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Derek H. Brown [5]Derek Henry Brown [1]
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Profile: Derek Brown (Southern Baptist Theological Seminary)
Profile: Derek Brown (Brandon University)
  1. Derek H. Brown (2014). Colour Layering and Colour Constancy. Philosophers' Imprint 14 (15).
    Loosely put, colour constancy for example occurs when you experience a partly shadowed wall to be uniformly coloured, or experience your favourite shirt to be the same colour both with and without sunglasses on. Controversy ensues when one seeks to interpret ‘experience’ in these contexts, for evidence of a constant colour may be indicative a constant colour in the objective world, a judgement that a constant colour would be present were things thus and so, et cetera. My primary aim is (...)
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  2. Derek H. Brown (2010). Locating Projectivism in Intentionalism Debates. Philosophical Studies 148 (1):69-78.
    Intentionalism debates seek to uncover the relationship between the qualitative aspects of experience—phenomenal character—and the intentionality of the mind. They have been at or near center stage in the philosophy of mind for more than two decades, and in my view need to be reexamined. There are two core distinct intentionalism debates that are rarely distinguished (Sect. 1). Additionally, the characterization of spectrum inversion as involving inverted qualities and constant intentional content is mistaken (Sect. 3). These confusions can be witnessed (...)
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  3. Derek Henry Brown (2009). Indirect Perceptual Realism and Demonstratives. Philosophical Studies 145 (3):377 - 394.
    I defend indirect perceptual realism against two recent and related charges to it offered by A. D. Smith and P. Snowdon, both stemming from demonstrative reference involving indirect perception. The needed aspects of the theory of demonstratives are not terribly new, but their connection to these objections has not been discussed. The groundwork for my solution emerges from considering normal cases of indirect perception (e.g., seeing something depicted on a television) and examining the role this indirectness plays in demonstrative assertions. (...)
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  4. Derek H. Brown (2008). Empiricism and Experience – Anil Gupta. Philosophical Quarterly 58 (230):180–185.
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  5. Thomas Nadelhoffer, Richard Brown, Derek H. Brown & Penny Munn (2007). Reviews. [REVIEW] Philosophical Psychology 20 (3):393 – 411.
  6. Derek H. Brown (2006). On the Dual Referent Approach to Colour Theory. Philosophical Quarterly 56 (222):96-113.
    A dual referent approach to colour theory maintains that colour names have two intended, equally legitimate referents. For example, one might argue that ‘red’ refers both to red appearances or qualia, and also to the way red objects reflect light, the spectral surface reflectance properties of red things. I argue that normal cases of perceptual relativity can be used to support a dual referent approach, yielding an understanding of colour whose natural extension includes abnormal cases of perceptual relativity. This contrasts (...)
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