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Profile: David Rosenthal (CUNY Graduate Center)
  1.  34
    Hakwan Lau & David Rosenthal (2011). Empirical Support for Higher-Order Theories of Conscious Awareness. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 15 (8):365-373.
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  2. David M. Rosenthal (1986). Two Concepts of Consciousness. Philosophical Studies 49 (May):329-59.
    No mental phenomenon is more central than consciousness to an adequate understanding of the mind. Nor does any mental phenomenon seem more stubbornly to resist theoretical treatment. Consciousness is so basic to the way we think about the mind that it can be tempting to suppose that no mental states exist that are not conscious states. Indeed, it may even seem mysterious what sort of thing a mental state might be if it is not a conscious state. On this way (...)
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  3. David M. Rosenthal (2005). Consciousness and Mind. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
    The first four essays develop various aspects of that theory.The next three essays present Rosenthal's homomorphism theory of mental qualities and qualitative ..
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  4. David M. Rosenthal, Consciousness (.
    (1) Most commonly these terms are used to describe people. People and other creatures are conscious if they are awake and responsive to sensory stimulation. Because this is a property of creatures, we can call it creature consciousness. An individual lacks such consciousness if it is asleep, in a coma, anesthetized, and so forth. Creature consciousness demands a mainly biological explanation, as against an explanation in mainly psychological terms.
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  5. David M. Rosenthal (2002). How Many Kinds of Consciousness? Consciousness and Cognition 11 (4):653-665.
    Ned BlockÕs influential distinction between phenomenal and access consciousness has become a staple of current discussions of consciousness. It is not often noted, however, that his distinction tacitly embodies unargued theoretical assumptions that favor some theoretical treatments at the expense of others. This is equally so for his less widely discussed distinction between phenomenal consciousness and what he calls reflexive consciousness. I argue that the distinction between phenomenal and access consciousness, as Block draws it, is untenable. Though mental states that (...)
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  6. David Rosenthal, Consciousness and its Function.
    MS, under submission, derived from a Powerpoint presentation at a Conference on Consciousness, Memory, and Perception, in honor of Larry Weiskrantz, City University, London, September 15, 2006.
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  7.  84
    David Rosenthal (2011). Exaggerated Reports: Reply to Block. Analysis 71 (3):431-437.
  8. David M. Rosenthal (1993). Thinking That One Thinks. In Martin Davies & Glyn W. Humphreys (eds.), Consciousness: Psychological and Philosophical Essays. Blackwell
     
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  9. David Rosenthal (2004). Varieties of Higher-Order Theory. In Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology. John Benjamins
    A touchstone of much modern theorizing about the mind is the idea, still tac- itly accepted by many, that a state's being mental implies that it's conscious. This view is epitomized in the dictum, put forth by theorists as otherwise di-.
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  10. David M. Rosenthal (2010). Consciousness, the Self and Bodily Location. Analysis 70 (2):270-276.
    (No abstract is available for this citation).
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  11. David M. Rosenthal (1997). A Theory of Consciousness. In Ned Block, Owen J. Flanagan & Guven Guzeldere (eds.), The Nature of Consciousness. MIT Press
  12. David Rosenthal (2012). Higher-Order Awareness, Misrepresentation, and Function. Higher-Order Awareness, Misrepresentation and Function 367 (1594):1424-1438.
    Conscious mental states are states we are in some way aware of. I compare higher-order theories of consciousness, which explain consciousness by appeal to such higher-order awareness (HOA), and first-order theories, which do not, and I argue that higher-order theories have substantial explanatory advantages. The higher-order nature of our awareness of our conscious states suggests an analogy with the metacognition that figures in the regulation of psychological processes and behaviour. I argue that, although both consciousness and metacognition involve higher-order psychological (...)
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  13.  75
    David Rosenthal & Josh Weisberg (2008). Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness. Scholarpedia 3 (5):4407.
  14. David M. Rosenthal, Consciousness.
    One phenomenon pertains roughly to being awake. A person or other creature is conscious when it's awake and mentally responsive to sensory input; otherwise it's unconscious. This kind of consciousness figures most often in everyday discourse.
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  15. David M. Rosenthal (ed.) (1991). The Nature of Mind. Oxford University Press.
    This anthology brings together readings mainly from contemporary philosophers, but also from writers of the past two centuries, on the philosophy of mind. Some of the main questions addressed are: is a human being really a mind in relation to a body; if so, what exactly is this mind and how it is related to the body; and are there any grounds for supposing that the mind survives the disintegration of the body?
     
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  16.  87
    David M. Rosenthal, Explicarea Conştiinţei.
    Dintre fenomenele mentale, nici unul nu pare să reziste atât de bine explicaţiei precum conştiinţa. Parţial, dificultatea se datorează faptului că folosim termenul „conştient” şi alţii înrudiţi să dea seama de anumite fenomene distincte ale căror legături nu sunt întotdeauna clare. Iar acest lucru duce adesea la amestecarea acestor fenomene distincte. De aceea, orice încercare de a explica conştiinţa trebuie să înceapă prin a distinge diferitele lucruri pe care le numim conştiinţă. Un astfel de fenomen este strâns legat de simplul (...)
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  17. David M. Rosenthal (2000). Consciousness, Content, and Metacognitive Judgments. Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):203-214.
    Because metacognition consists in our having mental access to our cognitive states and mental states are conscious only when we are conscious of them in some suitable way, metacognition and consciousness shed important theoretical light on one another. Thus, our having metacognitive access to information carried by states that are not conscious helps con?rm the hypothesis that a mental state.
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  18. David Rosenthal (web). Concepts and Definitions of Consciousness. In P. W. Banks (ed.), Encyclopedia of Consciousness. Elsevier
    in Encyclopedia of Consciousness, ed. William P. Banks, Amsterdam: Elsevier, forthcoming in 2009.
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  19.  2
    David M. Rosenthal (2004). The Nature of Consciousness. Mind 113 (451):581-588.
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  20. David M. Rosenthal (2000). Metacognition and Higher-Order Thoughts. Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):231-242.
    Because there is a fair amount of overlap in the points by Balog and Rey, I will organize this response topically, referring specifically to each commentator as rele- vant. And, because much of the discussion focuses on my higher-order-thought hypothesis independent of questions about metacognition, I will begin by addressing a cluster of issues that have to do with the status, motivation, and exact formulation of that hypothesis.
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  21. David Rosenthal (2010). How to Think About Mental Qualities. Philosophical Issues 20 (1):368-393.
    It’s often held that undetectable inversion of mental qualities is, if not possible, at least conceivable. It’s thought to be conceivable that the mental quality your visual states exhibit when you see something red in standard conditions is literally of the same type as the mental quality my visual states exhibit when I see something green in such circumstances. It’s thought, moreover, to be conceivable that such inversion of mental qualities could be wholly undetectable by any third-person means. And since (...)
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  22. David M. Rosenthal (1991). The Independence of Consciousness and Sensory Quality. Philosophical Issues 1:15-36.
  23. David M. Rosenthal, The Kinds of Consciousness.
    I begin by considering Ned Block's widely accepted distinction between phenomenal and access consciousness. I argue that on Block's official characterization a mental state's being access conscious is not a way the state's being conscious in any intuitive sense; that if phenomenal consciousness itself corresponds to an intuitive way of a state's being conscious, it literally implies access consciousness; and that Block misconstrues the theoretical significance of the commonsense distinction. These considerations point to the view that mental states' being conscious (...)
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  24. David M. Rosenthal (2002). Consciousness and Higher-Order Thought. In L. Nagel (ed.), Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. Macmillan
    The problem of consciousness is to say what it is for some of our thoughts, feelings, and sensations to be conscious, given that others are not. This is different from saying what it is for a person to be conscious or not conscious. Even when people are conscious, many of their thoughts and sensations typically are not. And there's nothing problematic about a person's being conscious; it's just the person's being awake and responsive to sensory input.
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  25.  12
    David M. Rosenthal (1999). The Colors and Shapes of Visual Experiences. In Denis Fisette (ed.), Consciousness and Intentionality: Models and Modalities of Attribution. Kluwer 95--118.
    red and round. According to common sense, the red, round thing we see is the tomato itself. When we have a hallucinatory vision of a tomato, however, there may be present to us no red and round phys- ical object. Still, we use the words 'red' and 'round' to describe that situation as well, this time applying them to the visual experience itself. We say that we have a red, round visual image, or a visual experience of a red disk, (...)
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  26. David Rosenthal (2002). Moore's Paradox and Crimmins's Case. Analysis 62 (274):167-171.
    Moore’s paradox occurs with sentences, such as (1) It’s raining and I don’t think it’s raining. which are self-defeating in a way that prevents one from making an asser- tion with them.1 But Mark Crimmins has given us a case of a sentence that is syntactically just like (1) but is nonetheless assertible. Suppose I know somebody, and know or have excellent reason to believe that I know that very person under some other guise. I do not know what that (...)
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  27. David M. Rosenthal (2002). The Timing of Conscious States. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):215-20.
    Striking experimental results by Benjamin Libet and colleagues have had an impor- tant impact on much recent discussion of consciousness. Some investigators have sought to replicate or extend Libet’s results (Haggard, 1999; Haggard & Eimer, 1999; Haggard, Newman, & Magno, 1999; Trevena & Miller, 2002), while others have focused on how to interpret those findings (e.g., Gomes, 1998, 1999, 2002; Pockett, 2002), which many have seen as conflicting with our commonsense picture of mental functioning.
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  28. David M. Rosenthal (1994). State Consciousness and Transitive Consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition 2 (3):355-63.
  29. David M. Rosenthal (1997). Phenomenal Consciousness and What It's Like. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):156--57.
    be realized. Whatever gets access to phenomenal awareness is represented within this absent together.
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  30.  15
    David M. Rosenthal (2002). Explaining Consciousness. In David J. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Oxford University Press 109-131.
  31.  80
    David M. Rosenthal (2004). Being Conscious of Ourselves. The Monist 87 (2):161-184.
  32. David Rosenthal (2010). Expressing One's Mind. Acta Analytica 25 (1):21 - 34.
    Remarks such as ‘I am in pain’ and ‘I think that it’s raining’ are puzzling, since they seem to literally describe oneself as being in pain or having a particular thought, but their conditions of use tend to coincide with unequivocal expressions of pain or of that thought. This led Wittgenstein, among others, to treat such remarks as expressing, rather than as reporting, one’s mental states. Though such expressivism is widely recognized as untenable, Bar-On has recently advanced a neo-expressivist view, (...)
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  33. David M. Rosenthal (1995). Self-Knowledge and Moore's Paradox. Philosophical Studies 77 (2-3):195 - 209.
    As G. E. Moore famously observed, sentences such as 'It's raining but I don't think it is', though they aren't contradictory, cannot be used to make coherent assertions.' The trouble with such sentences is not a matter of their truth conditions; such sentences can readily be true. Indeed, it happens often enough with each of us that we think, for example, that it isn't raining even though it is. This shows that such sentences are not literally contradictory. But even though (...)
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  34. David M. Rosenthal, The Mind and its Expression.
    pain' and ┌I think that p┐ express the pain and the thought that p, themselves. The book is most impressive. It is packed with careful argument, and addresses a remarkable range of important issues about the mind. I have very much enjoyed studying it.
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  35. David Rosenthal, The Mind and its Expression.
    MS., for an Eastern Division APA Author-Meets-Critics Session on Dorit Bar-On, Speaking My Mind: Expression and Self-Knowledge, Baltimore, December 2007.
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  36. David M. Rosenthal (2005). Sensory Qualities, Consciousness, and Perception. In Consciousness and Mind. Clarendon Press 175-226.
  37. David Rosenthal, HOTs and Mental Appearance: A Reply to Prettyman.
    There are a few things I’d like to say in reply to Adrienne Prettyman’s interesting paper, “Empty Thoughts: An Explanatory Problem for Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness,” in which she discusses the objection to higher-order theories from the possibility those theories leave open that a higher-order awareness represents one as being in a state that one is not actually in.
     
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  38.  96
    David Rosenthal (2011). Awareness and Identification of Self. In JeeLoo Liu & John Perry (eds.), Consciousness and the Self: New Essays.
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  39.  11
    David M. Rosenthal (1999). Sensory Quality and the Relocation Story. Philosophical Topics 26 (1/2):321-350.
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  40. David M. Rosenthal (2004). Subjective Character and Reflexive Content. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):191-198.
    I. Zombies and the Knowledge Argument John Perry.
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  41.  6
    David Rosenthal (2007). Phenomenological Overflow and Cognitive Access. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5-6):522-523.
    I argue that the partial-report results Block cites do not establish that phenomenology overflows cognitive accessibility, as Block maintains. So, without additional argument, the mesh he sees between psychology and neuroscience is unsupported. I argue further that there is reason to hold, contra Block, that phenomenology does always involve some cognitive access to the relevant experience.
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  42. G. E. M. Anscombe, R. Rhees & David M. Rosenthal, The Mind and Its Expression.
    pain' and ┌I think that p┐ express the pain and the thought that p, themselves. The book is most impressive. It is packed with careful argument, and addresses a remarkable range of important issues about the mind. I have very much enjoyed studying it.
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  43. David Rosenthal (2002). The Higher-Order Model of Consciousness. In Rita Carter (ed.), Consciousness.
    All mental states, including thoughts, feelings, perceptions, and sensations, often occur consciously. But they all occur also without being conscious. So the first thing a theory of consciousness must do is explain the difference between thoughts, feelings, perceptions, and sensations that are conscious and those which are not.
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  44. E. M. Anscombe, R. Rhees & David M. Rosenthal, Consciousness.
    One phenomenon pertains roughly to being awake. A person or other creature is conscious when it's awake and mentally responsive to sensory input; otherwise it's unconscious. This kind of consciousness figures most often in everyday discourse.
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  45. David Rosenthal (2005). The Higher-Order Model of Consciousness. In Rita Carter (ed.), Consciousness. Weidenfeld & Nicolson
    All mental states, including thoughts, feelings, perceptions, and sensations, often occur consciously. But they all occur also without being conscious. So the first thing a theory of consciousness must do is explain the difference between thoughts, feelings, perceptions, and sensations that are conscious and those which are not.
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  46.  6
    David M. Rosenthal (1985). Perception: A Representative Theory by Frank Jackson. Journal of Philosophy 82 (1):28-41.
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  47. David M. Rosenthal (1995). Multiple Drafts and the Facts of the Matter. In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Ferdinand Schoningh 275--290.
  48. David M. Rosenthal (2001). Color, Mental Location, and the Visual Field. Consciousness and Cognition 10 (1):85-93.
    Color subjectivism is the view that color properties are mental properties of our visual sensations, perhaps identical with properties of neural states, and that nothing except visual sensations and other mental states exhibits color properties. Color phys- icalism, by contrast, holds that colors are exclusively properties of visible physical objects and processes.
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  49. David Rosenthal, Aristotle on Thought.
    The main goal of Deborah Modrak's penetrating and compelling discussion is to show that Aristotle subscribed "to an integrated model of perceptual and noetic functions" (268). Using Aristotle's phrase (Γ4, 429b13, 21), Modrak describes the integrated model as the view that "the noetic faculty is the perceptual faculty differently disposed" (283). She notes that this interpretation faces certain difficulties, but argues forcefully and incisively that it can nonetheless be sustained.
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  50. David Rosenthal, Aristotle's Hylomorphism.
    In these comments on Bernard Williams's probing and provocative paper, I shall first try to develop a line of response to the pair of problems Williams poses concerning Aristotle's account of soul. I shall then offer some reactions, of a more general sort, to his discussion of hylomorphism (henceforth "HMism"). In particular, I want to suggest that, though HMism is in part a form of inoffensive materialism, it is more than just that. And I want to urge also that HMism (...)
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