39 found
Sort by:
  1. David Widerker & Stewart Goetz (2013). Fischer Against the Dilemma Defence: The Defence Prevails. Analysis 73 (2):283-295.
    In a recent paper, John Fischer develops a new argument against the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP) based on a deterministic scenario. Fischer uses this result (i) to rebut the Dilemma Defense - a well-known incompatibilist response to Frankfurt-type counterexamples to PAP; and (ii) to maintain that: If causal determinism rules out moral responsibility, it is not just in virtue of eliminating alternative possibilities. In this article, we argue that Fischer's new argument against PAP fails, thus leaving points (i) and (...)
    Direct download (12 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Ira M. Schnall & David Widerker (2012). The Direct Argument and the Burden of Proof. Analysis 72 (1):25-36.
    Peter van Inwagen's Direct Argument (DA) for incompatibilism purports to establish incompatibilism with respect to moral responsibility and determinism without appealing to assumptions that compatibilists usually consider controversial. Recently, Michael McKenna has presented a novel critique of DA. McKenna's critique raises important issues about philosophical dialectics. In this article, we address those issues and contend that his argument does not succeed.
    Direct download (13 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. David Widerker (2009). A Defense of Frankfurt-Friendly Libertarianism. Philosophical Explorations 12 (2):87 – 108.
    Elsewhere, I proposed a libertarian-based account of freedom and moral blameworthiness which like Harry Frankfurt's 1969 account rejects the principle of alternative possibilities (which I call, Frankfurt-friendly libertarianism). In this paper I develop this account further (a) by responding to an important objection to it raised by Carlos Moya; (b) by exploring the question why, if unavoidability per se does not exonerate from blame, the Frankfurt-friendly libertarian is justified in exculpating an agent under determinism; (c) by arguing that some main (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. David Widerker (2006). Libertarianism and the Philosophical Significance of Frankfurt Scenarios. Journal of Philosophy 103 (4):163-187.
  5. David Widerker (2005). Agent-Causation and Control. Faith and Philosophy 22 (1):87-98.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. David Widerker (2005). Blameworthiness, Non-Robust Alternatives, and the Principle of Alternative Expectations. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):292–306.
    No categories
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Michael S. McKenna & David Widerker (eds.) (2003). Freedom, Responsibility, and Agency: Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities. Ashgate.
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Michael McKenna & David Widerker (eds.) (2003). Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities.
  9. David Widerker (2003). Blameworthiness and Frankfurt's Argument Against the Principle of Alternative Possibilities. In David Widerker & Michael McKenna (eds.), Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities: Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities. Ashgate. 53--73.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. David Widerker & Michael McKenna (eds.) (2003). Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities: Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities. Ashgate.
    This book explores an important issue within the free will debate: the relation between free will and moral responsibility.
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Michael S. McKenna & David Widerker (eds.) (2002). Freedom, Responsibility, and Action: Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities. Ashgate Press.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. David Widerker (2002). Farewell to the Direct Argument. Journal of Philosophy 99 (6):316-324.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. David Widerker (2002). Responsibility and Frankfurt-Type Examples. In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press.
  14. David Widerker (2002). Why God's Beliefs Are Not Hard-Type Soft Facts. Religious Studies 38 (1):77-88.
    John Fischer has attacked the Ockhamistic solution to the freedom–foreknowledge dilemma by arguing that: (1) God's prior beliefs about the future, though being soft facts about the past, are soft facts of a special sort, what he calls ‘hard-type soft facts’, i.e. soft facts, the constitutive properties of which are ‘hard’, or ‘temporally non-relational properties’; (2) in this respect, such facts are like regular past facts which are subject to the fixity of the past. In this paper, I take issue (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. David Widerker (2000). Frankfurt's Attack on the Principle of Alternative Possibilities: A Further Look. Philosopical Perspectives 14 (s14):181-202.
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. David Widerker (2000). ``Theological Fatalism and Frankfurt Counterexamples to the Principle of Alternate Possibilities&Quot. Faith and Philosophy 17 (2):249-254.
    In a recent article, David Hunt has proposed a theological counterexample to the principle of alternative possibilities involving divine foreknowledge (G-scenario). Hunt claims that this example is immune to my criticism of regular Frankfurt-type counterexamples to that principle, as God’s foreknowing an agent’s act does not causally determine that act. Furthermore, he claims that the considerations which support the claim that the agent is morally responsible for his act in a Frankfurt-type scenario also hold in a G-scenario. In reply, Icontest (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. David Widerker (1998). Metaphilosophy and Free Will. Philosophical Review 107 (4):630-634.
  18. David Widerker (1996). Contra Snapshot Ockhamism. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 39 (2):95 - 102.
    Given the failure of Fischer's and other entailment accounts of the soft/hard fact distinction, the conclusion that emerges is that the Ockhamist cannot justify his treating the likes of F1 as soft facts about the past by appealing to an entailment account of soft/hard facthood. As we have seen, accounts of this sort are seriously flawed in that they overlook the point that a fact may entail a fact about the future and still be a genuine past fact. Call this (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. David Widerker (1996). ``Contra Snapshot Ockhamism&Quot. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 39:95-102.
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. David Widerker (1995). Libertarianism and Frankfurt's Attack on the Principle of Alternative Possibilities. Philosophical Review 104 (2):247-61.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. David Widerker (1995). ``Libertarian Freedom and the Avoidability of Decisions&Quot. Faith and Philosophy 12 (1):112-118.
    Recently, John Fischer has applied Frankfurt’s well-known counter-example to the principle of alternate possibilities to refute the traditional libertarian position which holds that a necessary condition for an agent’s decision (choice) to be free in the sense of freedom required for moral responsibility is that the decision not be causally determined, and that the agent could have avoided making it. Fischer’s argument has consequently led various philosophers to develop libertarian accounts of freedom which try to dispense with the avoidability constraint (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. David Widerker (1994). Providence, Eternity, and Human Freedom. Faith and Philosophy 11 (2):242-254.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. David Widerker & Charlotte Katzoff (1994). Zimmerman on Moral Responsibility, Obligation and Alternate Possibilities. Analysis 54 (4):285 - 287.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. David Widerker (1992). Cartesian Intuitions and Anomalous Monism. Grazer Philosophische Studien 43:95-100.
    Recently, Colin McGinn has argued that Kripke's Cartesian argument against the mind-body identity thesis is not effective against anomalous monism. This paper attempts to show that the Cartesian has at his disposal an argument that is stronger than that formulated by Kripke, and one that cannot be rebutted by the anomalous monist in the way suggested by McGinn. The paper concludes with a suggestion as to the sort of identity theory one would have to subscribe to in order to resist (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. David Widerker (1991). A Problem for the Eternity Solution. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 29 (2):87-95.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. David Widerker (1991). Frankfurt on 'Ought Implies Can' and Alternative Possibilities. Analysis 51 (4):222 - 224.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. David Widerker (1990). Troubles with Ockhamism. Journal of Philosophy 87 (9):462-480.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. David Widerker (1990). ``Troubles with Ockhamism&Quot. Journal of Philosophy 87:462-480.
    No categories
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. David Widerker (1989). In Defense of Davidson's Identity Thesis Regarding Action Individuation. Dialectica 43 (3):281-288.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. David Widerker (1989). Two Fallacious Objections to Adams' Soft/Hard Fact Distinction. Philosophical Studies 57 (1):103 - 107.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. David Widerker (1988). Action Sentences. Erkenntnis 28 (2):269 - 291.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. David Widerker (1987). On an Argument for Incompatibilism. Analysis 47 (January):37-41.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. Eddy M. Zemach & David Widerker (1987). ``Facts, Freedom, and Foreknowledge&Quot. Religious Studies 23:19-28.
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. David Widerker (1985). Davidson on Singular Causal Sentences. Erkenntnis 23 (3):223 - 242.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. David Widerker (1983). The Extensionality Argument. Noûs 17 (3):457-468.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. David Widerker (1977). Epistemic Opacity Again. Philosophical Studies 32 (4):355 - 358.
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. David Widerker (1973). A Note on Sharvy. Philosophia 3 (4):449-452.
    No categories
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation