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Profile: J David Velleman (New York University)
  1. David Velleman, Author Display.
    I also discuss recent research into "believable" software agents, which are designed on principles borrowed from the character-based arts, especially cinematic animation as practiced by the artists at Disney and Warner Brothers Studios. I claim that these agents exemplify a kind of autonomy that should be of greater interest to philosophers than that exemplified by the generic agent modeled in current philosophical theory. The latter agent is autonomous by virtue of being governed by itself; but a believable agent appears to (...)
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  2. David Velleman, So It Goes.
    Derek Parfit finally meets the Buddha -- on Tralfamadore! This paper is also archived at SSRN.
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  3. David Velleman (2009). Really Seeing Another. In Alex Voorhoeve (ed.), Conversations on Ethics. Oxford University Press.
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  4. David Velleman (2005). Replies to Discussion on the Possibility of Practical Reason. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 121 (3):277 - 298.
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  5. David Velleman (2004). Review: Replies to Discussion on "The Possibility of Practical Reason". [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 121 (3):277 - 298.
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  6. David Velleman (2000). On the Aim of Belief. In , The Possibility of Practical Reason. Oxford University Press. 244--81.
    This paper explores the sense in which belief "aims at the truth". In this course of this exploration, it discusses the difference between belief and make-believe, the nature of psychoanalytic explanation, the supposed "normativity of meaning", and related topics.
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  7. David Velleman (2000). The Possibility of Practical Reason. Oxford University Press.
    Suppose that we want to frame a conception of reasons that isn't relativized to the inclinations of particular agents. That is, we want to identify particular things that count as reasons for acting simpliciter and not merely as reasons for some agents rather than others, depending on their inclinations. One way to frame such a conception is to name some features that an action can have and to say that they count as reasons for someone whether or not he is (...)
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  8. David Velleman (1996). Self to Self. Philosophical Review 105 (1):39-76.
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  9. David Velleman (1989). Practical Reflection. Princeton University Press.
    “What do you see when you look at your face in the mirror?” asks J. David Velleman in introducing his philosophical theory of action. He takes this simple act of self-scrutiny as a model for the reflective reasoning of rational agents: our efforts to understand our existence and conduct are aided by our efforts to make it intelligible. Reflective reasoning, Velleman argues, constitutes practical reasoning. By applying this conception, Practical Reflection develops philosophical accounts of intention, free will, and the foundation (...)
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