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Profile: Deborah Heikes (University of Alabama, Huntsville)
  1.  7
    Deborah K. Heikes (2015). Can Mind Be a Virtue? Southwest Philosophy Review 31 (1):119-128.
    While feminist philosophy has had much to say on the topic of reason, little has been done to develop a specifically feminist account of the concept. I argue for a virtue account of mind grounded in contemporary approaches to rationality. The evolutionary stance adopted within most contemporary theories of mind implicitly entails a rejection of central elements of Cartesianism. As a result, many accounts of rationality are anti-modern is precisely the sorts of ways that feminists demand. I maintain that a (...)
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  2.  25
    Deborah K. Heikes (2012). Being Reasonable. Southwest Philosophy Review 28 (1):187-195.
    Although feminists have spilled a great deal of ink criticizing Enlightenment conceptions of rationality, the time has come to consider constructing a positive account. Recent attempts to construct an account of rationality as a virtue concept reflect many feminist complaints concerning Enlightenment rationality, and, thus, I maintain that feminism should take seriously such a conception. Virtue rationality offers a more diverse account of rationality without sacrificing the fundamental normativity of the concept. Furthermore, the narrower concept of reasonableness, promises to provide (...)
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  3.  28
    Deborah K. Heikes (1996). The Realism in Quasi-Realism. Southwest Philosophy Review 12 (1):75-83.
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  4.  8
    Deborah K. Heikes (2004). Wittgenstein and the Private Language of Ethlcs. Southwest Philosophy Review 20 (2):27-38.
    Beyond “A Lecture on Ethics,” Wittgenstein says little on the topic of ethics, despite professing a great respect for ethics. I argue that while Wittgenstein ceases to speak of ethics, his account fits equally within his Tractarian and post-Tractarian writing. On both accounts of language, ethics remains nonsense, but it is not insignificant nonsense. However, because Wittgenstein holds ethics to concern absolute values that are in principle inexpressible, his anti-theoretical conception of ethics fails to offer guidance in how one ought (...)
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  5.  47
    Deborah K. Heikes (2004). The Bias Paradox: Why It's Not Just for Feminists Anymore. Synthese 138 (3):315 - 335.
    The bias paradox emerges out of a tension between objectivism and relativism.If one rejects a certain the conception objectivity as absolute impartiality and value-neutrality (i.e., if all views are biased), how, then, can one hold that some epistemic perspectives are better than others? This is a problem that has been most explicitly dealt with in feminist epistemology, but it is not unique to feminist perspectives. In this paper, I wish to clearly lay out the nature of the paradox and the (...)
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  6.  20
    Deborah K. Heikes (2009). Let's Be Reasonable. Southwest Philosophy Review 25 (1):127-134.
    Feminist philosophy is highly critical of Cartesian, and more broadly Enlightenment, conceptions of rationality. However, feminist philosophers typically fail to address contemporary theories of rationality and to consider how more current thoeories address feminist concerns. I argue that, contrary to their protestations, feminists are “obsessing over an outdated conception of reason” and that even the most suspect of “malestream” philosophers express an understanding of rationality that is closer to feminist concerns than Cartesian ones. I begin by briefly examining key features (...)
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  7.  1
    Deborah K. Heikes (1998). Concepts, Content, and Consciousness: A Kantian View of Mind. Dissertation, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
    The mind is, for Kant, a functional system whereby bare sensations are combined into representations of objects and unified within a single consciousness. I argue that this picture allows for realistic mental content and provides a useful explanation of the nature of consciousness. ;However, despite its insights, a Kantian view of mind has two significant difficulties: the first concerns the relationship between mental concepts and objects in the world while the second concerns the relationship of concepts to the consciousness which (...)
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  8.  22
    Deborah K. Heikes (2010/2011). Rationality and Feminist Philosophy. Continuum.
    Exploring the history of the concept of 'rationality', Deborah K. Hakes argues that feminism should seek to develop a virtue theory of rationality.
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  9. Deborah K. Heikes (2003). Schema, Language, and Two Problems Content. Journal of Mind and Behavior 24 (2):155-168.
    Human cognition is often taken to be a rule-governed system of representations that serve to guide our beliefs about our actions in the world around us. This view, though, has two problems: it must explain how the conceptually governed contents of the mind can be about objects that exist in a non-conceptual world, and it must explain how the non-conceptual world serves as a constraint on belief. I argue that the solution to these problems is to recognize that cognition has (...)
     
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