43 found
Sort by:
Disambiguations:
David Sobel [34]David M. Sobel [9]
See also:
Profile: David Sobel (Syracuse University)
  1. Alison Gopnik, Clark Glymour, David M. Sobel & Laura E. Schultz, Causal Learning in Children: Causal Maps and Bayes Nets.
    We outline a cognitive and computational account of causal learning in children. We propose that children employ specialized cognitive systems that allow them to recover an accurate “causal map” of the world: an abstract, coherent representation of the causal relations among events. This kind of knowledge can be perspicuously represented by the formalism of directed graphical causal models, or “Bayes nets”. Human causal learning and inference may involve computations similar to those for learnig causal Bayes nets and for predicting with (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Janice Dowell, J. L. & David Sobel (forthcoming). Advice for Non-Analytical Naturalists. In Simon Kirchin (ed.), Reading Parfit. Routledge.
    We argue that Parfit's "Triviality Objection" against some naturalistic views of normativity is not compelling. We think that once one accepts, as one should, that identity statements can be informative in virtue of their pragmatics and not only in virtue of their semantics, Parfit's case against naturalism can be overcome.
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. David Sobel (forthcoming). Self-Ownership and the Conflation Problem. In Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics.
    Libertarian self-ownership views in the tradition of Locke, Nozick, and the left-libertarians have supposed that we enjoy very powerful deontological protections against infringing upon our property. Such a conception makes sense when we are focused on property that is very important to its owner, such as a person’s kidney. However, this stringency of our property rights is harder to credit when we consider more trivial infringements such as very mildly toxic pollution or trivial risks such having planes fly overhead. Maintaining (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Kate Manne & David Sobel (2014). Disagreeing About How to Disagree. Philosophical Studies 168 (3):823-34.
    David Enoch, in Taking Morality Seriously, argues for a broad normative asymmetry between how we should behave when disagreeing about facts and how we should behave when disagreeing due to differing preferences. Enoch claims that moral disputes have the earmarks of a factual dispute rather than a preference dispute and that this makes more plausible a realist understanding of morality. We try to clarify what such claims would have to look like to be compelling and we resist his main conclusions.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Christopher D. Erb, David W. Buchanan & David M. Sobel (2013). Children's Developing Understanding of the Relation Between Variable Causal Efficacy and Mechanistic Complexity. Cognition 129 (3):494-500.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. David Sobel (2012). Backing Away From Libertarian Self-Ownership. Ethics 123 (1):32-60.
    Libertarian self-ownership views have traditionally maintained that we enjoy very powerful deontological protections against any infringement upon our property. This stringency yields very counter-intuitive results when we consider trivial infringements such as very mildly toxic pollution or trivial risks such having planes fly overhead. Maintaining that other people's rights against all infringements are very powerful threatens to undermine our liberty, as Nozick saw. In this paper I consider the most sophisticated attempts to rectify this problem within a libertarian self-ownership framework. (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Thomas L. Griffiths, David M. Sobel, Joshua B. Tenenbaum & Alison Gopnik (2011). Bayes and Blickets: Effects of Knowledge on Causal Induction in Children and Adults. Cognitive Science 35 (8):1407-1455.
    People are adept at inferring novel causal relations, even from only a few observations. Prior knowledge about the probability of encountering causal relations of various types and the nature of the mechanisms relating causes and effects plays a crucial role in these inferences. We test a formal account of how this knowledge can be used and acquired, based on analyzing causal induction as Bayesian inference. Five studies explored the predictions of this account with adults and 4-year-olds, using tasks in which (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. David Sobel (2011). Parfit's Case Against Subjectivism. In Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, volume 6. Oup Oxford.
    I argue that Parfit's On What Matters does not make a compelling case against subjective accounts of reasons for action.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. David Sobel (2011). The Limits of the Explanatory Power of Developmentalism. Journal of Moral Philosophy 7 (4):517-527.
    Richard Kraut's neo-Aristotelian account of well-being, Developmentalism, aspires to explain not only which things are good for us but why those things are good for us. The key move in attempting to make good on this second aspiration involves his claim that our ordinary intuitions about what is good for a person can be successfully explained and systematized by the idea that what benefi ts a living thing develops properly that living thing's potentialities, capacities, and faculties. I argue that Kraut's (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. David M. Sobel (2011). Knowledge and Children's Reasoning About Possibility. In Christoph Hoerl, Teresa McCormack & Sarah R. Beck (eds.), Understanding Counterfactuals, Understanding Causation. Oxford University Press. 123.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. David Sobel (2009). Review of Mark Schroeder, Slaves of the Passions. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (4).
    I assess Schroeder's book Slaves of the Passions and isolate some grounds for concerns about the overall position.
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. David Sobel (2009). Subjectivism and Idealization. Ethics 119 (2):336-352.
  13. David M. Sobel (2009). Enabling Conditions and Children's Understanding of Pretense. Cognition 113 (2):177-188.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. David Sobel & Steven Wall (2009). Introduction. In David Sobel & Steven Wall (eds.), Reasons for Action. Cambridge University Press.
  15. David Sobel & Steven Wall (eds.) (2009). Reasons for Action. Cambridge University Press.
  16. David W. Buchanan & David M. Sobel (2008). Bridging the Gap: Children's Developing Inferences About Objects' Labels and Insides From Causality-at-a-Distance. In B. C. Love, K. McRae & V. M. Sloutsky (eds.), Proceedings of the 30th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Cognitive Science Society. 64--70.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. David Sobel (2007). Practical Reasons and Mistakes of Practical Rationality. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 94 (1):299-321.
  18. David Sobel (2007). Subjectivism and Blame. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (5):pp. 149-170.
    My favorite thing about this paper is that I think I usefully explicate and then mess with Bernard Williams's attempt to explain how his internalism is compatible with our ordinary practices of blame. There are a surprising number of things wrong with Williams's position. Of course that leaves my own favored subjectivism in a pickle, but still...
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. David Sobel (2007). The Impotence of the Demandingness Objection. Philosophers' Imprint 7 (8):1-17.
    Consequentialism, many philosophers have claimed, asks too much of us to be a plausible ethical theory. Indeed, the theory's severe demandingness is often claimed to be its chief flaw. My thesis is that as we come to better understand this objection, we see that, even if it signals or tracks the existence of a real problem for Consequentialism, it cannot itself be a fundamental problem with the view. The objection cannot itself provide good reason to break with Consequentialism, because it (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. David M. Sobel & Natasha Z. Kirkham (2007). Interactions Between Causal and Statistical Learning. In Alison Gopnik & Laura Schulz (eds.), Causal Learning: Psychology, Philosophy, and Computation. Oxford University Press. 139--153.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. David Sobel (2005). Instrumental Rationality: Not Dead Yet. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 1 (1).
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. David Sobel (2005). Pain for Objectivists: The Case of Matters of Mere Taste. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 8 (4):437 - 457.
    Can we adequately account for our reasons of mere taste without holding that our desires ground such reasons? Recently, Scanlon and Parfit have argued that we can, pointing to pleasure and pain as the grounds of such reasons. In this paper I take issue with each of their accounts. I conclude that we do not yet have a plausible rival to a desire-based understanding of the grounds of such reasons.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. David Copp & David Sobel (2004). Morality and Virtue: An Assessment of Some Recent Work in Virtue Ethics. Ethics 114 (3):514-554.
    This essay focuses on three recent books on morality and virtue, Michael Slote's 'Morals from Motives', Rosalind Hursthouse's 'On Virtue Ethics', and Philippa Foot's 'Natural Goodness'. Slote proposes an "agent-based" ethical theory according to which the ethical status of acts is derivative from assessments of virtue. Following Foot's lead, Hursthouse aims to vindicate an ethical naturalism that explains human goodness on the basis of views about human nature. Both Hursthouse and Slote take virtue to be morally basic in a way (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Alison Gopnik, Clark Glymour, David M. Sobel, Laura Schulz, Tamar Kushnir & David Danks, A Theory of Causal Learning in Children: Causal Maps and Bayes Nets.
    We propose that children employ specialized cognitive systems that allow them to recover an accurate “causal map” of the world: an abstract, coherent, learned representation of the causal relations among events. This kind of knowledge can be perspicuously understood in terms of the formalism of directed graphical causal models, or “Bayes nets”. Children’s causal learning and inference may involve computations similar to those for learning causal Bayes nets and for predicting with them. Experimental results suggest that 2- to 4-year-old children (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. David Sobel (2003). Reply to Robertson. Philosophical Papers 32 (2):185-191.
    Philosophical Papers Vol.32(2) 2003: 185-191.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. David Copp & David Sobel (2002). Desires, Motives, and Reasons: Scanlon's Rationalistic Moral Psychology. Social Theory and Practice 28 (2):243-76.
  27. David Sobel (2002). The Moral Importance of the Capability to Achieve Elementary Functionings. Apeiron (4):163-82.
  28. David Sobel (2002). Varieties of Hedonism. Journal of Social Philosophy 33 (2):240–256.
  29. Clark Glymour, Alison Gopnik, David M. Sobel & Laura E. Schulz, Causal Learning Mechanisms in Very Young Children: Two-, Three-, and Four-Year-Olds Infer Causal Relations From Patterns of Variation and Covariation.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. David Sobel (2001). Explanation, Internalism, and Reasons for Action. Social Philosophy and Policy 18 (02):218-.
    These days, just about every philosophical debate seems to generate a position labeled internalism. The debate I will be joining in this essay concerns reasons for action and their connection, or lack of connection, to motivation. The internalist position in this debate posits a certain essential connection between reasons and motivation, while the externalist position denies such a connection. This debate about internalism overlaps an older debate between Humeans and Kantians about the exclusive reason-giving power of desires. As we will (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. David Sobel (2001). Subjective Accounts of Reasons for Action. Ethics 111 (3):461-492.
  32. David Sobel & David Copp (2001). Against Direction of Fit Accounts of Belief and Desire. Analysis 61 (1):44-53.
    We argue that beliefs and desires cannot be successfully explicated in terms of direction of fit. It is more difficult than has been realized to do so without presupposing these notions in the explication.
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. David Copp & David Sobel (2000). What We Owe to Each Other, T. M. Scanlon, the Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1998, IX + 420 Pages. [REVIEW] Economics and Philosophy 16 (2):333-378.
  34. David Sobel (1999). Michael J. Zimmerman, The Concept of Moral Obligation:The Concept of Moral Obligation. Ethics 109 (2):468-470.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. David Sobel (1999). Pleasure as a Mental State. Utilitas 11 (02):230-.
    Shelly Kagan and Leonard Katz have offered versions of hedonism that aspire to occupy a middle position between the view that pleasure is a unitary sensation and the view that pleasure is, as Sidgwick put it, desirable consciousness. Thus they hope to offer a hedonistic account of well-being that does not mistakenly suppose that pleasure is a special kind of tingle, yet to offer a sharp alternative to desire-based accounts. I argue that they have not identified a coherent middle position.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. David Sobel (1999). Do the Desires of Rational Agents Converge? Analysis 59 (3):137–147.
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. David Sobel (1998). Morality, Normativity, and Society, David Copp. Oxford University Press, 1995, Xii + 262 Pages. [REVIEW] Economics and Philosophy 14 (02):349-.
  38. David Sobel (1998). Well-Being as the Object of Moral Consideration. Economics and Philosophy 14 (02):249-.
    The proposal I offer attempts to remedy the inadequacies of exclusive focus on well-being for moral purposes. The proposal is this: We should allow the (informed) agent to decide for herself where she wants to throw the weight that is her due in moral reflection, with the proviso that she understands the way that her weight will be aggregated with others in reaching a moral outcome. I will call this the "autonomy principle." The autonomy principle, I claim, provides the consequentialist's (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. David Sobel (1998). James Griffin: Value Judgement. [REVIEW] Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 1 (4):479-480.
  40. David Sobel (1998). Sumner on Welfare. Dialogue 37 (03):571-.
    In this paper I criticize the way Sumner marks the subjective/objective divide and the way he argues for subjective views of well-being.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. David Sobel (1997). On the Subjectivity of Welfare. Ethics 107 (3):501-508.
  42. David Sobel (1994). Full Information Accounts of Well-Being. Ethics 104 (4):784-810.