Search results for 'Degrees of Belief' (try it on Scholar)

1000+ found
Sort by:
See also:
  1. Jane Friedman (2013). Rational Agnosticism and Degrees of Belief. Oxford Studies in Epistemology 4:57.score: 720.0
    There has been much discussion about whether traditional epistemology's doxastic attitudes are reducible to degrees of belief. In this paper I argue that what I call the Straightforward Reduction - the reduction of all three of believing p, disbelieving p, and suspending judgment about p, not-p to precise degrees of belief for p and not-p that ought to obey the standard axioms of the probability calculus - cannot succeed. By focusing on suspension of judgment (agnosticism) rather (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Julia Staffel (2013). Can There Be Reasoning with Degrees of Belief? Synthese 190 (16):3535-3551.score: 720.0
    In this paper I am concerned with the question of whether degrees of belief can figure in reasoning processes that are executed by humans. It is generally accepted that outright beliefs and intentions can be part of reasoning processes, but the role of degrees of belief remains unclear. The literature on subjective Bayesianism, which seems to be the natural place to look for discussions of the role of degrees of belief in reasoning, does not (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Jeff Dunn (forthcoming). Reliability for Degrees of Belief. Philosophical Studies:1-24.score: 720.0
    We often evaluate belief-forming processes, agents, or entire belief states for reliability. This is normally done with the assumption that beliefs are all-or-nothing. How does such evaluation go when we’re considering beliefs that come in degrees? I consider a natural answer to this question that focuses on the degree of truth-possession had by a set of beliefs. I argue that this natural proposal is inadequate, but for an interesting reason. When we are dealing with all-or-nothing belief, (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Dietrich Franz & Christian List, From Degrees of Belief to Beliefs: Lessons From Judgment-Aggregation Theory.score: 656.0
    What is the relationship between degrees of belief and (all-or-nothing) beliefs? Can the latter be expressed as a function of the former, without running into paradoxes? We reassess this “belief-binarization” problem from the perspective of judgment-aggregation theory. Although some similarities between belief binarization and judgment aggregation have been noted before, the literature contains no general study of the implications of aggregation-theoretic impossibility and possibility results for belief binarization. We seek to fill this gap. At the (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Franz Huber (2009). Belief and Degrees of Belief. In F. Huber & C. Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of Belief. Springer.score: 630.0
    Degrees of belief are familiar to all of us. Our confidence in the truth of some propositions is higher than our confidence in the truth of other propositions. We are pretty confident that our computers will boot when we push their power button, but we are much more confident that the sun will rise tomorrow. Degrees of belief formally represent the strength with which we believe the truth of various propositions. The higher an agent’s degree of (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Richard Foley (2009). Beliefs, Degrees of Belief, and the Lockean Thesis. In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of Belief. Springer. 37-47.score: 630.0
    What propositions are rational for one to believe? With what confidence is it rational for one to believe these propositions? Answering the first of these questions requires an epistemology of beliefs, answering the second an epistemology of degrees of belief.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Peter Milne (2012). Belief, Degrees of Belief, and Assertion. Dialectica 66 (3):331-349.score: 630.0
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Lina Eriksson & Wlodek Rabinowicz (2013). The Interference Problem for the Betting Interpretation of Degrees of Belief. Synthese 190 (5):809-830.score: 558.0
    The paper’s target is the historically influential betting interpretation of subjective probabilities due to Ramsey and de Finetti. While there are several classical and well-known objections to this interpretation, the paper focuses on just one fundamental problem: There is a sense in which degrees of belief cannot be interpreted as betting rates. The reasons differ in different cases, but there’s one crucial feature that all these cases have in common: The agent’s degree of belief in a proposition (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Michael G. Titelbaum (2013). Quitting Certainties: A Bayesian Framework Modeling Degrees of Belief. Oxford University Press.score: 558.0
    Michael G. Titelbaum presents a new Bayesian framework for modeling rational degrees of belief—the first of its kind to represent rational requirements on agents who undergo certainty loss.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Lyle Zynda (2000). Representation Theorems and Realism About Degrees of Belief. Philosophy of Science 67 (1):45-69.score: 549.0
    The representation theorems of expected utility theory show that having certain types of preferences is both necessary and sufficient for being representable as having subjective probabilities. However, unless the expected utility framework is simply assumed, such preferences are also consistent with being representable as having degrees of belief that do not obey the laws of probability. This fact shows that being representable as having subjective probabilities is not necessarily the same as having subjective probabilities. Probabilism can be defended (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Darrell P. Rowbottom (2007). 'In Between Believing' and Degrees of Belief. Teorema 26 (1):131-137.score: 540.0
    Schwitzgebel (2001) — henceforth 'S' — offers three examples in order to convince us that there are situations in which individuals are neither accurately describable as believing that p or failing to so believe, but are rather in 'in-between states of belief'. He then argues that there are no 'Bayesian' or representational strategies for explicating these, and proposes a dispositional account. I do not have any fundamental objection to the idea that there might be 'in-between states of belief'. (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Lina Eriksson & Alan Hájek (2007). What Are Degrees of Belief? Studia Logica 86 (2):185-215.score: 540.0
    Probabilism is committed to two theses: 1) Opinion comes in degrees—call them degrees of belief, or credences. 2) The degrees of belief of a rational agent obey the probability calculus. Correspondingly, a natural way to argue for probabilism is: i) to give an account of what degrees of belief are, and then ii) to show that those things should be probabilities, on pain of irrationality. Most of the action in the literature concerns stage (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Nicholas J. J. Smith (forthcoming). Vagueness, Uncertainty and Degrees of Belief: Two Kinds of Indeterminacy—One Kind of Credence. Erkenntnis:1-18.score: 540.0
    If we think, as Ramsey did, that a degree of belief that P is a stronger or weaker tendency to act as if P, then it is clear that not only uncertainty, but also vagueness, gives rise to degrees of belief. If I like hot coffee and do not know whether the coffee is hot or cold, I will have some tendency to reach for a cup; if I like hot coffee and know that the coffee is (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Lyle Zynda (2012). A Springboard for Exploring the Many Approaches to Degrees of Belief. Metascience 21 (2):467-470.score: 540.0
    A springboard for exploring the many approaches to degrees of belief Content Type Journal Article Category Book Review Pages 1-4 DOI 10.1007/s11016-012-9641-x Authors Lyle Zynda, Philosophy Department, Indiana University South Bend, 1700 Mishawaka Ave., P.O. Box 7111, South Bend, IN 46634, USA Journal Metascience Online ISSN 1467-9981 Print ISSN 0815-0796.
    No categories
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Colin Howson (2009). Epistemic Probability and Coherent Degrees of Belief. In. In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of Belief. Springer. 97--119.score: 540.0
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. A. I. Dale (1976). Probability, Likelihood and Support: A Metamathematical Approach to a System of Axioms for Upper and Lower Degrees of Belief. Philosophical Papers 5 (2):153-161.score: 540.0
    (1976). PROBABILITY, LIKELIHOOD AND SUPPORT: A METAMATHEMATICAL APPROACH TO A SYSTEM OF AXIOMS FOR UPPER AND LOWER DEGREES OF BELIEF. Philosophical Papers: Vol. 5, No. 2, pp. 153-161.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Rolf Haenni (2009). Non-Additive Degrees of Belief. In. In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of Belief. Springer. 121--159.score: 540.0
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. T. Seidenfeld, M. J. Schervish & J. B. Kadane (1990). When Fair Betting Odds Are Not Degrees of Belief. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1990:517 - 524.score: 517.0
    The "Dutch Book" argument, tracing back to Ramsey and to deFinetti, offers prudential grounds for action in conformity with personal probability. Under several structural assumptions about combinations of stakes (that is, assumptions about the combination of wagers), your betting policy is coherent only if your fair odds are probabilities. The central question posed here is the following one: Besides providing an operational test of coherent betting, does the "Book" argument also provide for adequate measurement (elicitation) of the agents (...) of beliefs? That is, are an agent's fair odds also his/her personal probabilities for those events? We argue the answer is "No!" The problem is caused by the possibility of state dependent utilities. (shrink)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Franz Huber (2003). Degrees of Belief as Basis for Scientific Reasoning? In W. Loeffler & P. Weingartner (eds.), Knowledge and Belief. Papers of the 26th International Wittgenstein Symposium. Kirchberg.score: 486.0
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. D. H. Mellor (1980). Consciousness and Degrees of Belief. In , Prospects for Pragmatism. Cambridge University Press.score: 486.0
  21. Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.) (2009). Degrees of Belief. Springer.score: 477.0
    Various theories try to give accounts of how measures of this confidence do or ought to behave, both as far as the internal mental consistency of the agent as ...
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Jeffrey Bub (2007). Quantum Probabilities as Degrees of Belief. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 38 (2):232-254.score: 459.0
  23. Wlodek Rabinowicz & Luc Bovens (2011). Bets on Hats: On Dutch Books Against Groups, Degrees of Belief as Betting Rates, and Group-Reflection. Episteme 8 (3):281-300.score: 459.0
    The Story of the Hats is a puzzle in social epistemology. It describes a situation in which a group of rational agents with common priors and common goals seems vulnerable to a Dutch book if they are exposed to different information and make decisions independently. Situations in which this happens involve violations of what might be called the Group-Reflection Principle. As it turns out, the Dutch book is flawed. It is based on the betting interpretation of the subjective probabilities, but (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Alastair Wilson (forthcoming). MICHAEL G. TITELBAUM Quitting Certainties: A Bayesian Framework Modeling Degrees of Belief. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axt056.score: 459.0
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Hannes Leitgeb (2013). Reducing Belief Simpliciter to Degrees of Belief. Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 164 (12):1338-1389.score: 459.0
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Michael Levin (2013). Quitting Certainties: A Bayesian Framework Modeling Degrees of Belief. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (1):1-4.score: 459.0
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Glenn Shafer (2010). A Betting Interpretation for Probabilities and Dempster-Shafer Degrees of Belief. International Journal of Approximate Reasoning.score: 459.0
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Jake Chandler (2009). Review of Franz Huber and Christoph Schmidt-Petri, Eds. Degrees of Belief. Philosophy in Review 296 (6):422-424.score: 450.0
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Richard Foley (1992). The Epistemology of Belief and the Epistemology of Degrees of Belief. American Philosophical Quarterly 29 (2):111 - 124.score: 450.0
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. R. M. Sainsbury (1986). Degrees of Belief and Degrees of Truth. Philosophical Papers 15 (2-3):97-106.score: 450.0
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Philip A. Ebert & Martin Smith (2012). Introduction: Outright Belief and Degrees of Belief. Dialectica 66 (3):305-308.score: 450.0
  32. Horacio Arlo-Costa (2010). Review of Franz Huber, Christoph Schmidt-Petri (Eds.), Degrees of Belief. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2010 (1).score: 450.0
    No categories
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. Rabinowicz Wlodek & Luc Bovens (2011). Bets on Hats-On Dutch Books Against Groups, Degrees of Belief as Betting Rates, and Group-Reflection. Episteme 8 (3):281-300.score: 450.0
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. Jake Chandler (2010). Franz Huber and Christoph Schmidt-Petri, Eds., Degrees of Belief Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 29 (6):422-424.score: 450.0
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. James Joyce (2005). How Degrees of Belief Reflect Evidence. Philosophical Perspectives 19:153-179.score: 450.0
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. David Over (1993). Deduction and Degrees of Belief. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):361.score: 450.0
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. Brian Skyrms (1980). Higher Order Degrees of Belief. In D. H. Mellor (ed.), Prospects for Pragmatism. Cambridge University Press. 109--137.score: 450.0
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. George F. Williamson (1915). Individual Differences in Belief, Measured and Expressed by Degrees of Confidence. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 12 (5):127-137.score: 444.0
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. Robert F. Hadley (1991). The Many Uses of 'Belief' in AI. Minds and Machines 1 (1):55-74.score: 426.0
    Within AI and the cognitively related disciplines, there exist a multiplicity of uses of belief. On the face of it, these differing uses reflect differing views about the nature of an objective phenomenon called belief. In this paper I distinguish six distinct ways in which belief is used in AI. I shall argue that not all these uses reflect a difference of opinion about an objective feature of reality. Rather, in some cases, the differing uses reflect differing (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. James Hawthorne (2009). The Lockean Thesis and the Logic of Belief. In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of Belief. Synthese Library: Springer. 49--74.score: 390.0
    In a penetrating investigation of the relationship between belief and quantitative degrees of confidence (or degrees of belief) Richard Foley (1992) suggests the following thesis: ... it is epistemically rational for us to believe a proposition just in case it is epistemically rational for us to have a sufficiently high degree of confidence in it, sufficiently high to make our attitude towards it one of belief. Foley goes on to suggest that rational belief may (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. Nicholas J. J. Smith (2009). Degree of Belief is Expected Truth Value. In Sebastiano Moruzzi & Richard Dietz (eds.), Cuts and Clouds. Vaguenesss, its Nature and its Logic. Oxford University Press.score: 380.0
    A number of authors have noted that vagueness engenders degrees of belief, but that these degrees of belief do not behave like subjective probabilities. So should we countenance two different kinds of degree of belief: the kind arising from vagueness, and the familiar kind arising from uncertainty, which obey the laws of probability? I argue that we cannot coherently countenance two different kinds of degree of belief. Instead, I present a framework in which there (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. Maria Lasonen-Aarnio (2010). Is There a Viable Account of Well-Founded Belief? Erkenntnis 72 (2):205 - 231.score: 351.0
    My starting point is some widely accepted and intuitive ideas about justified, well-founded belief. By drawing on John Pollock’s work, I sketch a formal framework for making these ideas precise. Central to this framework is the notion of an inference graph. An inference graph represents everything that is relevant about a subject for determining which of her beliefs are justified, such as what the subject believes based on what. The strengths of the nodes of the graph represent the (...) of justification of the corresponding beliefs. There are two ways in which degrees of justification can be computed within this framework. I argue that there is not any way of doing the calculations in a broadly probabilistic manner. The only alternative looks to be a thoroughly non-probabilistic way of thinking wedded to the thought that justification is closed under competent deduction. However, I argue that such a view is unable to capture the intuitive notion of justification, for it leads to an uncomfortable dilemma: either a widespread scepticism about justification, or drawing epistemically spurious distinctions between different types of lotteries. This should worry anyone interested in well-founded belief. (shrink)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. Dorit Ganson (2008). Evidentialism and Pragmatic Constraints on Outright Belief. Philosophical Studies 139 (3):441 - 458.score: 315.0
    Evidentialism is the view that facts about whether or not an agent is justified in having a particular belief are entirely determined by facts about the agent’s evidence; the agent’s practical needs and interests are irrelevant. I examine an array of arguments against evidentialism (by Jeremy Fantl, Matthew McGrath, David Owens, and others), and demonstrate how their force is affected when we take into account the relation between degrees of belief and outright belief. Once we are (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. Lara Buchak (forthcoming). Rational Faith and Justified Belief. In Tim O'Connor & Laura Goins (eds.), Religious Faith and Intellectual Virtue.score: 315.0
    In “Can it be rational to have faith?”, it was argued that to have faith in some proposition consists, roughly speaking, in stopping one’s search for evidence and committing to act on that proposition without further evidence. That paper also outlined when and why stopping the search for evidence and acting is rationally required. Because the framework of that paper was that of formal decision theory, it primarily considered the relationship between faith and degrees of belief, rather than (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. Darrell P. Rowbottom (2013). Group Level Interpretations of Probability: New Directions. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (2):188-203.score: 315.0
    In this article, I present some new group level interpretations of probability, and champion one in particular: a consensus-based variant where group degrees of belief are construed as agreed upon betting quotients rather than shared personal degrees of belief. One notable feature of the account is that it allows us to treat consensus between experts on some matter as being on the union of their relevant background information. In the course of the discussion, I also introduce (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. Weng Hong Tang (forthcoming). Reliability Theories of Justified Credence. Mind.score: 312.0
    Reliabilists hold that a belief is doxastically justified if and only if it is caused by a reliable process. But since such a process is one that tends to produce a high ratio of true to false beliefs, reliabilism is on the face of it applicable to binary beliefs, but not to degrees of confidence or credences. For while (binary) beliefs admit of truth or falsity, the same cannot be said of credences in general. A natural question now (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. Luc Bovens (1999). Do Beliefs Supervene on Degrees of Confidence? In Anthonie W. M. Meijers (ed.), Belief, Cognition, and the Will. Tilburg University Press. 6--27.score: 312.0
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. Franz Huber, Formal Representations of Belief. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.score: 309.0
    Epistemology is the study of knowledge and justified belief. Belief is thus central to epistemology. It comes in a qualitative form, as when Sophia believes that Vienna is the capital of Austria, and a quantitative form, as when Sophia's degree of belief that Vienna is the capital of Austria is at least twice her degree of belief that tomorrow it will be sunny in Vienna. Formal epistemology, as opposed to mainstream epistemology (Hendricks 2006), is epistemology done (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. Timothy Cleveland (1997). On the Very Idea of Degrees of Truth. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 75 (2):218 – 221.score: 309.0
    In his book _Paradoxes, Mark Sainsbury suggests that degrees of truth can be justified and explained by analogy with degrees of belief. Considerations of vagueness place theoretical limitations on degrees of belief which require degrees of truth. This paper argues that considerations of vagueness and degrees of belief do nothing to illuminate degrees of truth. An account of vagueness need not postulate degrees of truth.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  50. Christopher S. Hill & Joshua Schechter (2007). Hawthorne's Lottery Puzzle and the Nature of Belief. Philosophical Issues 17 (1):1020-122.score: 300.0
    In the first chapter of his Knowledge and Lotteries, John Hawthorne argues that thinkers do not ordinarily know lottery propositions. His arguments depend on claims about the intimate connections between knowledge and assertion, epistemic possibility, practical reasoning, and theoretical reasoning. In this paper, we cast doubt on the proposed connections. We also put forward an alternative picture of belief and reasoning. In particular, we argue that assertion is governed by a Gricean constraint that makes no reference to knowledge, and (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 1000