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Profile: Deborah Smith (Macalester College)
  1. Deborah C. Smith (2012). Metaphysical Antirealism and Objective Truth. Southern Journal of Philosophy 37 (2):293-313.
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  2. Deborah C. Smith (2012). Rainbows, Time Zones, and Other Mind-Dependent Objects: Making Sense of the Relevant Notions of “Mind-Dependence” in the Debate Between Metaphysical Realists and Antirealists. Open Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):38-44.
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  3. Deborah C. Smith (2011). Mind-Independence and the Logical Space of Wright's Realist-Relevant Axes. Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (2):164-191.
    This paper continues the work begun by Crispin Wright of identifying, articulating, and explaining the relations between various realist-relevant axes that emerge when it is conceded that any predicate capable of satisfying a small range of platitudes is syntactically and semantically adequate to count as a truth predicate for a discourse. I argue that the fact that a given discourse satisfies the three realist-relevant axes that remain if evidence-transcendent truth and reference to evidence-transcendent facts are ruled out by Dummettian meaning-theoretic (...)
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  4. Deborah C. Smith (2007). Superassertibility and the Equivalence Schema: A Dilemma for Wright's Antirealist. Synthese 157 (1):129 - 139.
    Crispin Wright champions the notion of superassertibility as providing a truth predicate that is congenial to antirealists in many debates in that it satisfies relevant platitudes concerning truth and does so in a very minimal way. He motivates such a claim by arguing that superassertibility can satisfy the equivalence schema: it is superassertible that P if and only if P. I argue that Wright’s attempted proof that superassertibility can satisfy this schema is unsuccessful, because it requires a premise that has (...)
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  5. Deborah C. Smith (2005). Warranted Assertibility and the Norms of Assertoric Practice: Why Truth and Warranted Assertibility Are Not Coincident Norms. Ratio 18 (2):206–220.
  6. Deborah C. Smith (2003). A Hole in the Defense of Pure Reason. Journal of Philosophical Research 28:345-360.
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  7. Deborah C. Smith (2002). Objective Prescriptions and Other Essays. Review of Metaphysics 55 (3):638-639.
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  8. Deborah C. Smith (2002). The Case for Metaphysical Realism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 40 (3):411-419.
    This work defends a modest version of metaphysical realism. The commitments of the view are spelled out and the strongest argument for it is presented. It is suggested that failure to find this argument persuasive frequently arises from either a failure to distinguish between trivial and nontrivial dependence of minds on minds or a tendency to equivocate between metaphysical and theoretical timelines. The notion of mind-dependence is then explored in more detail. It is argued that, while the metaphysical realist has (...)
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  9. Deborah C. Smith (2001). Introduction and Elimination Rules Vs. Equivalence Rules in Systems of Formal Logic. Teaching Philosophy 24 (4):379-390.
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  10. Deborah C. Smith (2001). Moral Realism, Skepticism and Anti-Realism: A Critical Analysis of the Criteria for Moral Realism. Disputatio 11:1 - 10.
  11. Deborah C. Smith (2001). Parfit on Personal Identity. Idealistic Studies 31 (2/3):169-181.
    This paper examines Parfit's argument that personal identity is not what matters, focusing on his case against reductionist theories of personal identity. I argue that Parfit's reasons for rejecting reductionist views do not take the physical criterion for personal identity seriously enough. I outline a thoroughly naturalistic version of the reductionist theory that, if true, would escape Parfit's criticism. Such a view would be a plausible candidate for a relation that would matter as much as, if not more than, the (...)
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  12. Deborah C. Smith (1999). Metaphysical Antirealism and Objective Truth: Is Metaphysical Antirealism Self-Refuting? Southern Journal of Philosophy 37 (2):293-313.
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