17 found
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Deborah C. Smith [16]Deborah Colleen Smith [1]
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Profile: Deborah Smith (Macalester College)
Profile: Deborah Colleen Smith (Kent State University)
  1.  14
    Deborah C. Smith (2015). Properties, Laws, and Worlds. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (4):471-489.
    Jonathan Schaffer argues against a necessary connection between properties and laws. He takes this to be a question of what possible worlds we ought to countenance in our best theories of modality, counterfactuals, etc. In doing so, he unfairly rigs the game in favor of contingentism. I argue that the necessitarian can resist Schaffer’s conclusion while accepting his key premise that our best theories of modality, counterfactuals, etc. require a very wide range of things called ‘possible worlds’. However, the necessitarian (...)
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  2.  13
    Deborah C. Smith (2016). Quid Quidditism Est? Erkenntnis 81 (2):237-257.
    Over the last decade or so, there has been a renewed interest in a view about properties known as quidditism. However, a review of the literature reveals that ‘quidditism’ is used to cover a range of distinct views. In this paper I explore the logical space of distinct types of quidditism. The first distinction noted is between quidditism as a thesis explicitly about property individuation and quidditism as a principle of unrestricted property recombination. The distinction recently drawn by Dustin Locke (...)
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  3.  29
    Deborah C. Smith (2005). Warranted Assertibility and the Norms of Assertoric Practice: Why Truth and Warranted Assertibility Are Not Coincident Norms. Ratio 18 (2):206–220.
    Crispin Wright has argued that truth and warranted assertibility are coincident but non-co-extensive norms of assertoric practice and that this fact tends to inflate deflationary theories of truth. Wright’s inflationary argument has generated much discussion in the literature. By contrast, relatively little has been said about the claim that truth and warranted assertibility are coincident norms. This paper will examine that claim. Wright’s argument for the claim that truth and warranted assertibility are coincident norms is first clearly presented. It is (...)
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  4.  17
    Deborah C. Smith (2001). Moral Realism, Skepticism and Anti-Realism: A Critical Analysis of the Criteria for Moral Realism. Disputatio 11:1 - 10.
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  5.  18
    Deborah C. Smith (1999). Metaphysical Antirealism and Objective Truth: Is Metaphysical Antirealism Self-Refuting? Southern Journal of Philosophy 37 (2):293-313.
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  6.  26
    Deborah C. Smith (2003). A Hole in the Defense of Pure Reason. Journal of Philosophical Research 28:345-360.
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  7.  22
    Deborah C. Smith (2001). Parfit on Personal Identity. Idealistic Studies 31 (2/3):169-181.
    This paper examines Parfit's argument that personal identity is not what matters, focusing on his case against reductionist theories of personal identity. I argue that Parfit's reasons for rejecting reductionist views do not take the physical criterion for personal identity seriously enough. I outline a thoroughly naturalistic version of the reductionist theory that, if true, would escape Parfit's criticism. Such a view would be a plausible candidate for a relation that would matter as much as, if not more than, the (...)
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  8.  12
    Deborah C. Smith (2012). Rainbows, Time Zones, and Other Mind-Dependent Objects: Making Sense of the Relevant Notions of “Mind-Dependence” in the Debate Between Metaphysical Realists and Antirealists. Open Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):38-44.
    In a recent article, Sam Page distinguishes four kinds of mind-dependence : ontological, causal, structural, and individuative. He argues that, despite the fact that the metaphysical realism/antirealism debate has been frequently characterized as a debate between those who accept and those who deny that the world is causally and/or structurally dependent on minds, many antirealists are primarily interested in defending the claim that the world is individuatively mind-dependent. In this article, I critically examine these differing senses of “ mind-dependence ” (...)
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  9.  23
    Deborah C. Smith (2011). Mind-Independence and the Logical Space of Wright's Realist-Relevant Axes. Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (2):164-191.
    This paper continues the work begun by Crispin Wright of identifying, articulating, and explaining the relations between various realist-relevant axes that emerge when it is conceded that any predicate capable of satisfying a small range of platitudes is syntactically and semantically adequate to count as a truth predicate for a discourse. I argue that the fact that a given discourse satisfies the three realist-relevant axes that remain if evidence-transcendent truth and reference to evidence-transcendent facts are ruled out by Dummettian meaning-theoretic (...)
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  10.  12
    Deborah C. Smith (2002). Objective Prescriptions and Other Essays. Review of Metaphysics 55 (3):638-639.
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  11.  26
    Deborah C. Smith (2007). Superassertibility and the Equivalence Schema: A Dilemma for Wright's Antirealist. Synthese 157 (1):129 - 139.
    Crispin Wright champions the notion of superassertibility as providing a truth predicate that is congenial to antirealists in many debates in that it satisfies relevant platitudes concerning truth and does so in a very minimal way. He motivates such a claim by arguing that superassertibility can satisfy the equivalence schema: it is superassertible that P if and only if P. I argue that Wright’s attempted proof that superassertibility can satisfy this schema is unsuccessful, because it requires a premise that has (...)
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  12.  18
    Deborah C. Smith (2002). The Case for Metaphysical Realism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 40 (3):411-419.
    This work defends a modest version of metaphysical realism. The commitments of the view are spelled out and the strongest argument for it is presented. It is suggested that failure to find this argument persuasive frequently arises from either a failure to distinguish between trivial and nontrivial dependence of minds on minds or a tendency to equivocate between metaphysical and theoretical timelines. The notion of mind-dependence is then explored in more detail. It is argued that, while the metaphysical realist has (...)
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  13.  2
    Deborah C. Smith (2001). Introduction and Elimination Rules Vs. Equivalence Rules in Systems of Formal Logic: A Pedagogical Comparison. Teaching Philosophy 24 (4):379-390.
    This paper argues that Lemmon-style proof systems have several pedagogical benefits over Copi-style systems . It is argued that Lemmon-style systems are easier to learn as they do not require memorizing as many rules, they do not require learning the subtle distinction between a rule of inference and a rule of replacement, and deriving material conditionals is more straightforward. Finally, it is argued that the need for learning provisional assumptions in Lemmon-style rules is not a significant enough reason for choosing (...)
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  14.  12
    Deborah C. Smith (2001). Introduction and Elimination Rules Vs. Equivalence Rules in Systems of Formal Logic. Teaching Philosophy 24 (4):379-390.
    This paper argues that Lemmon-style proof systems have several pedagogical benefits over Copi-style systems . It is argued that Lemmon-style systems are easier to learn as they do not require memorizing as many rules, they do not require learning the subtle distinction between a rule of inference and a rule of replacement, and deriving material conditionals is more straightforward. Finally, it is argued that the need for learning provisional assumptions in Lemmon-style rules is not a significant enough reason for choosing (...)
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  15.  2
    Deborah C. Smith (2012). Metaphysical Antirealism and Objective Truth. Southern Journal of Philosophy 37 (2):293-313.
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  16. Deborah Colleen Smith (1996). Metaphysical Realism and Antirealism: An Analysis of the Contemporary Debate. Dissertation, University of Washington
    The metaphysical realist asserts, while the metaphysical antirealist denies, that there are individuals that exist independently of the existence and workings of any mind or minds. I begin by distinguishing the thesis of metaphysical realism from other theses that are also called ' realism '. Of particular interest in this discussion is the relation between metaphysical realism and views such as moral realism and scientific realism. ; Metaphysical realism is commonly thought to be the default position in the debate since (...)
     
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  17. Deborah C. Smith (2007). Superassertibility and the Equivalence Schema: A Dilemma for Wright’s Antirealist. Synthese 157 (1):129-139.
    In _Truth and Objectivity_, Crispin Wright argues that the notion of superassertibility affords the antirealist (with respect to a given range of discourse) a viable alternative to the realist’s more robust notion of truth. Toward this end, he endeavors to prove that a superassertibility predicate can satisfy the traditional equivalence schema: it is true that P iff P. (Wright takes satisfaction of this schema to be a criterion of adequacy for any viable truth predicate.) In this paper, I will argue (...)
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