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Profile: Delia Graff Fara (Princeton University)
  1. Delia Graff, Vagueness, Adjectives, and Interests (II).
    equiv: (¬ DEF T (x) & ¬ DEF ¬ T (x)). equiv: ¬(DEF T (x) ∨ DEF ¬T (x)). equiv: ¬∆ T (x) (“not determinate whether x is tall”).
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  2. Delia Graff (2006). Descriptions with Adverbs of Quantification. Philosophical Issues 16 16:65–87.
    In “Descriptions as Predicates” (Graff 2001) I argued that definite and indefinite descriptions should be given a uniform semantic treatment as predicates rather than as quantifier phrases. The aim of the current paper is to clarify and elaborate one of the arguments for the descriptions-as-predicates view, one that concerns the interaction of descriptions with adverbs of quantification.
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  3. Delia Graff (2004). Gap Principles, Penumbral Consequence, and Infinitely Higher-Order Vagueness. In J. C. Beall (ed.), Liars and Heaps: New Essays on Paradox. Clarendon Press.
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  4. Delia Graff (2002). An Anti-Epistemicist Consequence of Margin for Error Semantics for Knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (1):127–142.
  5. Delia Graff & Timothy Williamson (eds.) (2002). Vagueness. Ashgate.
    If you’ve read the first five hundred pages of this book, you’ve read most of it (we assume that ‘most’ requires more than ‘more than half’). The set of natural numbers n such that the first n pages are most of this book is nonempty. Therefore, by the least number principle, it has a least member k. What is k? We do not know. We have no idea how to find out. The obstacle is something about the term ‘most’. It (...)
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  6. Delia Graff (2001). Descriptions As Predicates. Philosophical Studies 102 (1):1-42.
    Although Strawson’s main aim in “On Referring” was to argue that definite descriptions can be used referentially – that is, “to mention or refer to some individual person or single object . . . , in the course of doing what we should normally describe as making a statement about that person [or] object” (1950, p. 320) – he denied that definite descriptions are always used referentially. The description in ‘Napoleon was the greatest French soldier’ is not used referentially, says (...)
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  7. Delia Graff (1999). Review: Gary Ostertag, Definite Descriptions, A Reader. [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 64 (3):1371-1374.
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