Search results for 'Delusion' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Philip Gerrans (2002). A One-Stage Explanation of the Cotard Delusion. Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology 9 (1):47-53.score: 24.0
    Cognitive neuropsychiatry (CN) is the explanation of psychiatric disorder by the methods of cognitive neuropsychology. Within CN there are, broadly speaking, two approaches to delusion. The first uses a one-stage model, in which delusions are explained as rationalizations of anomalous experiences via reasoning strategies that are not, in themselves, abnormal. Two-stage models invoke additional hypotheses about abnormalities of reasoning. In this paper, I examine what appears to be a very strong argument, developed within CN, in favor of a twostage (...)
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  2. Matthew Ratcliffe (2008). The Phenomenological Role of Affect in the Capgras Delusion. Continental Philosophy Review 41 (2):195-216.score: 24.0
    This paper draws on studies of the Capgras delusion in order to illuminate the phenomenological role of affect in interpersonal recognition. People with this delusion maintain that familiars, such as spouses, have been replaced by impostors. It is generally agreed that the delusion involves an anomalous experience, arising due to loss of affect. However, quite what this experience consists of remains unclear. I argue that recent accounts of the Capgras delusion incorporate an impoverished conception of experience, (...)
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  3. Garry Young (2008). Restating the Role of Phenomenal Experience in the Formation and Maintenance of the Capgras Delusion. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (2):177-189.score: 24.0
    In recent times, explanations of the Capgras delusion have tended to emphasise the cognitive dysfunction that is believed to occur at the second stage of two-stage models. This is generally viewed as a response to the inadequacies of the one-stage account. Whilst accepting that some form of cognitive disruption is a necessary part of the aetiology of the Capgras delusion, I nevertheless argue that the emphasis placed on this second-stage is to the detriment of the important role played (...)
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  4. Sarah Troubé (2012). Understanding Schizophrenic Delusion: The Role of Some Primary Alterations of Subjective Experience. [REVIEW] Medicine Studies 3 (4):233-248.score: 24.0
    This paper explores the possibility of understanding schizophrenic delusion through the role of a primary alteration of subjective experience. Two approaches are contrasted: the first defines schizophrenic delusion as a primary symptom resisting any attempt to understand, whereas the second describes delusion as a secondary symptom, to be understood as a rational reaction of the self. The paper discusses the possibility of applying this second approach to schizophrenic delusion. This leads us to raise the issue of (...)
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  5. Robyn Langdon, Emily Connaughton & Max Coltheart (2014). The Fregoli Delusion: A Disorder of Person Identification and Tracking. Topics in Cognitive Science 6 (3).score: 24.0
    Fregoli delusion is the mistaken belief that some person currently present in the deluded person's environment (typically a stranger) is a familiar person in disguise. The stranger is believed to be psychologically identical to this known person (who is not present) even though the deluded person perceives the physical appearance of the stranger as being different from the known person's typical appearance. To gain a deeper understanding of this contradictory error in the normal system for tracking and identifying known (...)
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  6. Lorenzo Servitje (forthcoming). Keep Your Head in the Gutter: Engendering Empathy Through Participatory Delusion in Christian de Metter's Graphic Adaptation of Shutter Island. [REVIEW] Journal of Medical Humanities:1-18.score: 24.0
    This paper argues that the graphic adaptation of Dennis Lehane’s Shutter Island utilizes the medium to evoke an affective participation and investment from the reader. It explores the ways the graphic novel overcomes problematic representations of mental illness in the popular film version. Drawing on graphic fiction theory, I contend that readers’ engagement in and construction of the story between panels, in the “gutters,” allows them to participate in the protagonist’s persecutory delusion. Additionally, I draw on Foucault’s conceptualizations of (...)
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  7. David Rose, Wesley Buckwalter & John Turri (2014). When Words Speak Louder Than Actions: Delusion, Belief, and the Power of Assertion. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-18.score: 22.0
    People suffering from severe monothematic delusions, such as Capgras, Fregoli, or Cotard patients, regularly assert extraordinary and unlikely things. For example, some say that their loved ones have been replaced by impostors. A popular view in philosophy and cognitive science is that such monothematic delusions aren't beliefs because they don't guide behaviour and affect in the way that beliefs do. Or, if they are beliefs, they are somehow anomalous, atypical, or marginal beliefs. We present evidence from five studies that folk (...)
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  8. Lisa Bortolotti, Delusion. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.score: 22.0
    Stanford Encyclopedia Entry on Delusions.
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  9. Philip Gerrans (2000). Refining the Explanation of Cotard's Delusion. Mind and Language 15 (1):111-122.score: 22.0
    An elegant theory in cognitive neuropsychiatry explains the Capgras and Cotard delusions as resulting from the same type of anomalous phenomenal experience explained in different ways by different sufferers. ‘Although the Capgras and Cotard delusions are phenomenally distinct, we thus think that they represent patients’ attempts to make sense of fundamentally similar experiences’ (Young and Leafhead, 1996, p. 168). On the theory proposed by Young and Leafhead, the anomalous experience results from damage to an information processing subsystem which associates an (...)
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  10. Lisa Bortolotti & Matteo Mameli (2012). Self-Deception, Delusion and the Boundaries of Folk Psychology. Humana.Mente 20:203-221.score: 22.0
    In this paper we argue that both self-deception and delusions can be understood in folk-psychological terms.
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  11. Gregory Currie (2000). Imagination, Delusion and Hallucinations. In Max Coltheart & Martin Davies (eds.), Pathologies of Belief. Blackwell. 168-183.score: 21.0
  12. Andy Egan (2008). Imagination, Delusion, and Self-Deception. In Tim Bayne & Jordi Fernandez (eds.), Delusion and Self-Deception: Affective and Motivational Influences on Belief Formation (Macquarie Monographs in Cognitive Science). Psychology Press.score: 21.0
    Subjects with delusions profess to believe some extremely peculiar things. Patients with Capgras delusion sincerely assert that, for example, their spouses have been replaced by impostors. Patients with Cotard’s delusion sincerely assert that they are dead. Many philosophers and psychologists are hesitant to say that delusional subjects genuinely believe the contents of their delusions.2 One way to reinterpret delusional subjects is to say that we’ve misidentified the content of the problematic belief. So for example, rather than believing that (...)
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  13. J. Campbell (2001). Rationality, Meaning, and the Analysis of Delusion. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 8 (2-3):89-100.score: 21.0
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  14. Jeanette Kennett & Steve Matthews (2003). Delusion, Dissociation and Identity. Philosophical Explorations 6 (1):31-49.score: 21.0
    The condition known as Multiple Personality Disorder (MPD) or Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID) is metaphysically strange. Can there really be several distinct persons operating in a single body? Our view is that DID sufferers are single persons with a severe mental disorder. In this paper we compare the phenomenology of dissociation between personality states in DID with certain delusional disorders. We argue both that the burden of proof must lie with those who defend the metaphysically extravagant Multiple Persons view and (...)
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  15. Gregory Currie & Jon Jureidini (2001). Delusion, Rationality, Empathy. Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology 8 (2-3):159-62.score: 21.0
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  16. Jakob Hohwy (2004). Top-Down and Bottom-Up in Delusion Formation. Philosophy Psychiatry and Psychology 11 (1):65-70.score: 21.0
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  17. K. W. M. Fulford & Lubomira Radoilska (2012). Three Challenges From Delusion for Theories of Autonomy. In Lubomira Radoilska (ed.), Autonomy and Mental Disorder. Oxford University Press. 44-74.score: 20.0
    This chapter identifies and explores a series of challenges raised by the clinical concept of delusion for theories which conceive autonomy as an agency rather than a status concept. The first challenge is to address the autonomy-impairing nature of delusions consistently with their role as grounds for full legal and ethical excuse, on the one hand, and psychopathological significance as key symptoms of psychoses, on the other. The second challenge is to take into account the full logical range of (...)
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  18. Mari Stenlund (2013). Is There a Right to Hold a Delusion? Delusions as a Challenge for Human Rights Discussion. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (4):829-843.score: 20.0
    The analysis presented in this article reveals an ambiguity and tension in human rights theory concerning the delusional person’s freedom of belief and thought. Firstly, it would appear that the concepts ‘opinion’ and ‘thought’ are defined in human rights discussion in such a way that they do include delusions. Secondly, the internal freedom to hold opinions and thoughts is defined in human rights discussion and international human rights covenants as an absolute human right which should not be restricted in any (...)
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  19. Tim Bayne, Delusion and Self-Deception: Mapping the Terrain.score: 18.0
    The papers in this volume are drawn from a workshop on delusion and self-deception, held at Macquarie University in November of 2004. Our aim was to bring together theorists working on delusions and self-deception with an eye towards identifying and fostering connections—at both empirical and conceptual levels—between these domains. As the contributions to this volume testify, there are multiple points of contact between delusion and self-deception. This introduction charts the conceptual space in which these points of contact can (...)
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  20. Paul Franceschi, An Analytic View of Delusion.score: 18.0
    The present article proposes a logical account of delusions, which are regarded as conclusions resulting from fallacious arguments. This leads to distinguish between primary, secondary, ..., n-ary types of delusional arguments. Examples of delusional arguments leading to delusion of reference, delusion of influence, thought-broadcasting delusion and delusion of grandeur are described and then analyzed. This suggests finally a way susceptible of improving the efficiency of cognitive therapy for delusions.
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  21. J. Angelo Corlett (2009). Dawkins' God Less Delusion. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 65 (3):125 - 138.score: 18.0
    A philosophical assessment of Richard Dawkins' The God Delusion, exposing some errors of reasoning that undermine part of the foundation of his atheism. Distinctions between theism, atheism and agnosticism are also provided and explored for their significance to Dawkins' argument.
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  22. Kwm Fulford (2004). Neuro-Ethics or Neuro-Values? Delusion and Religious Experience as a Case Study in Values-Based Medicine. Poiesis and Praxis 2 (4):297-313.score: 18.0
    Values-Based Medicine (VBM) is the theory and practice of clinical decision-making for situations in which legitimately different values are in play. VBM is thus to values what Evidence-Based Medicine (EBM) is to facts. The theoretical basis of VBM is a branch of analytic philosophy called philosophical value theory. As a set of practical tools, VBM has been developed to meet the challenges of value diversity as they arise particularly in psychiatry. These challenges are illustrated in this paper by a case (...)
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  23. Eugen Fischer (2011). Philosophical Delusion and its Therapy: Outline of a Philosophical Revolution. Routledge.score: 18.0
    Philosophical Delusion and its Therapy provides new foundations and methods for the revolutionary project of philosophical therapy pioneered by Ludwig Wittgenstein. The book vindicates this currently much-discussed project by reconstructing the genesis of important philosophical problems: With the help of concepts adapted from cognitive linguistics and cognitive psychology, the book analyses how philosophical reflection is shaped by pictures and metaphors we are not aware of employing and are prone to misapply. Through innovative case-studies on the genesis of classical problems (...)
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  24. Ian Gold & Jakob Hohwy (2000). Rationality and Schizophrenic Delusion. Mind and Language 15 (1):146-167.score: 18.0
    The theory of rationality has traditionally been concerned with the investigation of the norms of rational thought and behaviour, and with the reasoning procedures that satisfy them. As a consequence, the investigation of irrationality has largely been restricted to the behaviour or thought that violates these norms. There are, however, other forms of irrationality. Here we propose that the delusions that occur in schizophrenia constitute a paradigm of irrationality. We examine a leading theory of schizophrenic delusion and propose that (...)
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  25. Pieter Sjoerd Hasper (2006). Sources of Delusion in Analytica Posteriora 1.5. Phronesis 51 (3):252-284.score: 18.0
    Aristotle's philosophically most explicit and sophisticated account of the concept of a (primary-)universal proof is found, not in "Analytica Posteriora" 1.4, where he introduces the notion, but in 1.5. In 1.4 Aristotle merely says that a universal proof must be of something arbitrary as well as of something primary and seems to explain primacy in extensional terms, as concerning the largest possible domain. In 1.5 Aristotle improves upon this account after considering three ways in which we may delude ourselves into (...)
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  26. Jerome Gellman (2008). Critical Study of Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion. Philo 11 (2):193-202.score: 18.0
    I examine the two main arguments that Richard Dawkins offers in The God Delusion to convince believers that God does not exist. Dawkins’ arguments, as stated, are not successful. Neither do sympathetic extensive reformulations have what it takes to require a believer to admit that God probably does not exist. I further argue against Dawkins’ assuming that belief in God, if legitimate, can be only a scientific hypothesis.
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  27. Adriano C. T. Rodrigues & Claudio E. M. Banzato (2010). Construct Representation and Definitions in Psychopathology: The Case of Delusion. Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 5 (1):5.score: 18.0
    Delusion is one of the most intriguing psychopathological phenomena and its conceptualization remains the subject of genuine debate. Claims that it is ill-defined, however, are typically grounded on essentialist expectations that a given definition should capture the core of every instance acknowledged as delusion in the clinical setting.
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  28. Anca Rădulescu (2011). Intuitive Coding: Vision and Delusion. Philosophical Psychology 24 (2):145-157.score: 18.0
    We review the hypothesis that the brain uses a generative model to explain the causes of sensory inputs, using prediction schemes that operate based upon assimilation of time-series sensory data. We put this hypothesis in the context of psychopathology, in particular, schizophrenia's positive symptoms. Building upon work of Helmholtz and upon theories in computational cognitive processing, we hypothesize that delusions in schizophrenia can be explained in terms of false inference. An impairment in inferring appropriate information from the sensory input reflects (...)
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  29. Pieter Sjoerd Hasper (2006). Sources of Delusion in "Analytica Posteriora" 1.5. Phronesis 51 (3):252 - 284.score: 18.0
    Aristotle's philosophically most explicit and sophisticated account of the concept of a (primary-)universal proof is found, not in "Analytica Posteriora" 1.4, where he introduces the notion, but in 1.5. In 1.4 Aristotle merely says that a universal proof must be of something arbitrary as well as of something primary and seems to explain primacy in extensional terms, as concerning the largest possible domain. In 1.5 Aristotle improves upon this account after considering three ways in which we may delude ourselves into (...)
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  30. David Benatar (2008). The Optimism Delusion. Think 6 (16):19-22.score: 18.0
    In the first of our three pieces responding to Richard Dawkins's The God Delusion, David Benatar suggests that Dawkins is preaching.
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  31. Kwm (2004). Neuro-Ethics or Neuro-Values? Delusion and Religious Experience as a Case Study in Values-Based Medicine. Poiesis and Praxis 2 (4):297-313.score: 18.0
    Values-Based Medicine (VBM) is the theory and practice of clinical decision-making for situations in which legitimately different values are in play. VBM is thus to values what Evidence-Based Medicine (EBM) is to facts. The theoretical basis of VBM is a branch of analytic philosophy called philosophical value theory. As a set of practical tools, VBM has been developed to meet the challenges of value diversity as they arise particularly in psychiatry. These challenges are illustrated in this paper by a case (...)
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  32. Douglas Groothuis (2009). Who Designed the Designer?: A Dialogue on Richard Dawkins's the God Delusion. Think 8 (21):71-81.score: 18.0
    In The God Delusion, Richard Dawkins argues that any designer capable of creating the universe and the things we find in it would have to be at least as complex as his creation. If complexity requires a designer, then the designer will require a designer, and so on to infinity. Rather than actually providing an explanation for complexity we see around us, those who invoke a cosmic designer merely postpone the problem. Here, Douglas Groothuis challenges Dawkins's argument.
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  33. R. Bodei (2004). On the Logics of Delusion. Diogenes 51 (4):37-48.score: 18.0
    Delusion is an exceptional test case for the principal categories of common sense and philosophical thought such as ‘reason’, ‘truth’ and ‘reality’. Via an engagement with the legacy of Freud and the most remarkable results of 20th-century psychiatry, the author’s aim is to analyse the paradoxical forms of delusion and to shed light on the logics that underlie and orient its specific modalities of temporalization, conceptualization and argumentation.
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  34. Jennifer Radden (2010). On Delusion. Routledge.score: 18.0
    Delusions play a fundamental role in the history of psychology, philosophy and culture, dividing not only the mad from the sane but reason from unreason. Yet the very nature and extent of delusions are poorly understood. What are delusions? How do they differ from everyday errors or mistaken beliefs? Are they scientific categories? In this superb, panoramic investigation of delusion Jennifer Radden explores these questions and more, unravelling a fascinating story that ranges from Descartes’s demon to famous first-hand accounts (...)
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  35. G. YounG (2008). Capgras Delusion: An Interactionist Model. Consciousness and Cognition 17 (3):863-876.score: 17.0
  36. K. W. M. Fulford (1993). Mental Illness and the Mind-Brain Problem: Delusion, Belief and Searle's Theory of Intentionality. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 14 (2).score: 16.0
    Until recently there has been little contact between the mind-brain debate in philosophy and the debate in psychiatry about the nature of mental illness. In this paper some of the analogies and disanalogies between the two debates are explored. It is noted in particular that the emphasis in modern philosophy of mind on the importance of the concept of action has been matched by a recent shift in the debate about mental illness from analyses of disease in terms of failure (...)
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  37. Matan Shelomi (2013). Mad Scientist: The Unique Case of a Published Delusion. Science and Engineering Ethics 19 (2):381-388.score: 16.0
    In 1951, entomologist Jay Traver published in the Proceedings of the Entomological Society of Washington her personal experiences with a mite infestation of her scalp that resisted all treatment and was undetectable to anyone other than herself. Traver is recognized as having suffered from Delusory Parasitosis: her paper shows her to be a textbook case of the condition. The Traver paper is unique in the scientific literature in that its conclusions may be based on data that was unconsciously fabricated by (...)
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  38. Tim Bayne & Jordi Fernandez (eds.) (2008). Delusion and Self-Deception: Affective and Motivational Influences on Belief Formation (Macquarie Monographs in Cognitive Science). Psychology Press.score: 16.0
    This collection of essays focuses on the interface between delusions and self-deception.
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  39. Anca Radulescu, Psychic Embedding — Vision and Delusion.score: 16.0
    The paper introduces the idea that the human brain may apply complex mathematical modules in order to process and understand the world. We speculate that the substrate of what appears outwardly as intuition, or prophetic power, may be a mathematical apparatus such as time-delay embedding. In this context, predictive accuracy may be the reflection of an appropriate choice of the embedding parameters. We further put this in the perspective of mental illness, and search for the possible differences between good intuition (...)
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  40. Daniel Dennett, Review of Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion for Free Inquiry. [REVIEW]score: 15.0
    We agree about most matters, and have learned a lot from each other, but on one central issue we are not (yet) of one mind: Dawkins is quite sure that the world would be a better place if religion were hastened to extinction and I am still agnostic about that. I don’t know what could be put in religion’s place–or what would arise unbidden–so I am still eager to explore the prospect of reforming religion, a task that cries out for (...)
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  41. Eva Feder Kittay (2010). Planning a Trip to Italy, Arriving in Holland: The Delusion of Choice in Planning a Family. International Journal of Feminist Approaches to Bioethics 3 (2):9-24.score: 15.0
    The title of this paper deserves an explanation—or rather two explanations, one for the portion preceding the colon, the other for that following as the subtitle. The first part is derived from a short essay by Emily Perl Kingsley, written in 1987 in response to questions she had received about what it is like to raise a child with Down Syndrome.1 Kingsley suggests that planning for a child is like planning a trip to some wonderful destination—in her example, Italy. She (...)
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  42. Thaddeus Metz (forthcoming). How to Obtain Meaning in Life: The Roles of Self-Inflation, Self-Deception and World-Delusion. Philosophical Psychology.score: 15.0
    Part of a special Issue on Robert Trivers’ The Folly of Fools: The Logic of Deceit and Self‐Deception in Human Life, with some focus on the implication of self-deception and related mental states for meaning in life.
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  43. Gregory Currie & Nicholas Jones (2006). McGinn on Delusion and Imagination. Philosophical Books 47 (4):306-313.score: 15.0
  44. Louis Arnorsson Sass (2004). Some Reflections on the (Analytic) Philosophical Approach to Delusion. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 11 (1):71-80.score: 15.0
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  45. Don S. Levi (2004). The Root Delusion Enshrined in Common Sense and Language. Asian Philosophy 14 (1):3 – 23.score: 15.0
    This paper is a critique of certain arguments given by the Milindapanha and Jay Garfield for the conventional nature of reality or existence. These arguments are of interest in their own right. They also are significant if they are presumed to attack an obstacle we all face in achieving non-attachment, namely, our belief in the inherent or substantial existence of ourselves and the familiar objects of our world. The arguments turn on a distinction between these objects, and some other way (...)
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  46. Kai Wehmeier (2009). On Ramsey's 'Silly Delusion' Regarding Tractatus 5.53. In Giuseppe Primiero & Shahid Rahman (eds.), Acts of Knowledge - History, Philosophy and Logic. College Publications.score: 15.0
    We investigate a variant of the variable convention proposed at Tractatus 5.53ff for the purpose of eliminating the identity sign from logical notation. The variant in question is what Hintikka has called the strongly exclusive interpretation of the variables, and turns out to be what Ramsey initially (and erroneously) took to be Wittgenstein's intended method. We provide a tableau calculus for this identity-free logic, together with soundness and completeness proofs, as well as a proof of mutual interpretability with first-order logic (...)
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  47. W. Blankenburg (1980). Anthropological and Ontoanalytical Aspects of Delusion. Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 11 (1):97-110.score: 15.0
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  48. Simon Glynn (2008). From the Delusion to the Dissolution of the Ego. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 18:35-48.score: 15.0
    Certainly many in “Western” philosophy and psychology have conceived of the human subject in the Cartesian or neo-Cartesian tradition, as a self subsisting, self identical, monadic consciousness or Ego, which is to say as an essentially unchanging, substantial subject, initially isolated or separate from the world and others. On the other hand Buddhist, Taoist, Hindu and other “non-Western” traditions, adopting a more holistic approach, have argued that such a reified,atomistic and hypostatized conception of the self is illusory. However, suggesting that (...)
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  49. Alfred Kraus (1994). Phenomenology of the Technical Delusion in Schizophrenics. Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 25 (1):51-69.score: 15.0
  50. Peter Milward (2008). The God Delusion. By Richard Dawkins. Heythrop Journal 49 (4):696–700.score: 15.0
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