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Derek Strijbos [9]Derek W. Strijbos [3]
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  1.  48
    Leon de Bruin, Derek Strijbos & Marc Slors (2011). Early Social Cognition: Alternatives to Implicit Mindreading. [REVIEW] Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (3):499-517.
    According to the BD-model of mindreading, we primarily understand others in terms of beliefs and desires. In this article we review a number of objections against explicit versions of the BD-model, and discuss the prospects of using its implicit counterpart as an explanatory model of early emerging socio-cognitive abilities. Focusing on recent findings on so-called ‘implicit’ false belief understanding, we put forward a number of considerations against the adoption of an implicit BD-model. Finally, we explore a different way to make (...)
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  2.  41
    Fleur Jongepier & Derek Strijbos (2015). Introduction: Self-Knowledge in Perspective. Philosophical Explorations 18 (2):123-133.
    This introduction is part of the special issue ‘ Self-knowledge in perspective’ guest edited by Fleur Jongepier and Derek Strijbos. // Papers included in the special issue: Transparency, expression, and self-knowledge Dorit Bar-On -/- Self-knowledge and communication Johannes Roessler -/- First-person privilege, judgment, and avowal Kateryna Samoilova -/- Self-knowledge about attitudes: rationalism meets interpretation Franz Knappik -/- How do you know that you settled a question? Tillmann Vierkant -/- On knowing one’s own resistant beliefs Cristina Borgoni -/- Self-knowledge and imagination (...)
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  3.  30
    Leon de Bruin, Fleur Jongepier & Derek Strijbos (2015). Mental Agency as Self-Regulation. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):815-825.
    The article proposes a novel approach to mental agency that is inspired by Victoria McGeer’s work on self-regulation. The basic idea is that certain mental acts leave further work to be done for an agent to be considered an authoritative self-ascriber of corresponding dispositional mental states. First, we discuss Richard Moran’s account of avowals, which grounds first-person authority in deliberative, self-directed agency. Although this view is promising, we argue that it ultimately fails to confront the empirical gap between occurrent judgments (...)
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  4.  40
    Leon Bruin, Derek Strijbos & Marc Slors (2011). Early Social Cognition: Alternatives to Implicit Mindreading. [REVIEW] Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (3):499-517.
    According to the BD-model of mindreading, we primarily understand others in terms of beliefs and desires. In this article we review a number of objections against explicit versions of the BD-model, and discuss the prospects of using its implicit counterpart as an explanatory model of early emerging socio-cognitive abilities. Focusing on recent findings on so-called ‘implicit’ false belief understanding, we put forward a number of considerations against the adoption of an implicit BD-model. Finally, we explore a different way to make (...)
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  5.  37
    Derek W. Strijbos & Leon C. de Bruin (2011). Folk Psychology Without Principles: An Alternative to the Belief-Desire Model of Action Interpretation. Philosophical Explorations 13 (3):257-274.
    In this paper, we take issue with the belief?desire model of second- and third-person action interpretation as it is presented by both theory theories and cognitivist versions of simulation theory. These accounts take action interpretation to consist in the (tacit) attribution of proper belief?desire pairs that mirror the structure of formally valid practical inferences. We argue that the belief?desire model rests on the unwarranted assumption that the interpreter can only reach the agent's practical context of action through inference. This assumption (...)
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  6.  7
    Leon de Bruin & Derek Strijbos (2015). Direct Social Perception, Mindreading and Bayesian Predictive Coding. Consciousness and Cognition 36:565-570.
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  7.  20
    Leon de Bruin, Derek Strijbos & Marc Slors (2014). Situating Emotions: From Embodied Cognition to Mindreading. Topoi 33 (1):173-184.
    In this article we analyze the strengths and weaknesses of mindreading versus embodied cognition approaches to emotion understanding. In the first part of the article we argue that mindreading explanations of how we understand the emotions of others (TT, ST or hybrid) face a version of the frame problem, i.e. the problem of how to limit the scope of the information that is relevant to mindreading. Also, we show that embodied cognition explanations are able to by-pass this problem because they (...)
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  8.  29
    Derek W. Strijbos & Leon C. de Bruin (2012). Universal Belief-Desire Psychology? A Dilemma for Theory Theory and Simulation Theory. Philosophical Psychology 26 (5):744-764.
    In this article we take issue with theory theory and simulation theory accounts of folk psychology committed to (i) the belief-desire (BD) model and (ii) the assumption of universality (AU). Recent studies cast doubt on the compatibility of these commitments because they reveal considerable cross-cultural differences in folk psychologies. We present both theory theory and simulation theory with the following dilemma: either (i) keep the BD-model as an account of the surface properties of specific explicit folk psychologies and give up (...)
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  9.  8
    Derek Strijbos & Leon de Bruin (2015). Self-Interpretation as First-Person Mindshaping: Implications for Confabulation Research. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18 (2):297-307.
    It is generally acknowledged that confabulation undermines the authority of self-attribution of mental states. But why? The mainstream answer is that confabulation misrepresents the actual state of one’s mind at some relevant time prior to the confabulatory response. This construal, we argue, rests on an understanding of self-attribution as first-person mindreading. Recent developments in the literature on folk psychology, however, suggest that mental state attribution also plays an important role in regulating or shaping future behaviour in conformity with normative expectations. (...)
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  10.  24
    Derek Strijbos & Leon de Bruin (2012). Making Folk Psychology Explicit. Philosophia 40 (1):139-163.
    One of the central explananda in the debate on social cognition is the interpretation of other people in terms of reasons for action. There is a growing dissatisfaction among participants in the debate concerning the descriptive adequacy of the traditional belief-desire model of action interpretation. Applying this model as an explanatory model at the subpersonal level threatens to leave the original explanandum largely unarticulated. Against this background we show how Brandom’s deontic scorekeeping model can be used as a valuable descriptive (...)
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  11.  6
    Derek W. Strijbos & Leon C. de Bruin (2013). Reason Attribution Without Belief-Desire Ascription. Grazer Philosophische Studien 86 (1):157-180.
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  12.  16
    Leon de Bruin & Derek Strijbos (2010). Folk Psychology Without Principles: An Alternative to the Belief-Desire Model of Action Interpretation. Philosophical Explorations 13 (3):257-274.
    In this paper, we take issue with the belief?desire model of second- and third-person action interpretation as it is presented by both theory theories and cognitivist versions of simulation theory. These accounts take action interpretation to consist in the (tacit) attribution of proper belief?desire pairs that mirror the structure of formally valid practical inferences. We argue that the belief?desire model rests on the unwarranted assumption that the interpreter can only reach the agent's practical context of action through inference. This assumption (...)
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