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Profile: David Svolba (Fitchburg State University)
  1.  22
    David Svolba (2016). Is There a Rawlsian Argument for Animal Rights? Ethical Theory and Moral Practice:1-12.
    Mark Rowlands defends a Rawlsian argument for animal rights, according to which animals have rights because we would assign them rights when deciding on the principles of morality from behind a veil of ignorance. Rowlands’s argument depends on a non-standard interpretation of the veil of ignorance, according to which we cannot know whether we are human or non-human on the other side of the veil. Rowlands claims that his interpretation of the veil is more consistent with a core commitment of (...)
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    David Svolba (2016). Is There a Rawlsian Argument for Animal Rights? Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (4):973-984.
    Mark Rowlands defends a Rawlsian argument for animal rights, according to which animals have rights because we would assign them rights when deciding on the principles of morality from behind a veil of ignorance. Rowlands’s argument depends on a non-standard interpretation of the veil of ignorance, according to which we cannot know whether we are human or non-human on the other side of the veil. Rowlands claims that his interpretation of the veil is more consistent with a core commitment of (...)
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    David Svolba (2011). Swindell, Frankfurt, and Ambivalence. Philosophical Explorations 14 (2):219 - 225.
    J.S. Swindell has argued that Harry Frankfurt's analysis of ambivalence is ambiguous and that it fails to do justice to the full range of this psychological phenomenon. Building on her criticism of Frankfurt, Swindell offers an analysis of ambivalence which is supposed to clarify ambiguities in Frankfurt's analysis and reveal varieties of ambivalence that Frankfurt's analysis allegedly overlooks. In this brief reply, I argue that Frankfurt's analysis of ambivalence is neither ambiguous nor objectionably narrow. I conclude with remarks on Swindell's (...)
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