Search results for 'Degrees of Belief' (try it on Scholar)

1000+ found
Order:
See also:
  1.  80
    Darrell P. Rowbottom (2016). How Might Degrees of Belief Shift? On Action Conflicting with Professed Beliefs. Philosophical Psychology 29 (5):732-742.
    People often act in ways that appear incompatible with their sincere assertions. But how might we explain such cases? On the shifting view, subjects’ degrees of belief may be highly sensitive to changes in context. This paper articulates and refines this view, after defending it against recent criticisms. It details two mechanisms by which degrees of beliefs may shift.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  2.  68
    Jeff Dunn (2015). Reliability for Degrees of Belief. Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1929-1952.
    We often evaluate belief-forming processes, agents, or entire belief states for reliability. This is normally done with the assumption that beliefs are all-or-nothing. How does such evaluation go when we’re considering beliefs that come in degrees? I consider a natural answer to this question that focuses on the degree of truth-possession had by a set of beliefs. I argue that this natural proposal is inadequate, but for an interesting reason. When we are dealing with all-or-nothing belief, (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  3.  98
    Julia Staffel (2013). Can There Be Reasoning with Degrees of Belief? Synthese 190 (16):3535-3551.
    In this paper I am concerned with the question of whether degrees of belief can figure in reasoning processes that are executed by humans. It is generally accepted that outright beliefs and intentions can be part of reasoning processes, but the role of degrees of belief remains unclear. The literature on subjective Bayesianism, which seems to be the natural place to look for discussions of the role of degrees of belief in reasoning, does not (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  4. Jane Friedman (2013). Rational Agnosticism and Degrees of Belief. Oxford Studies in Epistemology 4:57.
    There has been much discussion about whether traditional epistemology's doxastic attitudes are reducible to degrees of belief. In this paper I argue that what I call the Straightforward Reduction - the reduction of all three of believing p, disbelieving p, and suspending judgment about p, not-p to precise degrees of belief for p and not-p that ought to obey the standard axioms of the probability calculus - cannot succeed. By focusing on suspension of judgment (agnosticism) rather (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  5.  28
    Peter Milne (2012). Belief, Degrees of Belief, and Assertion. Dialectica 66 (3):331-349.
    Starting from John MacFarlane's recent survey of answers to the question ‘What is assertion?’, I defend an account of assertion that draws on elements of MacFarlane's and Robert Brandom's commitment accounts, Timothy Williamson's knowledge norm account, and my own previous work on the normative status of logic. I defend the knowledge norm from recent attacks. Indicative conditionals, however, pose a problem when read along the lines of Ernest Adams' account, an account supported by much work in the psychology of reasoning. (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  6.  5
    Rosanna Keefe (forthcoming). Degrees of Belief, Expected and Actual. Synthese:1-12.
    A framework of degrees of belief, or credences, is often advocated to model our uncertainty about how things are or will turn out. It has also been employed in relation to the kind of uncertainty or indefiniteness that arises due to vagueness, such as when we consider “a is F” in a case where a is borderline F. How should we understand degrees of belief when we take into account both these phenomena? Can the right kind (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  7. Richard Foley (2009). Beliefs, Degrees of Belief, and the Lockean Thesis. In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of Belief. Springer 37-47.
    What propositions are rational for one to believe? With what confidence is it rational for one to believe these propositions? Answering the first of these questions requires an epistemology of beliefs, answering the second an epistemology of degrees of belief.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   13 citations  
  8.  32
    Sinan Dogramaci (forthcoming). Knowing Our Degrees of Belief. Episteme:1-19.
    The main question of this paper is: how do we manage to know what our own degrees of belief are? Section 1 briefly reviews and criticizes the traditional functionalist view, a view notably associated with David Lewis and sometimes called the theory-theory. I use this criticism to motivate the approach I want to promote. Section 2, the bulk of the paper, examines and begins to develop the view that we have a special kind of introspective access to our (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  9. Franz Huber (2009). Belief and Degrees of Belief. In F. Huber & C. Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of Belief. Springer
    Degrees of belief are familiar to all of us. Our confidence in the truth of some propositions is higher than our confidence in the truth of other propositions. We are pretty confident that our computers will boot when we push their power button, but we are much more confident that the sun will rise tomorrow. Degrees of belief formally represent the strength with which we believe the truth of various propositions. The higher an agent’s degree of (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  10.  31
    Dietrich Franz & Christian List, From Degrees of Belief to Beliefs: Lessons From Judgment-Aggregation Theory.
    What is the relationship between degrees of belief and all-or-nothing beliefs? Can the latter be expressed as a function of the former, without running into paradoxes? We reassess this “belief-binarization” problem from the perspective of judgment-aggregation theory. Although some similarities between belief binarization and judgment aggregation have been noted before, the literature contains no general study of the implications of aggregation-theoretic impossibility and possibility results for belief binarization. We seek to fill this gap. This paper (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  11.  24
    Michael G. Titelbaum (2013). Quitting Certainties: A Bayesian Framework Modeling Degrees of Belief. Oxford University Press.
    Michael G. Titelbaum presents a new Bayesian framework for modeling rational degrees of belief—the first of its kind to represent rational requirements on agents who undergo certainty loss.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   8 citations  
  12.  38
    Hannes Leitgeb (2013). Reducing Belief Simpliciter to Degrees of Belief. Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 164 (12):1338-1389.
    Is it possible to give an explicit definition of belief in terms of subjective probability, such that believed propositions are guaranteed to have a sufficiently high probability, and yet it is neither the case that belief is stripped of any of its usual logical properties, nor is it the case that believed propositions are bound to have probability 1? We prove the answer is ‘yes’, and that given some plausible logical postulates on belief that involve a contextual (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   10 citations  
  13. Lina Eriksson & Alan Hájek (2007). What Are Degrees of Belief? Studia Logica 86 (2):185-215.
    Probabilism is committed to two theses: 1) Opinion comes in degrees—call them degrees of belief, or credences. 2) The degrees of belief of a rational agent obey the probability calculus. Correspondingly, a natural way to argue for probabilism is: i) to give an account of what degrees of belief are, and then ii) to show that those things should be probabilities, on pain of irrationality. Most of the action in the literature concerns stage (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   19 citations  
  14. Darrell P. Rowbottom (2007). 'In Between Believing' and Degrees of Belief. Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 26 (1):131-137.
    Schwitzgebel (2001) — henceforth 'S' — offers three examples in order to convince us that there are situations in which individuals are neither accurately describable as believing that p or failing to so believe, but are rather in 'in-between states of belief'. He then argues that there are no 'Bayesian' or representational strategies for explicating these, and proposes a dispositional account. I do not have any fundamental objection to the idea that there might be 'in-between states of belief'. (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   7 citations  
  15.  33
    Lina Eriksson & Wlodek Rabinowicz (2013). The Interference Problem for the Betting Interpretation of Degrees of Belief. Synthese 190 (5):809-830.
    The paper’s target is the historically influential betting interpretation of subjective probabilities due to Ramsey and de Finetti. While there are several classical and well-known objections to this interpretation, the paper focuses on just one fundamental problem: There is a sense in which degrees of belief cannot be interpreted as betting rates. The reasons differ in different cases, but there’s one crucial feature that all these cases have in common: The agent’s degree of belief in a proposition (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  16. Lyle Zynda (2000). Representation Theorems and Realism About Degrees of Belief. Philosophy of Science 67 (1):45-69.
    The representation theorems of expected utility theory show that having certain types of preferences is both necessary and sufficient for being representable as having subjective probabilities. However, unless the expected utility framework is simply assumed, such preferences are also consistent with being representable as having degrees of belief that do not obey the laws of probability. This fact shows that being representable as having subjective probabilities is not necessarily the same as having subjective probabilities. Probabilism can be defended (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   12 citations  
  17.  27
    Nicholas J. J. Smith (2014). Vagueness, Uncertainty and Degrees of Belief: Two Kinds of Indeterminacy—One Kind of Credence. Erkenntnis 79 (5):1027-44.
    If we think, as Ramsey did, that a degree of belief that P is a stronger or weaker tendency to act as if P, then it is clear that not only uncertainty, but also vagueness, gives rise to degrees of belief. If I like hot coffee and do not know whether the coffee is hot or cold, I will have some tendency to reach for a cup; if I like hot coffee and know that the coffee is (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  18.  3
    Mikkel Birkegaard Andersen, Thomas Bolander, Hans van Ditmarsch & Martin Holm Jensen (forthcoming). Bisimulation and Expressivity for Conditional Belief, Degrees of Belief, and Safe Belief. Synthese:1-41.
    Plausibility models are Kripke models that agents use to reason about knowledge and belief, both of themselves and of each other. Such models are used to interpret the notions of conditional belief, degrees of belief, and safe belief. The logic of conditional belief contains that modality and also the knowledge modality, and similarly for the logic of degrees of belief and the logic of safe belief. With respect to these logics, plausibility (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  19.  12
    Colin Howson (2009). Epistemic Probability and Coherent Degrees of Belief. In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of Belief. Springer 97--119.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  20.  18
    Lyle Zynda (2012). A Springboard for Exploring the Many Approaches to Degrees of Belief. Metascience 21 (2):467-470.
    A springboard for exploring the many approaches to degrees of belief Content Type Journal Article Category Book Review Pages 1-4 DOI 10.1007/s11016-012-9641-x Authors Lyle Zynda, Philosophy Department, Indiana University South Bend, 1700 Mishawaka Ave., P.O. Box 7111, South Bend, IN 46634, USA Journal Metascience Online ISSN 1467-9981 Print ISSN 0815-0796.
    No categories
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  21.  5
    A. I. Dale (1976). Probability, Likelihood and Support: A Metamathematical Approach to a System of Axioms for Upper and Lower Degrees of Belief. Philosophical Papers 5 (2):153-161.
    (1976). PROBABILITY, LIKELIHOOD AND SUPPORT: A METAMATHEMATICAL APPROACH TO A SYSTEM OF AXIOMS FOR UPPER AND LOWER DEGREES OF BELIEF. Philosophical Papers: Vol. 5, No. 2, pp. 153-161.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  22.  3
    Rolf Haenni (2009). Non-Additive Degrees of Belief. In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of Belief. Springer 121--159.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  23. Michael G. Titelbaum (2014). Quitting Certainties: A Bayesian Framework Modeling Degrees of Belief. Oxford University Press Uk.
    Michael G. Titelbaum presents a new Bayesian framework for modeling rational degrees of belief--the first of its kind to represent rational requirements on agents who undergo certainty loss. He compares the framework to alternative solutions, and applies it to cases in epistemology, decision theory, the theory of identity, and quantum mechanics.
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  24. Michael G. Titelbaum (2014). Quitting Certainties: A Bayesian Framework Modeling Degrees of Belief. OUP Oxford.
    Michael G. Titelbaum presents a new Bayesian framework for modeling rational degrees of belief--the first of its kind to represent rational requirements on agents who undergo certainty loss. He compares the framework to alternative solutions, and applies it to cases in epistemology, decision theory, the theory of identity, and quantum mechanics.
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  25.  14
    T. Seidenfeld, M. J. Schervish & J. B. Kadane (1990). When Fair Betting Odds Are Not Degrees of Belief. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1990:517-524.
    The "Dutch Book" argument, tracing back to Ramsey and to deFinetti, offers prudential grounds for action in conformity with personal probability. Under several structural assumptions about combinations of stakes, your betting policy is coherent only if your fair odds are probabilities. The central question posed here is the following one: Besides providing an operational test of coherent betting, does the "Book" argument also provide for adequate measurement of the agents degrees of beliefs? That is, are an agent's fair odds (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  26.  68
    Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.) (2009). Degrees of Belief. Springer.
    Various theories try to give accounts of how measures of this confidence do or ought to behave, both as far as the internal mental consistency of the agent as ...
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  27.  9
    Franz Huber (2003). Degrees of Belief as Basis for Scientific Reasoning? In W. Loeffler & P. Weingartner (eds.), Knowledge and Belief. Papers of the 26th International Wittgenstein Symposium. Kirchberg
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  28.  1
    Martin Smith Philip A. Ebert (2012). Introduction: Outright Belief and Degrees of Belief. Dialectica 66 (3):305-308.
    What is the relation between ‘full’ or ‘outright’ belief and the various levels of confidence that agents can have in the propositions that concern them? This paper argues for a new answer to this question. Decision theory implies that in making decisions, rational agents must treat certain propositions as though they were completely certain; but on most forms of decision theory, these propositions are not ones for which any finite agent could have maximal justification – the agent will clearly (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  29. D. H. Mellor (1980). Consciousness and Degrees of Belief. In Prospects for Pragmatism. Cambridge University Press
  30.  19
    Kenny Easwaran (2016). Quitting Certainties: A Bayesian Framework Modeling Degrees of Belief. Philosophical Review 125 (1):143-148.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  31.  62
    Richard Foley (1992). The Epistemology of Belief and the Epistemology of Degrees of Belief. American Philosophical Quarterly 29 (2):111 - 124.
  32.  50
    Jeffrey Bub (2007). Quantum Probabilities as Degrees of Belief. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 38 (2):232-254.
  33.  32
    Alastair Wilson (2014). MICHAEL G. TITELBAUM Quitting Certainties: A Bayesian Framework Modeling Degrees of Belief. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 65 (4):887-891.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  34. Brian Skyrms (1980). Higher Order Degrees of Belief. In D. H. Mellor (ed.), Prospects for Pragmatism. Cambridge University Press 109--137.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   26 citations  
  35.  34
    Wlodek Rabinowicz & Luc Bovens (2011). Bets on Hats: On Dutch Books Against Groups, Degrees of Belief as Betting Rates, and Group-Reflection. Episteme 8 (3):281-300.
    The Story of the Hats is a puzzle in social epistemology. It describes a situation in which a group of rational agents with common priors and common goals seems vulnerable to a Dutch book if they are exposed to different information and make decisions independently. Situations in which this happens involve violations of what might be called the Group-Reflection Principle. As it turns out, the Dutch book is flawed. It is based on the betting interpretation of the subjective probabilities, but (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  36.  16
    Michael Levin (2013). Quitting Certainties: A Bayesian Framework Modeling Degrees of Belief. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (1):1-4.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  37.  2
    Jon Williamson (2007). Inductive Influence: Objective Bayesianism has Been Criticised for Not Allowing Learning From Experience: It is Claimed That an Agent Must Give Degree of Belief Formula to the Next Raven Being Black, However Many Other Black Ravens Have Been Observed. I Argue That This Objection Can Be Overcome by Appealing to Objective Bayesian Nets, a Formalism for Representing Objective Bayesian Degrees of Belief. Under This Account, Previous Observations Exert an Inductive Influence on the Next Observation. I Show How This Approach Can Be Used to Capture the Johnson–Carnap Continuum of Inductive Methods, as Well as the Nix–Paris Continuum, and Show How Inductive Influence Can Be Measured. [REVIEW] British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58 (4):689-708.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  38. Glenn Shafer (2010). A Betting Interpretation for Probabilities and Dempster-Shafer Degrees of Belief. International Journal of Approximate Reasoning.
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  39. Jeffrey Bub (2007). Quantum Probabilities as Degrees of Belief. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 38 (2):232-254.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  40. James Joyce (2005). How Degrees of Belief Reflect Evidence. Philosophical Perspectives 19:153-179.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  41.  29
    R. M. Sainsbury (1986). Degrees of Belief and Degrees of Truth. Philosophical Papers 15 (2-3):97-106.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  42.  49
    Philip A. Ebert & Martin Smith (2012). Introduction: Outright Belief and Degrees of Belief. Dialectica 66 (3):305-308.
  43.  80
    Jake Chandler (2009). Review of Franz Huber and Christoph Schmidt-Petri, Eds. Degrees of Belief. [REVIEW] Philosophy in Review 296 (6):422-424.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  44.  12
    Rabinowicz Wlodek & Luc Bovens (2011). Bets on Hats-On Dutch Books Against Groups, Degrees of Belief as Betting Rates, and Group-Reflection. Episteme 8 (3):281-300.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  45.  3
    David Over (1993). Deduction and Degrees of Belief. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):361.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  46.  22
    Horacio Arlo-Costa (2010). Review of Franz Huber, Christoph Schmidt-Petri (Eds.), Degrees of Belief. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2010 (1).
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  47. Jake Chandler (2010). Franz Huber and Christoph Schmidt-Petri, Eds., Degrees of Belief Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 29 (6):422-424.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  48.  1
    Alexandru Marcoci (2015). Quitting Certainties: A Bayesian Framework Modeling Degrees of Belief, Michael G. Titelbaum. Oxford University Press, 2013, Xii + 345 Pages. [REVIEW] Economics and Philosophy 31 (1):194-200.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  49.  8
    George F. Williamson (1915). Individual Differences in Belief, Measured and Expressed by Degrees of Confidence. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 12 (5):127-137.
  50.  45
    Robert F. Hadley (1991). The Many Uses of 'Belief' in AI. Minds and Machines 1 (1):55-74.
    Within AI and the cognitively related disciplines, there exist a multiplicity of uses of belief. On the face of it, these differing uses reflect differing views about the nature of an objective phenomenon called belief. In this paper I distinguish six distinct ways in which belief is used in AI. I shall argue that not all these uses reflect a difference of opinion about an objective feature of reality. Rather, in some cases, the differing uses reflect differing (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
1 — 50 / 1000