We demonstrate that the key components of cognitive architectures (declarative and procedural memory) and their key capabilities (learning, memory retrieval, probability judgment, and utility estimation) can be implemented as algebraic operations on vectors and tensors in a high‐dimensional space using a distributional semantics model. High‐dimensional vector spaces underlie the success of modern machine learning techniques based on deep learning. However, while neural networks have an impressive ability to process data to find patterns, they do not typically model (...) high‐level cognition, and it is often unclear how they work. Symbolic cognitive architectures can capture the complexities of high‐level cognition and provide human‐readable, explainable models, but scale poorly to naturalistic, non‐symbolic, or big data. Vector‐symbolic architectures, where symbols are represented as vectors, bridge the gap between the two approaches. We posit that cognitive architectures, if implemented in a vector‐space model, represent a useful, explanatory model of the internal representations of otherwise opaque neural architectures. Our proposed model, Holographic Declarative Memory (HDM), is a vector‐space model based on distributional semantics. HDM accounts for primacy and recency effects in free recall, the fan effect in recognition, probability judgments, and human performance on an iterated decision task. HDM provides a flexible, scalable alternative to symbolic cognitive architectures at a level of description that bridges symbolic, quantum, and neural models of cognition. (shrink)

Individual differences in phonological processing abilities have often been attributed to perceptual factors, rather than to factors relating to learning and memory. Here, we consider the contribution of individual differences in declarative and procedural memory to phonological processing performance in adulthood. We examined the phonological processing, declarative memory, and procedural memory abilities of 79 native English-speaking young adults with typical language and reading abilities. Declarative memory was assessed with a recognition memory (...) task of real and made-up objects. Procedural memory was assessed with a serial reaction time task. For both tasks, learning was assessed shortly after encoding, and again after a 12-h, overnight delay. We regressed phonological processing ability with memory performance on both days. We found that declarative memory, but not procedural memory, was highly predictive of phonological processing abilities. Specifically, declarative memory scores obtained shortly after learning were associated with non-word repetition performance, whereas declarative memory scores obtained after the overnight delay were associated with phonological awareness. Procedural memory was not associated with either of the phonological processing measures. We discuss these findings in the context of adult participants with mature phonological systems. We examine possible implications for the relationship between declarative memory and phonological processing in adulthood. (shrink)

Klein's target article argues that autonoetic consciousness is a necessary condition for memory; this unusually narrow view of the scope of memory implies that only episodic memory is, strictly speaking, memory. The narrow view is opposed to the standard broad view, on which causal connection with past experience is sufficient for memory; on the broad view, both declarative (i.e., episodic and semantic) and procedural memory count as genuine forms of memory. Klein mounts (...) a convincing attack on the broad view, arguing that it opens the "doors of memory" too far, but this commentary contends that the narrow view does not open them far enough. It may be preferable to adopt an intermediate view of the scope of memory, on which causal connection is sufficient for memory only when it involves encoding, storage, and retrieval of content. More demanding than the simple causal condition but less demanding than the autonoesis condition, the encoding-storage-retrieval condition implies that both episodic and semantic memory count as genuine forms of memory but that procedural memory does not. (shrink)

This paper investigates relationships between procedural-memory, declarative-memory, and working-memory skills and adult native English speakers’ novel sound-category learning. Participants completed a sound-categorization task that required integrating two dimensions: one native (vowel quality), one non-native (pitch). Similar information-integration category structures in the visual and auditory domains have been shown to be best learned implicitly (e.g., Maddox, Ing, & Lauritzen, 2006). Thus, we predicted that individuals with greater procedural-memory capacity would better learn sound categories, because procedural (...) class='Hi'>memory appears to support implicit learning of new information and integration of dimensions. Seventy undergraduates were tested across two experiments. Procedural memory was assessed using a linguistic adaptation of the serial-reaction-time task (Misyak, Christiansen, & Tomblin, 2010a, 2010b). Declarative memory was assessed using the logical-memory subtest of the Wechsler Memory Scale-4th edition (WMS-IV; Wechsler, 2009). Working memory was assessed using an auditory version of the reading-span task (Kane et al., 2004). Experiment 1 revealed contributions of only declarative memory to dimensional integration, which might indicate not enough time or motivation to shift over to a procedural/integrative strategy. Experiment 2 gave twice the speech-sound training, distributed over two days, and also attempted to train at the category boundary. As predicted, effects of declarative memory were removed and effects of procedural memory emerged, but, unexpectedly, new effects of working memory surfaced. The results may be compatible with a multiple-systems account in which declarative and working memory facilitate transfer of control to the procedural system. (shrink)

Sleep strengthens memories by repeatedly reactivating associated neuron ensembles. Our studies show that although long-term memory for a medium number of word-pairs benefits from sleep, a large number does not. This suggests an upper limit to the amount of information that has access to sleep-dependent declarative memory consolidation, which is possibly linked to the availability of reactivation opportunities. Due to competing processes of global forgetting that are active during sleep, we hypothesized that even larger amounts of information (...) would enhance the proportion of information that is actively forgotten during sleep. In the present study, we aimed to induce such forgetting by challenging the sleeping brain with vast amounts of to be remembered information. For this, 78 participants learned a very large number of 640 word-pairs interspersed with periods of quiet awake rest over the course of an entire day and then either slept or stayed awake during the night. Recall was tested after another night of regular sleep. Results revealed comparable retention rates between the sleep and wake groups. Although this null-effect can be reconciled with the concept of limited capacities available for sleep-dependent consolidation, it contradicts our hypothesis that sleep would increase forgetting compared to the wake group. Additional exploratory analyses relying on equivalence testing and Bayesian statistics reveal that there is evidence against sleep having a detrimental effect on the retention of declarative memory at high information loads. We argue that forgetting occurs in both wake and sleep states through different mechanisms, i.e., through increased interference and through global synaptic downscaling, respectively. Both of these processes might scale similarly with information load. (shrink)

Bouts of exercise performed either prior to or immediately following study periods enhance encoding and learning. Empirical evidence supporting the benefits of interventions that simultaneously pair physical activity with material to be learned is not conclusive, however. A narrative, theory-based review of dual-task experiments evaluated studies in terms of arousal theories, attention theories, cognitive-energetic theories, and entrainment theories. The pattern of the results of these studies suggests that cognitive-motor interference can either impair or enhance memory of semantic information and (...) the manner in which physical activity impacts working memory within executive processing appears to explain disparate outcomes. The integration and timing of physical movements in concert with the type of information to be encoded and remembered appears to be a critical requirement for learning. These observations have implications for the role of physical activity in education, rehabilitation, and gerontological settings. (shrink)

Continuing commentary raised several issues concerning our proposal that the hippocampus, parahippocampal region, and cortical association areas mediate different aspects of memory function. Recent relevant findings strengthen our argument that neocortical areas and the parahippocampal region maintain persistent encodings of specific single items and that the hippocampus mediates representations of the relations among these items. The reciprocally and closely interconnected structures that compose the hippocampal memory system work interactively to support flexible memory expression that is relevant to (...) the natural behavior of animals and to conscious recollection in humans. (shrink)

The structure of the brain and the nature of evolution suggest that, despite its uniqueness, language likely depends on brain systems that also subserve other functions. The declarative / procedural model claims that the mental lexicon of memorized word- specific knowledge depends on the largely temporal-lobe substrates of declarative memory, which underlies the storage and use of knowledge of facts and events. The mental grammar, which subserves the rule-governed combination of lexical items into complex representations, depends on (...) a distinct neural system. This system, which is composed of a network of specific frontal, basal - ganglia, parietal and cerebellar structures, underlies procedural memory, which supports the learning and execution of motor and cognitive skills, especially those involving sequences. The functions of the two brain systems, together with their anatomical, physiological and biochemical substrates, lead to specific claims and predictions regarding their roles in language. These predictions are compared with those of other neurocognitive models of language. Empirical evidence is presented from neuroimaging studies of normal language processing, and from developmental and adult- onset disorders. It is argued that this evidence supports the DP model. It is additionally proposed that “ language ” disorders, such as specific language impairment and non-fluent and fluent aphasia, may be profitably viewed as impairments primarily affecting one or the other brain system. Overall, the data suggest a new neurocognitive framework for the study of lexicon and grammar. (shrink)

Typically, thalamic aphasias appear to be primarily lexical-semantic disorders representing difficulty using stored declarative memories for semantic information to access lexical word forms. Yet, there also is reason to believe that the thalamus might play a role in linguistic procedural memory. For more than two decades, we have known that basal ganglia dysfunction is associated with difficulties in procedural learning, and specific thalamic nuclei are the final waypoint back to the cortex in cortico-basal ganglia-cortical loops. Recent analyses of (...) the role of the thalamus in lexical-semantic processes and of the role of the basal ganglia in linguistic processes suggest that thalamic participation is not simply a matter of declarative vs. procedural memory, but a matter of how the thalamus participates in lexical-semantic processes and in linguistic procedural memory, as well as the interaction of these processes. One role for the thalamus in accessing lexical forms for semantic concepts relates to the stabilization of a very complex semantic-lexical interface with thousands of representations on both sides of the interface. Further, the possibility is discussed that the thalamus, through its participation in basal ganglia loops, participates in two linguistic procedural memory processes: syntactic/grammatical procedures and procedures for finding words to represent semantic concepts, with the latter interacting intricately with declarative memories. These concepts are discussed in detail along with complexities that can be addressed by future research. (shrink)

The main goal of this article consists in addressing two fundamental issues of consciousness research and cognitive science, namely, the question of why declarative memory functions are inextricably linked with phenomenal awareness and the question of the physical basis of memory traces. The presented approach proposes that high-level cognitive processes involving consciousness employ a universal mechanism by means of which they access and modulate an omnipresent background field that is identified with the zero-point field (ZPF) specified by (...) stochastic electrodynamics, a branch of physics that deals with the universal principles underlying quantum systems. In addition to its known physical properties and memory capacities, the ZPF is hypothesized to be an immanently sentient medium. It is propounded that linking up to a particular field mode of the ZPF activates a particular phenomenal nuance, implying that the phase-locked coupling of a set of field modes, i.e., the formation of a so-called ZPF information state, constitutes an appropriate mechanism for the amalgamation of elementary shades of consciousness into a complex state of consciousness. Since quantum systems rest exactly on this mechanism, conscious memory processes in the brain are expected to differ from unconscious processes by the presence of the typical features of many-body quantum systems, particularly long-range coherence and attractor formation, which is supported by a huge body of empirical evidence. On this basis, the conceptual framework set out in this article paves the way for a new understanding of the brain as a write-read head interacting with the ZPF, leading to self-consistent interpretations of the neural correlates of memory formation and memory retrieval and explaining why these memory processes are closely intertwined with phenomenal awareness. In particular, the neural correlates suggest that the brain produces consciously perceived memory traces by writing sequences of information states into the ZPF and retrieves consciously experienced memory traces by reading sequences of information states from the ZPF. Using these theoretical foundations, altered states of consciousness and memory disorders can be traced back to impairments of the ZPF write-read mechanism. The mechanism should reveal itself through characteristic photon emissions, resulting in testable predictions. (shrink)

Memory is not a unitary phenomenon. Even among the group of long-term individual memory representations (known in the literature as declarative memory) there seems to be a distinction between two kinds of memory: memory of personally experienced events (episodic memory) and memory of facts or knowledge about the world (semantic memory). Although this distinction seems very intuitive, it is not so clear in which characteristic or set of interrelated characteristics lies the (...) difference. In this article, I present the different criteria proposed in the philosophical and scientific literature in order to account for this distinction: (1) the vehicle of representation; (2) the grammar of the verb “to remember”; (3) the cause of the memory; (4) the memory content; and (5) the phenomenology of memory representations. Whereas some criteria seem more plausible than others, I show that all of them are problematic and none of them really fulfill their aim. I then briefly outline a different criterion, the affective criterion, which seems a promising line of research to try to understand the grounds of this distinction. (shrink)

The Hard Question of memory is the following: how are memory representations stored and organized so as to be made available for retrieval in the appropriate circumstances and format? In this essay, I argue that philosophical theories of memory should engage with the Hard Question directly and seriously. I propose that declarative memory is a faculty performing a kind of cognitive triage: management of information for a variety of uses under significant computational constraints. In such (...) triage, memory representations are preferentially selected and stabilized, but also systematically modified and integrated into generalized, model-like representational structures. Further, I propose a hybrid theory of remembering, which takes into account both the nature of the cognitive processes underlying remembering and the norms that govern representational success in relevant cognitive/epistemic contexts. (shrink)

During communication, we form assumptions about what our communication partners know and believe. Information that is mutually known between the discourse partners—their common ground—serves as a backdrop for successful communication. Here we present an introduction to the focus of this topic, which is the role of memory in common ground and language use. Two types of questions emerge as central to understanding the relationship between memory and common ground, specifically questions having to do with the representation of common (...) ground in memory, and the use of common ground during language processing. (shrink)

Although there is a broad consensus that both the procedural and declarative memory systems play a crucial role in language learning, use, and knowledge, the mapping between linguistic types and memory structures remains underspecified: by default, a dual-route mapping of language systems to memory systems is assumed, with declarative memory handling idiosyncratic lexical knowledge and procedural memory handling rule-governed knowledge of grammar.We experimentally contrast the processing of morphology (case and aspect), syntax (subordination), and (...) lexical semantics (collocations) in a healthy L1 population of Polish, a language rich in form distinctions. We study the processing of these four types under two conditions: a single task condition in which the grammaticality of stimuli was judged and a concurrent task condition in which grammaticality judgments were combined with a digit span task. Dividing attention impedes access to declarative memory while leaving procedural memory unaffected and hence constitutes a test that dissociates which types of linguistic information each long-term memory construct subserves.Our findings confirm the existence of a distinction between lexicon and grammar as a generative, dual-route model would predict, but the distinction is graded, as usage-based models assume: the hypothesized grammar–lexicon opposition appears as a continuum on which grammatical phenomena can be placed as being more or less “ruly” or “idiosyncratic.” However, usage-based models, too, need adjusting as not all types of linguistic knowledge are proceduralized to the same extent. This move away from a simple dichotomy fundamentally changes how we think about memory for language, and hence how we design and interpret behavioral and neuroimaging studies that probe into the nature of language cognition. (shrink)

ABSTRACTA longstanding tradition in philosophy distinguishes between knowthatand know-how. This traditional “anti-intellectualist” view is soentrenched in folk psychology that it is often invoked in supportof an allegedly equivalent distinction between explicit and implicitmemory, derived from the so-called “standard model of memory.”In the last two decades, the received philosophical view has beenchallenged by an “intellectualist” view of know-how. Surprisingly, defenders of the anti-intellectualist view have turned to the cognitivescience of memory, and to the standard model in particular, todefend their (...) view. Here, I argue that this strategy is a mistake. As it turns out, upon closer scrutiny, the evidence from cognitivepsychology and neuroscience of memory does not support theanti-intellectualist approach, mainly because the standard modelof memory is likely wrong. However, this need not be interpretedas good news for the intellectualist, for it is not clear that theempirical evidence necessarily supp... (shrink)

Je lui ai associÉ un court extrait d'une revue de questions portant sur le même thème. Implicit memory is revealed when previous experiences facilitate perf on a task that does not require conscious or intentional recollection of those expces. Explicit memory is revealed when perf on a task requires conscious recolelction of previous expces. Il s'agit de defs descriptives qui n'impliquent pas l'existence de deux systs de mÉmo sÉparÉs. Historiquement Descartes est le premier ˆ faire mention de phÉnomènes (...) de mÉmo implicites, Leibniz, Maine de Biran, Bergson en ont Également parlÉ. Korsakoff (1889) avec ses travaux sur les amnÉsiques montre qu'ils sont capables d'utiliser de l'info qu'ils ont acquises dans des Épisodes rÉcents sans pour autant manifester le moindre souvenir de l'Épisode. L'interprÉtation de ces phÉnomènes Était alors que ça renvoyait ˆ des traces en mÉmoire trop tÉnues pour accèder jusqu'au champ de la conscience. Cette interprÉtation va pouvoir être ÉcartÉe par les travaux rÉcents. Thorndike a Également conduit un nbre important de travaux sur MI. Les trauvaux un peu plus rÉcents ont montrÉ qu'un apprentissage antÉrieur pouvait faciliter une perfce sans qu'il y ait ref explicite à l'Épisode d'apprentissage. On a montrÉ aussi l'effet de stimuli subliminaux, qui en tant que tels ne peuvent pas être rappelÉs consciemment, mais qui influencent la conduite ou les jugts ultÉrieurs. Par ex, la prÉsentation de formes sur des temps très courts qui excluent la possibilitÉ d'une perception consciente influence significativement lechoix de formes dans une pÉreuve ultÉrieure de choix forcÉs où les sjts doivent indiquer la forme qu'il prÉfère entre deux. Ils choisissent prÉfÉrentiellement celles qui leur ont ÉtÉ prÉsentÉes de manière subliminale. De même Bargh et al. ont montrÉ que des sjts soumis de manière subliminale ˆ des mots hostiles portent ultÉrieurement des jugts plus nÉgatifs sur une personne target. Il ya Également eu des travaux sur l'apprsge ou le condt without awareness en particulier apprsge implicite de règles de grammaire (ie le sjt peut construire de nouvelles phrases conformes ˆ la syntaxe de celles qui lui ont ÉtÉ prÉsentÉes sans pour autant petre capables d'noncer les règles de grammaire qu'il utilise) Rem: N'est ce pas un pbe de typemÉtacognition??? Enfin, tous les travaux sur le priming sont des elts en faveur de MI: Facilitation in the processing of a stimulus as a function of a recent encounter with the same stimulus. Type de perfce sur lesquels les effets de priming ont ÉtÉ dÉmontrÉs: -T‰ches de dÉcision lexicale: Le sjt doit dire si la cha"ne de caractères qu'on lui prÉsente est un mot ou pas: Le temps de latence est beaucoup plus court si la cha"ne a dÉjˆ ÉtÉ prÉsentÉe une première fois. -Mesures de temps d'identification de mots en rpÉsentation tachitoscopiques -ComplÉmentation de mots: les sjts ont tendance ˆ complÉter pour crÉer les mots qui leur ont ÉtÉ prÉsentÉs antÉrieurement. L'intÉrêt pour le paradigme de priming se retouve chez les gens qui s'intÉressent ˆ: -reconnaissance de mots et organisation lexicale. les effets de priming permettent de faire des hyps sur l'accès lexical et la reprÉsentation. -M. Épisodique: travux sur les amnÉsiques qui ne se souviennent pas qu'on vient de leur prÉsenter des mots mais qui manifestent une mÉmoire implicite lorsqu'on leur fait faire de la complÉmentation de mots. DISSOCIATION ENTRE M.I. ET M EXPLICITE 1-Si de nombreux travaux montrent que la M explicite est influencÉe par le travail d'Élaboration (profondeur de traitement) en jeu pendant la première phase d'Étude des stimuli, il semble que la MI ne le soit pas. 2-Le changt de modalitÉ (par ex auditif -> visuel) entre la phase d'Étude et la phase de test provoque une attÉnuation importante de l'effet de priming si le test est un test de MI mais pas si c'est un test de ME. 3-Les effets de primings persistent assez largement sur plusieurs jours ce qui n'est pas le cas des perfces ˆ une Épreuve de reconnaissance. 4-Les perfces sur des tests de MI ne semblent pas influencÉes par des manipulations d'interfÉrences proactives ou rÉtroactives dont on sait qu'elles influencent les perfces en ME. 5-Absce de corrÉlation entre perfces ˆ des tests de reconnaissance et perfces ˆ une Épreuve de complÉmentation de mots. SIMILARITES ENTRE PRIMING ET REMEMBERING 1- A certaines conditions les durÉes de rÉtention on des effets parallèles sur les effets de priming et les mesures de ME (REm: en partie contradictoire avec 3 ci dessus) 2-La manipulation du contexte de la liste lors de la phase d'Étude affecte ˆ la fois les perfces en reconnaissance et en identification de mots. 3- ME et MI sont influencÉes par des associations nouvellement acquises entre des paires de mots non reliÉes (Rem: contradictoires avec 4 ci dessus ??) 4- Rem: Le contraire de 1 du pt "dissociation" !!!! dans une manip particulière 5-Johnston et al. ont montrÉ que des mots identifÉs plus rapidement Étaient plus svt jugÉs comme 'old' dans une t‰che de reconnaissance que les mots identifiÉs plus lentement. Il n'est pas exclu que les phÉnomènes que l'on interprètent comme relevant de MI soient parfois de la ME involontaire cad des cas o les cues fournis dans le test conduisent ˆ un souvenir involontaire mais totalement conscient. LES INTERPRETATIONS THEORIQUES DE MI 1-Les effets de priming sur des test de MI sont attribuables ˆ l'activation temporaires de reprÉsentations ou structures de K prÉ-existantes . Cette activation est supposÉe avoir lieu de manière automatique, indÉpendamment des processus d'Élaboration nÉcessaires pour Établir de nouvelles traces Épisodiques. 2- les difÉrences entre ME et MI sont dues ˆ la nature et aux relations entre les processus d'encodage et de rÉcupÉration. Une version de cette approche est celle qui s'appuie sur la distinction entre processus dirigÉs par les donnÉes et processus dirigÉs par les concepts. Ces derniers reflètent des activitÉs initiÉes par le sjt comme l'Élaboration, l'organisation et la reconstruction, c'est sur ce type de processus que reposerait la ME alors que la MI reposerait sur des processus data-driven. 3-ME et MI renvoient ˆ des systs sous jacents diffÉrents. Pour Cohen & Squire (1984), la ME est supportÉe par une M DECLARATIVE , syst qui est en jeu dans la formation de nouvelles reprÉsentations. La MI repose sur un syst PROCEDURAL dans lequel la M se manifeste par des modifications on line de procÉdures ou opÉrations de traitement. Le syst de M Épisodique est vu comme la base pour le souvenir explicite d'evts rÉcents tandis que la M sÉmantique est responsable des perfces sur des tests de MI. Chacune de ces approches est conforme ˆ certaines des donnÉes recueillies mais pas ˆ d'autres. (shrink)

The word «history» can always be understood in two different meanings: as what happened in the past and as a story about the past. One and the same past can be described in different ways. The gap between historical events and representations of these events determines the diversity of historical discourses. Shifting the focus of the philosophy of history from identifying the con- ditions for the possibility of historical knowledge to the analysis of the process of historiography reflects an understanding (...) of the fundamental nature of historical discourses for the formation of pictures of the past. But the fascination with the subject of historical representation often overshadows what makes it possible in principle. Historical discourse is a modern narrative of the past. Thus, the condition for the possibility of historical discursiveness is the mediation of the horizons of the present and the past, which is a fundamental feature of the historicity of human existence. This article explains the discourses of memory and oppositional critical scientific history. Discourses of memory are considered as modern forms of manifestation of the historicity of human existence, because it is in them that the constant mediation of time horizons of the past and present becomes thematic. Critical history declaratively opposes the discourses of memory, but reveals the dependence of its methodological foundations on predetermined forms of under- standing the past presented in memory. The opposition between the discourses of memory and critical history structurally repeats the opposition of tradition and scientific history revealed in hermeneutics. The conceptual shift from tradition to memory reflects the fundamental changes in the modern understanding of historicity associated with the further detraditionalization and globalization of the world. Me- mory appears as a new form of understanding the past, associated with the fear of losing it, as well as understanding the distances and gaps in relation to it. Based on the differentiation of collective memory types, the corresponding types of dis- courses are distinguished. It is argued that historical discourses of identity cannot be identified with historical discourses of power, and historical-didactic and historical-aesthetic discourses are independent forms of modern attitude to the past. In an effort to separate critical reconstruc- tion from memory, scientific discourses become counterfactual to the taken for granted past, represented in the narratives of collective memory. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIn keeping with the dominant view that skills are largely automatic, the standard view of memory systems distinguishes between a representational declarative system associated with cognitive processes and a performance-based procedural system. The procedural system is thought to be largely responsible for the performance of well-learned skilled actions. Here we argue that most skills do not fully automate, which entails that the declarative system should make a substantial contribution to skilled performance. To support this view, we review (...) evidence showing that the declarative system does indeed play a number of roles in skilled action. (shrink)

This paper identifies a form of remembering sufficiently overlooked that it has not yet been dignified with a name. I shall christen it Rilkean Memory. This form of memory is, typically, embodied and embedded. It is a form of involuntary, autobiographical memory that is neither implicit nor explicit, neither declarative nor procedural, neither episodic nor semantic, and not Freudian. While a discussion of the importance of Rilkean memory lies beyond the scope of this paper, I (...) shall try to show that admitting Rilkean memory into our ontology does point us in the direction of a very different conception of the mind and mental processes. (shrink)

The causal and simulation theories are often presented as very distinct views about declarative memory, their major difference lying on the causal condition. The causal theory states that remembering involves an accurate representation causally connected to an earlier experience. In the simulation theory, remembering involves an accurate representation generated by a reliable memory process. I investigate how to construe detailed versions of these theories that correctly classify memory errors as misremembering or confabulation. Neither causalists nor simulationists (...) have paid attention to memory-conjunction errors, which is unfortunate because both theories have problems with these cases. The source of the difficulty is the background assumption that an act of remembering has one target. I fix these theories for those cases. The resulting versions are closely related when implemented using tools of information theory, differing only on how memory transmits information about the past. The implementation provides us with insights about the distinction between confabulatory and non-confabulatory memory, where memory-conjunction errors have a privileged position. (shrink)

The hippocampal formation is known for its importance in conscious, declarative memory. Here, we report neuroimaging evidence in humans for an additional role of the hippocampal formation in nonconscious memory. We maskedly presented combinations of faces and written professions such that subjects were not aware of them. Nevertheless, the masked presentations activated many of the brain regions that unmasked presentations of these stimuli did. To induce a nonconscious retrieval of the faces and face-associated occupational information, subjects were (...) instructed to view the previously masked faces and to guess the professional category of each person—academic, artist, and workman. Guessing the professional category of previously masked versus new faces activated the left and right hippocampal formation and right perirhinal cortex as well as bilateral fusiform areas and fronto-temporal areas known to mediate the retrieval of semantic information. These activations within the semantic processing system suggest that conceptual knowledge acquired during masking was nonconsciously retrieved. Our data provide clues to an analogous role of the hippocampus in conscious and nonconscious memory. (shrink)

This paper explores the prospects for a Pritchardean epistemological disjunctivist account of memory knowledge. We begin by providing an overview of Duncan Pritchard's epistemological disjunctivist account of perceptual knowledge, as well as the theoretical advantages of such an account. Drawing on that account, we present and motivate our own Pritchardean epistemological disjunctivist account of memory knowledge. After distinguishing different sorts of memory and the different roles that memory can play in knowledge acquisition, we set out our (...) account and argue that the case for epistemological disjunctivism enjoys parity with the case for epistemological disjunctivism of perceptual knowledge. We also consider objections to our account. The first is from Joe Milburn and Andrew Moon, who argue against a general epistemological disjunctivism of memory on the basis of differences in memory types. The second objection arises from a Radford-like case whereby one's true belief is from memory even though one lacks rational support that is reflectively accessible to one. (shrink)

The present paper examines the relationship between explicit and implicit memory and ultimate attainment in the native language. Two groups of native speakers of English with different levels of academic attainment (i.e., high vs. low) took part in three language tasks which assessed grammar, vocabulary and collocational knowledge, as well as phonological short-term memory (assessed using a forward digit-span task), explicit associative memory (assessed using a paired-associates task) and implicit memory (assessed using a deterministic serial reaction (...) time task). Results revealed strong relationships between phonological short-term memory and explicit associative memory on the one hand and the three language tasks on the other hand, and no relation between linguistic performance and implicit memory. Taken together, these results cast doubts on the common assumption that L1 grammar learning depends almost entirely on implicit memory and align with the claims of usage-based models of language acquisition that grammatical and lexical knowledge depend on the same cognitive mechanisms. (shrink)

Is the memory of touching always disguised by senses that forget where they come from? Creating distancethrough a mastery that constitutes the object as a monument built in place of the subject’s disappearance.The memory of touching? The most insistent and the most difficult to enter into memory. The one that entailsreturning to a commitment whose beginning and end cannot be recovered.Memory of the flesh, where that which has not yet been written is inscribed, laid down? That (...) which has a place,has taken place, but has no language. The felt, which expresses itself for the first time. Declares itself to theother in silence.One must remember this and hope that the other remembers. Lodge it in a memory that serves as its bedand its nest, while waiting for the other to understand. Make a cradle for him inside and out while leaving himfree, and keep oneself in the memory of the strength that revealed itself, that acted. (Irigaray, 215–16). (shrink)

South Africa since 1994 is widely represented as a society which has broken both historically and politically with white supremacy. One of the central discursive pillars sustaining this representation is the appeal to the most recent South African constitution Act 108 of 1996, the founding provisions of which declare that South Africa is founded on the value of non-racialism. The central argument of this article is that an examination of the philosophical underpinnings of the non-racialism of the constitution can give (...) us a better understanding of why and how South Africa remains a racial polity despite the coming into effect of the constitution. We will conclude the article by considering the ethical and political demands which must be met before the actuality of non-racialism may be experienced. (shrink)

Can humanity be divided into good and evil? And if so, is it possible for the good to vanquish the evil, eradicating it from the face of the Earth by declaring war on evildoers and bringing them to justice? Can we overcome evil by the power of memory? In _Memory as a Remedy for Evil_, Tzvetan Todorov answers these questions in the negative, arguing that despite all our efforts to the contrary, we cannot be delivered from evil. In this (...) work on evil, memory and justice, Todorov examines the uses of memory and the spate of memorial laws in France in order to show how memory has failed as a remedy against evil and how efforts to come to grips with past evil through trials and punitive justice have failed as well. Todorov locates the fatal flaw of all these approaches in our erroneous relationship with evil as alterity, the distinction that we draw between ourselves and others that allows us to imagine ourselves in the appealing role of hero and victim and confine others to the role of villain and criminal. Similarly, in his analysis of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission and Cambodia’s Khmer Rouge Tribunal, Todorov argues in favor of restorative justice, which “seeks not to punish but to restore relations that should never have been interrupted” between former perpetrators and former victims. _Memory as a Remedy for Evil_ is a powerful and timely work that asks that we recognize the good and evil within each of us—and reminds us that it is only by coming to terms with evil and trying to understand it that we can hope to tame it. (shrink)

This paper explores the prospects for a Pritchardean epistemological disjunctivist account of memory knowledge. We begin by providing an overview of Duncan Pritchard's epistemological disjunctivist account of perceptual knowledge, as well as the theoretical advantages of such an account. Drawing on that account, we present and motivate our own Pritchardean epistemological disjunctivist account of memory knowledge. After distinguishing different sorts of memory and the different roles that memory can play in knowledge acquisition, we set out our (...) account and argue that the case for epistemological disjunctivism enjoys parity with the case for epistemological disjunctivism of perceptual knowledge. We also consider objections to our account. The first is from Joe Milburn and Andrew Moon, who argue against a general epistemological disjunctivism of memory on the basis of differences in memory types. The second objection arises from a Radford-like case whereby one's true belief is from memory even though one lacks rational support that is reflectively accessible to one. (shrink)

Can humanity be divided into good and evil? And if so, is it possible for the good to vanquish the evil, eradicating it from the face of the Earth by declaring war on evildoers and bringing them to justice? Can we overcome evil by the power of memory? In Memory as a Remedy for Evil, Tzvetan Todorov answers these questions in the negative, arguing that despite all our efforts to the contrary, we cannot be delivered from evil. In (...) this work on evil, memory and justice, Todorov examines the uses of memory and the spate of memorial laws in France in order to show how memory has failed as a remedy against evil and how efforts to come to grips with past evil through trials and punitive justice have failed as well. Todorov locates the fatal flaw of all these approaches in our erroneous relationship with evil as alterity, the distinction that we draw between ourselves and others that allows us to imagine ourselves in the appealing role of hero and victim and confine others to the role of villain and criminal. Similarly, in his analysis of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission and Cambodia's Khmer Rouge Tribunal, Todorov argues in favor of restorative justice, which "seeks not to punish but to restore relations that should never have been interrupted" between former perpetrators and former victims. Memory as a Remedy for Evil is a powerful and timely work that asks that we recognize the good and evil within each of us--and reminds us that it is only by coming to terms with evil and trying to understand it that we can hope to tame it. (shrink)

Post-communist East-Central Europe is witnessing a clash of memories focused on its recent past. Whereas Western memory is constructed around the “politics of regret” and responsibility-assumption vis-à-vis the Holocaust, Eastern memory focuses to a large extent on responsibility-attribution for the trauma of communist rule. These are comparable traumatic experiences, but due to different “cognitive mapping” and different mnemonic social frameworks, Eastern memory has produced a post-mnemonic framework that allows for a creeping justification of interwar Radical Right ideologies; (...) for the transmogrification some of their standard-bearers into anti-communist heroes and martyrs; and the obfuscation World War II history. In some countries, religion and its past representatives are used for the same purpose. (shrink)

Three experiments explore the role of working memory in motor skill acquisition and performance. Traditional theories postulate that skill acquisition proceeds through stages of knowing, which are initially declarative but later procedural. The reported experiments challenge that view and support an independent, parallel processing model, which predicts that procedural and declarative knowledge can be acquired separately and that the former does not depend on the availability of working memory, whereas, the latter does. The behaviour of these (...) two processes was manipulated by providing or withholding visual (and auditory) appraisal of outcome feedback. Withholding feedback was predicted to inhibit the use of working memory to appraise success and, thus, prevent the formation of declarative knowledge without affecting the accumulation of procedural knowledge. While the first experiment failed to support these predictions, the second and third experiments demonstrated that procedural and declarative knowledge can be acquired independently. It is suggested that the availability of working memory is crucial to motor performance only when the learner has come to rely on its use. (shrink)