidence, however, the "bootstrap" condition allows confirmation in clear cases of evidential irrelevance. The difficulties with Glymour's account seem to be due to a basic feature which it shares with hypothetico-deductive accounts, and which may explain why neither can give a satisfactory analysis of evidential relevance.
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  26. Jennifer Lackey & David Christensen (eds.) (2013). The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays. Oxford University Press.score: 240.0
    This is a collective study of the epistemic significance of disagreement: twelve contributors explore rival responses to the problems that it raises for philosophy.
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  27. David Christensen (1990). The Irrelevance of Bootstrapping. Philosophy of Science 57 (4):644-662.score: 240.0
    The main appeal of the currently popular "bootstrap" account of confirmation developed by Clark Glymour is that it seems to provide an account of evidential relevance. This account has, however, had severe problems; and Glymour has revised his original account in an attempt to solve them. I argue that this attempt fails completely, and that any similar modifications must also fail. If the problems can be solved, it will only be by radical revisions which involve jettisoning bootstrapping's basic approach to (...)
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  28. David Christensen (2007). Three Questions About Leplin's Reliabilism. Philosophical Studies 134 (1):43 - 50.score: 240.0
    Jarrett Leplin’s paper is multifaceted; it’s rich with ideas, and I won’t even try to touch on all of them. Instead, I’d like to raise three questions about the paper: one about its definition of reliable method, one about its solution to the generality problem, and one about its answer to clairvoyance-type objections.
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  29. David Christensen (1993). Skeptical Problems, Semantical Solutions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (2):301-321.score: 240.0
  30. Wayne David Christensen & Mark H. Bickhard (2002). The Process Dynamics of Normative Function. The Monist 85 (1):3-28.score: 240.0
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  31. David Christensen (1993). Switched-Words Skepticism: A Case Study in Semantical Anti-Skeptical Argument. Philosophical Studies 71 (1):33 - 58.score: 240.0
  32. David Christensen (2013). Epistemic Modesty Defended. In David Christensen & Jennifer Lackey (eds.), The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays. Oxford University Press. 77.score: 240.0
    It has often been noticed that conciliatory views of disagreement are "self-undermining" in a certain way: advocates of such views cannot consistently maintain them when other philosophers disagree. This leads to apparent problems of instability and even inconsistency. Does self-undermining, then, show conciliationism untenable? If so, the untenablity would extend not only to almost all views of disagreement, but to a wide range of other views supporting what one might call epistemic modesty: roughly, the idea that getting evidence that one (...)
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  33. Wayne David Christensen, Self-Directedness, Integration and Higher Cognition.score: 240.0
    In this paper, I discuss connections between self-directedness, integration and higher cognition. I present a model of self-directedness as a basis for approaching higher cognition from a situated cognition perspective. According to this model increases in sensorimotor complexity create pressure for integrative higher order control and learning processes for acquiring information about the context in which action occurs. This generates complex articulated abstractive information processing, which forms the major basis for higher cognition. I present evidence that indicates that the same (...)
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  34. David Christensen (1994). John Earman's 'Bayes or Bust? A Critical Examination of Bayesian Confirmation Theory' (Book Review). Philosophical Review 103:345-347.score: 240.0
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  35. Sanford G. Thatcher, James S. Stramel, Heather Blair, David Christensen, Ronald De Sousa, Timothy F. Murphy, Paul Raymont, Harold J. Dumain, Joseph A. Grispino, Todd Volker, Anto Knežević & Karen M. Kuss (1995). Letters to the Editor. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 68 (5):107 - 122.score: 240.0
    A letter protesting the publication of a homophobic rant in the Proceedings of the APA.
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  36. David Christensen, Jeff Barnes & David Rees (2007). Developing Resolve to Have Moral Courage. Journal of Business Ethics Education 4:79-96.score: 240.0
    Ethics research literature often uses Rest’s Four Component Model of ethical behavior as a framework to teach business and accounting ethics. Moral motivation, including resolve to have moral courage, is the third component of the model and is the least-tested component in ethics research. Using a quasi-experimental design with pretest and posttest measurements, we compare the effectiveness of several methods (traditional, exhortation, reflection, moral exemplar) for developing resolve to have moral courage in 211 accounting students during one semester. Results show (...)
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  37. David Christensen (forthcoming). The Epistemology of Controversy. Philosophy Compass.score: 240.0
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  38. Wayne David Christensen & Luca Tommasi (2006). Neuroscience in Context: The New Flagship of the Cognitive Sciences. Biological Theory 1 (1):78-83.score: 240.0
    Cognitive neuroscience has come to be viewed as the flagship of the cognitive sciences and is transforming our understanding of the nature of mind. In this paper we survey several research fields in cognitive neuroscience and note that they are making rapid progress on fundamental issues. Lateralization research is developing a comparative framework for evolutionary analysis, and is identifying individual- and population-level factors that favor brain asymmetries. Neuroeconomics is creating a research framework for studying valuation mechanisms in the brain that (...)
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  39. Peter H. Rohn, William Casement, Don T. Martin, James E. Christensen, David E. Denton, Robert R. Sherman, Robert W. Zuber, Clinton Collins & Turner Rogers (2011). Book Review Section 2. [REVIEW] Educational Studies 19 (3-4):361-403.score: 240.0
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  40. James H. Fetzer, Henry Cribbs, Morten H. Christiansen, Peggy DesAutels, Douglas G. Winblad, Pete Mandik, Wayne Christensen & David Blumenfeld (1997). Book Reviews. [REVIEW] Philosophical Psychology 10 (1):113-137.score: 240.0
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  41. Jennifer Lackey & David Christensen (eds.) (forthcoming). An OUP Volume on Disagreement. OUP.score: 240.0
  42. Kate Christensen (1999). Kate Christensen Speaks with Pat Matheny, a Recipient of Lethal Medication Under Oregon's Death with Dignity Act. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 8 (04):564-568.score: 180.0
    Oregon is the only state in the United States where a physician may legally prescribe a lethal dose of barbiturate for a patient intending suicide. The Oregon Death with Dignity Act was passed by voters in 1994 and came into effect after much legal wrangling in October of 1997. At the same time, a cabinetmaker named Pat Matheny was struggling with progressive weakness from amyotrophic lateral sclerosis, or ALS. I met with Pat and his family for a lengthy interview in (...)
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  43. Thomas Frangenberg & Ludovico David (1994). The Geometry of a Dome: Ludovico David 's Dichiarazione Della Pittura Della Capella Del Collegio Clementino di Roma. Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes 57:191-208.score: 180.0
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  44. Evans David (2007). The Ethics of War Richard Sorabji & David Rodin (Eds.) Ashgate, 2006, Pp. IX+ 253. Philosophy 82 (2):370.score: 180.0
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  45. E. G. Turner, M. David, B. A. van Groningen, J. C. van Oven, E. Boswinkel, E. P. Wegener, A. H. R. E. Paap, M. Hombert & Cl Preaux (1953). Papyrologica Lugduno-Batava, edidit Institutum Papyrologicum Universitatis Lugduno-Batavae, moderantibus M. David, B. A. van Groningen, J. C. van Oven. I. The Warren PapyriPapyrologica Lugduno-Batava, edidit Institutum Papyrologicum Universitatis Lugduno-Batavae, moderantibus M. David, B. A. van Groningen, J. C. van Oven. II. Einige Wiener PapyriPapyrologica Lugduno-Batava, edidit Institutum Papyrologicum Universitatis Lugduno-Batavae, moderantibus M. David, B. A. van Groningen, J. C. van Oven. III. Some Oxford PapyriPapyrologica Lugduno-Batava, edidit Institutum Papyrologicum Universitatis Lugduno-Batavae, moderantibus M. David, B. A. van Groningen, J. C. van Oven. IV. De Herodoti reliquiis in papyris et membranis Aegyptiis servatisPapyrologica Lugduno-Batava, edidit Institutum Papyrologicum Universitatis Lugduno-Batavae, moderantibus M. David, B. A. van Groningen, J. C. van Oven. V. Recherches sur le Recensement dans l'Egypte romaine (P. Brux. Inv. E7616)Papyrologica Lugduno-Batava. [REVIEW] Journal of Hellenic Studies 73:163.score: 180.0
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  46. García Bacca & Juan David (2002). Ensayos y Estudios de Juan David García Bacca. Fundación Para la Cultura Urbana.score: 180.0
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  47. Archard David (forthcoming). Should We Teach Patriotism?/David Archard. Studies in Philosophy and Education.–Ny.score: 180.0
     
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  48. Patrick Maher (2006). Book Review: David Christensen. Putting Logic in its Place: Formal Constraints on Rational Belief. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 47 (1):133-149.score: 120.0
  49. M. G. Titelbaum (2008). Review: David Christensen: Putting Logic in Its Place: Formal Constraints on Rational Belief. [REVIEW] Mind 117 (467):677-681.score: 120.0
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  50. Andrew Rotondo (2014). The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays by Christensen, David and Lackey, Jennifer (Eds.). Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (2):413-414.score: 120.0
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