Search results for 'Deference' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Knut Olav Skarsaune (forthcoming). Moral Deference and Authentic Interaction. Journal of Philosophy.
    The article defends a mild form of pessimism about moral deference, by arguing that deference is incompatible with authentic interaction, that is, acting in a way that communicates our own normative judgment. The point of such interaction is ultimately that it allows us to get to know and engage one another. This vindication of our intuitive resistance to moral deference is upheld, in a certain range of cases, against David Enoch’s recent objection to views that motivate pessimism (...)
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  2.  23
    Cathal O'Madagain (forthcoming). Outsourcing Concepts: Deference, the Extended Mind, and Expanding Our Epistemic Capacity. In J. Adam Carter, Andy Clark, Jesper Kallestrup, Orestis Palermos & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Socially Extended Knowledge. Oxford University Press
    Semantic deference is the apparent phenomenon whereby some of -/- our concepts have their content fixed by the minds of others. The -/- phenomenon is puzzling both in terms of how such concepts are -/- supposed to work, but also in terms of why we should have -/- concepts whose content is fixed by others. Here I argue that if we -/- rethink semantic deference in terms of extended mind reasoning -/- we find answers to both of these (...)
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  3.  58
    Cory Davia & Michele Palmira (2015). Moral Deference and Deference to an Epistemic Peer. Philosophical Quarterly 65 (261):605-625.
    Deference to experts is normal in many areas of inquiry, but suspicious in morality. This is puzzling if one thinks that morality is relevantly like those other areas of inquiry. We argue that this suspiciousness can be explained in terms of the suspiciousness of deferring to an epistemic peer. We then argue that this explanation is preferable to others in the literature, and explore some metaethical implications of this result.
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  4.  34
    Richard Pettigrew & Michael G. Titelbaum (2014). Deference Done Right. Philosophers' Imprint 14 (35):1-19.
    There are many kinds of epistemic experts to which we might wish to defer in setting our credences. These include: highly rational agents, objective chances, our own future credences, our own current credences, and evidential probabilities. But exactly what constraint does a deference requirement place on an agent's credences? In this paper we consider three answers, inspired by three principles that have been proposed for deference to objective chances. We consider how these options fare when applied to the (...)
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  5.  16
    Aaron Stalnaker (2013). Confucianism, Democracy, and the Virtue of Deference. Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy 12 (4):441-459.
    Some democratic theorists have argued that contemporary people should practice only a civility that recognizes others as equal persons, and eschew any form of deference to authority as a feudalistic cultural holdover that ought to be abandoned in the modern era. Against such views, this essay engages early Confucian views of ethics and society, including their analyses of different sorts of authority and status, in order to argue that, properly understood, deference is indeed a virtue of considerable importance (...)
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  6.  17
    Aaron Bronfman (2015). Deference and Description. Philosophical Studies 172 (5):1333-1353.
    Consider someone whom you know to be an expert about some issue. She knows at least as much as you do and reasons impeccably. The issue is a straightforward case of statistical inference that raises no deep problems of epistemology. You happen to know the expert’s opinion on this issue. Should you defer to her by adopting her opinion as your own? An affirmative answer may appear mandatory. But this paper argues that a crucial factor in answering this question is (...)
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  7.  38
    Jules Holroyd (2010). Substantively Constrained Choice and Deference. Journal of Moral Philosophy 7 (2):180-199.
    Substantive accounts of autonomy place value constraints on the objects of autonomous choice. According to such views, not all sober and competent choices can be autonomous: some things simply cannot be autonomously chosen. Such an account is developed and appealed to, by Thomas Hill Jr, in order to explain the intuitively troubling nature of choices for deferential roles. Such choices are not consistent with the value of self-respect, it is claimed. In this paper I argue that Hill's attempt to explain (...)
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  8.  12
    Avery Kolers (2005). Justice and the Politics of Deference. Journal of Political Philosophy 13 (2):153–173.
    Steady progress toward justice is not evident within extant political systems. A good-faith commitment to justice therefore requires oppositional collective action. This paper articulates and defends a moral principle of “progressive solidarity” that guides oppositional political action. Solidarity requires us to work alongside others according to their choice of action, even if this requires doing what we believe unwise or immoral. Progressive solidarity requires deference to the decisions of the least well-off group. Although individual judgment is by no means (...)
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  9.  80
    Kimberley Brownlee (2008). Legal Obligation as a Duty of Deference. Law and Philosophy 27 (6):583 - 597.
    An enduring question in political and legal philosophy concerns whether we have a general moral obligation to follow the law. In this paper, I argue that Philip Soper’s intuitively appealing effort to give new life to the idea of legal obligation by characterising it as a duty of deference is ultimately unpersuasive. Soper claims that people who understand what a legal system is and admit that it is valuable must recognise that they would be morally inconsistent to deny that (...)
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  10.  38
    Andrea C. Westlund (2013). Deference as a Normative Power. Philosophical Studies 166 (3):455-474.
    Much of the literature on practical authority concerns the authority of the state over its subjects—authority to which we are, as G. E. M. Anscombe says, subject “willy nilly”. Yet many of our “willy” (or voluntary) relationships also seem to involve the exercise of practical authority, and this species of authority is in some ways even more puzzling than authority willy nilly. In this paper I argue that voluntary authority relies on a form of voluntary obligation that is akin (in (...)
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  11.  4
    Peter Carrier (2012). Fear and Deference in Holocaust Education. The Pitfalls of “Engagement Teaching” According to a Report by the British Historical Association. Human Affairs 22 (1):43-55.
    This article questions the effectiveness of “engagement teaching” when dealing with controversial subjects by exploring the role of fear in contemporary education about the Holocaust in the United Kingdom. It begins by assessing a governmental report about education and a series of related press reports and chain emails, whose assumption that secondary school teachers are afraid of teaching controversial subjects triggered an international scandal about Holocaust education in the UK in April 2007. The author argues that three forms of respectful (...)
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  12. David Enoch, Moral Deference.
    Everyone agrees, I think, that there is something fishy about moral deference and expertise, but that's where consensus ends. This paper has two aims – the first is to mount a defense of moral deference, and the second is to offer a (non-debunking) diagnosis of its fishiness. I defend moral deference by connecting the discussion of moral deference to the recent discussion of the appropriate response to uncertainty. It is, I argue, morally obligatory to minimize the (...)
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  13.  6
    Pádraig Hogan (2003). Difference and Deference in the Tenor of Learning. Studies in Philosophy and Education 22 (3/4):281-293.
    The critical resources furnished bydeconstruction have more than occasionally beenturned with negative effect on traditional andmore recent conceptions of liberal learning,including the reaffirmation of the humanitiesassociated with philosophical hermeneutics. Thefirst two sections of the paper review thecontrasting and mutually opposed stancestowards learning represented by earlyformulations of deconstruction and ofhermeneutics. An exploration is thenundertaken in the later sections ofdevelopments that have taken place in bothdeconstruction and hermeneutics since theDerrida-Gadamer encounter in Paris in 1981.While not in any sense assimilatinghermeneutics to deconstruction or (...)
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  14.  63
    Henry Jackman (2005). Temporal Externalism, Deference, and Our Ordinary Linguistic Practice. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (3):365-380.
    Temporal externalists argue that ascriptions of thought and utterance content can legitimately reflect contingent conceptual developments that are only settled after the time of utterance. While the view has been criticized for failing to accord with our.
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  15.  42
    Anna Mahtani (2016). Deference, Respect and Intensionality. Philosophical Studies:1-21.
    This paper is about the standard Reflection Principle :235–256, 1984) and the Group Reflection Principle :478–502, 2007; Bovens and Rabinowicz in Episteme 8:281–300, 2011; Titelbaum in Quitting certainties: a Bayesian framework modeling degrees of belief, OUP, Oxford, 2012; Hedden in Mind 124:449–491, 2015). I argue that these principles are incomplete as they stand. The key point is that deference is an intensional relation, and so whether you are rationally required to defer to a person at a time can depend (...)
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  16.  16
    Lawrence Lengbeyer, Defending Limited Non-Deference to Science Experts.
    Scientists and their supporters often portray as exasperatingly irrational all those laypersons who refuse to accede to practical recommendations issued by expert scientists and 'science appliers'. After first considering the latter groups’ standard explanations for such non-deference, which focus upon irrationalities besetting the laity, I will propose that a better explanation for at least some of the non-deference is that many laypersons are rationally electing to substitute their own judgments for those urged upon them by the scientific community. (...)
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  17.  58
    Daniel A. Wilkenfeld, Dillon Plunkett & Tania Lombrozo (2016). Depth and Deference: When and Why We Attribute Understanding. Philosophical Studies 173 (2):373-393.
    Four experiments investigate the folk concept of “understanding,” in particular when and why it is deployed differently from the concept of knowledge. We argue for the positions that people have higher demands with respect to explanatory depth when it comes to attributing understanding, and that this is true, in part, because understanding attributions play a functional role in identifying experts who should be heeded with respect to the general field in question. These claims are supported by our findings that people (...)
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  18. David Enoch (2014). A Defense of Moral Deference. Journal of Philosophy 111 (5):229-258.
    The combination of this vindication of moral deference and diagnosis of its fishiness nicely accommodates, I argue, some related phenomena, like the (neglected) fact that our uneasiness with moral deference is actually a particular instance of uneasiness with opaque evidence in general when it comes to morality, and the (familiar) fact that the scope of this uneasiness is wider than the moral as it includes other normative domains.
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  19.  20
    Philip Soper (2002). The Ethics of Deference: Learning From Law's Morals. Cambridge University Press.
    Do citizens have an obligation to obey the law? This book differs from standard approaches by shifting from the language of obedience (orders) to that of deference (normative judgments). The popular view that law claims authority but does not have it is here reversed on both counts: Law does not claim authority but has it. Though the focus is on political obligation, the author approaches that issue indirectly by first developing a more general account of when deference is (...)
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  20.  29
    Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij, The Social Virtue of Blind Deference.
    Recently, it has become popular to account for knowledge and other epistemic states in terms of epistemic virtues. The present paper focuses on an epistemic virtue relevant when deferring to others in testimonial contexts. It is argued that, while many virtue epistemologists will accept that epistemic virtue can be exhibited in cases involving epistemically motivated hearers, carefully vetting their testimonial sources for signs of untrustworthiness prior to deferring, anyone who accepts that also has to accept that an agent may exhibit (...)
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  21. Michael Devitt (2011). Deference and the Use Theory. Protosociology 27:196-211.
    It is plausible to think that members of a linguistic community typically mean the same by their words. Yet “ignorance and error” arguments proposed by the revolution in the theory of reference seem to show that people can share a meaning and yet differ greatly in usage. Horwich responds to this problem for UTM by appealing to deference. I give five reasons for doubting that his brief remarks about deference can be developed into a satisfactory theory. But this (...)
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  22. Mark Greenberg, Incomplete Understanding, Deference, and the Content of Thought.
    Tyler Burge’s influential arguments have convinced most philosophers that a thinker can have a thought involving a particular concept without fully grasping or having mastery of that concept. In Burge’s (1979) famous example, a thinker who lacks mastery of the concept of arthritis nonetheless has thoughts involving that concept. It is generally supposed, however, that this phenomenon – incomplete understanding, for short – does not require us to reconsider in a fundamental way what it is for a thought to involve (...)
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  23.  42
    Diego Marconi (2012). Semantic Normativity, Deference and Reference. Dialectica 66 (2):273-287.
    I discuss Paolo Casalegno's objections to my views about semantic normativity as presented in my book Lexical Competence (MIT Press, 1997) and in a later paper. I argue that, contrary to Casalegno's claim, the phenomenon of semantic deference can be accounted for without having to appeal to an “objective” notion of reference, i.e. to the view that words have the reference they have independently of whatever knowledge or ability is available to or within the linguistic community. Against both Casalegno (...)
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  24.  40
    Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij (2014). Procedural Justice and the Problem of Intellectual Deference. Episteme 11 (4):423-442.
    It is a well-established fact that we tend to underestimate our susceptibility to cognitive bias on account of overconfidence, and thereby often fail to listen to intellectual advice aimed at reducing such bias. This is the problem of intellectual deference. The present paper considers this problem in contexts where educators attempt to teach students how to avoid bias for purposes of instilling epistemic virtues. It is argued that recent research in social psychology suggests that we can come to terms (...)
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  25.  58
    Antonio Rauti (2010). How Use Theories of Meaning Can Accommodate Shared Meanings: A Modal Account of Semantic Deference. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (2):285-303.
    Use theories of meaning (UTMs) seem ill-equipped to accommodate the intuition that ignorant but deferential speakers use natural kind terms (e.g. 'zinc') and technical expression (e.g. 'credit default swap') with the same meanings as the experts do. After all, their use deviates from the experts', and if use determines meaning, a deviant use ordinarily would determine a deviant meaning. Yet the intuition is plausible and advocates of UTMs believe it can be accommodated. I examine Gilbert Harman's and Paul Horwich's views, (...)
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  26.  45
    Antonio Rauti (2012). Multiple Groundings and Deference. Philosophical Quarterly 62 (247):317-336.
    The idea that reference is multiply grounded allows causal-historical theories of reference to account for reference change. It also threatens the stability of reference in light of widespread error and confusion. I describe the problem, so far unrecognised, and provide a solution based on the phenomenon of semantic deference, which I differentiate from reference-borrowing. I conclude that deference has an authentic foundational semantic role to play.
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  27.  35
    Barry Smith (1991). Textual Deference. American Philosophical Quarterly 28 (1):1 - 12.
    It is a truism that the attitude of deference to the text plays a lesser role in Anglo-Saxon philosophy than in other philosophical traditions. Works of philosophy written in English have, it is true, spawned a massive secondary literature dealing with the ideas, problems or arguments they contain. But they have almost never given rise to works of commentary in the strict sense, a genre which is however a dominant literary form not only in the Confucian, Vedantic, Islamic, Jewish (...)
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  28.  21
    Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij (forthcoming). People Listen to People Who Listen: Instilling Virtues of Deference. In Christian Miller (ed.), The Character Project: New Perspectives in Psychology, Philosophy, and Theology. Oxford University Press
    We often fail to defer to sources who know what they’re talking about. When doing so consistently, we fail to manifest a virtue of deference. This is because epistemic virtues are dispositions that promote epistemic goals, and knowledge is an epistemic goal. The present paper makes two points about how to instill this virtue. First, virtues of deference can be instilled by promoting compliance with requests on the part of good sources to be listened to, since listening is (...)
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  29.  45
    Richard Horsey (2000). Meaning Postulates and Deference. Philosophical Explorations.
    Fodor (1998) argues that most lexical concepts have no internal structure. He rejects what he calls Inferential Role Semantics (IRS), the view that primitive concepts are constituted by their inferential relations, on the grounds that this violates the compositionality constraint and leads to an unacceptable form of holism. In rejecting IRS, Fodor must also reject meaning postulates. I argue, contra Fodor, that meaning postulates must be retained, but that when suitably constrained they are not susceptible to his arguments against IRS. (...)
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  30.  5
    Alison L. Young (2010). Deference, Dialogue and the Search for Legitimacy. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 30 (4):815-831.
    This review article discusses the relationship between deference and the presumption of constitutionality, as discussed in Brian Foley’s book, Deference and the Presumption of Constitutionality. Foley argues for the rejection of the presumption of constitutionality as it operates in the Irish Constitution, proposing instead a ‘due deference’ approach. This approach would require courts to give varying degrees of weight to the legislature’s conclusions that particular legislative provisions are constitutional. The article praises Foley’s book, particularly its stronger justification (...)
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  31.  9
    Sor-Hoon Tan (2012). Ritual and Deference: Extending Chinese Philosophy in a Comparative Context. Philosophy East and West 62 (1):131-134.
    The twelve elegant essays in this slim volume by Robert Cummings Neville, Ritual and Deference: Extending Chinese Philosophy in a Comparative Context, originating in lectures and projects of varying purposes, crystallize Neville’s “Confucian program” of comparative philosophy, which has been taking shape in his earlier works. More accessible than his other monographs, its apparent simplicity is deceptive. While it would inspire and benefit even the novice, only those who have traveled some distance on the same arduous journey would fully (...)
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  32. Scott Brewer (1997). Valuing Reasons: Analogy and Epistemic Deference in Legal Argument. Dissertation, Harvard University
    This thesis addresses two enduring issues in legal theory-- rationality and its association with rule of law values--by offering detailed models of two patterns of legal reasoning. One is reasoning by analogy. The other is the inference process that legal reasoners use when they defer epistemically to scientific experts in the course of reaching legal decisions. Discussions in both chapters reveal that the inference pattern known as "abduction" is a deeply important element of many legal inferences, including analogy and epistemic (...)
     
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  33. Jaemin Jung (forthcoming). Steadfastness, Deference, and Permissive Rationality. Synthese:1-20.
    Recently, Levinstein has offered two interesting arguments concerning epistemic norms and epistemic peer disagreement. In his first argument, Levinstein claims that a tension between Permissivism and steadfast attitudes in the face of epistemic peer disagreement generally leads us to conciliatory attitudes; in his second argument, he argues that, given an ‘extremely weak version of a deference principle,’ Permissivism collapses into Uniqueness. However, in this paper, I show that when we clearly distinguish among several types of Permissivism, Permissivism\, and Permissivism\), (...)
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  34.  88
    Andrea C. Westlund (2003). Selflessness and Responsibility for Self: Is Deference Compatible with Autonomy? Philosophical Review 112 (4):483-523.
    She was intensely sympathetic. She was immensely charming. She excelled in the difficult arts of family life. She sacrificed herself daily. If there was chicken, she took the leg, if there was a draught, she sat in it—in short, she was so constituted that she never had a mind or wish of her own, but preferred to sympathise always with the minds and wishes of others. — Virginia Woolf (1979, 59).
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  35. Robert J. Howell (2014). Google Morals, Virtue, and the Asymmetry of Deference. Noûs 48 (3):389-415.
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  36.  10
    Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij, The Epistemic Virtue of Deference.
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  37. Frank Keil (2005). Doubt, Deference, and Deliberation: Understanding and Using the Division of Cognitive Labour. In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology. OUP Oxford 143.
     
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  38. Stacie Friend & Peter Ludlow (2003). Disagreement and Deference: Is Diversity of Opinion a Precondition for Thought? Philosophical Perspectives 17 (1):115–139.
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  39. Christopher Gauker (2007). The Circle of Deference Proves the Normativity of Semantics. Rivista di Estetica 34 (34):181-198.
    The question whether semantics is a normative discipline can be formulated as a question about the meaning of the word “means”. If I assert, “The word ‘gatto’ in Italian means cat,” what have I done? The naturalist about meaning claims that I have asserted that a certain natural relation obtains between Italian speakers’ tokens of “gatto” and cats. Or at least, I have asserted something about the way Italian speakers use the word “gatto”, which way presumably has something to do (...)
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  40.  10
    Frédéric Bouchard (2016). The Roles of Institutional Trust and Distrust in Grounding Rational Deference to Scientific Expertise. Perspectives on Science 24 (5):582-608.
    Given the complexity of most phenomena, we have to delegate much epistemic work to other knowers and we must find reasons for relying on these specific knowers and not others. In our societies, these other knowers are often called experts and we rely on their epistemic authority more and more. For many complex phenomena such as climate change, genetically modified crops, and immunization, the experts that are called upon are scientific experts. For that reason, finding good reasons and justification for (...)
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  41.  15
    Laurence Thomas (1993). Moral Deference. Philosophical Forum 24 (1-3):232-250.
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  42.  70
    James M. Joyce (2007). Epistemic Deference: The Case of Chance. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (2):187 - 206.
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  43. George S. Pappas (2000). Epistemic Deference. Acta Analytica 24:113-126.
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  44.  46
    Marcia Baron (1985). Servility, Critical Deference and the Deferential Wife. Philosophical Studies 48 (3):393 - 400.
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  45.  1
    Steve Fuller (forthcoming). Social Epistemology for Theodicy Without Deference: Response to William Lynch. Symposion. Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences.
    Steve Fuller ABSTRACT: This article is a response to William Lynch’s, ‘Social Epistemology Transformed: Steve Fuller’s Account of Knowledge as a Divine Spark for Human Domination,’ an extended and thoughtful reflection on my Knowledge: The Philosophical Quest in History. I grant that Lynch has captured well, albeit critically, the spirit and content of the book –...
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  46.  53
    Henry Jackman (2000). Deference and Self-Knowledge. Southwest Philosophy Review 16 (1):171-180.
    It has become increasingly popular to suggest that non-individualistic theories of content undermine our purported a priori knowledge of such contents because they entail that we lack the ability to distinguish our thoughts from alternative thoughts with different contents. However, problems relating to such knowledge of 'comparative' content tell just as much against individualism as non-individualism. Indeed, the problems presented by individualistic theories of content for self-knowledge are at least, if not more, serious than those presented by non-individualistic theories. Consequently, (...)
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  47.  8
    Thaddeus Mason Pope (2010). The Case of Samuel Golubchuk: The Dangers of Judicial Deference and Medical Self-Regulation. American Journal of Bioethics 10 (3):59-61.
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  48.  25
    Andrew Woodfield (2000). Reference and Deference. Mind and Language 15 (4):433–451.
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  49.  17
    James M. Joyce (2007). ``Epistemic Deference: The Case of Chance&Quot. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (1pt2):187-206.
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  50.  8
    Phyllis Nichols (2001). Shakespearean Deference to Female Virgin Power. Inquiry 2.
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