Search results for 'Degrees of Belief' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Jane Friedman (2013). Rational Agnosticism and Degrees of Belief. Oxford Studies in Epistemology 4:57.score: 180.0
    There has been much discussion about whether traditional epistemology's doxastic attitudes are reducible to degrees of belief. In this paper I argue that what I call the Straightforward Reduction - the reduction of all three of believing p, disbelieving p, and suspending judgment about p, not-p to precise degrees of belief for p and not-p that ought to obey the standard axioms of the probability calculus - cannot succeed. By focusing on suspension of judgment (agnosticism) rather (...)
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  2. Julia Staffel (2013). Can There Be Reasoning with Degrees of Belief? Synthese 190 (16):3535-3551.score: 180.0
    In this paper I am concerned with the question of whether degrees of belief can figure in reasoning processes that are executed by humans. It is generally accepted that outright beliefs and intentions can be part of reasoning processes, but the role of degrees of belief remains unclear. The literature on subjective Bayesianism, which seems to be the natural place to look for discussions of the role of degrees of belief in reasoning, does not (...)
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  3. Franz Huber (2009). Belief and Degrees of Belief. In F. Huber & C. Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of Belief. Springer.score: 150.0
    Degrees of belief are familiar to all of us. Our confidence in the truth of some propositions is higher than our confidence in the truth of other propositions. We are pretty confident that our computers will boot when we push their power button, but we are much more confident that the sun will rise tomorrow. Degrees of belief formally represent the strength with which we believe the truth of various propositions. The higher an agent’s degree of (...)
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  4. Richard Foley (2009). Beliefs, Degrees of Belief, and the Lockean Thesis. In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of Belief. Springer. 37-47.score: 150.0
    What propositions are rational for one to believe? With what confidence is it rational for one to believe these propositions? Answering the first of these questions requires an epistemology of beliefs, answering the second an epistemology of degrees of belief.
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  5. Peter Milne (2012). Belief, Degrees of Belief, and Assertion. Dialectica 66 (3):331-349.score: 150.0
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  6. Lina Eriksson & Wlodek Rabinowicz (2013). The Interference Problem for the Betting Interpretation of Degrees of Belief. Synthese 190 (5):809-830.score: 126.0
    The paper’s target is the historically influential betting interpretation of subjective probabilities due to Ramsey and de Finetti. While there are several classical and well-known objections to this interpretation, the paper focuses on just one fundamental problem: There is a sense in which degrees of belief cannot be interpreted as betting rates. The reasons differ in different cases, but there’s one crucial feature that all these cases have in common: The agent’s degree of belief in a proposition (...)
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  7. Michael G. Titelbaum (2013). Quitting Certainties: A Bayesian Framework Modeling Degrees of Belief. Oxford University Press.score: 126.0
    Michael G. Titelbaum presents a new Bayesian framework for modeling rational degrees of belief—the first of its kind to represent rational requirements on agents who undergo certainty loss.
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  8. Lyle Zynda (2000). Representation Theorems and Realism About Degrees of Belief. Philosophy of Science 67 (1):45-69.score: 123.0
    The representation theorems of expected utility theory show that having certain types of preferences is both necessary and sufficient for being representable as having subjective probabilities. However, unless the expected utility framework is simply assumed, such preferences are also consistent with being representable as having degrees of belief that do not obey the laws of probability. This fact shows that being representable as having subjective probabilities is not necessarily the same as having subjective probabilities. Probabilism can be defended (...)
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  9. Darrell P. Rowbottom (2007). 'In Between Believing' and Degrees of Belief. Teorema 26 (1):131-137.score: 120.0
    Schwitzgebel (2001) — henceforth 'S' — offers three examples in order to convince us that there are situations in which individuals are neither accurately describable as believing that p or failing to so believe, but are rather in 'in-between states of belief'. He then argues that there are no 'Bayesian' or representational strategies for explicating these, and proposes a dispositional account. I do not have any fundamental objection to the idea that there might be 'in-between states of belief'. (...)
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  10. Lina Eriksson & Alan Hájek (2007). What Are Degrees of Belief? Studia Logica 86 (2):185-215.score: 120.0
    Probabilism is committed to two theses: 1) Opinion comes in degrees—call them degrees of belief, or credences. 2) The degrees of belief of a rational agent obey the probability calculus. Correspondingly, a natural way to argue for probabilism is: i) to give an account of what degrees of belief are, and then ii) to show that those things should be probabilities, on pain of irrationality. Most of the action in the literature concerns stage (...)
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  11. Nicholas J. J. Smith (forthcoming). Vagueness, Uncertainty and Degrees of Belief: Two Kinds of Indeterminacy—One Kind of Credence. Erkenntnis:1-18.score: 120.0
    If we think, as Ramsey did, that a degree of belief that P is a stronger or weaker tendency to act as if P, then it is clear that not only uncertainty, but also vagueness, gives rise to degrees of belief. If I like hot coffee and do not know whether the coffee is hot or cold, I will have some tendency to reach for a cup; if I like hot coffee and know that the coffee is (...)
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  12. Lyle Zynda (2012). A Springboard for Exploring the Many Approaches to Degrees of Belief. Metascience 21 (2):467-470.score: 120.0
    A springboard for exploring the many approaches to degrees of belief Content Type Journal Article Category Book Review Pages 1-4 DOI 10.1007/s11016-012-9641-x Authors Lyle Zynda, Philosophy Department, Indiana University South Bend, 1700 Mishawaka Ave., P.O. Box 7111, South Bend, IN 46634, USA Journal Metascience Online ISSN 1467-9981 Print ISSN 0815-0796.
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  13. Colin Howson (2009). Epistemic Probability and Coherent Degrees of Belief. In. In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of Belief. Springer. 97--119.score: 120.0
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  14. A. I. Dale (1976). Probability, Likelihood and Support: A Metamathematical Approach to a System of Axioms for Upper and Lower Degrees of Belief. Philosophical Papers 5 (2):153-161.score: 120.0
    (1976). PROBABILITY, LIKELIHOOD AND SUPPORT: A METAMATHEMATICAL APPROACH TO A SYSTEM OF AXIOMS FOR UPPER AND LOWER DEGREES OF BELIEF. Philosophical Papers: Vol. 5, No. 2, pp. 153-161.
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  15. Rolf Haenni (2009). Non-Additive Degrees of Belief. In. In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of Belief. Springer. 121--159.score: 120.0
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  16. Robert F. Hadley (1991). The Many Uses of 'Belief' in AI. Minds and Machines 1 (1):55-74.score: 114.0
    Within AI and the cognitively related disciplines, there exist a multiplicity of uses of belief. On the face of it, these differing uses reflect differing views about the nature of an objective phenomenon called belief. In this paper I distinguish six distinct ways in which belief is used in AI. I shall argue that not all these uses reflect a difference of opinion about an objective feature of reality. Rather, in some cases, the differing uses reflect differing (...)
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  17. T. Seidenfeld, M. J. Schervish & J. B. Kadane (1990). When Fair Betting Odds Are Not Degrees of Belief. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1990:517 - 524.score: 112.3
    The "Dutch Book" argument, tracing back to Ramsey and to deFinetti, offers prudential grounds for action in conformity with personal probability. Under several structural assumptions about combinations of stakes (that is, assumptions about the combination of wagers), your betting policy is coherent only if your fair odds are probabilities. The central question posed here is the following one: Besides providing an operational test of coherent betting, does the "Book" argument also provide for adequate measurement (elicitation) of the agents (...) of beliefs? That is, are an agent's fair odds also his/her personal probabilities for those events? We argue the answer is "No!" The problem is caused by the possibility of state dependent utilities. (shrink)
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  18. James Hawthorne (2009). The Lockean Thesis and the Logic of Belief. In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of Belief. Synthese Library: Springer. 49--74.score: 102.0
    In a penetrating investigation of the relationship between belief and quantitative degrees of confidence (or degrees of belief) Richard Foley (1992) suggests the following thesis: ... it is epistemically rational for us to believe a proposition just in case it is epistemically rational for us to have a sufficiently high degree of confidence in it, sufficiently high to make our attitude towards it one of belief. Foley goes on to suggest that rational belief may (...)
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  19. Franz Huber (2003). Degrees of Belief as Basis for Scientific Reasoning? In W. Loeffler & P. Weingartner (eds.), Knowledge and Belief. Papers of the 26th International Wittgenstein Symposium. Kirchberg.score: 102.0
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  20. D. H. Mellor (1980). Consciousness and Degrees of Belief. In , Prospects for Pragmatism. Cambridge University Press.score: 102.0
  21. Dorit Ganson (2008). Evidentialism and Pragmatic Constraints on Outright Belief. Philosophical Studies 139 (3):441 - 458.score: 99.0
    Evidentialism is the view that facts about whether or not an agent is justified in having a particular belief are entirely determined by facts about the agent’s evidence; the agent’s practical needs and interests are irrelevant. I examine an array of arguments against evidentialism (by Jeremy Fantl, Matthew McGrath, David Owens, and others), and demonstrate how their force is affected when we take into account the relation between degrees of belief and outright belief. Once we are (...)
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  22. Lara Buchak (forthcoming). Rational Faith and Justified Belief. In Tim O'Connor & Laura Goins (eds.), Religious Faith and Intellectual Virtue.score: 99.0
    In “Can it be rational to have faith?”, it was argued that to have faith in some proposition consists, roughly speaking, in stopping one’s search for evidence and committing to act on that proposition without further evidence. That paper also outlined when and why stopping the search for evidence and acting is rationally required. Because the framework of that paper was that of formal decision theory, it primarily considered the relationship between faith and degrees of belief, rather than (...)
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  23. Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.) (2009). Degrees of Belief. Springer.score: 99.0
    Various theories try to give accounts of how measures of this confidence do or ought to behave, both as far as the internal mental consistency of the agent as ...
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  24. Darrell P. Rowbottom (2013). Group Level Interpretations of Probability: New Directions. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (2):188-203.score: 99.0
    In this article, I present some new group level interpretations of probability, and champion one in particular: a consensus-based variant where group degrees of belief are construed as agreed upon betting quotients rather than shared personal degrees of belief. One notable feature of the account is that it allows us to treat consensus between experts on some matter as being on the union of their relevant background information. In the course of the discussion, I also introduce (...)
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  25. Daniel Whiting (2013). Nothing but the Truth: On the Norms and Aims of Belief. In Timothy Chan (ed.), The Aim of Belief. Oxford University Press.score: 98.0
    That truth provides the standard for believing appears to be a platitude, one which dovetails with the idea that in some sense belief aims only at the truth. In recent years, however, an increasing number of prominent philosophers have suggested that knowledge provides the standard for believing, and so that belief aims only at knowledge. In this paper, I examine the considerations which have been put forward in support of this suggestion, considerations relating to lottery beliefs, Moorean beliefs, (...)
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  26. Berit Brogaard (forthcoming). Wide-Scope Requirements and the Ethics of Belief. In Jonathan Matheson & Rico Vitz (eds.), The Ethics of Belief.score: 98.0
    William Kingdon Clifford proposed a vigorous ethics of belief, according to which you are morally prohibited from believing something on insufficient evidence. Though Clifford offers numerous considerations in favor of his ethical theory, the conclusion he wants to draw turns out not to follow from any reasonable assumptions. In fact, I will argue, regardless of how you propose to understand the notion of evidence, it is implausible that we could have a moral obligation to refrain from believing something whenever (...)
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  27. Dennis Whitcomb (forthcoming). Can There Be a Knowledge-First Ethics of Belief? In Jonathan Matheson & Rico Vits (eds.), The Ethics of Belief: Individual and Social. Oxford University Press.score: 98.0
    This article critically examines numerous attempts to build a knowledge-first ethics of belief.
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  28. Maria Lasonen-Aarnio (2010). Is There a Viable Account of Well-Founded Belief? Erkenntnis 72 (2):205 - 231.score: 93.0
    My starting point is some widely accepted and intuitive ideas about justified, well-founded belief. By drawing on John Pollock’s work, I sketch a formal framework for making these ideas precise. Central to this framework is the notion of an inference graph. An inference graph represents everything that is relevant about a subject for determining which of her beliefs are justified, such as what the subject believes based on what. The strengths of the nodes of the graph represent the (...) of justification of the corresponding beliefs. There are two ways in which degrees of justification can be computed within this framework. I argue that there is not any way of doing the calculations in a broadly probabilistic manner. The only alternative looks to be a thoroughly non-probabilistic way of thinking wedded to the thought that justification is closed under competent deduction. However, I argue that such a view is unable to capture the intuitive notion of justification, for it leads to an uncomfortable dilemma: either a widespread scepticism about justification, or drawing epistemically spurious distinctions between different types of lotteries. This should worry anyone interested in well-founded belief. (shrink)
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  29. Hartry Field (forthcoming). What Is Logical Validity? In Colin Caret & Ole Hjortland (eds.), Foundations of Logical Consequence.score: 93.0
    What are people who disagree about logic disagreeing about? The paper argues that (in a wide range of cases) they are primarily disagreeing about how to regulate their degrees of belief. An analogy is drawn between beliefs about validity and beliefs about chance: both sorts of belief serve primarily to regulate degrees of belief about other matters, but in both cases the concepts have a kind of objectivity nonetheless.
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  30. Jeffrey Bub (2007). Quantum Probabilities as Degrees of Belief. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 38 (2):232-254.score: 93.0
  31. Brad Armendt (2010). Stakes and Beliefs. Philosophical Studies 147 (1):71 - 87.score: 93.0
    The idea that beliefs may be stake-sensitive is explored. This is the idea that the strength with which a single, persistent belief is held may vary and depend upon what the believer takes to be at stake. The stakes in question are tied to the truth of the belief—not, as in Pascal’s wager and other cases, to the belief’s presence. Categorical beliefs and degrees of belief are considered; both kinds of account typically exclude the idea (...)
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  32. Wlodek Rabinowicz & Luc Bovens (2011). Bets on Hats: On Dutch Books Against Groups, Degrees of Belief as Betting Rates, and Group-Reflection. Episteme 8 (3):281-300.score: 93.0
    The Story of the Hats is a puzzle in social epistemology. It describes a situation in which a group of rational agents with common priors and common goals seems vulnerable to a Dutch book if they are exposed to different information and make decisions independently. Situations in which this happens involve violations of what might be called the Group-Reflection Principle. As it turns out, the Dutch book is flawed. It is based on the betting interpretation of the subjective probabilities, but (...)
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  33. Alastair Wilson (forthcoming). MICHAEL G. TITELBAUM Quitting Certainties: A Bayesian Framework Modeling Degrees of Belief. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axt056.score: 93.0
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  34. Hannes Leitgeb (2013). Reducing Belief Simpliciter to Degrees of Belief. Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 164 (12):1338-1389.score: 93.0
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  35. Michael Levin (2013). Quitting Certainties: A Bayesian Framework Modeling Degrees of Belief. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (1):1-4.score: 93.0
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  36. Glenn Shafer (2010). A Betting Interpretation for Probabilities and Dempster-Shafer Degrees of Belief. International Journal of Approximate Reasoning.score: 93.0
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  37. Patrick Maher (2010). Bayesian Probability. Synthese 172 (1):119 - 127.score: 90.0
    Bayesian decision theory is here construed as explicating a particular concept of rational choice and Bayesian probability is taken to be the concept of probability used in that theory. Bayesian probability is usually identified with the agent’s degrees of belief but that interpretation makes Bayesian decision theory a poor explication of the relevant concept of rational choice. A satisfactory conception of Bayesian decision theory is obtained by taking Bayesian probability to be an explicatum for inductive probability given the (...)
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  38. Jake Chandler (2009). Review of Franz Huber and Christoph Schmidt-Petri, Eds. Degrees of Belief. Philosophy in Review 296 (6):422-424.score: 90.0
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  39. Richard Foley (1992). The Epistemology of Belief and the Epistemology of Degrees of Belief. American Philosophical Quarterly 29 (2):111 - 124.score: 90.0
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  40. R. M. Sainsbury (1986). Degrees of Belief and Degrees of Truth. Philosophical Papers 15 (2-3):97-106.score: 90.0
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  41. Philip A. Ebert & Martin Smith (2012). Introduction: Outright Belief and Degrees of Belief. Dialectica 66 (3):305-308.score: 90.0
  42. David James Anderson (2012). Knowledge and Conviction. Synthese 187 (2):377-392.score: 90.0
    Much philosophical effort has been exerted over problems having to do with the correct analysis and application of the concept of epistemic justification. While I do not wish to dispute the central place of this problem in contemporary epistemology, it seems to me that there is a general neglect of the belief condition for knowledge. In this paper I offer an analysis of 'degrees of belief' in terms of a quality I label 'conviction', go on to argue (...)
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  43. Horacio Arlo-Costa (2010). Review of Franz Huber, Christoph Schmidt-Petri (Eds.), Degrees of Belief. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2010 (1).score: 90.0
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  44. Gregor Betz (2008). Evaluating Dialectical Structures with Bayesian Methods. Synthese 163 (1):25 - 44.score: 90.0
    This paper shows how complex argumentation, analyzed as dialectical structures, can be evaluated within a Bayesian framework by interpreting them as coherence constraints on subjective degrees of belief. A dialectical structure is a set of arguments (premiss-conclusion structure) among which support- and attack-relations hold. This approach addresses the observation that some theses in a debate can be better justified than others and thus fixes a shortcoming of a theory of defeasible reasoning which applies the bivalence principle to argument (...)
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  45. George F. Williamson (1915). Individual Differences in Belief, Measured and Expressed by Degrees of Confidence. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 12 (5):127-137.score: 90.0
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  46. Rabinowicz Wlodek & Luc Bovens (2011). Bets on Hats-On Dutch Books Against Groups, Degrees of Belief as Betting Rates, and Group-Reflection. Episteme 8 (3):281-300.score: 90.0
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  47. Jake Chandler (2010). Franz Huber and Christoph Schmidt-Petri, Eds., Degrees of Belief Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 29 (6):422-424.score: 90.0
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  48. James Joyce (2005). How Degrees of Belief Reflect Evidence. Philosophical Perspectives 19:153-179.score: 90.0
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  49. David Over (1993). Deduction and Degrees of Belief. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):361.score: 90.0
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  50. Brian Skyrms (1980). Higher Order Degrees of Belief. In D. H. Mellor (ed.), Prospects for Pragmatism. Cambridge University Press. 109--137.score: 90.0
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