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Profile: David Widerker (Bar-Ilan University, Ramat Gan)
  1. David Widerker (2016). A New Argument Against Libertarian Free Will? Analysis 76 (3):296-306.
    In this paper, I present an argument that shows that the belief in libertarian freedom is inconsistent with two assumptions widely accepted by those who are physicalists with regard to the relation between the mental and the physical - (i) that mental properties are distinct from physical properties, and (ii) that mental properties supervene on physical properties. After presenting the argument I trace its implications for the question of the compatibility of libertarian free will and physicalism in general.
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  2.  94
    David Widerker & Michael McKenna (eds.) (2003). Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities: Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities. Ashgate.
    This book explores an important issue within the free will debate: the relation between free will and moral responsibility.
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  3. David Widerker (1995). Libertarianism and Frankfurt's Attack on the Principle of Alternative Possibilities. Philosophical Review 104 (2):247-61.
  4. David Widerker & Stewart Goetz (2013). Fischer Against the Dilemma Defence: The Defence Prevails. Analysis 73 (2):283-295.
    In a recent paper, John Fischer develops a new argument against the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP) based on a deterministic scenario. Fischer uses this result (i) to rebut the Dilemma Defense - a well-known incompatibilist response to Frankfurt-type counterexamples to PAP; and (ii) to maintain that: If causal determinism rules out moral responsibility, it is not just in virtue of eliminating alternative possibilities. In this article, we argue that Fischer's new argument against PAP fails, thus leaving points (i) and (...)
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  5.  24
    David Widerker (2015). On the Luck Objection to Libertarianism. In Carlos Moya, Andrei Buckareff & Sergi Rosell (eds.), Agency and Responsibility. Palgrave-Macmillan 94-115.
    Abstract -/- Libertarians typically believe that we are morally responsible for the choices (or decisions) we make only if those choices are free, and our choices are free only if they are neither caused nor nomically necessitated by antecedent events. Recently, there have been a number of attempts by philosophers to refute libertarianism by arguing that because a libertarianly free decision (choice) is both causally and nomically undetermined, which decision an agent makes in a deliberative situation is a matter of (...)
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  6.  15
    David Widerker (2016). A New Argument Against Libertarian Free Will? Analysis 76 (3):296-306.
    In this paper, I present an argument that shows that the belief in libertarian freedom is inconsistent with two assumptions widely accepted by those who are physicalists with regard to the relation between the mental and the physical - that mental properties are distinct from physical properties, and that mental properties supervene on physical properties. After presenting the argument, I trace its implications for the question of the compatibility of libertarian free will and physicalism in general.
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  7. David Widerker (2006). Libertarianism and the Philosophical Significance of Frankfurt Scenarios. Journal of Philosophy 103 (4):163-187.
  8. David Widerker (1991). Frankfurt on 'Ought Implies Can' and Alternative Possibilities. Analysis 51 (4):222 - 224.
  9.  11
    David Widerker & Ira M. Schnall (2014). The Direct Argument for Incompatibilism. In David Palmer (ed.) Libertarian Free Will, Oxford University Press, 2014, pp. 88-106. 88-106.
    Peter van Inwagen's Direct Argument (DA) purports to establish the incompatibility of determinism and moral responsibility, without appealing to the notion of avoidability, a notion on whose analysis compatibilists and incompatibilists disagree. Van Inwagen intended DA to refute compatibilism, or at least to shift the burden of proof onto the compatibilist. In this paper, we offer a critical assessment of DA. We examine a variety of objections to DA due to John Fischer and Mark Ravizza, Ishtiyaque Haji, Seth Shabo, Michael (...)
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  10. Ira M. Schnall & David Widerker (2012). The Direct Argument and the Burden of Proof. Analysis 72 (1):25-36.
    Peter van Inwagen's Direct Argument (DA) for incompatibilism purports to establish incompatibilism with respect to moral responsibility and determinism without appealing to assumptions that compatibilists usually consider controversial. Recently, Michael McKenna has presented a novel critique of DA. McKenna's critique raises important issues about philosophical dialectics. In this article, we address those issues and contend that his argument does not succeed.
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  11.  47
    David Widerker (2002). Farewell to the Direct Argument. Journal of Philosophy 99 (6):316-324.
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  12.  7
    David Widerker (2002). Farewell to the Direct Argument. Journal of Philosophy 99 (6):316 - 324.
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  13.  45
    David Widerker (2005). Blameworthiness, Non-Robust Alternatives, and the Principle of Alternative Expectations. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):292–306.
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  14. David Widerker (1987). On an Argument for Incompatibilism. Analysis 47 (January):37-41.
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  15.  81
    David Widerker (2009). A Defense of Frankfurt-Friendly Libertarianism. Philosophical Explorations 12 (2):87 – 108.
    Elsewhere, I proposed a libertarian-based account of freedom and moral blameworthiness which like Harry Frankfurt's 1969 account rejects the principle of alternative possibilities (which I call, Frankfurt-friendly libertarianism). In this paper I develop this account further (a) by responding to an important objection to it raised by Carlos Moya; (b) by exploring the question why, if unavoidability per se does not exonerate from blame, the Frankfurt-friendly libertarian is justified in exculpating an agent under determinism; (c) by arguing that some main (...)
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  16. David Widerker (2000). Frankfurt's Attack on the Principle of Alternative Possibilities: A Further Look. Philosopical Perspectives 14 (s14):181-202.
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  17.  71
    David Widerker & Charlotte Katzoff (1994). Zimmerman on Moral Responsibility, Obligation and Alternate Possibilities. Analysis 54 (4):285 - 287.
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  18.  28
    David Widerker (1995). Libertarian Freedom and the Avoidability of Decisions. Faith and Philosophy 12 (1):112-118.
    Recently, John Fischer has applied Frankfurt’s well-known counter-example to the principle of alternate possibilities to refute the traditional libertarian position which holds that a necessary condition for an agent’s decision (choice) to be free in the sense of freedom required for moral responsibility is that the decision not be causally determined, and that the agent could have avoided making it. Fischer’s argument has consequently led various philosophers to develop libertarian accounts of freedom which try to dispense with the avoidability constraint (...)
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  19. David Widerker (2002). Responsibility and Frankfurt-Type Examples. In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press
  20.  50
    David Widerker (2005). Agent-Causation and Control. Faith and Philosophy 22 (1):87-98.
  21.  17
    David Widerker (2003). Blameworthiness and Frankfurt's Argument Against the Principle of Alternative Possibilities. In David Widerker & Michael McKenna (eds.), Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities: Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities. Ashgate 53--73.
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  22. Michael S. McKenna & David Widerker (eds.) (2003). Freedom, Responsibility, and Agency: Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities. Ashgate.
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  23.  33
    David Widerker (1991). A Problem for the Eternity Solution. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 29 (2):87-95.
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  24.  43
    David Widerker (1990). Troubles with Ockhamism. Journal of Philosophy 87 (9):462-480.
  25.  12
    David Widerker (1983). The Extensionality Argument. Noûs 17 (3):457-468.
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  26.  14
    David Widerker (2005). Agent-Causation and Control. Faith and Philosophy 22 (1):87-98.
  27. David Widerker (2002). Farewell to the Direct Argument. Journal of Philosophy 99 (6):316.
  28. Michael McKenna & David Widerker (eds.) (2003). Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities.
  29.  49
    David Widerker (1988). Action Sentences. Erkenntnis 28 (2):269 - 291.
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  30.  22
    David Widerker (1989). Two Fallacious Objections to Adams' Soft/Hard Fact Distinction. Philosophical Studies 57 (1):103 - 107.
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  31.  20
    David Widerker (1994). Providence, Eternity, and Human Freedom. Faith and Philosophy 11 (2):242-254.
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  32.  18
    David Widerker (2000). Theological Fatalism and Frankfurt Counterexamples to the Principle of Alternate Possibilities. Faith and Philosophy 17 (2):249-254.
    In a recent article, David Hunt has proposed a theological counterexample to the principle of alternative possibilities involving divine foreknowledge (G-scenario). Hunt claims that this example is immune to my criticism of regular Frankfurt-type counterexamples to that principle, as God’s foreknowing an agent’s act does not causally determine that act. Furthermore, he claims that the considerations which support the claim that the agent is morally responsible for his act in a Frankfurt-type scenario also hold in a G-scenario. In reply, Icontest (...)
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  33.  31
    David Widerker (2002). Why God's Beliefs Are Not Hard-Type Soft Facts. Religious Studies 38 (1):77-88.
    John Fischer has attacked the Ockhamistic solution to the freedom–foreknowledge dilemma by arguing that: (1) God's prior beliefs about the future, though being soft facts about the past, are soft facts of a special sort, what he calls ‘hard-type soft facts’, i.e. soft facts, the constitutive properties of which are ‘hard’, or ‘temporally non-relational properties’; (2) in this respect, such facts are like regular past facts which are subject to the fixity of the past. In this paper, I take issue (...)
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  34.  1
    David Widerker (1990). Troubles with Ockhamism. Journal of Philosophy 87 (9):462.
  35.  1
    Eddy M. Zemach & David Widerker (1987). ``Facts, Freedom, and Foreknowledge&Quot. Religious Studies 23 (1):19-28.
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  36.  16
    David Widerker (1985). Davidson on Singular Causal Sentences. Erkenntnis 23 (3):223 - 242.
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  37.  17
    David Widerker (1998). Metaphilosophy and Free Will. Philosophical Review 107 (4):630-634.
  38.  5
    David Widerker & Charlotte Katzoff (1993). Freedom From Necessity: The Metaphysical Basis of Responsibility by Bernard Berofsky. Journal of Philosophy 90 (2):98-104.
  39.  7
    David Widerker (1992). Cartesian Intuitions and Anomalous Monism. Grazer Philosophische Studien 43:95-100.
    Recently, Colin McGinn has argued that Kripke's Cartesian argument against the mind-body identity thesis is not effective against anomalous monism. This paper attempts to show that the Cartesian has at his disposal an argument that is stronger than that formulated by Kripke, and one that cannot be rebutted by the anomalous monist in the way suggested by McGinn. The paper concludes with a suggestion as to the sort of identity theory one would have to subscribe to in order to resist (...)
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  40.  2
    David Widerker (2000). Frankfurt's Attack on the Principle of Alternative Possibilities: A Further Look. Noûs 34 (s14):181-201.
  41.  1
    David Widerker (1996). Avoidability And Libertarianism: A Response To Fischer. Faith and Philosophy 39:95-102.
  42.  20
    David Widerker (1996). Contra Snapshot Ockhamism. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 39 (2):95 - 102.
    Recently, John Fischer has proposed a novel account of the hard/soft distinction which is an entailment account. At its basis is the idea that a fact about a time T as a soft fact about T if it entails a fact about a time later than T; and a fact about a time T as a hard fact about T if it does not do so. Elsewhere, I have expressed serious doubts whether an entailment account of the hard/soft fact distinction (...)
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  43.  6
    David Widerker (1989). In Defense of Davidson's Identity Thesis Regarding Action Individuation. Dialectica 43 (3):281-288.
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  44. David Widerker (1990). ``Troubles with Ockhamism&Quot. Journal of Philosophy 87:462-480.
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  45.  15
    David Widerker (1977). Epistemic Opacity Again. Philosophical Studies 32 (4):355 - 358.
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  46.  12
    David Widerker (1973). A Note on Sharvy. Philosophia 3 (4):449-452.
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  47. Yakir Levin, David Widerker & Richard Double (1998). Metaphilosophy and Free Will. Philosophical Review 107 (4):630.
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  48. Michael S. McKenna & David Widerker (eds.) (2002). Freedom, Responsibility, and Action: Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities. Ashgate Press.
     
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  49. David Widerker (1996). ``Contra Snapshot Ockhamism&Quot. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 39:95-102.
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  50. David Widerker (forthcoming). In Defense of Non-Causal Libertarianism. American Philosophical Quarterly.
    Non-Causal Libertarianism (NCL) is a libertarian position which aims to provide a non-causal account of action and freedom to do otherwise. NCL has been recently criticized from a number of quarters, notably from proponents of free will skepticism and agent-causation. The main complaint that has been voiced against NCL is that it does not provide a plausible account of an agent’s control over her action, and therefore, the account of free action it offers is inadequate. Some critics (mainly agent-causationists) have (...)
     
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