Search results for 'Default reasons' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Pekka Väyrynen (2004). Particularism and Default Reasons. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 7 (1):53-79.score: 240.0
    This paper addresses a recent suggestion that moral particularists can extend their view to countenance default reasons (at a first stab, reasons that are pro tanto unless undermined) by relying on certain background expectations of normality. I first argue that normality must be understood non-extensionally. Thus if default reasons rest on normality claims, those claims won't bestow upon default reasons any definite degree of extensional generality. Their generality depends rather on the contingent distributional (...)
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  2. Sean McKeever & Michael Ridge (2007). Turning on Default Reasons. Journal of Moral Philosophy 4 (1):55-76.score: 178.0
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  3. Xiang Huang (2008). Situating Default Position Inside the Space of Reasons. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 53:85-95.score: 144.0
    Epistemology of testimony’s map has been charted by identifying the basic controversy between reductionism and non-reductions. John McDowell’s article “Knowledge by Hearsay” (1993/1998) has been taken as a clear example of non-reductionism. This is, however, only partially right. It is correct that, as a non-reductionist, he defends the justifying role that the default position plays in testimonial knowledge. But, his insistence on situating the default position inside the space of reasons suggests that default position should be (...)
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  4. Instrumental Reasons, Instrumental Reasons.score: 140.0
    As Kant claimed in the Groundwork , and as the idea has been developed (in markedly different ways) by Korsgaard 1997, Bratman 1987, and Broome 2002. This formulation is agnostic on whether reasons for ends derive from our desiring those ends, or from the relation of those ends to things of independent value. However, desire-based theorists may deny, against Hubin 1999, that their theory is a combination of a principle of instrumental transmission and the principle that reasons for (...)
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  5. Richard Norman (2007). Particularism and Reasons: A Reply to Kirchin. Journal of Moral Philosophy 4 (1):33-39.score: 102.0
    Valency switching can appear especially puzzling if we think of moral reasons as ‘pushes and pulls’—considerations whose job it is to get us to act or to stop us acting. Talk of ‘default valency’ doesn't remove the puzzle, it merely restates it. We need a different picture of reasons—perhaps as providing a map of the moral terrain which helps us to see which actions are appropriate to which situations, and who the appropriate agents are. The role of (...)
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  6. Alan Thomas (2007). Practical Reasoning and Normative Relevance: A Reply to McKeever and Ridge. Journal of Moral Philosophy 4 (1):77-84.score: 100.0
    A putative problem for the moral particularist is that he or she fails to capture the normative relevance of certain considerations that they carry on their face, or the intuitive irrelevance of other considerations. It is argued in response that mastery of certain topic-specific truisms about a subject matter is what it is for a reasonable interlocutor to be engaged in a moral discussion, but the relevance of these truisms has nothing to do with the particularist/generalist dispute. Given that practical (...)
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  7. Beihai Zhou & Yi Mao (2006). A Base Logic for Default Reasoning. Frontiers of Philosophy in China 1 (4):688-709.score: 96.0
    Based on a close study of benchmark examples in default reasoning, such as Nixon Diamond, Penguin Principle, etc., this paper provides an in depth analysis of the basic features of default reasoning. We formalize default inferences based on Modus Ponens for Default Implication, and mark the distinction between "local inferences"(to infer a conclusion from a subset of given premises) and "global inferences"(to infer a conclusion from the entire set of given premises). These conceptual analyses are captured (...)
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  8. Jeff Pelletier, What Should Default Reasoning Be, by Default?score: 96.0
    This is a position paper concerning the role of empirical studies of human default reasoning in the formalization of AI theories of default reasoning. We note that AI motivates its theoretical enterprise by reference to human skill at default reasoning, but that the actual research does not make any use of this sort of information and instead relies on intuitions of individual investigators. We discuss two reasons theorists might not consider human performance relevant to formalizing (...) reasoning: (a) that intuitions are sufficient to describe a model, and (b) that human performance in this arena is irrelevant to a competence model of the phenomenon. We provide arguments against both these reasons. We then bring forward three further considerations against the use of intuitions in this arena: (a) it leads to an unawareness of predicate ambiguity, (b) it presumes an understanding of ordinary language statements of typicality, and (c) it is similar to discredited views in other fields. We advocate empirical investigation of the range of human phenomena that intuitively embody default reasoning. Gathering such information would provide data with which to generate formal default theories and against which to test the claims of proposed theories. Our position is that such data are the very phenomena that default theories are supposed to explain. (shrink)
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  9. Jonathan Dancy (2007). Defending the Right. Journal of Moral Philosophy 4 (1):85-98.score: 90.0
    In this paper I consider what might be my best response to various difficulties and challenges that emerged at a conference held at the University of Kent in December 2004, the contributions to which are given in the same volume. I comment on Crisp's distinction between ultimate and non-ultimate reasons, and reply to McKeever and Ridge on default reasons, and to Norman on the idea of a reason for action. I don't here consider what other particularists might (...)
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  10. Rebecca Lynn Stangl (2006). Particularism and the Point of Moral Principles. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 9 (2):201 - 229.score: 90.0
    According to radical moral particularists such as Jonathan Dancy, there are no substantive moral principles. And yet, few particularists wish to deny that something very like moral principles do indeed play a significant role in our everyday moral practice. Loathe at dismissing this as mere error on the part of everyday moral agents, particularists have proposed a number of alternative accounts of the practice. The aim of all of these accounts is to make sense of our appeal to general moral (...)
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  11. John Horty (2007). Reasons as Defaults. Philosophers' Imprint 7 (3):1-28.score: 86.0
    The goal of this paper is to frame a theory of reasons--what they are, how they support actions or conclusions--using the tools of default logic. After sketching the basic account of reasons as provided by defaults, I show how it can be elaborated to deal with two more complicated issues: first, situations in which the priority relation among defaults, and so reasons as well, is itself established through default reasoning; second, the treatment of undercutting defeat (...)
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  12. Lawrence Cavedon (1998). Default Reasoning as Situated Monotonic Inference. Minds and Machines 8 (4):509-531.score: 86.0
    Since its inception, situation theory has been concerned with the situated nature of meaning and cognition, a theme which has also recently gained some prominence in Artificial Intelligence. Channel theory is a recently developed framework which builds on concepts introduced in situation theory, in an attempt to provide a general theory of information flow. In particular, the channel theoretic framework offers an account of fallible regularities, regularities which provide enough structure to an agent's environment to support efficient cognitive processing but (...)
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  13. Alan Thomas (2011). Another Particularism: Reasons, Status and Defaults. [REVIEW] Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (2):151-167.score: 84.0
    This paper makes the non-monotonicity of a wide range of moral reasoning the basis of a case for particularism. Non-monotonicity threatens practical decision with an overwhelming informational complexity to which a form of ethical generalism seems the best response. It is argued that this impression is wholly misleading: the fact of non-monotonicity is best accommodated by the defence of four related theses in any theory of justification. First, the explanation of and defence of a default/challenge model of justification. Secondly, (...)
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  14. Zhou Beihai & Mao Yi (2006). A Base Logic for Default Reasoning. Frontiers of Philosophy in China 1 (4):688-709.score: 84.0
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  15. Sharon Berry (2013). Default Reasonableness and the Mathoids. Synthese 190 (17):3695-3713.score: 72.0
    In this paper I will argue that (principled) attempts to ground a priori knowledge in default reasonable beliefs cannot capture certain common intuitions about what is required for a priori knowledge. I will describe hypothetical creatures who derive complex mathematical truths like Fermat’s last theorem via short and intuitively unconvincing arguments. Many philosophers with foundationalist inclinations will feel that these creatures must lack knowledge because they are unable to justify their mathematical assumptions in terms of the kind of basic (...)
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  16. Angelo Gilio (2005). Probabilistic Logic Under Coherence, Conditional Interpretations, and Default Reasoning. Synthese 146 (1-2):139 - 152.score: 72.0
    We study a probabilistic logic based on the coherence principle of de Finetti and a related notion of generalized coherence (g-coherence). We examine probabilistic conditional knowledge bases associated with imprecise probability assessments defined on arbitrary families of conditional events. We introduce a notion of conditional interpretation defined directly in terms of precise probability assessments. We also examine a property of strong satisfiability which is related to the notion of toleration well known in default reasoning. In our framework we give (...)
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  17. Hans Rott (2013). Two Concepts of Plausibility in Default Reasoning. Erkenntnis:1-34.score: 72.0
    In their unifying theory to model uncertainty, Friedman and Halpern (1995–2003) applied plausibility measures to default reasoning satisfying certain sets of axioms. They proposed a distinctive condition for plausibility measures that characterizes “qualitative” reasoning (as contrasted with probabilistic reasoning). A similar and similarly fundamental, but more general and thus stronger condition was independently suggested in the context of “basic” entrenchment-based belief revision by Rott (1996–2003). The present paper analyzes the relation between the two approaches to formalizing basic notions of (...)
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  18. Salem Benferhat, Jean F. Bonnefon & Rui Silva Nevedas (2005). An Overview of Possibilistic Handling of Default Reasoning, with Experimental Studies. Synthese 146 (1-2):53 - 70.score: 72.0
    . This paper first provides a brief survey of a possibilistic handling of default rules. A set of default rules of the form, “generally, from α deduce β”, is viewed as the family of possibility distributions satisfying constraints expressing that the situation where α and β is true has a greater plausibility than the one where a and - β is true. When considering only the subset of linear possibility distributions, the well-known System P of postulates proposed by (...)
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  19. Salem Benferhat, Jean F. Bonnefon & Rui Da Silva Neves (2005). An Overview of Possibilistic Handling of Default Reasoning, with Experimental Studies. Synthese 146 (1/2):53 - 70.score: 72.0
    This paper first provides a brief survey of a possibilistic handling of default rules. A set of default rules of the form, "generally, from α deduce β", is viewed as the family of possibility distributions satisfying constraints expressing that the situation where α and β is true has a greater plausibility than the one where α and ⇁β is true. When considering only the subset of linear possibility distributions, the well-known System P of postulates proposed by Kraus, Lehmann (...)
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  20. Ariel Cohen, Michael Kaminski & Johann A. Makowsky (2008). Notions of Sameness by Default and Their Application to Anaphora, Vagueness, and Uncertain Reasoning. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 17 (3):285-306.score: 68.0
    We motivate and formalize the idea of sameness by default: two objects are considered the same if they cannot be proved to be different. This idea turns out to be useful for a number of widely different applications, including natural language processing, reasoning with incomplete information, and even philosophical paradoxes. We consider two formalizations of this notion, both of which are based on Reiter’s Default Logic. The first formalization is a new relation of indistinguishability that is introduced by (...)
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  21. Andrew Reisner (2009). The Possibility of Pragmatic Reasons for Belief and the Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem. Philosophical Studies 145 (2):257 - 272.score: 66.0
    In this paper I argue against the stronger of the two views concerning the right and wrong kind of reasons for belief, i.e. the view that the only genuine normative reasons for belief are evidential. The project in this paper is primarily negative, but with an ultimately positive aim. That aim is to leave room for the possibility that there are genuine pragmatic reasons for belief. Work is required to make room for this view, because evidentialism of (...)
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  22. Anna Bergqvist (2010). Why Sibley is Not a Generalist After All. British Journal of Aesthetics 50 (1):1-14.score: 66.0
    In his influential paper, ‘General Criteria and Reasons in Aesthetics’, Frank Sibley outlines what is taken to be a generalist view (shared with Beardsley) such that there are general reasons for aesthetic judgement, and his account of the behaviour of such reasons, which differs from Beardsley's. In this paper my aim is to illuminate Sibley's position by employing a distinction that has arisen in meta-ethics in response to recent work by Jonathan Dancy in particular. Contemporary research involves (...)
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  23. Graham Oppy (2004). Faulty Reasoning About Default Principles in Cosmological Arguments. Faith and Philosophy 21 (2):242-249.score: 66.0
    Robert Koons claims that my previous critique of his “new” cosmological argument is vitiated by confusion about the nature of defeasible argumentation.In response, I claim that Koons misrepresents—and perhaps misunderstands—the nature of my objections to his “new” cosmological argument. The main claims which I defend are: (1) that the move from a non-defeasible to a defeasible causal principle makes absolutely no difference to the success of the cosmological argument in which it is contained; and (2) that, since it is perfectly (...)
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  24. Francis Jeffry Pelletier & Renée Elio, Human Performance in Default Reasoning.score: 62.0
    There has long been a history of studies investigating how people (“ordinary people”) perform on tasks that involve deductive reasoning. The upshot of these studies is that people characteristically perform some deductive tasks well but others badly. For instance, studies show that people will typically perform MP (“modus ponens”: from ‘If A then B’ and ‘A’, infer ‘B’) and bi-conditional MP (from: ‘A if and only if B’ and ‘A’, infer ‘B’) correctly when invited to make the inference and additionally (...)
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  25. Moisés Goldszmidt & Judea Pearl (1996). Qualitative Probabilities for Default Reasoning, Belief Revision, and Causal Modeling. Artificial Intelligence 84:57-112.score: 62.0
    This paper presents a formalism that combines useful properties of both logic and probabilities. Like logic, the formalism admits qualitative sentences and provides symbolic machinery for deriving deductively closed beliefs and, like probability, it permits us to express if-then rules with different levels of firmness and to retract beliefs in response to changing observations. Rules are interpreted as order-of-magnitude approximations of conditional probabilities which impose constraints over the rankings of worlds. Inferences are supported by a unique priority ordering on rules (...)
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  26. Francis Jeffry Pelletier & Renée Elio (2005). The Case for Psychologism in Default and Inheritance Reasoning. Synthese 146 (1-2):7 - 35.score: 62.0
    Default reasoning occurs whenever the truth of the evidence available to the reasoner does not guarantee the truth of the conclusion being drawn. Despite this, one is entitled to draw the conclusion “by default” on the grounds that we have no information which would make us doubt that the inference should be drawn. It is the type of conclusion we draw in the ordinary world and ordinary situations in which we find ourselves. Formally speaking, ‘nonmonotonic reasoning’ refers to (...)
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  27. Yao-Hua Tan (1997). Is Default Logic a Reinvention of Inductive-Statistical Reasoning? Synthese 110 (3):357-379.score: 60.0
    Currently there is hardly any connection between philosophy of science and Artificial Intelligence research. We argue that both fields can benefit from each other. As an example of this mutual benefit we discuss the relation between Inductive-Statistical Reasoning and Default Logic. One of the main topics in AI research is the study of common-sense reasoning with incomplete information. Default logic is especially developed to formalise this type of reasoning. We show that (...)
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  28. Salem Benferhat, Alessandro Saffiotti & Philippe Smets (2000). Belief Functions and Default Reasoning. Artificial Intelligence 122 (1--2):1--69.score: 60.0
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  29. Nir Friedman, Joseph Halpern, Koller Y. & Daphne (2000). First-Order Conditional Logic for Default Reasoning Revisited. Acm Trans. Comput. Logic 1 (2):175--207.score: 60.0
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  30. Theo Van Willigenburg (2005). Reason and Love: A Non-Reductive Analysis of the Normativity of Agent-Relative Reasons. [REVIEW] Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 8 (1-2):45-62.score: 58.0
    Why do agent-relative reasons have authority over us, reflective creatures? Reductive accounts base the normativity of agent-relative reasons on agent-neutral considerations like having parents caring especially for their own children serves best the interests of all children. Such accounts, however, beg the question about the source of normativity of agent-relative ways of reason-giving. In this paper, I argue for a non-reductive account of the reflective necessity of agent-relative concerns. Such an account will reveal an important structural complexity of (...)
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  31. Paul Piwek, Towards a Computational Account of Inferentialist Meaning.score: 58.0
    Both in formal and computational natural language semantics, the classical correspondence view of meaning – and, more specifically, the view that the meaning of a declarative sentence coincides with its truth conditions – is widely held. Truth (in the world or a situation) plays the role of the given, and meaning is analysed in terms of it. Both language and the world feature in this perspective on meaning, but language users are conspicuously absent. In contrast, the inferentialist semantics that Robert (...)
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  32. Wiebe van der Hoek, John-Jules Meyer & Jan Treur (1998). Temporalizing Epistemic Default Logic. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 7 (3):341-367.score: 56.0
    We present an epistemic default logic, based on the metaphore of a meta-level architecture. Upward reflection is formalized by a nonmonotonic entailment relation, based on the objective facts that are either known or unknown at the object level. Then, the meta (monotonic) reasoning process generates a number of default-beliefs of object-level formulas. We extend this framework by proposing a mechanism to reflect these defaults down. Such a reflection is seen as essentially having a temporal flavour: defaults derived at (...)
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  33. Hector Geffner (1992). High-Probabilities, Model-Preference and Default Arguments. Minds and Machines 2 (1):51-70.score: 56.0
    In this paper we analyze two recent conditional interpretations of defaults, one based on probabilities, and the other, on models. We study what makes them equivalent, explore their limitations and develop suitable extensions. The resulting framework ties together a number of important notions in default reasoning, like high-probabilities and model-preference, default priorities and argument systems, and independence assumptions and minimality considerations.
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  34. Augustín Rayo (2003). Success by Default? Philosophia Mathematica 11 (3):305-322.score: 54.0
    I argue that Neo-Fregean accounts of arithmetical language and arithmetical knowledge tacitly rely on a thesis I call [Success by Default]—the thesis that, in the absence of reasons to the contrary, we are justified in thinking that certain stipulations are successful. Since Neo-Fregeans have yet to supply an adequate defense of [Success by Default], I conclude that there is an important gap in Neo-Fregean accounts of arithmetical language and knowledge. I end the paper by offering a naturalistic (...)
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  35. Kent Bach, Default Reasoning: Jumping to Conclusions and Knowing When to Think Twice.score: 50.0
    Look before you leap. - Proverb. He who hesitates is lost. - Another proverb.
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  36. Joeri Engelfriet & Jan Treur (1998). An Interpretation of Default Logic in Minimal Temporal Epistemic Logic. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 7 (3):369-388.score: 50.0
    When reasoning about complex domains, where information available is usually only partial, nonmonotonic reasoning can be an important tool. One of the formalisms introduced in this area is Reiter's Default Logic (1980). A characteristic of this formalism is that the applicability of default (inference) rules can only be verified in the future of the reasoning process. We describe an interpretation of default logic in temporal epistemic logic which makes this characteristic explicit. It is shown that this interpretation (...)
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  37. Jeff Pelletier, On Reasoning with Default Rules and Exceptions.score: 50.0
    Department of Computing Science Departments of Philosophy and Computing Science University of Alberta University of Alberta Edmonton, Alberta T6G 2H1 Edmonton, Alberta T6G 2H..
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  38. Salem Benferhat, Jean F. Bonnefon & Rui da Silva Neves (2005). An Overview of Possibilistic Handling of Default Reasoning, with Experimental Studies. Synthese 146 (1-2):53-70.score: 50.0
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  39. Veronica Biazzo, Angelo Gilio, Thomas Lukasiewicz & Giuseppe Sanfilippo (2002). Probabilistic Logic Under Coherence, Model-Theoretic Probabilistic Logic, and Default Reasoning in SystemP. Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 12 (2):189-213.score: 50.0
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  40. Gerhard Brewka (1991). Belief Revision in a Framework for Default Reasoning. In André Fuhrmann & Michael Morreau (eds.), The Logic of Theory Change. Springer. 206--222.score: 50.0
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  41. J. Delgrande & F. J. Pelletier (1998). Formal Senses of Relevance in Default Reasoning. Erkenntnis 49:137-173.score: 50.0
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  42. Gerhard Paass (1991). Probabilistic Default Reasoning. In B. Bouchon-Meunier, R. R. Yager & L. A. Zadeh (eds.), Uncertainty in Knowledge Bases. Springer. 75--85.score: 50.0
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  43. Erik Weber (1996). Default Reasoning in the Correction of Falsified System Descriptions. Logique Et Analyse 145:13-22.score: 50.0
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  44. Vojko Strahovnik, Matjaz Potrc & Mark Norris Lance (eds.) (2008). Challenging Moral Particularism. Routledge.score: 48.0
    Particularism is a justly popular ‘cutting-edge’ topic in contemporary ethics across the world. Many moral philosophers do not, in fact, support particularism (instead defending "generalist" theories that rest on particular abstract moral principles), but nearly all would take it to be a position that continues to offer serious lessons and challenges that cannot be safely ignored. Given the high standard of the contributions, and that this is a subject where lively debate continues to flourish, Challenging Moral Particularism will become required (...)
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  45. Gregory Wheeler & Carlos Damasio (2004). An Implementation of Statistical Default Logic. In Jose Alferes & Joao Leite (eds.), Logics in Artificial Intelligence (JELIA 2004). Springer.score: 44.0
    Statistical Default Logic (SDL) is an expansion of classical (i.e., Reiter) default logic that allows us to model common inference patterns found in standard inferential statistics, e.g., hypothesis testing and the estimation of a population‘s mean, variance and proportions. This paper presents an embedding of an important subset of SDL theories, called literal statistical default theories, into stable model semantics. The embedding is designed to compute the signature set of literals that uniquely distinguishes each extension on a (...)
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  46. Vladimir Lifschitz (forthcoming). The Dramatic True Story of the Frame Default. Journal of Philosophical Logic:1-14.score: 44.0
    This is an expository article about the solution to the frame problem proposed in 1980 by Raymond Reiter. For years, his “frame default” remained untested and suspect. But developments in some seemingly unrelated areas of computer science—logic programming and satisfiability solvers—eventually exonerated the frame default and turned it into a basis for important applications.
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  47. Hector Geffner & Judea Pearl (1990). A Framework for Reasoning with Defaults. In Kyburg Henry E., Loui Ronald P. & Carlson Greg N. (eds.), Knowledge Representation and Defeasible Reasoning. Kluwer. 69--87.score: 42.0
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  48. Mark Schroeder (2012). Book Reviews Horty , John F . Reasons as Defaults . Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. Pp. 272. $65.00 (Cloth). [REVIEW] Ethics 123 (1):162-167.score: 40.0
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  49. Alan Thomas, Practical Reasoning and Normative Relevance: A Reply to Ridge and McKeever.score: 40.0
    The central concern of McKeever & Ridge’s paper is with whether or not the moral particularist can formulate a defensible distinction between default and non-default reasons. [McKeever & Ridge 2004] But that issue is only of concern to the particularist, they argue, because it allows him or her to avoid a deeper problem, an unacceptable “flattening of the normative landscape”. The particularist ought, McKeever & Ridge claim, to view this corollary of his or her position as a (...)
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  50. Paul Saka (2014). Reasons as Defaults By John F. Horty. Analysis 74 (2):358-360.score: 40.0
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