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  1. David W. Green (2008). Persuasion and the Contexts of Dissuasion: Causal Models and Informal Arguments. Thinking and Reasoning 14 (1):28 – 59.
    This paper develops the view that in arguing informally individuals construct a dual representation in which there is a coupling of arguments and the structure of the qualitative (mental) causal model to which these refer. Invited to consider a future possibility, individuals generate a causal model and mentally simulate the consequences of certain actions. Their arguments refer to the causal paths in the model. Correspondingly, faced with specific arguments about a policy option they generate a model with particular causal paths (...)
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  2. David W. Green, Ronit Applebaum & Simon Tong (2006). Mental Simulation and Argument. Thinking and Reasoning 12 (1):31 – 61.
    We examine how opinion on a controversial real-world issue shifts as a function of reading relevant arguments and engaging in a specific mental simulation about a future, fictional state of affairs involving the target issue. Individuals thought either counterfactually about a future event (“if only X had not happened …”) or semifactually about it (“even if X had not happened …”). In Experiment 1, as expected, individuals became more in favour of a course of action (the electronic tagging of children) (...)
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  3. David W. Green & Rachel McCloy (2003). Reaching a Verdict. Thinking and Reasoning 9 (4):307 – 333.
    Two experiments, using a mock legal case, confirmed the causal role of arguments in verdict decisions and explored the process involved. Experiment 1 showed that verdicts varied with the strength of counter-arguments and Experiment 2 showed that the use of background information that undermined such arguments determined the verdict reached. Such results confirm the causal role of arguments but do not speak to the representations constructed. In both experiments we analysed the reasons proposed for verdicts. Participants generally represented the state (...)
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  4. David W. Green (1998). Refocusing on the Data: A Reply to Hardman. Thinking and Reasoning 4 (1):95 – 96.
    Hardman in press claims that the results of Green and Larking 1995 favour a mental rules theory account of performance in the selection task over a mental model theory account. This reply rebuts his claim.
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  5. David W. Green, David E. Over & Robin A. Pyne (1997). Probability and Choice in the Selection Task. Thinking and Reasoning 3 (3):209-235.
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  6. David W. Green & Rodney Larking (1995). The Locus of Facilitation in the Abstract Selection Task. Thinking and Reasoning 1 (2):183 – 199.
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  7. David W. Green (1994). Comments on Johnson-Laird By. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 8 (1):45-50.
     
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  8. David W. Green (1994). Induction: Representation, Strategy and Argument. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 8 (1):45 – 50.
    Abstract In order to be a general theory of human cognition, the theory of mental models needs to accommodate a variety of forms of reasoning in addition to deduction. The mental model theory of induction is a crucial step in establishing generality. After suggesting that the theory of mental models can also account for abduction and analogy, the paper points out that inductive performance is likely to be constrained both by the nature of the representation used and by strategic factors. (...)
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