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David Pitt [19]David C. Pitt [1]
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Profile: David Pitt (California State University, Los Angeles)
  1. David Pitt, Realist Bundle Theory.
    Philosophical theories of the nature of concrete particulars come in two basic kinds, those according to which a concrete particular consists of properties and a bearer of those properties (a substratum), and those according to which a concrete particular consists only of its properties, in a relation of compresence or concurrence. Substrata are theoretical entities defined by their explanatory functions. As such, there is not much disagreement about their nature: they are propertyless, unobservable constituents of concrete particulars that are the (...)
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  2. David Pitt, The Paraphenomenal Hypothesis.
    Gilbert Ryle accused Descartes of advancing what he called the “paramechanical hypothesis,” according to which the structure and operations of the mind can be understood on the model of the structure and operations of a physical system. The body is a complex machine – “a bit of clockwork” – that operates according to laws governing the mechanical interactions of material things. The mind, on the other hand, according to Descartes (according to Ryle), is an immaterial machine that operates according to (...)
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  3. David Pitt, Unconscious Intentionality.
    Some contemporary philosophers – most notably John Searle and Galen Strawson – have persisted in the Cartesian intuition that consciousness and intentionality are somehow essentially connected. Descartes himself held that the relation between consciousness and intentionality is especially intimate: there can be no unconscious mental states of any kind; and no creature incapable of consciousness is capable of mentality. Descartes’s view is widely acknowledged to have been discredited by Freud, and by contemporary cognitive science. Freud argued that the (...)
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  4. David Pitt, What Is It Like to Think That P?
    A number of philosophers endorse, without argument, the view that there’s something it’s like consciously to think that p, which is distinct from what it’s like consciously to think that q. This thesis, if true, would have important consequences for philosophy of mind and cognitive science. In this paper I offer two arguments for it. The first argument claims it would be impossible introspectively to distinguish conscious thoughts with respect to their content if there weren’t something it’s like to think (...)
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  5. David Pitt, The Burgean Intuitions.
    have established that psychological content can be socially determined. They are taken to show that, contrary to the traditional Cartesian conception, the contents of an individual’s thoughts are not always determined by his intrinsic properties alone, but can depend on the practices of the linguistic community of which he is a member. Specifically, Burge claims that his thought experiments show that the socially determined meanings of the words a linguistically competent individual uses to express his thoughts about himself, his fellows (...)
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  6. David Pitt (2013). IndeXical Thought. In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Phenomenal Intentionality. Oxford University Press. 49.
    Call a thought whose expression involves the utterance of an indexical an indexical thought . Thus, my thoughts that I’m annoyed, that now is not the right time, that this is not acceptable, are all indexical thoughts. Such thoughts present a prima facie problem for the thesis that thought contents are phenomenally individuated -- i.e., that each distinct thought type has a proprietarily cognitive phenomenology such that its having that phenomenology makes it the thought that it is -- given the (...)
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  7. David Pitt (2011). Introspection, Phenomenality, and the Availability of Intentional Content. In Tim Bayne & Michelle Montague (eds.), Cognitive Phenomenology. OUP. 141.
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  8. David Pitt (2009). Intentional Psychologism. Philosophical Studies 146 (1):117 - 138.
    In the past few years, a number of philosophers (notably, Siewert, C. (The significance of consciousness. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998); Horgan and Tienson (Philosophy of mind: Classical and contemporary readings, Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. 520–533); Pitt 2004) have maintained the following three theses: (1) there is a distinctive sort of phenomenology characteristic of conscious thought, as opposed to other sorts of conscious mental states; (2) different conscious thoughts have different phenomenologies; and (3) thoughts with the same phenomenology have (...)
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  9. David Pitt, Mental Representation. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    The notion of a "mental representation" is, arguably, in the first instance a theoretical construct of cognitive science. As such, it is a basic concept of the Computational Theory of Mind, according to which cognitive states and processes are constituted by the occurrence, transformation and storage (in the mind/brain) of information-bearing structures (representations) of one kind or another.
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  10. David Pitt (2004). The Phenomenology of Cognition, or, What is It Like to Think That P? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (1):1-36.
    A number of philosophers endorse, without argument, the view that there's something it's like consciously to think that p, which is distinct from what it's like consciously to think that q. This thesis, if true, would have important consequences for philosophy of mind and cognitive science. In this paper I offer two arguments for it. The first argument claims it would be impossible introspectively to distinguish conscious thoughts with respect to their content if there weren't something it's like to think (...)
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  11. Douglas Lackey & David Pitt (2003). Introduction. Philosophical Forum 34 (3-4):iii–v.
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  12. Douglas Lackey & David Pitt (2003). The Philosophical Ideas of Jerrold J. Katz-Introduction. Philosophical Forum 34 (3-4):iii - V.
     
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  13. David Pitt (2003). On Markerese. Philosophical Forum 34 (3-4):267–300.
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  14. David Pitt (2002). Jerrold Katz, 1932-2002. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 75 (5):193 - 195.
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  15. David Pitt (2001). Alter Egos and Their Names. Journal of Philosophy 98 (10):531-552.
    ailure of substitutivity of coreferential terms, one of the hallmarks of referential opacity, is standardly explained in terms of the presence of an expression (such as a verb of propositional attitude, a modal adverb or quotation marks) with opacity-inducing properties. It is thus assumed that any term in a complex expression for which substitutivity fails will be within the scope of an expression of one of these types, and that where there is an expression of one of these types there (...)
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  16. David Pitt (2000). Nativism and the Theory of Content. Protosociology 14:222-239.
  17. David Pitt (1999). In Defense of Definitions. Philosophical Psychology 12 (2):139-156.
    The arguments of Fodor, Garret, Walker and Parkes [(1980) Against definitions, Cognition, 8, 263-367] are the source of widespread skepticism in cognitive science about lexical semantic structure. Whereas the thesis that lexical items, and the concepts they express, have decompositional structure (i.e. have significant constituents) was at one time "one of those ideas that hardly anybody [in the cognitive sciences] ever considers giving up" (p. 264), most researchers now believe that "[a]ll the evidence suggests that the classical [(decompositional)] view is (...)
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  18. David C. Pitt (1983). The Socioeconomic Context of Migrants and Minorities. Journal of Biosocial Science 15 (S8):111-127.
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