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Dean Pettit [5]Dean R. Pettit [1]
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Profile: Dean Pettit
  1. Dean Pettit (2010). On the Epistemology and Psychology of Speech Comprehension. The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication 5 (1):9.
    How do we know what other speakers say? Perhaps the most natural view is that we hear a speaker's utterance and infer what was said, drawing on our competence in the syntax and semantics of the language. An alternative view that has emerged in the literature is that native speakers have a non-inferential capacity to perceive the content of speech. Call this the perceptual view. The disagreement here is best understood as an epistemological one about whether our knowledge of what (...)
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  2. Dean Pettit & Joshua Knobe (2009). The Pervasive Impact of Moral Judgment. Mind and Language 24 (5):586-604.
    Shows that the very same asymmetries that arise for intentionally also arise from deciding, desiring, in favor of, opposed to, and advocating. It seems that the phenomenon is not due to anything about the concept of intentional action in particular. Rather, the effects observed for the concept of intentional action should be regarded as just one manifestation of the pervasive impact of moral judgment.
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  3. Dean Pettit (2005). Belief and Understanding: A Rejoinder to Gross. Mind 114 (453):67-74.
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  4. Dean Pettit (2002). Why Knowledge is Unnecessary for Understanding Language. Mind 111 (443):519-550.
    It is a natural thought that understanding language consists in possessing knowledge—to understand a word is to know what it means. It is also natural to suppose that this knowledge is propositional knowledge—to know what a word means is to know that it means such-and-such. Thus it is prima facie plausible to suppose that understanding a bit of language consists in possessing propositional knowledge of its meaning. I refer to this as the epistemic view of understanding language. The theoretical appeal (...)
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  5. Dean R. Pettit (2001). Understanding Language. Dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
    My dissertation concerns the nature of linguistic understanding. A standard view about linguistic understanding is that it is a propositional knowledge state. The following is an instance of this view: given a speaker S and an expression alpha that means M, S understand alpha just in case S knows that alpha means M. I refer to this as the epistemic view of linguistic understanding. The epistemic view would appear to be a mere conceptual truth about linguistic understanding, since it is (...)
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