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  1. Deborah P. Tollefsen, Rick Dale & Alexandra Paxton (2013). Alignment, Transactive Memory, and Collective Cognitive Systems. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (1):49-64.
    Research on linguistic interaction suggests that two or more individuals can sometimes form adaptive and cohesive systems. We describe an “alignment system” as a loosely interconnected set of cognitive processes that facilitate social interactions. As a dynamic, multi-component system, it is responsive to higher-level cognitive states such as shared beliefs and intentions (those involving collective intentionality) but can also give rise to such shared cognitive states via bottom-up processes. As an example of putative group cognition we turn to transactive memory (...)
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  2. Rick Dale, Deborah P. Tollefsen & Christopher T. Kello (2012). An Integrative Pluralistic Approach to Phenomenal Consciousness. In Shimon Edelman, Tomer Fekete & Neta Zach (eds.), Being in Time: Dynamical Models of Phenomenal Experience. John Benjamins Pub. Co.. 88--231.
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  3. Sondra Bacharach & Deborah Tollefsen (2011). We Did It Again: A Reply to Livingston. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 69 (2):225-230.
  4. Deborah Tollefsen (2011). Groups as Rational Sources. In Hans Bernhard Schmid, Daniel Sirtes & Marcel Weber (eds.), Collective Epistemology. Ontos. 20--11.
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  5. Deborah Tollefsen & Rick Dale (2011). Naturalizing Joint Action: A Process-Based Approach. Philosophical Psychology 25 (3):385 - 407.
    Numerous philosophical theories of joint agency and its intentional structure have been developed in the past few decades. These theories have offered accounts of joint agency that appeal to higher-level states (such as goals, commitments, and intentions) that are ?shared? in some way. These accounts have enhanced our understanding of joint agency, yet there are a number of lower-level cognitive phenomena involved in joint action that philosophers rarely acknowledge. In particular, empirical research in cognitive science has revealed that when individuals (...)
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  6. Sondra Bacharach & Deborah Tollefsen (2010). We Did It: From Mere Contributors to Coauthors. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 68 (1):23-32.
  7. Deborah Tollefsen (2009). Symposia on Gender, Race and Philosophy. In David Papineau (ed.), Philosophy. Oxford University Press. 5--1.
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  8. Deborah Perron Tollefsen (2009). WIKIPEDIA and the Epistemology of Testimony. Episteme 6 (1):8-24.
    In “Group Testimony” (2007) I argued that the testimony of a group cannot be understood (or at least cannot always be understood) in a summative fashion; as the testimony of some or all of the group members. In some cases, it is the group itself that testifies. I also argued that one could extend standard reductionist accounts of the justification of testimonial belief to the case of testimonial belief formed on the basis of group testimony. In this paper, I explore (...)
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  9. Deborah Perron Tollefsen (2008). Review of Daniel D. Hutto, Folk Psychological Narratives: The Sociocultural Basis of Understanding Reasons. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008 (3).
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  10. Deborah Tollefsen (2007). Comments on Jackman's “Incompatibility Arguments and Semantic Self-Knowledge”. Southwest Philosophy Review 23 (2):51-54.
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  11. Deborah Tollefsen (2007). Group Testimony. Social Epistemology 21 (3):299 – 311.
    The fact that much of our knowledge is gained through the testimony of others challenges a certain form of epistemic individualism. We are clearly not autonomous knowers. But the discussion surrounding testimony has maintained a commitment to what I have elsewhere called epistemic agent individualism. Both the reductionist and the anti-reductionist have focused their attention on the testimony of individuals. But groups, too, are sources of testimony - or so I shall argue. If groups can be testifiers, a natural question (...)
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  12. David Henderson & Deborah Tollefsen (2006). Editors' Introduction. Southern Journal of Philosophy 44 (S1):15-15.
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  13. Deborah Tollefsen (2006). &Quot;from Extended Mind to Collective Mind.&Quot;. Cognitive Systems Research 7 (2):140-150.
  14. Deborah Tollefsen (2006). The Rationality of Collective Guilt. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 30 (1):222–239.
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  15. Deborah Perron Tollefsen (2006). Group Deliberation, Social Cohesion, and Scientific Teamwork: Is There Room for Dissent? Episteme 3 (1-2):37-51.
    Recent discussions of rational deliberation in science present us with two extremes: unbounded optimism and sober pessimism. Helen Longino (1990) sees rational deliberation as the foundation of scientific objectivity. Miriam Solomon (1991) thinks it is overrated. Indeed, she has recently argued (2006) that group deliberation is detrimental to empirical success because it often involves groupthink and the suppression of dissent. But we need not embrace either extreme. To determine the value of rational deliberation we need to look more closely at (...)
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  16. Deborah Tollefsen (2005). Let’s Pretend!: Children and Joint Action. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 35 (1):75-97.
    According to many, joint intentional action must be understood in terms of joint intentions. Most accounts of joint intention appeal to a set of sophisticated individual intentional states. The author argues that standard accounts of joint intention exclude the possibility of joint action in young children because they presuppose that the participants have a robust theory of mind, something young children lack. But young children do engage in joint action. The author offers a revision of Michael Bratman’s analysis of joint (...)
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  17. Deborah Tollefsen (2004). Collective Epistemic Agency. Southwest Philosophy Review 20 (1):55-66.
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  18. Deborah Tollefsen, Collective Intentionality. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  19. Deborah Tollefsen (2004). Collective Rationality and Collective Reasoning, Christopher McMahon. Cambridge University Press 2001, VII + 251 Pages. [REVIEW] Economics and Philosophy 20 (2):409-416.
  20. Deborah Tollefsen (2003). Book Review. [REVIEW] Philosophy of the Social Sciences 33 (3):406-411.
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  21. Deborah Perron Tollefsen (2003). Participant Reactive Attitudes and Collective Responsibility. Philosophical Explorations 6 (3):218 – 234.
    The debate surrounding the issue of collective moral responsibility is often steeped in metaphysical issues of agency and personhood. I suggest that we can approach the metaphysical problems surrounding the issue of collective responsibility in a roundabout manner. My approach is reminiscent of that taken by P.F. Strawson in "Freedom and Resentment" (1968). Strawson argues that the participant reactive attitudes - attitudes like resentment, gratitude, forgiveness and so on - provide the justification for holding individuals morally responsible. I argue that (...)
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  22. Deborah Tollefsen (2002). Organizations as True Believers. Journal of Social Philosophy 33 (3):395–410.
  23. Deborah Perron Tollefsen (2002). Collective Intentionality and the Social Sciences. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 32 (1):25-50.
    In everyday discourse and in the context of social scientific research we often attribute intentional states to groups. Contemporary approaches to group intentionality have either dismissed these attributions as metaphorical or provided an analysis of our attributions in terms of the intentional states of individuals in the group.Insection1, the author argues that these approaches are problematic. In sections 2 and 3, the author defends the view that certain groups are literally intentional agents. In section 4, the author argues that there (...)
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  24. Deborah Tollefsen (1999). Princess Elisabeth and the Problem of Mind-Body Interaction. Hypatia 14 (3):59-77.
    : This paper focuses on Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia's philosophical views as exhibited in her early correspondence with René Descartes. Elisabeth's criticisms of Descartes's interactionism as well as her solution to the problem of mind-body interaction are examined in detail. The aim here is to develop a richer picture of Elisabeth as a philosophical thinker and to dispel the myth that she is simply a Cartesian muse.
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