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  1. Deborah Perron Tollefsen (2009). WIKIPEDIA and the Epistemology of Testimony. Episteme 6 (1):8-24.
    In “Group Testimony” (2007) I argued that the testimony of a group cannot be understood (or at least cannot always be understood) in a summative fashion; as the testimony of some or all of the group members. In some cases, it is the group itself that testifies. I also argued that one could extend standard reductionist accounts of the justification of testimonial belief to the case of testimonial belief formed on the basis of group testimony. In this paper, I explore (...)
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  2. Deborah Perron Tollefsen (2008). Review of Daniel D. Hutto, Folk Psychological Narratives: The Sociocultural Basis of Understanding Reasons. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008 (3).
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  3. Deborah Perron Tollefsen (2006). Group Deliberation, Social Cohesion, and Scientific Teamwork: Is There Room for Dissent? Episteme 3 (1-2):37-51.
    Recent discussions of rational deliberation in science present us with two extremes: unbounded optimism and sober pessimism. Helen Longino (1990) sees rational deliberation as the foundation of scientific objectivity. Miriam Solomon (1991) thinks it is overrated. Indeed, she has recently argued (2006) that group deliberation is detrimental to empirical success because it often involves groupthink and the suppression of dissent. But we need not embrace either extreme. To determine the value of rational deliberation we need to look more closely at (...)
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  4. Deborah Perron Tollefsen (2003). Participant Reactive Attitudes and Collective Responsibility. Philosophical Explorations 6 (3):218 – 234.
    The debate surrounding the issue of collective moral responsibility is often steeped in metaphysical issues of agency and personhood. I suggest that we can approach the metaphysical problems surrounding the issue of collective responsibility in a roundabout manner. My approach is reminiscent of that taken by P.F. Strawson in "Freedom and Resentment" (1968). Strawson argues that the participant reactive attitudes - attitudes like resentment, gratitude, forgiveness and so on - provide the justification for holding individuals morally responsible. I argue that (...)
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  5. Deborah Perron Tollefsen (2002). Collective Intentionality and the Social Sciences. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 32 (1):25-50.
    In everyday discourse and in the context of social scientific research we often attribute intentional states to groups. Contemporary approaches to group intentionality have either dismissed these attributions as metaphorical or provided an analysis of our attributions in terms of the intentional states of individuals in the group.Insection1, the author argues that these approaches are problematic. In sections 2 and 3, the author defends the view that certain groups are literally intentional agents. In section 4, the author argues that there (...)
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