Search results for 'Debunking arguments' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Guy Kahane (2011). Evolutionary Debunking Arguments. Noûs 45 (1):103-125.score: 240.0
    Evolutionary debunking arguments (EDAs) are arguments that appeal to the evolutionary origins of evaluative beliefs to undermine their justification. This paper aims to clarify the premises and presuppositions of EDAs—a form of argument that is increasingly put to use in normative ethics. I argue that such arguments face serious obstacles. It is often overlooked, for example, that they presuppose the truth of metaethical objectivism. More importantly, even if objectivism is assumed, the use of EDAs in normative (...)
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  2. Benjamin James Fraser (2014). Evolutionary Debunking Arguments and the Reliability of Moral Cognition. Philosophical Studies 168 (2):457-473.score: 208.0
    Recent debate in metaethics over evolutionary debunking arguments against morality has shown a tendency to abstract away from relevant empirical detail. Here, I engage the debate about Darwinian debunking of morality with relevant empirical issues. I present four conditions that must be met in order for it to be reasonable to expect an evolved cognitive faculty to be reliable: the environment, information, error, and tracking conditions. I then argue that these conditions are not met in the case (...)
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  3. Jonathan Jong & Aku Visala (forthcoming). Evolutionary Debunking Arguments Against Theism, Reconsidered. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion:1-16.score: 192.0
    Evolutionary debunking arguments (EDAs) against religious beliefs move from the claim that religious beliefs are caused by off-track processes to the conclusion that said religious beliefs are unjustified and/or false. Prima facie, EDAs commit the genetic fallacy, unduly conflating the context of discovery and the context of justification. In this paper, we first consider whether EDAs necessarily commit the genetic fallacy, and if not, whether modified EDAs (e.g., those that posit falsehood-tracking or perniciously deceptive belief-forming mechanisms) provide successful (...)
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  4. Elizabeth Tropman (2014). Evolutionary Debunking Arguments: Moral Realism, Constructivism, and Explaining Moral Knowledge. 17 (2):126-140.score: 180.0
    One of the alleged advantages of a constructivist theory in metaethics is that the theory avoids the epistemological problems with moral realism while reaping many of realism's benefits. According to evolutionary debunking arguments, the epistemological problem with moral realism is that the evolutionary history of our moral beliefs makes it hard to see how our moral beliefs count as knowledge of moral facts, realistically construed. Certain forms of constructivism are supposed to be immune to this argument, giving the (...)
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  5. John S. Wilkins & Paul E. Griffiths (forthcoming). Evolutionary Debunking Arguments in Three Domains: Fact, Value, and Religion. In James Maclaurin Greg Dawes (ed.), A New Science of Religion. Routledge.score: 156.0
    Ever since Darwin people have worried about the sceptical implications of evolution. If our minds are products of evolution like those of other animals, why suppose that the beliefs they produce are true, rather than merely useful? We consider this problem for beliefs in three different domains: religion, morality, and commonsense and scientific claims about matters of empirical fact. We identify replies to evolutionary scepticism that work in some domains but not in others. One reply is that evolution can be (...)
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  6. Kelby Mason (2010). Debunking Arguments and the Genealogy of Religion and Morality. Philosophy Compass 5 (9):770-778.score: 150.0
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  7. Helen de Cruz & Johan de Smedt (2012). Evolved Cognitive Biases and the Epistemic Status of Scientific Beliefs. Philosophical Studies 157 (3):411-429.score: 90.0
    Our ability for scientific reasoning is a byproduct of cognitive faculties that evolved in response to problems related to survival and reproduction. Does this observation increase the epistemic standing of science, or should we treat scientific knowledge with suspicion? The conclusions one draws from applying evolutionary theory to scientific beliefs depend to an important extent on the validity of evolutionary arguments (EAs) or evolutionary debunking arguments (EDAs). In this paper we show through an analytical model that cultural (...)
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  8. Guy Kahane (2014). Evolution and Impartiality. Ethics 124 (2):327-341.score: 90.0
    Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek and Peter Singer argue that evolutionary considerations can resolve Sidgwick’s dualism of practical reason because such considerations debunk moral views that give weight to self-interested or partial considerations but cannot threaten the principle of universal benevolence. I argue that even if we grant these claims, this appeal to evolution is ultimately self-defeating. De Lazari-Radek and Singer face a dilemma. Either their evolutionary argument against partial morality succeeds, but then we need to also give up our conviction that (...)
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  9. Katia Vavova (2014). Debunking Evolutionary Debunking. Oxford Studies in Metaethics 9:76-101.score: 72.0
    Evolutionary debunking arguments start with a premise about the influence of evolutionary forces on our evaluative beliefs, and conclude that we are not justified in those beliefs. The value realist holds that there are attitude-independent evaluative truths. But the debunker argues that we have no reason to think that the evolutionary forces that shaped human evaluative attitudes would track those truths. Worse yet, we seem to have a good reason to think that they wouldn’t: evolution selects for characteristics (...)
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  10. Matthew Braddock (2013). Defusing the Demandingness Objection: Unreliable Intuitions. Journal of Social Philosophy 44 (2):169-191.score: 62.0
    Dogged resistance to demanding moral views frequently takes the form of The Demandingness Objection. Premise (1): Moral view V demands too much of us. Premise (2): If a moral view demands too much of us, then it is mistaken. Conclusion: Therefore, moral view V is mistaken. Objections of this form harass major theories in normative ethics as well as prominent moral views in applied ethics and political philosophy. The present paper does the following: (i) it clarifies and distinguishes between various (...)
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  11. Maarten Boudry, Helen De Cruz, Stefaan Blancke & Johan De Smedt (2011). Het 'Universele Zuur' van de Evolutionaire Psychologie? Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 73 (2):287-305.score: 62.0
    In a previous issue of Tijdschrift voor Filosofie, Filip Buekens argues that evolutionary psychology (EP), or some interpretations thereof, have a corrosive impact on our ‘manifest self-image’. Buekens wants to defend and protect the global adequacy of this manifest self-image in the face of what he calls evolutionary revisionism. Although we largely agree with Buekens’ central argument, we criticize his analysis on several accounts, making some constructive proposals to strengthen his case. First, Buekens’ argument fails to target EP, because his (...)
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  12. Erik J. Wielenberg (2010). On the Evolutionary Debunking of Morality. Ethics 120 (3):441-464.score: 60.0
    Evolutionary debunkers of morality hold this thesis: If S’s moral belief that P can be given an evolutionary explanation, then S’s moral belief that P is not knowledge. In this paper, I debunk a variety of arguments for this thesis. I first sketch a possible evolutionary explanation for some human moral beliefs. Next, I explain how, given a reliabilist approach to warrant, my account implies that humans possess moral knowledge. Finally, I examine the debunking arguments of Michael (...)
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  13. Daniel Z. Korman (2014). Debunking Perceptual Beliefs About Ordinary Objects. Philosophers' Imprint 14 (13).score: 60.0
    Debunking arguments are arguments that aim to undermine some range of beliefs by showing that those beliefs are not appropriately connected to their subject matter. Arguments of this sort rear their heads in a wide variety of domains, threatening beliefs about morality, mathematics, logic, color, and the existence of God. Perceptual beliefs about ordinary objects, however, are widely thought to be invulnerable to such arguments. I will show that this is a mistake. I articulate a (...)
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  14. William J. FitzPatrick (forthcoming). Debunking Evolutionary Debunking of Ethical Realism. Philosophical Studies:1-22.score: 60.0
    What implications, if any, does evolutionary biology have for metaethics? Many believe that our evolutionary background supports a deflationary metaethics, providing a basis at least for debunking ethical realism. Some arguments for this conclusion appeal to claims about the etiology of the mental capacities we employ in ethical judgment, while others appeal to the etiology of the content of our moral beliefs. In both cases the debunkers’ claim is that the causal roles played by evolutionary factors raise deep (...)
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  15. Shaun Nichols (forthcoming). Process Debunking and Ethics. .score: 60.0
    In this essay, two different forms of debunking arguments are distinguished. On the type of debunking argument that I will promote, one attempts to undercut the justificatory status of a belief by showing that the belief was formed by an epistemically defective psychological process. I argue that there is a promising application of such a process debunking argument in metaethics. In normative ethics, however, process debunking arguments face greater obstacles.
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  16. Larry Hauser (1997). Searle's Chinese Box: Debunking the Chinese Room Argument. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 7 (2):199-226.score: 56.0
    John Searle's Chinese room argument is perhaps the most influential andwidely cited argument against artificial intelligence (AI). Understood astargeting AI proper – claims that computers can think or do think– Searle's argument, despite its rhetorical flash, is logically andscientifically a dud. Advertised as effective against AI proper, theargument, in its main outlines, is an ignoratio elenchi. It musterspersuasive force fallaciously by indirection fostered by equivocaldeployment of the phrase "strong AI" and reinforced by equivocation on thephrase "causal powers" (at least) equal (...)
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  17. Christopher Toner (2011). Evolution, Naturalism, and the Worthwhile: A Critique of Richard Joyce's Evolutionary Debunking of Morality. Metaphilosophy 42 (4):520-546.score: 54.0
    Abstract: In The Evolution of Morality, Richard Joyce argues there is good reason to think that the “moral sense” is a biological adaptation, and that this provides a genealogy of the moral sense that has a debunking effect, driving us to the conclusion that “our moral beliefs are products of a process that is entirely independent of their truth, … we have no grounds one way or the other for maintaining these beliefs.” I argue that Joyce's skeptical conclusion is (...)
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  18. David Resnik (1994). Debunking the Slippery Slope Argument Against Human Germ-Line Gene Therapy. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 19 (1):23-40.score: 48.0
    This paper attempts to debunk the slippery-slope argument against human germ-line gene therapy by showing that the downside of the slope – genetic enhancement – need not be as unethical or unjust as some people have supposed. It argues that if genetic enhancement is governed by proper regulations and is accompanied by adequate education, then it need not violate recognized principles of morality or social justice. Keywords: germ-line therapy, slippery slope argument, future generations, social justice CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this?
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  19. Scott Stapleford (2008). Kant's Transcendental Arguments: Disciplining Pure Reason. Continuum.score: 48.0
    Two currents of thought dominated Western philosophy in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries: Continental Rationalism and British Empiricism. Despite the gradual dissemination of British ideas on the Continent in the first decades of the eighteenth century, these fundamentally disparate philosophical outlooks seemed to be wholly irreconcilable. However, the publication of Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason in 1781 presented an entirely new method of philosophical reasoning that promised to combine the virtues of Rationalism with the scientific rigour of Empiricism. This (...)
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  20. Toby Handfield, Genealogical Explanations of Chance and Morals.score: 42.0
    Objective chance and morality are rarely discussed together. In this paper, I argue that there is a surprising similarity in the epistemic standing of our beliefs about both objective chance and objective morality. The key similarity is that both of these sorts of belief are undermined -- in a limited, but important way -- by plausible genealogical accounts of the concepts that feature in these beliefs. The paper presents a brief account of Richard Joyce's evolutionary hypothesis of the genealogy of (...)
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  21. Justin Clarke-Doane (forthcoming). Justification and Explanation in Mathematics and Morality. In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics. Oxford University Press.score: 42.0
    In an influential book, Harman writes, "In explaining the observations that support a physical theory, scientists typically appeal to mathematical principles. On the other hand, one never seems to need to appeal in this way to moral principles [1977, 9 – 10]." What is the epistemological relevance of this contrast? In this article, I argue that ethicists and philosophers of mathematics have misunderstood it. They have confused what I shall call the justificatory challenge for realism about an area, D – (...)
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  22. Hallvard Lillehammer (2003). Debunking Morality: Evolutionary Naturalism and Moral Error Theory. [REVIEW] Biology and Philosophy 18 (4):567-581.score: 36.0
    The paper distinguishes three strategies by means of which empirical discoveries about the nature of morality can be used to undermine moral judgements. On the first strategy, moral judgements are shown to be unjustified in virtue of being shown to rest on ignorance or false belief. On the second strategy, moral judgements are shown to be false by being shown to entail claims inconsistent with the relevant empirical discoveries. On the third strategy, moral judgements are shown to be false in (...)
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  23. Nikk Effingham, Debunking a Mereological Myth: If Composition as Identity is True, Universalism Need Not Be.score: 36.0
    It is a common view that if composition as identity is true, then so is mereological universalism (the thesis that all objects have a mereological fusion). Various arguments have been advanced in favour of this: (i) there has been a recent argument by Merricks, (ii) some claim that Universalism is entailed by the ontological innocence of the identity relation, (or that ontological innocence undermines objections to universalism) and (iii) it is entailed by the law of selfidentity. After a preliminary (...)
     
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  24. Matthew Braddock & Alexander Rosenberg (2012). Reconstruction in Moral Philosophy? Analyse Und Kritik 34 (1):63-80.score: 34.0
    We raise three issues for Philip Kitcher's "Ethical Project" (2011): First, we argue that the genealogy of morals starts well before the advent of altruism-failures and the need to remedy them, which Kitcher dates at about 50K years ago. Second, we challenge the likelihood of long term moral progress of the sort Kitcher requires to establish objectivity while circumventing Hume's challenge to avoid trying to derive normative conclusions from positive ones--'ought' from 'is'. Third, we sketch ways in which Kitcher's metaethical (...)
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  25. Russ Shafer-Landau (2012). Evolutionary Debunking, Moral Realism, and Moral Knowledge. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 7 (1).score: 32.0
    This paper reconstructs what I take to be the central evolutionary debunking argument that underlies recent critiques of moral realism. The argument claims that given the extent of evolutionary influence on our moral faculties, and assuming the truth of moral realism, it would be a massive coincidence were our moral faculties reliable ones. Given this coincidence, any presumptive warrant enjoyed by our moral beliefs is defeated. So if moral realism is true, then we can have no warranted moral beliefs, (...)
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  26. Gary Slater (2014). A Peircean Response to the Evolutionary Debunking of Moral Knowledge. Zygon 49 (3):593-611.score: 32.0
    The evolutionary debunking argument advanced by Sharon Street, Michael Ruse, and Richard Joyce employs the logic of Paul Griffiths and John Wilkins to contend that humans cannot have knowledge of moral truths, since the evolutionary process that has produced our basic moral intuitions lacks causal connections to those (putative) truths. Yet this argument is self-defeating, because its aim is the categorical, normative claim that we should suspend our moral beliefs in light of the discoveries about their non-truth-tracking origins, when (...)
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  27. Daniel Z. Korman (2011). Ordinary Objects. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.score: 30.0
    An encyclopedia entry which covers various revisionary conceptions of which macroscopic objects there are, and the puzzles and arguments that motivate these conceptions: sorites arguments, the argument from vagueness, the puzzles of material constitution, arguments against indeterminate identity, arguments from arbitrariness, debunking arguments, the overdetermination argument, and the problem of the many.
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  28. Justin Clarke-Doane (forthcoming). What is the Benacerraf Problem? In Fabrice Pataut (ed.), New Perspectives on the Philosophy of Paul Benacerraf: Truth, Objects, Infinity.score: 30.0
    In "Mathematical Truth", Paul Benacerraf articulated an epistemological problem for mathematical realism. His formulation of the problem relied on a causal theory of knowledge which is now widely rejected. But it is generally agreed that Benacerraf was onto a genuine problem for mathematical realism nevertheless. Hartry Field describes it as the problem of explaining the reliability of our mathematical beliefs, realistically construed. In this paper, I argue that the Benacerraf Problem cannot be made out. There simply is no intelligible problem (...)
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  29. Tristram McPherson (forthcoming). A Case for Ethical Veganism. Journal of Moral Philosophy.score: 30.0
    This paper begins by setting out an intuitive case for ethical veganism: the thesis that it is typically wrong to consume animal products. This case begins with the intuitive claim that it is wrong to set fire to a cat. I then raise a methodological challenge: this is an intuitive argument for a revisionary conclusion. Even if we grant that we cannot both believe that it is permissible to drink milk, and that it is wrong to set fire to cats, (...)
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  30. Victor Kumar & Richmond Campbell (2012). On the Normative Significance of Experimental Moral Psychology. Philosophical Psychology 25 (3):311-330.score: 30.0
    Experimental research in moral psychology can be used to generate debunking arguments in ethics. Specifically, research can indicate that we draw a moral distinction on the basis of a morally irrelevant difference. We develop this naturalistic approach by examining a recent debate between Joshua Greene and Selim Berker. We argue that Greene's research, if accurate, undermines attempts to reconcile opposing judgments about trolley cases, but that his attempt to debunk deontology fails. We then draw some general lessons about (...)
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  31. Kelby Mason (2011). Moral Psychology And Moral Intuition: A Pox On All Your Houses. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (3):441-458.score: 30.0
    Peter Singer has argued for a radical anti-intuitionism on the basis of recent empirical research into the psychological and evolutionary origins of moral intuition. There is, however, a gap between the putative genealogy of moral intuition that Singer offers and his desired methodological claim. I explore three ways to bridge the gap, and argue that the promising way is to construe the genealogy as a debunking genealogy. I sketch an account of how debunking arguments work, and then (...)
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  32. Raffaella de Rosa (2004). Locke's Essay Book I: The Question-Begging Status of the Anti-Nativist Arguments. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (1):37-64.score: 30.0
    In this paper I argue against the received view that the anti-nativist arguments of Book I of Locke’s Essay conclusively challenge nativism. I begin by reconstructing the chief argument of Book I and its corollary arguments. I call attention to their dependence on (what I label) “the Awareness Principle”, viz., the view that there are no ideas in the mind of which the mind either isn’t currently aware or hasn’t been aware in the past. I then argue that (...)
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  33. Derek Leben (2012). When Psychology Undermines Beliefs. Philosophical Psychology (3):1-23.score: 30.0
    This paper attempts to specify the conditions under which a psychological explanation can undermine or debunk a set of beliefs. The focus will be on moral and religious beliefs, where a growing debate has emerged about the epistemic implications of cognitive science. Recent proposals by Joshua Greene and Paul Bloom will be taken as paradigmatic attempts to undermine beliefs with psychology. I will argue that a belief p may be undermined whenever: (i) p is evidentially based on an intuition which (...)
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  34. Richard Joyce (2013). Irrealism and the Genealogy of Morals. Ratio 26 (4):351-372.score: 30.0
    Facts about the evolutionary origins of morality may have some kind of undermining effect on morality, yet the arguments that advocate this view are varied not only in their strategies but in their conclusions. The most promising such argument is modest: it attempts to shift the burden of proof in the service of an epistemological conclusion. This paper principally focuses on two other debunking arguments. First, I outline the prospects of trying to establish an error theory on (...)
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  35. Raffaella Rosa (2004). Locke's "Essay, Book I": The Question-Begging Status of the Anti-Nativist Arguments. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (1):37 - 64.score: 30.0
    In this paper I argue against the received view that the anti-nativist arguments of Book I of Locke's Essay conclusively challenge nativism. I begin by reconstructing the chief argument of Book I and its corollary arguments. I call attention to their dependence on (what I label) "the Awareness Principle", viz., the view that there are no ideas in the mind of which the mind either isn't currently aware or hasn't been aware in the past. I then argue that (...)
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  36. Helen De Cruz & Johan De Smedt (2012). Evolved Cognitive Biases and the Epistemic Status of Scientific Beliefs. Philosophical Studies 157 (3):411 - 429.score: 30.0
    Our ability for scientific reasoning is a byproduct of cognitive faculties that evolved in response to problems related to survival and reproduction. Does this observation increase the epistemic standing of science, or should we treat scientific knowledge with suspicion? The conclusions one draws from applying evolutionary theory to scientific beliefs depend to an important extent on the validity of evolutionary arguments (EAs) or evolutionary debunking arguments (EDAs). In this paper we show through an analytical model that cultural (...)
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  37. Ben Fraser (2013). Moral Error Theories and Folk Metaethics. Philosophical Psychology:1-18.score: 26.0
    In this paper, I distinguish between two error theories of morality: one couched in terms of truth (ET1); the other in terms of justification (ET2). I then present two arguments: the Poisoned Presupposition Argument for ET1; and the Evolutionary Debunking Argument for ET2. I go on to show how assessing these arguments requires paying attention to empirical moral psychology, in particular, work on folk metaethics. After criticizing extant work, I suggest avenues for future research.
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  38. Mark T. Nelson (2003). Who Needs Valid Moral Arguments? Argumentation 17 (1):35-42.score: 25.0
    Why have so many philosophers agonised over the possibility of valid arguments from factual premises to moral conclusions? I suggest that they have done so, because of worries over a sceptical argument that has as one of its premises, `All moral knowledge must be non-inferential, or, if inferential, based on valid arguments or strong inductive arguments from factual premises'. I argue that this premise is false.
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  39. Henry Prakken (2011). Argumentation Without Arguments. Argumentation 25 (2):171-184.score: 25.0
    A well-known ambiguity in the term ‘argument’ is that of argument as an inferential structure and argument as a kind of dialogue. In the first sense, an argument is a structure with a conclusion supported by one or more grounds, which may or may not be supported by further grounds. Rules for the construction and criteria for the quality of arguments in this sense are a matter of logic. In the second sense, arguments have been studied as a (...)
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  40. Matthew W. McKeon (2013). On the Rationale for Distinguishing Arguments From Explanations. Argumentation 27 (3):283-303.score: 25.0
    Even with the lack of consensus on the nature of an argument, the thesis that explanations and arguments are distinct is near orthodoxy in well-known critical thinking texts and in the more advanced argumentation literature. In this paper, I reconstruct two rationales for distinguishing arguments from explanations. According to one, arguments and explanations are essentially different things because they have different structures. According to the other, while some explanations and arguments may have the same structure, they (...)
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  41. Jonathan Adler (2013). Are Conductive Arguments Possible? Argumentation 27 (3):245-257.score: 25.0
    Conductive Arguments are held to be defeasible, non-conclusive, and neither inductive nor deductive (Blair and Johnson in Conductive argument: An overlooked type of defeasible reasoning. College, London, 2011). Of the different kinds of Conductive Arguments, I am concerned only with those for which it is claimed that countervailing considerations detract from the support for the conclusion, complimentary to the positive reasons increasing that support. Here’s an example from Wellman (Challenge and response: justification in ethics. Southern Illinois University Press, (...)
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  42. Adam Corner & Ulrike Hahn (2007). Evaluating the Meta-Slope: Is There a Slippery Slope Argument Against Slippery Slope Arguments? [REVIEW] Argumentation 21 (4):349-359.score: 25.0
    Slippery slope arguments (SSAs) have often been viewed as inherently weak arguments, to be classified together with traditional fallacies of reasoning and argumentation such as circular arguments and arguments from ignorance. Over the last two decades several philosophers have taken a kinder view, often providing historical examples of the kind of gradual change on which slippery slope arguments rely. Against this background, Enoch (2001, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 21(4), 629–647) presented a novel argument against (...)
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  43. Lev G. Vassiliev (2003). Rational Comprehension of Arguments in Theoretical Texts: A Program for an Argumentative-Linguistic Approach. [REVIEW] Argumentation 17 (1):21-34.score: 25.0
    A method of linguistically-oriented reasoning comprehension is proposed. It is based on semiological principles of text comprehension. Both content and form are essential for comprehending argumentative texts. A text recipient is viewed as a rational judge trying to detect all the components of the argument he/she considers and thus to see if the argument is consistent. Elementary and higher level argumentative units of the text are discovered by applying a modified S. Toulmin's model of argumentative functions. Validity and correctness of (...)
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  44. Bianca Bernardi & Emanuela Antolini (1996). Structural Differences in the Production of Written Arguments. Argumentation 10 (2):175-196.score: 25.0
    The purpose of this study is to analyse the structure of written argumentative texts produced by pupils in grades 3, 5, 7 and 11 in relation to three different tasks: Group A — subjects are assigned a topic question consisting of a single statement (open question); Group B — subjects are given a topic question consisting of both a statement and its opposite (opposite opinions); Group C — subjects are given an initial and a final sentence of a text, which (...)
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  45. Manfred Hofer & Birgit Pikowsky (1993). Validation of a Category System for Arguments in Conflict Discourse. Argumentation 7 (2):135-148.score: 25.0
    Theories of individuation predict systematic differences in argumentative behavior between adolescent girls and their mothers. In order to reveal the nature and functions of this kind of discourse, two studies were carried out on 110 mother-daughter pairs. The second study (n=80) replicated and extended the first study (n=30) on an independent sample. The mother-daughter pairs were asked to discuss a subject that had recently been at issue between them. To assess the argumentative behavior, a category system was developed that reflects (...)
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  46. James F. Voss, Rebecca Fincher-Kiefer, Jennifer Wiley & Laurie Ney Silfies (1993). On the Processing of Arguments. Argumentation 7 (2):165-181.score: 25.0
    This paper is concerned with the processing of informal arguments, that is, arguments involving “probable truth.” A model of informal argument processing is presented that is based upon Hample's (1977) expansion of Toulmin's (1958) model of argument structure. The model postulates that a claim activates an attitude, the two components forming a complex that in turn activates reasons. Furthermore, the model holds occurrence of the reason, or possibly the claim and the reason, activates values. Three experiments are described (...)
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  47. Mark Vorobej (1995). Linked Arguments and the Validity Requirement. Argumentation 9 (2):291-304.score: 25.0
    In this paper I demonstrate that most textbook accounts of the linked/convergent distinction fail to conform to the widespread intuition that all valid arguments ought to be classified as linked arguments. I also show that standard textbook accounts of linkage and convergence cannot provide a satisfactory treatment of fallacies of irrelevance and, due to their general insensitivity to the epistemic context in which arguments are offered, must be supplemented by subjective accounts of linkage and convergence which appeal (...)
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  48. Ian Proops (2001). The New Wittgenstein: A Critique. European Journal of Philosophy 9 (3):375–404.score: 24.0
    An essay challenging Cora Diamond's influential approach to reading Wittgenstein's Tractatus. According to Diamond, the Tractatus contains no substantive philosophical theses, but is purely an exercise in the debunking of nonsense. I argue that a convincing case for this claim has not yet been made--either by Diamond herself, or by the numerous defenders of this so-called "resolute" reading. Having critically examined the arguments that have been offered in favor of the resolute reading, I go on to marshal textual (...)
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  49. Christopher Weaver (2009). Explanation, Entailment, and Leibnizian Cosmological Arguments. Metaphysica 10 (1):97-108.score: 24.0
    I argue that there are Leibnizian-style cosmological arguments for the existence of God which start from very mild premises which affirm the mere possibility of a principle of sufficient reason. The utilization of such premises gives a great deal of plausibility to such types of argumentation. I spend the majority of the paper defending three major objections to such mild premises viz., a reductio argument from Peter van Inwagen and William Rowe, which proffers and defends the idea that a (...)
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  50. Ariela Tubert (2011). Korsgaard's Constitutive Arguments and the Principles of Practical Reason. Philosophical Quarterly 61 (243):343-362.score: 24.0
    Constitutive arguments for the principles of practical reason attempt to justify normative requirements by claiming that we already accept them in so far as we are believers or agents. In two constitutive arguments for the requirement that we must will universally, Korsgaard attempts first to arrive at the requirement that we will universally from observations about the causality of the will, and secondly to establish that willing universally is constitutive of having a self. Some rational requirements may be (...)
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