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Profile: David Rosenthal (CUNY Graduate Center)
  1. David Rosenthal (web). Concepts and Definitions of Consciousness. In P W. Banks (ed.), Encyclopedia of Consciousness. Elsevier.
    in Encyclopedia of Consciousness, ed. William P. Banks, Amsterdam: Elsevier, forthcoming in 2009.
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  2. David Rosenthal, Consciousness and its Function.
    MS, under submission, derived from a Powerpoint presentation at a Conference on Consciousness, Memory, and Perception, in honor of Larry Weiskrantz, City University, London, September 15, 2006.
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  3. David Rosenthal, Reflections on Five Questions: Autobiographical and Disciplinary.
    in Mind and Consciousness: Five Questions, ed. Patrick Grim, New York and London: Automatic Press, forthcoming.
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  4. David Rosenthal, “Replies to Galen Strawson and Ned Block.
    (not intended for publication), Replies to Strawson and Block in Colloquium at the CUNY Graduate Center, December 13, 2006.
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  5. David Rosenthal, The Function and Facilitation of Consciousness.
  6. David Rosenthal, The Mind and its Expression.
    MS., for an Eastern Division APA Author-Meets-Critics Session on Dorit Bar-On, Speaking My Mind: Expression and Self-Knowledge, Baltimore, December 2007.
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  7. E. M. Anscombe, R. Rhees & David M. Rosenthal, Consciousness.
    One phenomenon pertains roughly to being awake. A person or other creature is conscious when it's awake and mentally responsive to sensory input; otherwise it's unconscious. This kind of consciousness figures most often in everyday discourse.
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  8. G. E. M. Anscombe, R. Rhees & David M. Rosenthal, The Mind and Its Expression.
    pain' and ┌I think that p┐ express the pain and the thought that p, themselves. The book is most impressive. It is packed with careful argument, and addresses a remarkable range of important issues about the mind. I have very much enjoyed studying it.
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  9. David Rosenthal, The The Poverty of Poverty of Poverty of Poverty of Consciousness Consciousness.
    , encapsulates his deep hostility to Marxist thinking. his deep hostility to Marxist thinking. his deep hostility to Marxist thinking. his deep hostility to Marxist thinking. By contrast, my own allusion is friendly, By contrast, my own allusion is friendly, and is meant to point up a nice parallel and is meant to point up a nice parallel my argument has with a schematic my argument has with a schematic aspect of Marx’s thinking. aspect of Marx’s thinking.
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  10. David M. Rosenthal, Consciousness, Plans, and Language: Commentary on Bridgeman on Consciousness.
    There is much in Bridgeman's account that I find congenial and compelling, especially appealing is Bridgeman's application of his thesis to the tie between consciousness and language. Nonetheless, I want to raise some questions about whether the tie he finds between plans and consciousness actually does hold. Not all memory and attention is conscious. Although attention and accessing of memories are required to execute plans, we need not be at all conscious of the relevant states of memory and attention. Nor (...)
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  11. David M. Rosenthal, Explicarea Conştiinţei.
    Dintre fenomenele mentale, nici unul nu pare să reziste atât de bine explicaţiei precum conştiinţa. Parţial, dificultatea se datorează faptului că folosim termenul „conştient” şi alţii înrudiţi să dea seama de anumite fenomene distincte ale căror legături nu sunt întotdeauna clare. Iar acest lucru duce adesea la amestecarea acestor fenomene distincte. De aceea, orice încercare de a explica conştiinţa trebuie să înceapă prin a distinge diferitele lucruri pe care le numim conştiinţă. Un astfel de fenomen este strâns legat de simplul (...)
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  12. David M. Rosenthal, The Kinds of Consciousness.
    I begin by considering Ned Block's widely accepted distinction between phenomenal and access consciousness. I argue that on Block's official characterization a mental state's being access conscious is not a way the state's being conscious in any intuitive sense; that if phenomenal consciousness itself corresponds to an intuitive way of a state's being conscious, it literally implies access consciousness; and that Block misconstrues the theoretical significance of the commonsense distinction. These considerations point to the view that mental states' being conscious (...)
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  13. David M. Rosenthal, Will and the Theory of Judgment.
    Contemporary discussions typically give somewhat sort shrift to the theory of judgment Descartes advances in the Fourth Meditation.' One reason for this relative neglect is presumably the prima facie implausibility of the theory. It sounds odd to say that, in believing something, one's mental affirmation is an act of free will, on a par with freely deciding what to do. In addition, Descartes advances the theory as a way to explain the possibility of human error, which doubtless strikes many as (...)
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  14. David Rosenthal & JeeLoo Liu, The Nature of Consciousness Handout.
    1. To refute this theory: consciousness is intrinsic to being an intentional or sensory mental state; one cannot understand what it is for states to have sensory or intentional character without knowing what it is for those states to be conscious.
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  15. David Rosenthal, Aristotle's Hylomorphism.
    In these comments on Bernard Williams's probing and provocative paper, I shall first try to develop a line of response to the pair of problems Williams poses concerning Aristotle's account of soul. I shall then offer some reactions, of a more general sort, to his discussion of hylomorphism (henceforth "HMism"). In particular, I want to suggest that, though HMism is in part a form of inoffensive materialism, it is more than just that. And I want to urge also that HMism (...)
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  16. David Rosenthal, Aristotle on Thought.
    The main goal of Deborah Modrak's penetrating and compelling discussion is to show that Aristotle subscribed "to an integrated model of perceptual and noetic functions" (268). Using Aristotle's phrase (Γ4, 429b13, 21), Modrak describes the integrated model as the view that "the noetic faculty is the perceptual faculty differently disposed" (283). She notes that this interpretation faces certain difficulties, but argues forcefully and incisively that it can nonetheless be sustained.
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  17. David Rosenthal, Book Reviews 581. [REVIEW]
    The focus of Mark Rowlands’s admirable, richly argued book is phenomenal consciousness, in particular, how such consciousness arises from processes that are not themselves phenomenally conscious. Rowlands examines several views on this question, arguing that their failures point toward his own intriguing, novel position, which he develops in the final three chapters.
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  18. David Rosenthal, Commentaries.
    But there is another reason, equally important. We distinguish among thoughts, feelings, and sensations by virtue of their characteristic representational properties. In particular, we describe thoughts and emotions in terms of the things they are about and how they represent those things. And we characterize sensations by reference to their qualitative properties and the things..
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  19. David Rosenthal, Consciousness and Intrinsic Higher-Order Content.
    PowerPoint presentation at Tucson VII, Toward a Science of Consciousness 2006, session on Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness.
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  20. David Rosenthal, 6. Philosophy and its Teaching.
    A striking difference between those fields we classify as humanities and those we regard as sciences is the attitude within each field toward its history. Learning about literature, music, or the visual arts requires becoming knowledgeable about a significant amount of the history of those areas. And education in these fields, at whatever level, invariably involves some study of great accomplishments in the past. By contrast, scientific work and standard scientific textbooks make little reference to the history of the science (...)
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  21. David Rosenthal, V. Consciousness, Interpretation, and Higher-Order-Thought.
    Few contemporary researchers in psychology, philosophy, and the cognitive sciences have any doubt about whether mental phenomena occur without being conscious. There is extensive and convincing clinical and experimental evidence for the existence of thoughts, desires, and related mental states that aren’t conscious. We characterize thoughts, desires, intentions, expectations, hopes, and many other mental states in terms of the things they are about and, more fully, in terms of their content, as captured by a sentence nominalization, such as a clause (...)
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  22. David M. Rosenthal, Consciousness (.
    (1) Most commonly these terms are used to describe people. People and other creatures are conscious if they are awake and responsive to sensory stimulation. Because this is a property of creatures, we can call it creature consciousness. An individual lacks such consciousness if it is asleep, in a coma, anesthetized, and so forth. Creature consciousness demands a mainly biological explanation, as against an explanation in mainly psychological terms.
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  23. William G. Lycan & David M. Rosenthal (forthcoming). Editor's booknotes. Cogito.
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  24. David M. Rosenthal (forthcoming). Philosophy of Mind. Social Research.
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  25. Benjamin D. Young, Andreas Keller & David Rosenthal (2014). Quality-Space Theory in Olfaction. Frontiers in Psychology:doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00001.
    Quality-space theory (QST) explains the nature of the mental qualities distinctive of perceptual states by appeal to their role in perceiving. QST is typically described in terms of the mental qualities that pertain to color. Here we apply QST to the olfactory modalities. Olfaction is in various respects more complex than vision, and so provides a useful test case for QST. To determine whether QST can deal with the challenges olfaction presents, we show how a quality space could be constructed (...)
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  26. David Rosenthal (2012). Higher-Order Awareness, Misrepresentation, and Function. Higher-Order Awareness, Misrepresentation and Function 367 (1594):1424-1438.
    Conscious mental states are states we are in some way aware of. I compare higher-order theories of consciousness, which explain consciousness by appeal to such higher-order awareness (HOA), and first-order theories, which do not, and I argue that higher-order theories have substantial explanatory advantages. The higher-order nature of our awareness of our conscious states suggests an analogy with the metacognition that figures in the regulation of psychological processes and behaviour. I argue that, although both consciousness and metacognition involve higher-order psychological (...)
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  27. Hakwan Lau & David Rosenthal (2011). Empirical Support for Higher-Order Theories of Conscious Awareness. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 15 (8):365-373.
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  28. Hakwan Lau & David Rosenthal (2011). The Higher-Order View Does Not Require Consciously Self-Directed Introspection: Response to Malach. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 15 (11):508-509.
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  29. David Rosenthal (2011). Awareness and Identification of Self. In JeeLoo Liu & John Perry (eds.), Consciousness and the Self: New Essays.
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  30. David Rosenthal (2011). Exaggerated Reports: Reply to Block. Analysis 71 (3):431-437.
  31. David Rosenthal (2010). Expressing One's Mind. Acta Analytica 25 (1):21 - 34.
    Remarks such as ‘I am in pain’ and ‘I think that it’s raining’ are puzzling, since they seem to literally describe oneself as being in pain or having a particular thought, but their conditions of use tend to coincide with unequivocal expressions of pain or of that thought. This led Wittgenstein, among others, to treat such remarks as expressing, rather than as reporting, one’s mental states. Though such expressivism is widely recognized as untenable, Bar-On has recently advanced a neo-expressivist view, (...)
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  32. David Rosenthal (2010). How to Think About Mental Qualities. Philosophical Issues 20 (1):368-393.
    It’s often held that undetectable inversion of mental qualities is, if not possible, at least conceivable. It’s thought to be conceivable that the mental quality your visual states exhibit when you see something red in standard conditions is literally of the same type as the mental quality my visual states exhibit when I see something green in such circumstances. It’s thought, moreover, to be conceivable that such inversion of mental qualities could be wholly undetectable by any third-person means. And since (...)
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  33. David M. Rosenthal (2010). Consciousness, the Self and Bodily Location. Analysis 70 (2):270-276.
    (No abstract is available for this citation).
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  34. Robert B. Talisse, Maureen Eckert, Norman Bowie, Steven M. Cahn, Randall Curren, Alan Goldman, Tziporah Kasachkoff, Peter Markie, John O'Connor, David Rosenthal, Robert Simon, David Shatz, George Sher, Douglas Stalker & Christine Vitrano (2009). A Teacher's Life: Essays for Steven M. Cahn. Lexington Books.
    This is a collection of 13 essays honoring Steven Cahn, presented to him on the occasion of his 25th year as Professor of Philosophy at the City University of New York.
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  35. David Rosenthal & Josh Weisberg (2008). Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness. Scholarpedia 3 (5):4407.
  36. David Rosenthal (2007). Phenomenological Overflow and Cognitive Access. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5-6):522-523.
    I argue that the partial-report results Block cites do not establish that phenomenology overflows cognitive accessibility, as Block maintains. So, without additional argument, the mesh he sees between psychology and neuroscience is unsupported. I argue further that there is reason to hold, contra Block, that phenomenology does always involve some cognitive access to the relevant experience.
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  37. David M. Rosenthal (2006). Experience and the Physical. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (10-11):117-28.
    Strawson’s challenging and provocative defence of panpsychism1 begins by sensibly insisting that physicalism, properly understood, must unflinchingly countenance the occurrence of conscious experiences. No view, he urges, will count as ‘real physicalism’ (p. 4) if it seeks to get around or soften that commitment, as versions of socalled physicalism sometimes do. Real physicalism (hereinafter physicalism tout court) must accordingly reject any stark opposition of mental and physical, which is not only invoked by many followers of Descartes, but even countenanced by (...)
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  38. David M. Rosenthal & Gerhard Preyer (2006). B. Referate Uber Fremdsprachige Neuerscheinungen-Consciousness and Mind. Philosophischer Literaturanzeiger 59 (3):310.
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  39. David Rosenthal (2005). The Higher-Order Model of Consciousness. In Rita Carter (ed.), Consciousness. Weidenfeld & Nicolson.
    All mental states, including thoughts, feelings, perceptions, and sensations, often occur consciously. But they all occur also without being conscious. So the first thing a theory of consciousness must do is explain the difference between thoughts, feelings, perceptions, and sensations that are conscious and those which are not.
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  40. David M. Rosenthal (2005). Consciousness and Mind. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
    The first four essays develop various aspects of that theory.The next three essays present Rosenthal's homomorphism theory of mental qualities and qualitative ...
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  41. David M. Rosenthal (2005). Sensory Qualities, Consciousness, and Perception. In Consciousness and Mind. Clarendon Press. 175-226.
     
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  42. Terry Bynum, Robert Cavalier, James Moor, David Rosenthal & Bill Uzgalis (2004). Daniel Dennett and the Computational Turn. Minds and Machines 14:281-282.
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  43. David Rosenthal (2004). Varieties of Higher-Order Theory. In Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology. John Benjamins.
    A touchstone of much modern theorizing about the mind is the idea, still tac- itly accepted by many, that a state's being mental implies that it's conscious. This view is epitomized in the dictum, put forth by theorists as otherwise di-.
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  44. David M. Rosenthal (2004). Being Conscious of Ourselves. The Monist 87 (2):161-184.
  45. David M. Rosenthal (2004). Review: Subjective Character and Reflexive Content. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):191 - 198.
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  46. David M. Rosenthal (2004). Review: The Nature of Consciousness. [REVIEW] Mind 113 (451):581-588.
  47. David M. Rosenthal (2004). Subjective Character and Reflexive Content. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):191-198.
    I. Zombies and the Knowledge Argument John Perry.
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  48. David M. Rosenthal (2004). The Nature of Consciousness. Mind 113 (451):581-588.
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  49. David M. Rosenthal (2003). Unity of Consciousness and the Self. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 103 (3):325-352.
    The so-called unity of consciousness consists in the compelling sense we have that all our conscious mental states belong to a single conscious subject. Elsewhere I have argued that a mental state's being conscious is a matter of our being conscious of that state by having a higher-order thought (HOT) about it. Contrary to what is sometimes argued, this HOT model affords a natural explanation of our sense that our conscious states all belong to a single conscious subject. HOTs often (...)
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  50. David Rosenthal (2002). The Higher-Order Model of Consciousness. In Rita Carter (ed.), Consciousness.
    All mental states, including thoughts, feelings, perceptions, and sensations, often occur consciously. But they all occur also without being conscious. So the first thing a theory of consciousness must do is explain the difference between thoughts, feelings, perceptions, and sensations that are conscious and those which are not.
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