Search results for 'Debra A. Tolliver' (try it on Scholar)

  1. Joseph Thomas Tolliver (1999). Sensory Holism and Functionalism. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (6):972-973.score: 60.0
    I defend the possibility of a functional account of the intrinsic qualities of sensory experience against the claim that functional characterization can only describe such qualities to the level of isomorphism of relational structures on those qualities. A form sensory holism might be true concerning the phenomenal, and this holism would account for some antifunctionalist intuition evoked by inverted spectrum and absent qualia arguments. Sensory holism is compatible with the correctness of functionalism about the phenomenal.
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  2. Joseph Thomas Tolliver (2007). Sensing, Perceiving, and Thinking: On the Method of Phenomenal Contrast. Southern Journal of Philosophy 45 (S1):143-151.score: 60.0
    I apply the Method of Phenomenal Contrast to examples involving aesthetic experience and sensory illusion. While the method can provide reasons to prefer one form of content hypothesis over others, it may be of no help in answering substantive questions about the nature and structure of such content. I suggest that successful application of the method can leave us with a difficult question. Why would a sensory system have the function of representing a property that it cannotdetect?
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  3. Joseph Thomas Tolliver (2012). Tales of the Ineffable: Crafting Concepts in Aesthetic Experience. Philosophical Studies 161 (1):153-162.score: 60.0
    Lehrer has argued that in having an aesthetic experience of an art work we come to have ineffable knowledge of what the art object is like. This knowledge is made possible by our ability to conceptualize the art object by means of a process Lehrer calls, "exemplarization", that involves using an experience to craft a general representation of that very experience. I suggest that exemplar concepts function as vehicles of ineffable representation only if they have two features: (i) they are (...)
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