Search results for 'Delusion' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Philip Gerrans (2002). A One-Stage Explanation of the Cotard Delusion. Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology 9 (1):47-53.score: 18.0
    Cognitive neuropsychiatry (CN) is the explanation of psychiatric disorder by the methods of cognitive neuropsychology. Within CN there are, broadly speaking, two approaches to delusion. The first uses a one-stage model, in which delusions are explained as rationalizations of anomalous experiences via reasoning strategies that are not, in themselves, abnormal. Two-stage models invoke additional hypotheses about abnormalities of reasoning. In this paper, I examine what appears to be a very strong argument, developed within CN, in favor of a twostage (...)
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  2. Matthew Ratcliffe (2008). The Phenomenological Role of Affect in the Capgras Delusion. Continental Philosophy Review 41 (2):195-216.score: 18.0
    This paper draws on studies of the Capgras delusion in order to illuminate the phenomenological role of affect in interpersonal recognition. People with this delusion maintain that familiars, such as spouses, have been replaced by impostors. It is generally agreed that the delusion involves an anomalous experience, arising due to loss of affect. However, quite what this experience consists of remains unclear. I argue that recent accounts of the Capgras delusion incorporate an impoverished conception of experience, (...)
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  3. Garry Young (2008). Restating the Role of Phenomenal Experience in the Formation and Maintenance of the Capgras Delusion. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (2):177-189.score: 18.0
    In recent times, explanations of the Capgras delusion have tended to emphasise the cognitive dysfunction that is believed to occur at the second stage of two-stage models. This is generally viewed as a response to the inadequacies of the one-stage account. Whilst accepting that some form of cognitive disruption is a necessary part of the aetiology of the Capgras delusion, I nevertheless argue that the emphasis placed on this second-stage is to the detriment of the important role played (...)
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  4. Sarah Troubé (2012). Understanding Schizophrenic Delusion: The Role of Some Primary Alterations of Subjective Experience. [REVIEW] Medicine Studies 3 (4):233-248.score: 18.0
    This paper explores the possibility of understanding schizophrenic delusion through the role of a primary alteration of subjective experience. Two approaches are contrasted: the first defines schizophrenic delusion as a primary symptom resisting any attempt to understand, whereas the second describes delusion as a secondary symptom, to be understood as a rational reaction of the self. The paper discusses the possibility of applying this second approach to schizophrenic delusion. This leads us to raise the issue of (...)
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  5. Lorenzo Servitje (forthcoming). Keep Your Head in the Gutter: Engendering Empathy Through Participatory Delusion in Christian de Metter's Graphic Adaptation of Shutter Island. [REVIEW] Journal of Medical Humanities:1-18.score: 18.0
    This paper argues that the graphic adaptation of Dennis Lehane’s Shutter Island utilizes the medium to evoke an affective participation and investment from the reader. It explores the ways the graphic novel overcomes problematic representations of mental illness in the popular film version. Drawing on graphic fiction theory, I contend that readers’ engagement in and construction of the story between panels, in the “gutters,” allows them to participate in the protagonist’s persecutory delusion. Additionally, I draw on Foucault’s conceptualizations of (...)
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  6. David Rose, Wesley Buckwalter & John Turri (forthcoming). When Words Speak Louder Than Actions: Delusion, Belief and the Power of Assertion. Australasian Journal of Philosophy.score: 16.0
    People suffering from severe monothematic delusions, such as Capgras and Cotard patients, regularly assert extraordinary and unlikely things. For example, some say that their loved ones have been replaced by impostors. A popular view in philosophy and cognitive science is that such monothematic delusions aren’t beliefs because they don’t guide behavior and affect in the way that beliefs do. Or, if they are beliefs, they are somehow anomalous, atypical, or marginal beliefs. We present evidence from four studies that folk psychology (...)
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  7. Lisa Bortolotti, Delusion. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.score: 16.0
    Stanford Encyclopedia Entry on Delusions.
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  8. Philip Gerrans (2000). Refining the Explanation of Cotard's Delusion. Mind and Language 15 (1):111-122.score: 16.0
    An elegant theory in cognitive neuropsychiatry explains the Capgras and Cotard delusions as resulting from the same type of anomalous phenomenal experience explained in different ways by different sufferers. ‘Although the Capgras and Cotard delusions are phenomenally distinct, we thus think that they represent patients’ attempts to make sense of fundamentally similar experiences’ (Young and Leafhead, 1996, p. 168). On the theory proposed by Young and Leafhead, the anomalous experience results from damage to an information processing subsystem which associates an (...)
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  9. Lisa Bortolotti & Matteo Mameli (2012). Self-Deception, Delusion and the Boundaries of Folk Psychology. Humana.Mente 20:203-221.score: 16.0
    In this paper we argue that both self-deception and delusions can be understood in folk-psychological terms.
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  10. Gregory Currie (2000). Imagination, Delusion and Hallucinations. In Max Coltheart & Martin Davies (eds.), Pathologies of Belief. Blackwell. 168-183.score: 15.0
  11. Andy Egan (2008). Imagination, Delusion, and Self-Deception. In Tim Bayne & Jordi Fernandez (eds.), Delusion and Self-Deception: Affective and Motivational Influences on Belief Formation (Macquarie Monographs in Cognitive Science). Psychology Press.score: 15.0
    Subjects with delusions profess to believe some extremely peculiar things. Patients with Capgras delusion sincerely assert that, for example, their spouses have been replaced by impostors. Patients with Cotard’s delusion sincerely assert that they are dead. Many philosophers and psychologists are hesitant to say that delusional subjects genuinely believe the contents of their delusions.2 One way to reinterpret delusional subjects is to say that we’ve misidentified the content of the problematic belief. So for example, rather than believing that (...)
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  12. J. Campbell (2001). Rationality, Meaning, and the Analysis of Delusion. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 8 (2-3):89-100.score: 15.0
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  13. Jeanette Kennett & Steve Matthews (2003). Delusion, Dissociation and Identity. Philosophical Explorations 6 (1):31-49.score: 15.0
    The condition known as Multiple Personality Disorder (MPD) or Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID) is metaphysically strange. Can there really be several distinct persons operating in a single body? Our view is that DID sufferers are single persons with a severe mental disorder. In this paper we compare the phenomenology of dissociation between personality states in DID with certain delusional disorders. We argue both that the burden of proof must lie with those who defend the metaphysically extravagant Multiple Persons view and (...)
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  14. Gregory Currie & Jon Jureidini (2001). Delusion, Rationality, Empathy. Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology 8 (2-3):159-62.score: 15.0
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  15. Jakob Hohwy (2004). Top-Down and Bottom-Up in Delusion Formation. Philosophy Psychiatry and Psychology 11 (1):65-70.score: 15.0
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  16. K. W. M. Fulford & Lubomira Radoilska (2012). Three Challenges From Delusion for Theories of Autonomy. In Lubomira Radoilska (ed.), Autonomy and Mental Disorder. Oxford University Press.score: 14.0
    This chapter identifies and explores a series of challenges raised by the clinical concept of delusion for theories which conceive autonomy as an agency rather than a status concept. The first challenge is to address the autonomy-impairing nature of delusions consistently with their role as grounds for full legal and ethical excuse, on the one hand, and psychopathological significance as key symptoms of psychoses, on the other. The second challenge is to take into account the full logical range of (...)
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  17. Mari Stenlund (2013). Is There a Right to Hold a Delusion? Delusions as a Challenge for Human Rights Discussion. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (4):829-843.score: 14.0
    The analysis presented in this article reveals an ambiguity and tension in human rights theory concerning the delusional person’s freedom of belief and thought. Firstly, it would appear that the concepts ‘opinion’ and ‘thought’ are defined in human rights discussion in such a way that they do include delusions. Secondly, the internal freedom to hold opinions and thoughts is defined in human rights discussion and international human rights covenants as an absolute human right which should not be restricted in any (...)
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  18. Lisa Bortolotti (2011). Psychiatric Classification and Diagnosis. Delusions and Confabulations. Paradigmi (1):99-112.score: 12.0
    In psychiatry some disorders of cognition are distinguished from instances of normal cognitive functioning and from other disorders in virtue of their surface features rather than in virtue of the underlying mechanisms responsible for their occurrence. Aetiological considerations often cannot play a significant classificatory and diagnostic role, because there is no sufficient knowledge or consensus about the causal history of many psychiatric disorders. Moreover, it is not always possible to uniquely identify a pathological behaviour as the symptom of a certain (...)
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  19. Tim Bayne, Delusion and Self-Deception: Mapping the Terrain.score: 12.0
    The papers in this volume are drawn from a workshop on delusion and self-deception, held at Macquarie University in November of 2004. Our aim was to bring together theorists working on delusions and self-deception with an eye towards identifying and fostering connections—at both empirical and conceptual levels—between these domains. As the contributions to this volume testify, there are multiple points of contact between delusion and self-deception. This introduction charts the conceptual space in which these points of contact can (...)
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  20. Tony Stone & Andrew W. Young (1997). Delusions and Brain Injury: The Philosophy and Psychology of Belief. Mind and Language 12 (3-4):327-64.score: 12.0
    Circumscribed delusional beliefs can follow brain injury. We suggest that these involve anomalous perceptual experiences created by a deficit to the person's perceptual system, and misinterpretation of these experiences due to biased reasoning. We use the Capgras delusion (the claim that one or more of one's close relatives has been replaced by an exact replica or impostor) to illustrate this argument. Our account maintains that people voicing this delusion suffer an impairment that leads to faces being perceived as (...)
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  21. Paul Franceschi, An Analytic View of Delusion.score: 12.0
    The present article proposes a logical account of delusions, which are regarded as conclusions resulting from fallacious arguments. This leads to distinguish between primary, secondary, ..., n-ary types of delusional arguments. Examples of delusional arguments leading to delusion of reference, delusion of influence, thought-broadcasting delusion and delusion of grandeur are described and then analyzed. This suggests finally a way susceptible of improving the efficiency of cognitive therapy for delusions.
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  22. Jakob Hohwy & Raben Rosenberg (2005). Unusual Experiences, Reality Testing and Delusions of Alien Control. Mind and Language 20 (2):141-162.score: 12.0
    Some monothematic types of delusions may arise because subjects have unusual experiences. The role of this experiential component in the pathogenesis of delusion is still not understood. Focussing on delusions of alien control, we outline a model for reality testing competence on unusual experiences. We propose that nascent delusions arise when there are local failures of reality testing performance, and that monothematic delusions arise as normal responses to these. In the course of this we address questions concerning the tenacity (...)
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  23. J. Angelo Corlett (2009). Dawkins' God Less Delusion. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 65 (3):125 - 138.score: 12.0
    A philosophical assessment of Richard Dawkins' The God Delusion, exposing some errors of reasoning that undermine part of the foundation of his atheism. Distinctions between theism, atheism and agnosticism are also provided and explored for their significance to Dawkins' argument.
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  24. Eugen Fischer (2011). Philosophical Delusion and its Therapy: Outline of a Philosophical Revolution. Routledge.score: 12.0
    Philosophical Delusion and its Therapy provides new foundations and methods for the revolutionary project of philosophical therapy pioneered by Ludwig Wittgenstein. The book vindicates this currently much-discussed project by reconstructing the genesis of important philosophical problems: With the help of concepts adapted from cognitive linguistics and cognitive psychology, the book analyses how philosophical reflection is shaped by pictures and metaphors we are not aware of employing and are prone to misapply. Through innovative case-studies on the genesis of classical problems (...)
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  25. Dominic Murphy (2012). The Folk Epistemology of Delusions. Neuroethics 5 (1):19-22.score: 12.0
    Lisa Bortolotti argues convincingly that opponents of the doxastic view of delusion are committed to unnecessarily stringent standards for belief attribution. Folk psychology recognises many non-rational ways in which beliefs can be caused, and our attributions of delusions may be guided by a sense that delusions are beliefs that we cannot explain in any folk psychological terms.
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  26. Ian Gold & Jakob Hohwy (2000). Rationality and Schizophrenic Delusion. Mind and Language 15 (1):146-167.score: 12.0
    The theory of rationality has traditionally been concerned with the investigation of the norms of rational thought and behaviour, and with the reasoning procedures that satisfy them. As a consequence, the investigation of irrationality has largely been restricted to the behaviour or thought that violates these norms. There are, however, other forms of irrationality. Here we propose that the delusions that occur in schizophrenia constitute a paradigm of irrationality. We examine a leading theory of schizophrenic delusion and propose that (...)
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  27. Kwm Fulford (2004). Neuro-Ethics or Neuro-Values? Delusion and Religious Experience as a Case Study in Values-Based Medicine. Poiesis and Praxis 2 (4):297-313.score: 12.0
    Values-Based Medicine (VBM) is the theory and practice of clinical decision-making for situations in which legitimately different values are in play. VBM is thus to values what Evidence-Based Medicine (EBM) is to facts. The theoretical basis of VBM is a branch of analytic philosophy called philosophical value theory. As a set of practical tools, VBM has been developed to meet the challenges of value diversity as they arise particularly in psychiatry. These challenges are illustrated in this paper by a case (...)
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  28. Pieter Sjoerd Hasper (2006). Sources of Delusion in Analytica Posteriora 1.5. Phronesis 51 (3):252-284.score: 12.0
    Aristotle's philosophically most explicit and sophisticated account of the concept of a (primary-)universal proof is found, not in "Analytica Posteriora" 1.4, where he introduces the notion, but in 1.5. In 1.4 Aristotle merely says that a universal proof must be of something arbitrary as well as of something primary and seems to explain primacy in extensional terms, as concerning the largest possible domain. In 1.5 Aristotle improves upon this account after considering three ways in which we may delude ourselves into (...)
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  29. Markus Heinimaa (2002). Incomprehensibility: The Role of the Concept in DSM-IV Definition of Schizophrenic Delusions. Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 5 (3):291-295.score: 12.0
    In this paper the role of incomprehensibility in the conceptualization of the DSM-IV definition of delusion is discussed. According to the analysis, the conceptual dependence of DSM-IV definition of delusion on incomprehensibility is manifested in several ways and infested with ambiguity. Definition of bizarre delusions is contradictory and gives room for two incompatible readings. Also the definition of delusion manifests internal inconsistencies and its tendency to account for delusions in terms of misinterpretation is bound to miss the (...)
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  30. Jerome Gellman (2008). Critical Study of Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion. Philo 11 (2):193-202.score: 12.0
    I examine the two main arguments that Richard Dawkins offers in The God Delusion to convince believers that God does not exist. Dawkins’ arguments, as stated, are not successful. Neither do sympathetic extensive reformulations have what it takes to require a believer to admit that God probably does not exist. I further argue against Dawkins’ assuming that belief in God, if legitimate, can be only a scientific hypothesis.
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  31. Alfred R. Mele (2006). Self-Deception and Delusions. European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 2 (1):109-124.score: 12.0
    My central question in this paper is how delusional beliefs are related to self-deception. In section 1, I summarize my position on what self-deception is and how representative instances of it are to be explained. I turn to delusions in section 2, where I focus on the Capgras delusion, delusional jealousy (or the Othello syndrome), and the reverse Othello syndrome.
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  32. Anca Rădulescu (2011). Intuitive Coding: Vision and Delusion. Philosophical Psychology 24 (2):145-157.score: 12.0
    We review the hypothesis that the brain uses a generative model to explain the causes of sensory inputs, using prediction schemes that operate based upon assimilation of time-series sensory data. We put this hypothesis in the context of psychopathology, in particular, schizophrenia's positive symptoms. Building upon work of Helmholtz and upon theories in computational cognitive processing, we hypothesize that delusions in schizophrenia can be explained in terms of false inference. An impairment in inferring appropriate information from the sensory input reflects (...)
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  33. Adriano C. T. Rodrigues & Claudio E. M. Banzato (2010). Construct Representation and Definitions in Psychopathology: The Case of Delusion. [REVIEW] Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 5 (1):5.score: 12.0
    Delusion is one of the most intriguing psychopathological phenomena and its conceptualization remains the subject of genuine debate. Claims that it is ill-defined, however, are typically grounded on essentialist expectations that a given definition should capture the core of every instance acknowledged as delusion in the clinical setting.
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  34. Andrew W. Young (1999). Delusions. The Monist 82 (4):571-589.score: 12.0
    Although a common clinical phenomenon, delusions are difficult to explain and have a problematic conceptual status. Advances in understanding delusions have come from studies which involve detailed investigation of particular types of delusion. Some of this work is summarised, with the Capgras and Cotard delusions as specific examples. These are used to high-highlight questions for which there is the potential for fruitful dialogue with philosophers. Such questions include the criteria for deciding that a statement represents a belief, the extent (...)
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  35. Pieter Sjoerd Hasper (2006). Sources of Delusion in "Analytica Posteriora" 1.5. Phronesis 51 (3):252 - 284.score: 12.0
    Aristotle's philosophically most explicit and sophisticated account of the concept of a (primary-)universal proof is found, not in "Analytica Posteriora" 1.4, where he introduces the notion, but in 1.5. In 1.4 Aristotle merely says that a universal proof must be of something arbitrary as well as of something primary and seems to explain primacy in extensional terms, as concerning the largest possible domain. In 1.5 Aristotle improves upon this account after considering three ways in which we may delude ourselves into (...)
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  36. David Benatar (2008). The Optimism Delusion. Think 6 (16):19-22.score: 12.0
    In the first of our three pieces responding to Richard Dawkins's The God Delusion, David Benatar suggests that Dawkins is preaching.
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  37. Kwm (2004). Neuro-Ethics or Neuro-Values? Delusion and Religious Experience as a Case Study in Values-Based Medicine. Poiesis and Praxis 2 (4):297-313.score: 12.0
    Values-Based Medicine (VBM) is the theory and practice of clinical decision-making for situations in which legitimately different values are in play. VBM is thus to values what Evidence-Based Medicine (EBM) is to facts. The theoretical basis of VBM is a branch of analytic philosophy called philosophical value theory. As a set of practical tools, VBM has been developed to meet the challenges of value diversity as they arise particularly in psychiatry. These challenges are illustrated in this paper by a case (...)
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  38. Douglas Groothuis (2009). Who Designed the Designer?: A Dialogue on Richard Dawkins's the God Delusion. Think 8 (21):71-81.score: 12.0
    In The God Delusion, Richard Dawkins argues that any designer capable of creating the universe and the things we find in it would have to be at least as complex as his creation. If complexity requires a designer, then the designer will require a designer, and so on to infinity. Rather than actually providing an explanation for complexity we see around us, those who invoke a cosmic designer merely postpone the problem. Here, Douglas Groothuis challenges Dawkins's argument.
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  39. R. Bodei (2004). On the Logics of Delusion. Diogenes 51 (4):37-48.score: 12.0
    Delusion is an exceptional test case for the principal categories of common sense and philosophical thought such as ‘reason’, ‘truth’ and ‘reality’. Via an engagement with the legacy of Freud and the most remarkable results of 20th-century psychiatry, the author’s aim is to analyse the paradoxical forms of delusion and to shed light on the logics that underlie and orient its specific modalities of temporalization, conceptualization and argumentation.
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  40. Jennifer Radden (2010). On Delusion. Routledge.score: 12.0
    Delusions play a fundamental role in the history of psychology, philosophy and culture, dividing not only the mad from the sane but reason from unreason. Yet the very nature and extent of delusions are poorly understood. What are delusions? How do they differ from everyday errors or mistaken beliefs? Are they scientific categories? In this superb, panoramic investigation of delusion Jennifer Radden explores these questions and more, unravelling a fascinating story that ranges from Descartes’s demon to famous first-hand accounts (...)
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  41. G. YounG (2008). Capgras Delusion: An Interactionist Model. Consciousness and Cognition 17 (3):863-876.score: 11.0
  42. Lisa Bortolotti (2005). Delusions and the Background of Rationality. Mind and Language 20 (2):189-208.score: 10.0
    I argue that some cases of delusions show the inadequacy of those theories of interpretation that rely on a necessary rationality constraint on belief ascription. In particular I challenge the view that irrational beliefs can be ascribed only against a general background of rationality. Subjects affected by delusions seem to be genuine believers and their behaviour can be successfully explained in intentional terms, but they do not meet those criteria that according to Davidson (1985a) need to be met for the (...)
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  43. Timothy J. Bayne & Elisabeth Pacherie (2005). In Defence of the Doxastic Conception of Delusions. Mind and Language 20 (2):163-88.score: 10.0
    In this paper we defend the doxastic conception of delusions against the metacognitive account developed by Greg Currie and collaborators. According to the metacognitive model, delusions are imaginings that are misidentified by their subjects as beliefs: the Capgras patient, for instance, does not believe that his wife has been replaced by a robot, instead, he merely imagines that she has, and mistakes this imagining for a belief. We argue that the metacognitive account is untenable, and that the traditional conception of (...)
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  44. K. W. M. Fulford (1993). Mental Illness and the Mind-Brain Problem: Delusion, Belief and Searle's Theory of Intentionality. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 14 (2).score: 10.0
    Until recently there has been little contact between the mind-brain debate in philosophy and the debate in psychiatry about the nature of mental illness. In this paper some of the analogies and disanalogies between the two debates are explored. It is noted in particular that the emphasis in modern philosophy of mind on the importance of the concept of action has been matched by a recent shift in the debate about mental illness from analyses of disease in terms of failure (...)
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  45. Martin Davies, Max Coltheart, Robyn Langdon & N. Breen (2001). Monothematic Delusions: Towards a Two-Factor Account. Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology 8 (2-3):133-58.score: 10.0
    We provide a battery of examples of delusions against which theoretical accounts can be tested. Then, we identify neuropsychological anomalies that could produce the unusual experiences that may lead, in turn, to the delusions in our battery. However, we argue against Maher’s view that delusions are false beliefs that arise as normal responses to anomalous experiences. We propose, instead, that a second factor is required to account for the transition from unusual experience to delusional belief. The second factor in the (...)
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  46. Keith Frankish (2012). Delusions, Levels of Belief, and Non-Doxastic Acceptances. Neuroethics 5 (1):23-27.score: 10.0
    In Delusions and Other Irrational Beliefs , Lisa Bortolotti argues that the irrationality of delusions is no barrier to their being classified as beliefs. This comment asks how Bortolotti’s position may be affected if we accept that there are two distinct types of belief, belonging to different levels of mentality and subject to different ascriptive constraints. It addresses some worries Bortolotti has expressed about the proposed two-level framework and outlines some questions that arise for her if the framework is adopted. (...)
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  47. Matthew Ratcliffe (2004). Interpreting Delusions. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3 (1):25-48.score: 10.0
    This paper explores the phenomenology of the Capgras and Cotard delusions. The former is generally characterised as the belief that relatives or friends have been replaced by impostors, and the latter as the conviction that one is dead or has ceased to exist. A commonly reported feature of these delusions is an experienced ''defamiliarisation'' or even ''derealisation'' of things, which is associated with an absence or distortion of affect. I suggest that the importance attributed to affect by current explanations of (...)
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  48. Matan Shelomi (2013). Mad Scientist: The Unique Case of a Published Delusion. Science and Engineering Ethics 19 (2):381-388.score: 10.0
    In 1951, entomologist Jay Traver published in the Proceedings of the Entomological Society of Washington her personal experiences with a mite infestation of her scalp that resisted all treatment and was undetectable to anyone other than herself. Traver is recognized as having suffered from Delusory Parasitosis: her paper shows her to be a textbook case of the condition. The Traver paper is unique in the scientific literature in that its conclusions may be based on data that was unconsciously fabricated by (...)
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  49. Tim Bayne & Jordi Fernandez (eds.) (2008). Delusion and Self-Deception: Affective and Motivational Influences on Belief Formation (Macquarie Monographs in Cognitive Science). Psychology Press.score: 10.0
    This collection of essays focuses on the interface between delusions and self-deception.
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  50. Anca Radulescu, Psychic Embedding — Vision and Delusion.score: 10.0
    The paper introduces the idea that the human brain may apply complex mathematical modules in order to process and understand the world. We speculate that the substrate of what appears outwardly as intuition, or prophetic power, may be a mathematical apparatus such as time-delay embedding. In this context, predictive accuracy may be the reflection of an appropriate choice of the embedding parameters. We further put this in the perspective of mental illness, and search for the possible differences between good intuition (...)
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