Search results for 'Dead' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Mike Collins (2010). Reevaluating the Dead Donor Rule. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 35 (2):1-26.
    The dead donor rule justifies current practice in organ procurement for transplantation and states that organ donors must be dead prior to donation. The majority of organ donors are diagnosed as having suffered brain death and hence are declared dead by neurological criteria. However, a significant amount of unrest in both the philosophical and the medical literature has surfaced since this practice began forty years ago. I argue that, first, declaring death by neurological criteria is both unreliable (...)
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  2.  17
    Mitchell Travis (2015). We ’Re All Infected: Legal Personhood, Bare Life and The Walking Dead‘. International Journal for the Semiotics of Law - Revue Internationale de Sémiotique Juridique 28 (4):787-800.
    This article argues that greater theoretical attention should be paid to the figure of the zombie in the fields of law, cultural studies and philosophy. Using The Walking Dead as a point of critical departure concepts of legal personhood are interrogated in relation to permanent vegetative states, bare life and the notion of the third person. Ultimately, the paper recommends a rejection of personhood; instead favouring a legal and philosophical engagement with humanity and embodiment. Personhood, it is suggested, creates (...)
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  3. Christian Coons & Noah Levin (2011). The Dead Donor Rule, Voluntary Active Euthanasia, and Capital Punishment. Bioethics 25 (5):236-243.
    We argue that the dead donor rule, which states that multiple vital organs should only be taken from dead patients, is justified neither in principle nor in practice. We use a thought experiment and a guiding assumption in the literature about the justification of moral principles to undermine the theoretical justification for the rule. We then offer two real world analogues to this thought experiment, voluntary active euthanasia and capital punishment, and argue that the moral permissibility of terminating (...)
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  4.  65
    Cody Gilmore (2007). Defining 'Dead' in Terms of 'Lives' and 'Dies'. Philosophia 35 (2):219-231.
    What is it for a thing to be dead? Fred Feldman holds, correctly in my view, that a definition of ‘dead’ should leave open both (1) the possibility of things that go directly from being dead to being alive, and (2) the possibility of things that go directly from being alive to being neither alive nor dead, but merely in suspended animation. But if this is right, then surely such a definition should also leave open the (...)
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  5.  33
    Seahwa Kim (2011). On Gilmore's Definition of 'Dead'. Philosophia 39 (1):105-110.
    Gilmore proposes a new definition of ‘dead’ in response to Fred Feldman’s earlier definition in terms of ‘lives’ and ‘dies.’ In this paper, I critically examine Gilmore’s new definition. First, I explain what his definition is and how it is an improvement upon Feldman’s definition. Second, I raise an objection to it by noting that it fails to rule out the possibility of a thing that dies without becoming dead.
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  6.  37
    David Rodríguez-Arias, Maxwell J. Smith & Neil M. Lazar (2011). Donation After Circulatory Death: Burying the Dead Donor Rule. American Journal of Bioethics 11 (8):36-43.
    Despite continuing controversies regarding the vital status of both brain-dead donors and individuals who undergo donation after circulatory death (DCD), respecting the dead donor rule (DDR) remains the standard moral framework for organ procurement. The DDR increases organ supply without jeopardizing trust in transplantation systems, reassuring society that donors will not experience harm during organ procurement. While the assumption that individuals cannot be harmed once they are dead is reasonable in the case of brain-dead protocols, we (...)
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  7. Peter Forrest (2004). The Real but Dead Past: A Reply to Braddon-Mitchell. Analysis 64 (4):358–362.
    In "How Do We Know It Is Now Now?" David Braddon-Mitchell (Analysis 2004) develops an objection to the thesis that the past is real but the future is not. He notes my response to this, namely that the past, although real, is lifeless and (a fortiori?) lacking in sentience. He argues, however, that this response, which I call 'the past is dead hypothesis', is not tenable if combined with 'special relativity'. My purpose in this reply is to argue that, (...)
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  8.  35
    F. G. Miller, R. D. Truog & D. W. Brock (2010). The Dead Donor Rule: Can It Withstand Critical Scrutiny? Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 35 (3):299-312.
    Transplantation of vital organs has been premised ethically and legally on "the dead donor rule" (DDR)—the requirement that donors are determined to be dead before these organs are procured. Nevertheless, scholars have argued cogently that donors of vital organs, including those diagnosed as "brain dead" and those declared dead according to cardiopulmonary criteria, are not in fact dead at the time that vital organs are being procured. In this article, we challenge the normative rationale for (...)
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  9. David Hershenov (2005). Do Dead Bodies Pose a Problem for Biological Approaches to Personal Identity? Mind 114 (453):31 - 59.
    Part of the appeal of the biological approach to personal identity is that it does not have to countenance spatially coincident entities. But if the termination thesis is correct and the organism ceases to exist at death, then it appears that the corpse is a dead body that earlier was a living body and distinct from but spatially coincident with the organism. If the organism is identified with the body, then the unwelcome spatial coincidence could perhaps be avoided. It (...)
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  10.  59
    Anil Gomes, Matthew Parrott & Joshua Shepherd (2016). More Dead Than Dead? Attributing Mentality to Vegetative State Patients. Philosophical Psychology 29 (1):84-95.
    In a recent paper, Gray, Knickman, and Wegner present three experiments which they take to show that people perceive patients in a persistent vegetative state to have less mentality than the dead. Following on from Gomes and Parrott, we provide evidence to show that participants' responses in the initial experiments are an artifact of the questions posed. Results from two experiments show that, once the questions have been clarified, people do not ascribe more mental capacity to the dead (...)
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  11.  21
    G. Khushf (2010). A Matter of Respect: A Defense of the Dead Donor Rule and of a "Whole-Brain" Criterion for Determination of Death. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 35 (3):330-364.
    Many accounts of the historical development of neurological criteria for determination of death insufficiently distinguish between two strands of interpretation advanced by advocates of a "whole-brain" criterion. One strand focuses on the brain as the organ of integration. Another provides a far more complex and nuanced account, both of death and of a policy on the determination of death. Current criticisms of the whole-brain criterion are effective in refuting the first interpretation, but not the second, which is advanced in the (...)
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  12. John Marmysz (1996). From Night to Day: Nihilism and the Living Dead. Film and Philosophy 3:138-143.
    Upon its release in 1968, George Romero's Night of the Living Dead was attacked by many critics as an exploitative low budget film of questionable moral value. I argue in this paper that Night of the Living Dead is indeed nihilistic, but in a deeper philosophical sense than the critics had in mind.
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  13.  57
    Robert M. Veatch (2004). Abandon the Dead Donor Rule or Change the Definition of Death? Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 14 (3):261-276.
    : Research by Siminoff and colleagues reveals that many lay people in Ohio classify legally living persons in irreversible coma or persistent vegetative state (PVS) as dead and that additional respondents, although classifying such patients as living, would be willing to procure organs from them. This paper analyzes possible implications of these findings for public policy. A majority would procure organs from those in irreversible coma or in PVS. Two strategies for legitimizing such procurement are suggested. One strategy would (...)
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  14. Chris Heathwood (2005). The Real Price of the Dead Past: A Reply to Forrest and to Braddon-Mitchell. Analysis 65 (287):249–251.
    Non-presentist A-theories of time (such as the growing block theory and the moving spotlight theory) seem unacceptable because they invite skepticism about whether one exists in the present. To avoid this absurd implication, Peter Forrest appeals to the "Past is Dead hypothesis," according to which only beings in the objective present are conscious. We know we're present because we know we're conscious, and only present beings can be conscious. I argue that the dead past hypothesis undercuts the main (...)
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  15. Megan Crowley-Matoka & Robert M. Arnold (2004). The Dead Donor Rule: How Much Does the Public Care ... And How Much Should. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 14 (3):319-332.
    : In this brief commentary, we reflect on the recent study by Siminoff, Burant, and Youngner of public attitudes toward "brain death" and organ donation, focusing on the implications of their findings for the rules governing from whom organs can be obtained. Although the data suggest that many seem to view "brain death" as "as good as dead" rather than "dead" (calling the dead donor rule into question), we find that the study most clearly demonstrates that understanding (...)
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  16.  13
    Sam D. Shemie (2007). Clarifying the Paradigm for the Ethics of Donation and Transplantation: Was 'Dead' Really so Clear Before Organ Donation? Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2 (1):18-.
    Recent commentaries by Verheijde et al, Evans and Potts suggesting that donation after cardiac death practices routinely violate the dead donor rule are based on flawed presumptions. Cell biology, cardiopulmonary resuscitation, critical care life support technologies, donation and transplantation continue to inform concepts of life and death. The impact of oxygen deprivation to cells, organs and the brain is discussed in relation to death as a biological transition. In the face of advancing organ support and replacement technologies, the reversibility (...)
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  17.  69
    W. R. Carter (1999). Will I Be a Dead Person? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (1):167 - 171.
    Eric Olsen argues from the fact that we once existed as fetal individuals to the conclusion that the Standard View of personal identity is mistaken. I shall establish that a similar argument focusing upon dead people opposes Olson’s favored Biological View of personal identity.
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  18.  8
    E. Christian Brugger (2016). Are Brain Dead Individuals Dead? Grounds for Reasonable Doubt. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 41 (3):329-350.
    According to the biological definition of death, a human body that has not lost the capacity to holistically organize itself is the body of a living human individual. Reasonable doubt against the conclusion that it has lost the capacity exists when the body appears to express it and no evidence to the contrary is sufficient to rule out reasonable doubt against the conclusion that the apparent expression is a true expression. This essay argues that the evidence and arguments against the (...)
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  19.  17
    Samuel C. M. Birch (2013). The Dead Donor Rule: A Defense. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 38 (4):426-440.
    Miller, Truog, and Brock have recently argued that the “dead donor rule,” the requirement that donors be determined to be dead before vital organs are procured for transplantation, cannot withstand ethical scrutiny. In their view, the dead donor rule is inconsistent with existing life-saving practices of organ transplantation, lacks a cogent ethical rationale, and is not necessary for maintenance of public trust in organ transplantation. In this paper, the second of these claims will be evaluated. (The first (...)
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  20.  19
    Scott Kretchmar (2007). Dualisms, Dichotomies and Dead Ends: Limitations of Analytic Thinking About Sport. Sport, Ethics and Philosophy 1 (3):266 – 280.
    In this essay I attempt to show the limitations of analytic thinking and the kinds of dead ends into which such analyses may lead us in the philosophy of sport. As an alternative, I argue for a philosophy of complementation and compatibility in the face of what appear to be exclusive alternatives. This is a position that is sceptical of bifurcations and other simplified portrayals of reality but does not dismiss them entirely. A philosophy of complementation traffics in the (...)
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  21. Norman Fost (2004). Reconsidering the Dead Donor Rule: Is It Important That Organ Donors Be Dead? Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 14 (3):249-260.
    : The "dead donor rule" is increasingly under attack for several reasons. First, there has long been disagreement about whether there is a correct or coherent definition of "death." Second, it has long been clear that the concept and ascertainment of "brain death" is medically flawed. Third, the requirement stands in the way of improving organ supply by prohibiting organ removal from patients who have little to lose—e.g., infants with anencephaly—and from patients who ardently want to donate while still (...)
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  22.  49
    Atsushi Asai, Yasuhiro Kadooka & Kuniko Aizawa (2012). Arguments Against Promoting Organ Transplants From Brain-Dead Donors, and Views of Contemporary Japanese on Life and Death. Bioethics 26 (4):215-223.
    As of 2009, the number of donors in Japan is the lowest among developed countries. On July 13, 2009, Japan's Organ Transplant Law was revised for the first time in 12 years. The revised and old laws differ greatly on four primary points: the definition of death, age requirements for donors, requirements for brain- death determination and organ extraction, and the appropriateness of priority transplants for relatives.In the four months of deliberations in the National Diet before the new law was (...)
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  23.  2
    Adam Buben (2015). Technology of the Dead: Objects of Loving Remembrance or Replaceable Resources? Philosophical Papers 44 (1):15-37.
    This paper addresses ethical questions surrounding death given imagined but not unlikely technological advancements in the near future. For example, how will highly detailed interactive simulations of deceased personalities affect the way we deal with dying and interact with the dead? Most cultures have at least a vague sense of duties to the dead, and many of these duties are related to the memorial preservation of decedents. I worry that our advances might be paralleled by a deteriorating grasp (...)
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  24.  20
    A. S. Iltis & M. J. Cherry (2010). Death Revisited: Rethinking Death and the Dead Donor Rule. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 35 (3):223-241.
    Traditionally, people were recognized as being dead using cardio-respiratory criteria: individuals who had permanently stopped breathing and whose heart had permanently stopped beating were dead. Technological developments in the middle of the twentieth century and the advent of the intensive care unit made it possible to sustain cardio-respiratory and other functions in patients with severe brain injury who previously would have lost such functions permanently shortly after sustaining a brain injury. What could and should physicians caring for such (...)
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  25.  5
    Nicanor Pier Giorgio Austriaco (2016). The Brain Dead Patient Is Still Sentient: A Further Reply to Patrick Lee and Germain Grisez. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 41 (3):315-328.
    Patrick Lee and Germain Grisez have argued that the total brain dead patient is still dead because the integrated entity that remains is not even an animal, not only because he is not sentient but also, and more importantly, because he has lost the radical capacity for sentience. In this essay, written from within and as a contribution to the Catholic philosophical tradition, I respond to Lee and Grisez’s argument by proposing that the brain dead patient is (...)
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  26. Masahiro Morioka (2012). Natural Right to Grow and Die in the Form of Wholeness: A Philosophical Interpretation of the Ontological Status of Brain-Dead Children. Diogenes 57 (3):103-116.
    In this paper, I would like to argue that brain-dead small children have a natural right not to be invaded by other people even if their organs can save the lives of other suffering patients. My basic idea is that growing human beings have the right to grow in the form of wholeness, and dying human beings also have the right to die in the form of wholeness; in other words, they have the right to be protected from outside (...)
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  27.  17
    V. English (2003). Presumed Consent for Transplantation: A Dead Issue After Alder Hey? Journal of Medical Ethics 29 (3):147-152.
    In the wake of scandals about the unauthorised retention of organs following postmortem examination, the issue of valid consent has returned to the forefront. Emphasis is put on obtaining explicit authorisation from the patient or family prior to any medical intervention, including those involving the dead. Although the controversies in the UK arose from the retention of human material for education or research rather than therapy, concern has been expressed that public mistrust could also adversely affect organ donation for (...)
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  28.  85
    Niall Connolly (2011). How the Dead Live. Philosophia 39 (1):83-103.
    This paper maintains (following Yougrau 1987; 2000 and Hinchliff 1996) that the dead and other former existents count as examples of non-existent objects. If the dead number among the things there are, a further question arises: what is it to be dead—how should the state of being dead be characterised? It is argued that this state should be characterised negatively: the dead are not persons, philosophers etc. They lack any of the (intrinsic) qualities they had (...)
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  29.  79
    William R. Carter (1999). Will I Be a Dead Person? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (1):167-171.
    Eric Olsen argues from the fact that we once existed as fetal individuals to the conclusion that the Standard View of personal identity is mistaken. I shall establish that a similar argument focusing upon dead people opposes Olson’s favored Biological View of personal identity.
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  30.  45
    Patrick Stokes (2012). Ghosts in the Machine: Do the Dead Live on in Facebook? [REVIEW] Philosophy and Technology 25 (3):363-379.
    Abstract Of the many ways in which identity is constructed and performed online, few are as strongly ‘anchored’ to existing offline relationships as in online social networks like Facebook and Myspace. These networks utilise profiles that extend our practical, psychological and even corporeal identity in ways that give them considerable phenomenal presence in the lives of spatially distant people. This raises interesting questions about the persistence of identity when these online profiles survive the deaths of the users behind them, via (...)
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  31.  5
    David Seedhouse (1995). The Way Around Health Economics' Dead End. Health Care Analysis 3 (3):205-220.
    Many leading health economists hold misconceived ideas about central components of their work. In particular, they assume that their methods are in principle valueneutral. This belief is demonstrably false. Health economic investigations incorporate mainly unexpressed theories of health. Unless this fact is recognised health economics will shortly reach a conceptual and practical dead end. The way to avoid this dead end is to express implicit theories of health, and explicitly to base philosophically and economically justifiable policy proposals on (...)
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  32.  47
    J. Jeremy Wisnewski (2009). What We Owe the Dead. Journal of Applied Philosophy 26 (1):54-70.
    abstract My aim in this paper is to argue that we have at least some obligations to the dead. After briefly considering some previous (unsuccessful) attempts to establish such obligations, I offer a reductio argument which establishes at least some obligations to the dead. Following this, the surprising extent of these obligations (given a few roughly Kantian assumptions) is considered. I then argue that there are and must be some significant limitations on the duties of the living in (...)
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  33.  23
    D. Alan Shewmon (2004). The Dead Donor Rule: Lessons From Linguistics. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 14 (3):277-300.
    : American society traditionally has assumed a univocal notion of "death," largely because we have only one word for it and, until recently, have not needed a more nuanced notion. The reality of death-processes does not preclude the reality of death events. Linguistically, "death" can be understood only as an event; there are other words for the process. Our death vocabulary should expand to reflect multiple events along the process from sickness to decomposition. Depending on context, some death-related events may (...)
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  34.  89
    Frederiek Depoortere (2007). “God Himself Is Dead!” Luther, Hegel, and the Death of God. Philosophy and Theology 19 (1/2):171-195.
    This paper traces the origins of the phrase “God is dead!” back to Hegel and Luther. It proceeds in the following four steps: Section I investigates the appearance of the theme of God’s death in Lutheran theology. Section II elaborates on Hegel’s adaptation of this theme in the context of his early work Faith & Knowledge. In section III, the paper continues on how the theme of the death of God developed from Luther to Nietzsche via Hegel, before concluding, (...)
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  35.  20
    Malin Masterton, Mats G. Hansson, Anna T. Höglund & Gert Helgesson (2007). Can the Dead Be Brought Into Disrepute? Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 28 (2):137-149.
    Queen Christina of Sweden was unconventional in her time, leading to hypotheses on her gender and possible hermaphroditic nature. If genetic analysis can substantiate the latter claim, could this bring the queen into disrepute 300 years after her death? Joan C. Callahan has argued that if a reputation changes, this constitutes a change only in the group of people changing their views and not in the person whose reputation it is. Is this so? This paper analyses what constitutes change and (...)
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  36.  85
    William Lauinger (2011). Dead Sea Apples and Desire-Fulfillment Welfare Theories. Utilitas 23 (03):324-343.
    This paper argues that, in light of Dead Sea apple cases, we should reject desire-fulfillment welfare theories (DF theories). Dead Sea apples are apples that look attractive while hanging on the tree, but which dissolve into smoke or ashes once plucked. Accordingly, Dead Sea apple cases are cases where an agent desires something and then gets it, only to find herself disappointed by what she has gotten. This paper covers both actual DF theories and hypothetical (or idealized) (...)
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  37.  24
    Mark R. Wicclair (2002). Informed Consent and Research Involving the Newly Dead. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 12 (4):351-372.
    : This paper examines informed consent in relation to research involving the newly dead. Reasons are presented for facilitating advance decision making in relation to postmortem research, and it is argued that the informed consent of family members should be sought when the deceased have not made a premortem decision. Regardless of whether the dead can be harmed, there are two important respects in which family consent can serve to protect the dead: (1) protecting the deceased's body (...)
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  38.  10
    Sheelagh McGuinness & Margaret Brazier (2008). Respecting the Living Means Respecting the Dead Too. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 28 (2):297-316.
    Why should we respect the wishes which individuals may have about how their body is treated after death? Reflecting on how and why the law respects the bodies of the living, we argue that we must also respect the ‘dead’. We contest the relevance of the argument ‘the dead have no interests’, rather we think that the pertinent argument is ‘the living have interests in what happens to their dead bodies’. And, we advance arguments why we should (...)
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  39. Robert S. Van Howe (2013). Infant Circumcision: The Last Stand for the Dead Dogma of Parental (Sovereignal) Rights. Journal of Medical Ethics 39 (7):475-481.
    J S Mill used the term ‘dead dogma’ to describe a belief that has gone unquestioned for so long and to such a degree that people have little idea why they accept it or why they continue to believe it. When wives and children were considered chattel, it made sense for the head of a household to have a ‘sovereignal right’ to do as he wished with his property. Now that women and children are considered to have the full (...)
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  40.  38
    Angelica Nuzzo (2007). Life and Death in the History of Philosophy: Brandom’s Tales of the Mighty Dead. Philosophy and Social Criticism 33 (1):35-53.
    This article discusses the role that history and historiography play in Brandom’s Tales of the Mighty Dead . I claim that Brandom’s attempt to integrate a historical dimension in his inferentialist project fails, and argue that the reason for that failure lies in the misconstruction and misreading of Hegel’s idea of rationality with regard, at least, to two fundamental points: to the Hegelian concept of ‘history’ and to his notion of the ‘social’. The further point that I make remains (...)
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  41.  13
    T. M. Wilkinson (2012). Consent and the Use of the Bodies of the Dead. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 37 (5):445-463.
    Gametes, tissue, and organs can be taken from the dying or dead for reproduction, transplantation, and research. Whole bodies as well as parts can be used for teaching anatomy. While these uses are diverse, they have an ethical consideration in common: the claims of the people whose bodies are used. Is some use permissible only when people have consented to the use, actually wanted the use, would have wanted the use, not opposed the use, or what? The aim of (...)
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  42.  29
    Elysa R. Koppelman (2003). The Dead Donor Rule and the Concept of Death: Severing the Ties That Bind Them. American Journal of Bioethics 3 (1):1 – 9.
    One goal of the transplant community is to seek ways to increase the number of people who are willing and able to donate organs. People in states between life and death are often medically excellent candidates for donating organs. Yet public policy surrounding organ procurement is a delicate matter. While there is the utilitarian goal of increasing organ supply, there is also the deontologic concern about respect for persons. Public policy must properly mediate between these two concerns. Currently the (...) donor (dd) rule is appealed to as an attempt at such mediation. I argue that given the lack of consensus on a definition of death, the dd rule is no longer successful at mediating utilitarian and deontologic concerns. I suggest instead that focusing on a particular person's history can be successful. (shrink)
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  43.  9
    M. Potts (2005). Does It Matter That Organ Donors Are Not Dead? Ethical and Policy Implications. Journal of Medical Ethics 31 (7):406-409.
    The “standard position” on organ donation is that the donor must be dead in order for vital organs to be removed, a position with which we agree. Recently, Robert Truog and Walter Robinson have argued that brain death is not death, and even though “brain dead” patients are not dead, it is morally acceptable to remove vital organs from those patients. We accept and defend their claim that brain death is not death, and we argue against both (...)
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  44.  26
    Robert Sparrow (2006). Right of the Living Dead? Consent to Experimental Surgery in the Event of Cortical Death. Journal of Medical Ethics 32 (10):601-605.
    Ravelingien et al have suggested that early human xenotransplantation trials should be carried out on patients who are in a permanent vegetative state (PVS) and who have previously granted their consent to the use of their bodies in such research in the event of their cortical death. Unfortunately, their philosophical defence of this suggestion is unsatisfactory in its current formulation, as it equivocates on the key question of the status of patients who are in a PVS. The solution proposed by (...)
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  45.  34
    Geoffrey F. Scarre (2012). Privacy and the Dead. Philosophy in the Contemporary World 19 (1):1-16.
    The privacy of the dead might be thought to be violated by, for instance, the disinterment for research purposes of human physical remains or the posthumous revelation of embarrassing facts about people's private lives. But are there any moral rights to privacy which extend beyond the grave? Although this notion can be challenged on the ground that death marks the end of the personal subject, with the consequent extinction of her interests, I argue that a right to privacy belongs (...)
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  46.  30
    T. M. Wilkinson (2001). Parental Consent and the Use of Dead Children's Bodies. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 11 (4):337-358.
    : It has recently become known that, in Liverpool and elsewhere, parts of children's bodies were taken postmortem and used for research without the parents being told. But should parental consent be sought before using children's corpses for medical purposes? This paper presents the view that parental consent is overrated. Arguments are rejected for consent from dead children's interests, property rights, family autonomy, and religious freedom. The only direct reason to get parental consent is to avoid distressing the parents, (...)
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  47.  17
    Thomas J. Scheff & David S. Fearon Jr (2004). Cognition and Emotion? The Dead End in Self-Esteem Research. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 34 (1):73–90.
    This article suggests that studies of self-esteem using scales have reached a dead end, and suggest alternative directions. First we show how significance tests have obscured meager results. According to reviews, this huge body of research has yielded no substantial findings. Some sub-fields show consistent, but trivially small, effects; reviews of the entire field show none at all. Most important, the size of effects does not seem to be increasing. Three questions are raised: 1. Are new standards needed to (...)
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  48.  56
    M. Spriggs (2004). Woman Wants Dead Fiance's Baby: Who Owns a Dead Man's Sperm. Journal of Medical Ethics 30 (4):384-388.
    The Brisbane Supreme Court has denied an Australian woman’s request to harvest and freeze her dead fiancé’s sperm for future impregnation. After she was denied access to the sperm, the woman learnt that her fiancé may have been a sperm donor and she began checking to find out if his sperm was still available. Given what we know, there is a good ethical argument that the woman should have access to the sperm and should be allowed to have her (...)
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    Vlad Dima (2014). You Only Die Thrice: Zombies Revisited in The Walking Dead. International Journal of Žižek Studies 8.
    This article explores notions of death and subjectivity, through the zombie, in the first four seasons of the AMC show, The Walking Dead. The body of the zombie elicits intriguing speculations. In its death, zombie lingers in the overlapping wedge between the grotesque and the sublime. Stemming from this idea, and through a re-analysis of the zombie as a concept, we propose an update to the Lacan/Zizek psychoanalytical models for death and subjectivity, as well as offer an explanation, through (...)
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    Graham Harman (2012). Concerning Stephen Hawking's Claim That Philosophy is Dead. Filozofski Vestnik 32 (2):11-22.
    The article begins from Stephen Hawking's well-known claim that philosophy is dead, and considers several other quotations in which philosophy is either belittled or subordinated outright to the natural sciences. This subordination requires a downward reductionism that is paralleled by the upward reductionism of the linguistic turn and social constructionist theories. Rather than undermining or overmining mid-sized individual entities, philosophy must deal with objects on their own terms. This suggests a possible tactical alliance between philosophy and the arts.
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