Search results for 'Dennis Hume Wrong' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Dennis Hume Wrong (1998). The Modern Condition: Essays at Century's End. Stanford University Press.score: 290.0
    In this collection, a leading sociologist brings his distinctive method of social criticism to bear on some of the most significant ideas, political and social events, and thinkers of the late twentieth century. In the first section, the author examines several concepts that have figured prominently in recent political-ideological controversies: capitalism, rationality, totalitarianism, power, alienation, left and right, and cultural relativism/ multiculturalism. He considers their origins, historical shifts in their meaning and the myths surrounding them, and their resonance beyond their (...)
     
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  2. David Hume, David Fate Norton & Mary J. Norton (eds.) (2007). David Hume: A Treatise of Human Nature: Volume 1: Texts. Clarendon Press.score: 150.0
    David and Mary Norton present the definitive scholarly edition of one of the greatest philosophical works ever written. This first volume contains the critical text of David Hume's Treatise of Human Nature (1739/40), followed by the short Abstract (1740) in which Hume set out the key arguments of the larger work; the volume concludes with A Letter from a Gentleman to his Friend in Edinburgh (1745), Hume's defence of the Treatise when it was under attack from ministers (...)
     
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  3. David Hume, David Fate Norton & Mary J. Norton (eds.) (2007). David Hume: A Treatise of Human Nature: Volume 2: Editorial Material. Clarendon Press.score: 150.0
    David and Mary Norton present the definitive scholarly edition of one of the greatest philosophical works ever written. This second volume begins with their 'Historical Account' of the Treatise, an account that runs from the beginnings of the work to the period immediately following Hume's death in 1776, followed by an account of the Nortons' editorial procedures and policies and a record of the differences between the first-edition text of the Treatise and the critical text that follows. The volume (...)
     
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  4. David Hume, Letters of David Hume to William Strahan.score: 120.0
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  5. Dennis H. Wrong (1999). Digby Baltzell: Sociologist and Critical Celebrant of the Upper Class. Sociological Theory 17 (1):112-116.score: 120.0
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  6. David Hume (1979). Hume's Ethical Writings: Selections From David Hume. University of Notre Dame Press.score: 120.0
     
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  7. David Hume (1954/1983). New Letters of David Hume. Garland Pub..score: 120.0
     
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  8. David Hume (1932/1983). The Letters of David Hume. Garland Pub..score: 120.0
     
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  9. David Hume (1963). The Philosophy of David Hume. New York, Modern Library.score: 120.0
    My own life.--A treatise of human nature (selections)--An inquiry concerning human understanding (selections)--An inquiry concerning the principles of morals (selections)--Of the standard of taste.--Dialogues concerning natural religion.
     
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  10. J. M. Stafford (1999). Hume on Luxury: A Response to John Dennis? History of Political Thought 20 (4):646-648.score: 48.0
    Hume's essay �Of Luxury� criticizes two extreme and contrasting doctrines: that luxury is always beneficial to society and that it is always baneful. Hume identifies the exponent of the first proposition as Bernard Mandeville in his book The Fable of the Bees, but does not name the second target of his essay. It is most probably John Dennis, one of Mandeville's contemporary critics. The evidence for this is that Hume challenges and contradicts three clearly defined theses (...)
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  11. Laurent Jaffro (2006). What is Wrong with Reid's Criticism of Hume on Moral Approbation? European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 2 (2):11-26.score: 39.0
    In his Essays on the Active Powers, Thomas Reid criticises <span class='Hi'>Hume</span>'s theory of moral judgment and argues that it is untenable. The aim of this paper is to show that Reid shares more with his target than is ordinarily acknowledged. The author suggests that the opposition between “cognitivism” and “non-cognitivism” concerning the role of feelings in moral judgment tends to obscure (disputable) assumptions held in common by both philosophers about the nature of feelings.
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  12. Philip A. Reed (2012). What's Wrong with Monkish Virtues? Hume on the Standard of Virtue. History of Philosophy Quarterly 29 (1).score: 36.0
     
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  13. Charles Pigden (2010). Comments on 'Hume's Master Argument'. In , Hume on Is and Ought. Palgrave Macmillan. 128-142.score: 30.0
    This is a commentary on Adrian Heathcote’s interesting paper ‘Hume’s Master Argument’. Heathcote contends that No-Ought-From-Is is primarily a logical thesis, a ban on Is/Ought inferences which Hume derives from the logic of Ockham. NOFI is thus a variation on what Heathcote calls ‘Hume’s Master Argument’, which he also deploys to prove that conclusions about the future (and therefore a-temporal generalizations) cannot be derived by reason from premises about the past, and that conclusions about external objects or (...)
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  14. Noriaki Iwasa (2011). Hume's Alleged Success Over Hutcheson. Synthesis Philosophica 26 (2):323-336.score: 27.0
    David Hume thinks that human affections are naturally partial, while Francis Hutcheson holds that humans originally have disinterested benevolence. Michael Gill argues that Hume's moral theory succeeds over Hutcheson's because the former severs the link between explaining and justifying morality. According to Gill, Hutcheson is wrong to assume that our original nature should be the basis of morality. Gill's understanding of Hutcheson's theory does not fully represent it, since for Hutcheson self-love and self-interest under certain conditions are (...)
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  15. Monique Wonderly (2008). A Humean Approach to Assessing the Moral Significance of Ultra-Violent Video Games. Ethics and Information Technology 10 (1):1-10.score: 24.0
  16. John J. Tilley (2009). Physical Objects and Moral Wrongness: Hume on the "Fallacy" in Wollaston's Moral Theory. Hume Studies 35 (1):87-101.score: 24.0
    According to the moral theory of William Wollaston (1659-1724), the mark of a wrong action is that it signifies a falsehood.1 This theory rests, in part, on an unusual account of actions according to which they have propositional content: they "declare," "signify," "affirm," or "express" propositions (RN 8-13). To take an example from Wollaston, the act of firing on a band of soldiers affirms the proposition "Those soldiers are my enemies" (RN 8-9). Likewise, the act of breaking a promise (...)
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  17. Constantine Sandis (2009). Hume and the Debate on 'Motivating Reasons'. In Charles Pigden (ed.), Hume on Motivation and Virtue. Palgrave Macmillan.score: 21.0
    This paper argues for a novel interpretation of Hume's account of motivation, according to which beliefs can (alone) motivate action though not by standing as reasons which normatively favour it. It si then suggested that a number of contemporary debates about concerning the nature of reasons for action could benefit from such an approach.
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  18. David Owen (2009). Hume and the Mechanics of Mind : Impressions, Ideas, and Association. In David Fate Norton & Jacqueline Anne Taylor (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Hume. Cambridge University Press.score: 21.0
    Hume introduced important innovations concerning the theory of ideas. The two most important are the distinction between impressions and ideas, and the use he made of the principles of association in explaining mental phenomena. Hume divided the perceptions of the mind into two classes. The members of one class, impressions, he held to have a greater degree of force and vivacity than the members of the other class, ideas. He also supposed that ideas are causally dependent copies of (...)
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  19. Mark Collier (2005). A New Look at Hume's Theory of Probabilistic Inference. Hume Studies 31 (1):21-36.score: 21.0
    We must rethink our assessment of Hume’s theory of probabilistic inference. Hume scholars have traditionally dismissed his naturalistic explanation of how we make inferences under conditions of uncertainty; however, psychological experiments and computer models from cognitive science provide substantial support for Hume’s account. Hume’s theory of probabilistic inference is far from obsolete or outdated; on the contrary, it stands at the leading edge of our contemporary science of the mind.
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  20. Mark Collier (2011). Hume's Natural History of Justice. In C. Taylor & S. Buckle (eds.), Hume and the Enlightenment.score: 21.0
    In Book III, Part 2 of the Treatise, Hume presents a natural history of justice. Self-interest clearly plays a central role in his account; our ancestors invented justice conventions, he maintains, for the sake of reciprocal advantage. But this is not what makes his approach so novel and attractive. Hume recognizes that prudential considerations are not sufficient to explain how human beings – with our propensities towards temporal discounting and free-riding – could have established conventions for social exchange (...)
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  21. Charles Pigden (2010). Snare's Puzzle/Hume's Purpose: Non-Cognitivism and What Hume Was Really Up to with No-Ought-From-Is. In Pigden (ed.), Hume on Is and Ought. Palgrave Macmillan.score: 21.0
    Frank Snare had a puzzle. Noncognitivism implies No-Ought-From-Is but No- Ought-From-Is does not imply non-cognitivism. How then can we derive non-cognitivism from No-Ought-From-Is? Via an abductive argument. If we combine non-cognitivism with the conservativeness of logic (the idea that in a valid argument the conclusion is contained in the premises), this implies No-Ought-From-Is. Hence if No-Ought-From-Is is true, we can arrive at non-cognitivism via an inference to the best explanation. With prescriptivism we can make this argument more precise. I develop (...)
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  22. P. F. Brownsey (1978). Hume and the Social Contract. Philosophical Quarterly 28 (111):132-148.score: 21.0
    Doubts the adequacy of teh accounts of Humes' successful refutation of the theory of a social contract. Groups Humes' refutation into three arguments: 1) hardly any social contracts are idscernible in the hoistories of actual governments 2) contract theory must be wrong because it conflicts with ordinary people's views on the sunject 3) utilitarian Argues that it is doubtful whether any of these arguments or clusters of arguments really refutes contract theory; certainly, none achieves a refutation of the 'simple (...)
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  23. Stephen M. Campbell (2009). The Surprise Twist in Hume's Treatise. Hume Studies 35 (1&2):103-34.score: 21.0
    A Treatise of Human Nature opens with ambitious hopes for the science of man, but Hume eventually launches into a series of skeptical arguments that culminates in a report of radical skeptical despair. This essay is a preliminary exploration of how to interpret this surprising development. I first distinguish two kinds of surprise twist: those that are incompatible with some preceding portion of the work, and those that are not. This suggests two corresponding pictures of Hume. On one (...)
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  24. Samir Okasha (2005). Does Hume's Argument Against Induction Rest on a Quantifier-Shift Fallacy? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105 (2):253–271.score: 21.0
    It is widely agreed that Hume's description of human inductive reasoning is inadequate. But many philosophers think that this inadequacy in no way affects the force of Hume's argument for the unjustifiability of inductive reasoning. I argue that this constellation of opinions contains a serious tension, given that Hume was not merely pointing out that induction is fallible. I then explore a recent diagnosis of where Hume's sceptical argument goes wrong, due to Elliott Sober. Sober (...)
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  25. Aaron Smuts (2000). The Metaphorics of Hume's Gendered Skepticism. In Anne Jaap Jacobson (ed.), Feminist Interpretations of David Hume. Penn State UP.score: 21.0
    In "Of Scepticism with Regard to the Senses" (Treatise I.IV.II) David Hume begins by saying that he will attempt to trace the causes of our belief in a mind-independent world, "a belief we must take for granted in all our reasonings". Yet the causes arrived at – namely natural inclination or imagination - are presented as so untrustworthy as to cast doubt on the credibility of the inescapable belief itself. However, in the Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding Hume presents (...)
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  26. John King-Farlow (1982). Historical Insights on Miracles: Babbage, Hume, Aquinas. [REVIEW] International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 13 (4):209 - 218.score: 21.0
    CHARLES BABBAGE, OUTSTANDING 19TH CENTURY FIGURE ON THEORY OF COMPUTING, URGES ON PROTO-GOODMANIAN AND NEO-MAIMONIDEAN GROUNDS THAT HUME IS QUITE WRONG ABOUT THE PROBABILITY OF MIRACLES’ OCCURRING. AQUINAS’ CLASSIFICATIONS OF MIRACLES INDICATE THAT NOT SINGLE PROBABILITY JUDGMENT IS ALWAYS RIGHT. BABBAGE’S WORK ON COMPUTING STILL CIRCULATES, BUT HIS NINTH BRIDGEWATER TREATISE (ON MIRACLES) HAS LONG DESERVED REPUBLICATION.
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  27. Rico Vitz (2009). Doxastic Virtues in Hume's Epistemology. Hume Studies 35 (1/2):211-29.score: 21.0
    In this paper, I elucidate Hume's account of doxastic virtues and offer three reasons that contemporary epistemologists ought to consider it as an alternative to one of the broadly Aristotelian models currently offered. Specifically, I suggest that Hume's account of doxastic virtues obviates (1) the much-debated question about whether such virtues are intellectual, "moral," or some combination thereof, (2) the much-debated question about whether people have voluntary control of their belief formation, and (3) the need to make the (...)
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  28. Kenneth R. Westphal (2010). From 'Convention' to 'Ethical Life': Hume's Theory of Justice in Post-Kantian Perspective. Journal of Moral Philosophy 7 (1):105-132.score: 21.0
    Hume and contemporary Humeans contend that moral sentiments form the sole and sufficient basis of moral judgments. This thesis is criticised by appeal to Hume’s theory of justice, which shows that basic principles of justice are required to form and to maintain society, which is indispensable to human life, and that acting according to, or violating, these principles is right, or wrong, regardless of anyone’s sentiments, motives or character. Furthermore, Hume’s theory of justice shows how the (...)
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  29. Charles Pigden (forthcoming). Hume On Is and Ought: Logic, Promises and the Duke of Wellington. In Paul Russell (ed.), Oxford Handbook on David Hume. Oxford University Press.score: 21.0
    Hume seems to contend that you can’t get an ought from an is. Searle professed to prove otherwise, deriving a conclusion about obligations from a premise about promises. Since (as Schurz and I have shown) you can’t derive a substantive ought from an is by logic alone, Searle is best construed as claiming that there are analytic bridge principles linking premises about promises to conclusions about obligations. But we can no more derive a moral obligation to pay up from (...)
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  30. Rico Vitz (2002). Hume and the Limits of Benevolence. Hume Studies 28 (2):271-296.score: 21.0
    The purpose of this paper is to explain Hume’s account of the way both the scope and the degree of benevolent motivation is limited. I argue (i) that Hume consistently affirms, both in the Treatise and in the second Enquiry, that the scope of benevolent motivation is very broad, such that it includes any creature that is conscious and capable of thought, and (ii) that the degree of benevolent motivation is limited, such that a person is naturally inclined (...)
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  31. James Fieser (1989). Is Hume a Moral Skeptic? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (1):89-105.score: 21.0
    I will approach this issue by seeing how Hume's moral theory compares to a contemporary standard of moral skepticism. Using J. L. Mackie's analysis of moral skepticism as a point of reference, I will argue that, as a normative theory, Hume's account of morality is not at all skeptical since he is offering a relatively optimistic consequentialist theory of right and wrong action. As a metaethical theory, however, I will argue that Hume is a weak metaethical (...)
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  32. Don Garrett (2007). The First Motive to Justice: Hume's Circle Argument Squared. Hume Studies 33 (2):257-288.score: 21.0
    Hume argues that respect for property (“justice”) is a convention-dependent (“artificial”) virtue. He does so by appeal to a principle, derived from his virtue-based approach to ethics, which requires that, for any kind of virtuous action, there be a “first virtuous motive” that is other than a sense of moral duty. It has been objected, however, that in the case of justice (and also in a parallel argument concerning promise-keeping) Hume (i) does not, (ii) should not, and (iii) (...)
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  33. Charles Pigden (2009). Introduction to Hume on Motivation and Virtue. In Hume on Motivation and Virtue. 1-29.score: 21.0
    This includes a methodological meditation (in blank verse) on the history of philosophy as a contribution to philosophy (rather than as a contribution to history) plus a conspectus of the issues surrounding Hume, the Motivation Argument and the Slavery of Reason Thesis. However I am posting it here mainly because it contains a novel restatement of the Argument from Queerness. Big Thesis: the Slavery of Reason Thesis (via the Motivation Argument) provides no support for non-cognitivism or emotivism, but there (...)
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  34. Michelle Mason (2005). Hume and Humeans on Practical Reason. Hume Studies 31 (2):347-378.score: 21.0
    I introduce a distinction between two divergent trends in the literature on Hume and practical reason. One trend, action-theoretic Humeanism, primarily concerns itself with defending a general account of reasons for acting. The other trend, virtue-theoretic Humeanism, concentrates on defending the case for being an agent of a particular practical character, one whose enduring dispositions of practical thought are virtuous. I discuss work exemplifying these two trends and warn against decoupling thought about Hume's and a Humean theory of (...)
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  35. Walter Ott (2006). Hume on Meaning. Hume Studies 32 (2):233-252.score: 21.0
    Hume’s views on language have been widely misunderstood. Typical discussions cast Hume as either a linguistic idealist who holds that words refer to ideas or a proto-verificationist. I argue that both readings are wide of the mark and develop my own positive account. Humean signification emerges as a relation whereby a word can both indicate ideas in the mind of the speaker and cause us to have those ideas. If I am right, Hume offers a consistent view (...)
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  36. Michael Welbourne (2002). Is Hume Really a Reductivist? Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 33 (2):407-423.score: 21.0
    Coady misrepresents Hume as a reductivist about testimony. Hume occasionally writes carelessly as if what goes for beliefs based on induction will also go for beliefs obtained from testimony. But, in fact, he has no theory of testimony at all, though in his more considered remarks he rightly thinks, as does Reid, that the natural response to a bit of testimony is simply to accept the information which it contains. The sense in which we owe the beliefs we (...)
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  37. John Greco (1998). The Force of Hume's Skepticism About Unobserved Matters of Fact. Journal of Philosophical Research 23:289-306.score: 21.0
    According to a popular objection, Hume assumes that only deductive inferences can generate knowledge and reasonable belief, and so Hume’s skepticism can be avoided by simply recognizing the role of inductive inferences in empirical matters. This paper offers an interpretation of Hume’s skepticism that avoids this objection. The resulting skeptical argument is a powerful one in the following sense: it is not at all obvious where the argument goes wrong, and responding to the argument forces us (...)
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  38. Mark Collier (2012). Hume's Science of Emotions. Hume Studies 37 (1):3-18.score: 21.0
    We must rethink the status of Hume’s science of emotions. Contemporary philosophers typically dismiss Hume’s account on the grounds that he mistakenly identifies emotions with feelings. But the traditional objections to Hume’s feeling theory are not as strong as commonly thought. Hume makes several important contributions, moreover, to our understanding of the operations of the emotions. His claims about the causal antecedents of the indirect passions receive support from studies in appraisal theory, for example, and his (...)
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  39. Hermann Deuser & Dennis Beach (1995). Hume's Pragmaticist Argument for the Reality of God. Journal of Speculative Philosophy 9 (1):1 - 13.score: 21.0
    The author examines Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion to discover a variant of the usual teleological argument that abandons reliance on analogical reasoning. This second version, never refuted in the Dialogues, is termed "pragmaticist" in Peirce's sense. It relies on an abductive hypothesis that claims not logical proof but the power of instinctual conviction. The Dialogues' espousal of sound common sense may then be viewed as an imperfectly articulated precursor of Peirce's pragmaticist argument for the reality rather than the (...)
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  40. John R. Bowlin (2000). Sieges, Shipwrecks, and Sensible Knaves: Justice and Utility in Butler and Hume. Journal of Religious Ethics 28 (2):253 - 280.score: 21.0
    By examining the theories of justice developed by Joseph Butler and David Hume, the author discloses the conceptual limits of their moral naturalism. Butler was unable to accommodate the possibility that justice is, at least to some extent, a social convention. Hume, who more presciently tried to spell out the conventional character of justice, was unable to carry through that project within the framework of his moral naturalism. These limits have gone unnoticed, largely because Butler and Hume (...)
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  41. James P. Sterba (1987). Justifying Morality: The Right and the Wrong Ways. Synthese 72 (1):45 - 69.score: 21.0
    Contemporary philosophers offer three kinds of justification for morality. Some, following plato, claim that morality is justified by self-interest. Others, following hume as he is frequently interpreted, claim that morality is justified in terms of other-regarding interests, wants or intentions that people happen to have. And still others, following kant, claim that morality is justified in terms of the requirements of practical reason. In "the moral point of view" published in 1958 and in a series of articles continuing to (...)
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  42. Andrew Lister (2005). Hume and Rawls on the Circumstances and Priority of Justice. History of Political Thought 26 (4):664-695.score: 21.0
    This article addresses a historical puzzle that arises from Sandel's critique of Rawls's use of Hume's 'circumstances of justice', and a related philosophical puzzle about the priority of justice over other values. Sandel questioned whether a remedy for selfishness could be the first virtue. Yet, as Rawls understood, Hume's theory gave justice priority over other personal virtues, and was not incompatible with Rawls's claim that justice was the first virtue of institutions. Rawls was mistaken, however, to think that (...)
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  43. Michael P. Lynch (1996). Hume and the Limits of Reason. Hume Studies 22 (1):89-104.score: 21.0
    The purpose of this paper is to explain Hume's account of the way both the scope and the degree of benevolent motivation is limited. I argue that Hume consistently affirms, both in the _Treatise<D> and in the second _Enquiry<D>, (i) that the scope of benevolent motivation is very broad, such that it includes any creature that is conscious and capable of thought, and (ii) that the degree of benevolent motivation is limited, such that a person is naturally inclined (...)
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  44. Thomas Holden (2002). Infinite Divisibility and Actual Parts in Hume’s Treatise. Hume Studies 28 (1):3-25.score: 21.0
    According to a standard interpretation of Hume’s argument against infinite divisibility, Hume is raising a purely formal problem for mathematical constructions of infinite divisibility, divorced from all thought of the stuffing or filling of actual physical continua. I resist this. Hume’s argument must be understood in the context of a popular early modern account of the metaphysical status of the parts of physical quantities. This interpretation disarms the standard mathematical objections to Hume’s reasoning; I also defend (...)
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  45. Charles R. Pigden (2009). If Not Non-Cognitivism, Then What? In , Hume on Motivation and Virtue. Palgrave Macmillan.score: 21.0
    Taking my cue from Michael Smith, I try to extract a decent argument for non-cognitivism from the text of the Treatise. I argue that the premises are false and that the whole thing rests on a petitio principi. I then re-jig the argument so as to support that conclusion that Hume actually believed (namely that an action is virtuous if it would excite the approbation of a suitably qualified spectator). This argument too rests on false premises and a begged (...)
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  46. Karen Green (2011). Will the Real Enlightenment Historian Please Stand Up? Catharine Macaulay Versus David Hume. In Stephen Buckle Craig Taylor (ed.), Hume and the Enlightenment. Pickering & Chatto.score: 21.0
    Argues that on an interpretation of the Enlightenment which emphasises its radical potential and importance for the development of democracy Catharine Macaulay should be recognised as a more centrally Enlightenment historian than David Hume.
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  47. Alon Segev (2008). Leaving the “Real Hume” in Peace and Reading the Dialogues From a Moral Perspective. Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology 8 (2).score: 21.0
    This paper offers a new reading of Hume’s much discussed Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (1779/2000) which shows that, in contrast to what commentators tend to ascribe to Hume, the crux of the text is not epistemological-ontological – that is, not the arguments in favour of and against God’s existence – but moral. It is shown that, although most of the epistemologicalontological pro-and-contra arguments are quite weak, Hume’s interlocutors nevertheless cling to their theses from beginning to end, with (...)
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  48. Rico Vitz (forthcoming). The Nature and Functions of Sympathy in Hume's Philosophy. In Paul Russell (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of David Hume. Oxford University Press.score: 21.0
    My aim, in this chapter, is to outline the key details of this particularly interesting aspect of Hume's philosophical system. My presentation will be threefold. In the first section of the paper, I will elucidate the nature of sympathy, drawing upon some of the more recent ways in which Hume's commentators have attempted to resolve the interpretive puzzles Hume's works present. In the second section, I will explicate some of the functions sympathy has in Hume's philosophy, (...)
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  49. Erik Wielenberg (2009). Dawkins's Gambit, Hume's Aroma, and God's Simplicity. Philosophia Christi 11 (1):113-127.score: 18.0
    I examine the central atheistic argument of Richard Dawkins’s book The God Delusion (“Dawkins’s Gambit”) and illustrate its failure. I further show that Dawkins’s Gambit is a fragment of a more comprehensive critique of theism found in David Hume’s Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. Among the failings of Dawkins’s Gambit is that it is directed against a version of the God Hypothesis that few traditional monotheists hold. Hume’s critique is more challenging in that it targets versions of the God (...)
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  50. James Giles (1993). The No-Self Theory: Hume, Buddhism, and Personal Identity. Philosophy East and West 43 (2):175-200.score: 18.0
    The problem of personal identity is often said to be one of accounting for what it is that gives persons their identity over time. However, once the problem has been construed in these terms, it is plain that too much has already been assumed. For what has been assumed is just that persons do have an identity. A new interpretation of Hume's no-self theory is put forward by arguing for an eliminative rather than a reductive view of personal identity, (...)
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