Search results for 'Determinable properties' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Robert Schroer (2011). Can Determinable Properties Earn Their Keep? Synthese 183 (2):229-247.score: 75.0
  2. Jonas Christensen (forthcoming). Determinable Properties and Overdetermination of Causal Powers. Philosophia:1-17.score: 72.0
    Do determinable properties such as colour, mass, and height exist in addition to their corresponding determinates, being red, having a mass of 1 kilogram, and having a height of 2 metres? Optimists say yes, pessimists say no. Among the latter are Carl Gillett and Bradley Rives who argue that optimism leads to systematic overdetermination of causal powers and hence should be rejected on the grounds that the position is ontologically unparsimonious. In this paper I defend optimism against this (...)
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  3. Tim Crane (2008). Causation and Determinable Properties : On the Efficacy of Colour, Shape, and Size. In Jakob Hohwy & Jesper Kallestrup (eds.), Being Reduced: New Essays on Reduction, Explanation, and Causation. Oxford University Press.score: 60.0
    This paper presents a puzzle or antinomy about the role of properties in causation. In theories of properties, a distinction is often made between determinable properties, like red, and their determinates, like scarlet (see Armstrong 1978, volume II). Sometimes determinable properties are cited in causal explanations, as when we say that someone stopped at the traffic light because it was red. If we accept that properties can be among the relata of causation, then (...)
     
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  4. Bence Nanay (forthcoming). Natural Properties and Bottomless Determination. Americal Philosophical Quarterly.score: 54.0
    It is widely held that some properties are more natural than others and that, as David Lewis put it, “an adequate theory of properties is one that recognises an objective difference between natural and unnatural properties” (Lewis 1983, p. 347). The general line of thought is that such ‘elitism’ about properties is justified as it can give simple and elegant solutions to a number of old metaphysical and philosophical problems. My aim is to analyze what these (...)
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  5. Crawford L. Elder (1996). Realism and Determinable Properties. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (1):149-159.score: 45.0
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  6. Bence Nanay (2012). Bayes or Determinables? What Does the Bidirectional Hierarchical Model of Brain Functions Tell Us About the Nature of Perceptual Representation? Frontiers in Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 3.score: 39.0
    The focus of this commentary is what Andy Clark takes to be the most groundbreaking of the philosophical import of the ‘bidirectional hierarchical model of brain functions’, namely, the claim that perceptual representations represent probabilities. This is what makes his account Bayesian and this is a philosophical or theoretical conclusion that neuroscientists and psychologists are also quick and happy to draw. My claim is that nothing in the ‘bidirectional hierarchical models of brain functions’ implies that perceptual representations are probabilistic, or (...)
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  7. Bence Nanay (2011). Ambiguous Figures, Attention, and Perceptual Content: Reply to Jagnow. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (4):557-561.score: 30.0
    I argued in Nanay 2010 that we cannot characterize perceptual content without reference to attention. Here, I defend this account from three objections raised by Jagnow 2011. This mainly takes the form of clarifying some details not sufficiently elaborated in the original article and dispelling some potential misunderstandings.
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  8. Andrea Borghini (2012). The Adverbial Theory of Properties. Metaphysica 13 (2):107-123.score: 30.0
    The paper presents a novel version of universalism—the thesis according to which there are only universals, no individuals—which is cashed out in terms of an adverbial analysis of predication. According to the theory, every spatiotemporal occurrence of a universal U can be expressed by a sentence which asserts the existence of U adverbially modified by the spatiotemporal region at which it exists. After some preliminary remarks on the interpretation of natural language, a formal semantics for the theory is first provided, (...)
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  9. Jessica M. Wilson (2013). A Determinable-Based Account of Metaphysical Indeterminacy. Inquiry 56 (4):359–385.score: 28.0
    Many phenomena appear to be indeterminate, including material macro-object boundaries, predicates or properties admitting of borderline cases, and certain open future claims. Here I provide an account of indeterminacy in metaphysical, rather than semantic or epistemic, terms. Previous such accounts have been "meta-level" accounts, taking metaphysical indeterminacy (MI) to involve its being indeterminate which of various determinate states of affairs obtain. On my alternative, "object-level" account, MI involves its being determinate (or just plain true) that an indeterminate (less than (...)
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  10. Jessica M. Wilson (2012). Fundamental Determinables. Philosophers' Imprint 12 (4).score: 24.0
    Contemporary philosophers commonly suppose that any fundamental entities there may be are maximally determinate. More generally, they commonly suppose that, whether or not there are fundamental entities, any determinable entities there may be are grounded in, hence less fundamental than, more determinate entities. So, for example, Armstrong takes the physical objects constituting the presumed fundamental base to be “determinate in all respects” (1961, 59), and Lewis takes the properties characterizing things “completely and without redundancy” to be “highly specific” (...)
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  11. Paul Audi (2013). How to Rule Out Disjunctive Properties. Noûs 47 (4):748-766.score: 24.0
    Are there disjunctive properties? This question is important for at least two reasons. First, disjunctive properties are invoked in defense of certain philosophical theories, especially in the philosophy of mind. Second, the question raises the prior issue of what counts as a genuine property, a central concern in the metaphysics of properties. I argue here, on the basis of general considerations in the metaphysics of properties, that there are no disjunctive properties. Specifically, I argue that (...)
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  12. I. Walker (1979). The Mechanical Properties of Proteins Determine the Laws of Evolutionary Change. Acta Biotheoretica 28 (4).score: 24.0
    The general inorganic nature of traditional selection theory (based on differential growth between any two systems) is pointed out, wherefrom it follows that this theory cannot provide explanations for the characteristics of organic evolution. Specific biophysical aspects enter with the complexity of macro-molecules: vital physical conditions for the perpetuation of the system, irrevocable extinction (= death) and random change leading to novelty, are the result of complexity per se. Further biophysical properties are a direct function of the pathway along (...)
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  13. Jessica M. Wilson (2009). Determination, Realization and Mental Causation. Philosophical Studies 145 (1):149 - 169.score: 21.0
    How can mental properties bring about physical effects, as they seem to do, given that the physical realizers of the mental goings-on are already sufficient to cause these effects? This question gives rise to the problem of mental causation (MC) and its associated threats of causal overdetermination, mental causal exclusion, and mental causal irrelevance. Some (e.g., Cynthia and Graham Macdonald, and Stephen Yablo) have suggested that understanding mental-physical realization in terms of the determinable/determinate relation (henceforth, 'determination') provides the (...)
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  14. Eric Funkhouser (2006). The Determinable-Determinate Relation. Noûs 40 (3):548–569.score: 21.0
    The properties colored and red stand in a special relation. Namely, red is a determinate of colored, and colored is determinable relative to red. Many other properties are similarly related. The determination relation is an interesting topic of logical investigation in its own right, and the prominent philosophical inquiries into this relation have, accordingly, operated at a high level of abstraction.1 It is time to return to these investigations, not just as a logical amusement, but for the (...)
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  15. Matthew C. Haug (2010). Realization, Determination, and Mechanisms. Philosophical Studies 150 (3):313-330.score: 21.0
    Several philosophers (e.g., Ehring (Nous (Detroit, Mich.) 30:461–480, 1996 ); Funkhouser (Nous (Detroit, Mich.) 40:548–569, 2006 ); Walter (Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37:217–244, 2007 ) have argued that there are metaphysical differences between the determinable-determinate relation and the realization relation between mental and physical properties. Others have challenged this claim (e.g., Wilson (Philosophical Studies, 2009 ). In this paper, I argue that there are indeed such differences and propose a “mechanistic” account of realization that elucidates why these differences (...)
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  16. Daniel von Wachter (2000). A World of Fields. In J. Faye, U. Scheffler & M. Urchs (eds.), Things, Facts and Events. Rhodopi. 305-326.score: 21.0
    Trope ontology is exposed and confronted with the question where one trope ends and another begins. It is argued that tropes do not have determinate boundaries, it is arbitrary how tropes are carved up. An ontology, which I call field ontology, is proposed which takes this into account. The material world consists of a certain number of fields, each of which is extended over all of space. It is shown how field ontology can also tackle the problem of determinable (...)
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  17. Ghislain Guigon (2014). Overall Similarity, Natural Properties, and Paraphrases. Philosophical Studies 167 (2):387-399.score: 21.0
    I call anti-resemblism the thesis that independently of any contextual specification there is no determinate fact of the matter about the comparative overall similarity of things. Anti-resemblism plays crucial roles in the philosophy of David Lewis. For instance, Lewis has argued that his counterpart theory is anti-essentialist on the grounds that counterpart relations are relations of comparative overall similarity and that anti-resemblism is true. After Lewis committed himself to a form of realism about natural properties he maintained that anti-resemblism (...)
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  18. Jan Treur (2005). States of Change: Explaining Dynamics by Anticipatory State Properties. Philosophical Psychology 18 (4):441-471.score: 21.0
    In cognitive science, the dynamical systems theory (DST) has recently been advocated as an approach to cognitive modeling that is better suited to the dynamics of cognitive processes than the symbolic/computational approaches are. Often, the differences between DST and the symbolic/computational approach are emphasized. However, alternatively their commonalities can be analyzed and a unifying framework can be sought. In this paper, the possibility of such a unifying perspective on dynamics is analyzed. The analysis covers dynamics in cognitive disciplines, as well (...)
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  19. Sharon R. Ford (2007). An Analysis of Properties in John Heil’s "From an Ontological Point of View&Quot;. In G. Romano & Malatesti (eds.), From an Ontological Point of View, SWIF Philosophy of Mind Review, Symposium. SWIF Philosophy of Mind Review.score: 21.0
    In this paper I argue that the requirement for the qualitative is theory-dependent, determined by the fundamental assumptions built into the ontology. John Heil’s qualitative, in its role as individuator of objects and powers, is required only by a theory that posits a world of distinct objects or powers. Does Heil’s ‘deep’ view of the world, such that there is only one powerful object (e.g. a field containing modes or properties which we perceive as manifest everyday objects) require the (...)
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  20. Jason Costanzo (forthcoming). Shadows of Consciousness: The Problem of Phenomenal Properties. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences.score: 21.0
    The aim of this essay is to show that phenomenal properties are contentless modes of appearances of representational properties. The essay initiates with examination of the first-person perspective of the conscious observer according to which a “reference to I” with respect to the observation of experience is determined. A distinction is then drawn between the conscious observer and experience as observed, according to which, three distinct modifications of experience are delineated. These modifications are then analyzed with respect to (...)
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  21. Christoph Redies & Franziska Groß (2013). Frames as Visual Links Between Paintings and the Museum Environment: An Analysis of Statistical Image Properties. Frontiers in Psychology 4.score: 21.0
    Frames provide a visual link between artworks and their surround. We asked how image properties change as an observer zooms out from viewing a painting alone, to viewing the painting with its frame and, finally, the framed painting in its museum environment (museum scene). To address this question, we determined three higher-order image properties that are based on histograms of oriented luminance gradients. First, complexity was measured as the sum of the strengths of all gradients in the image. (...)
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  22. Stephen Handel (2008). The Nature of Economical Coding is Determined by the Unique Properties of Objects in the Environment. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (1):81-82.score: 21.0
    The physical properties that signify objects differ dramatically, so that the organization of sensory systems must reflect those differences. Although all senses may encode peripheral sensory information using across-fiber firing distributions, an economical coding system for each sense will necessarily differ. An economical code must maximize information about objects, whether they are predators or foods.
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  23. Douglas E. Ehring (1996). Mental Causation, Determinables, and Property Instances. Noûs 30 (4):461-80.score: 20.0
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  24. Rom Harré (2006). Resolving the Emergence-Reduction Debate. Synthese 151 (3):499-509.score: 19.0
    The debate between emergentists and reductionists rests on the observation that in many situations, in which it seems desirable to work with a coherent and unified discourse, key predicates fall into different groups, such that pairs of members one taken from each group, cannot be co-predicated of some common subject. Must we settle for ‘island’ discourses in science and human affairs or is some route to a unified discourse still open? To make progress towards resolving the issue the conditions under (...)
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  25. Rom Harre (2006). Resolving the Emergence-Reduction Debate. Synthese 151 (3):499-509.score: 19.0
    The debate between emergentists and reductionists rests on the observation that in many situations, in which it seems desirable to work with a coherent and unified discourse, key predicates fall into different groups, such that pairs of members one taken from each group, cannot be co-predicated of some common subject. Must we settle for 'island' discourses in science and human affairs or is some route to a unified discourse still open? To make progress towards resolving the issue the conditions under (...)
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  26. Todd Buras (2006). Counterpart Theory, Natural Properties, and Essentialism. Journal of Philosophy 103 (1):27-42.score: 18.0
    David Lewis advised essentialists to judge his counterpart theory a false friend. He also argued that counterpart theory needs natural properties. This essay argues that natural properties are all essentialists need to find a true friend in counterpart theory. Section one explains why Lewis takes counterpart theory to be anti-essentialist and why he thinks it needs natural properties. Section two establishes the connection between the natural properties counterpart theory needs and the essentialist consequences Lewis disavows. Section (...)
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  27. Sharon R. Ford (2010). What Fundamental Properties Suffice to Account for the Manifest World? Powerful Structure. Dissertation, University of Queenslandscore: 18.0
    This Thesis engages with contemporary philosophical controversies about the nature of dispositional properties or powers and the relationship they have to their non-dispositional counterparts. The focus concerns fundamentality. In particular, I seek to answer the question, ‘What fundamental properties suffice to account for the manifest world?’ The answer I defend is that fundamental categorical properties need not be invoked in order to derive a viable explanation for the manifest world. My stance is a field-theoretic view which describes (...)
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  28. Robert Schroer (2012). Two Challenges That Categorical Properties Pose to Physicalism. Ratio 25 (2):195-206.score: 18.0
    What are physical objects like when they are considered independently of their causal interactions? Many think that the answer to this question involves categorical propertiesproperties that make contributions to their bearers that are independent of any causal interactions those objects may enter into. In this paper, I examine two challenges that this solution poses to Physicalism. The first challenge is that, given that they are distinct from any of the scientifically described causal powers that they happen to (...)
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  29. Benjamin Smart, Categorical Properties in Background Independent Substantivalist General Relativity.score: 18.0
    Assuming the increasingly popular background independent substantivalist interpretation of general relativity (GR), in this paper I show that the possibility of spacetime point permutations implies that the locational properties of spacetime points, and structural properties of spacetime are categorical. Categorical properties, however, are often deemed implausible by dispositional monists (Bird 2007; Mumford 2004) due to their quiddistic nature, as their primitive identity entails the unacceptable possibility of properties changing their causal role across possible worlds. The question (...)
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  30. Bart Streumer (2008). Are There Irreducibly Normative Properties? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (4):537-561.score: 18.0
    Frank Jackson has argued that, given plausible claims about supervenience, descriptive predicates and property identity, there are no irreducibly normative properties. Philosophers who think that there are such properties have made several objections to this argument. In this paper, I argue that all of these objections fail. I conclude that Jackson's argument shows that there are no irreducibly normative properties.
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  31. Tuomas E. Tahko (2013). Tropes: Properties, Objects, and Mental Causation. By Douglas Ehring. [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 63 (251):379-382.score: 18.0
    Book review of 'Tropes: Properties, Objects, and Mental Causation' (2011, OUP). By DOUGLAS EHRING.
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  32. Olivier Massin (2013). Determinables and Brute Similarities. In Christer Svennerlind, Jan Almäng & Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson (eds.), Johanssonian Investigations. Ontos Verlag.score: 18.0
    Ingvar Johansson has argued that there are not only determinate universals, but also determinable ones. I here argue that this view is misguided by reviving a line of argument to the following effect: what makes determinates falling under a same determinable similar cannot be distinct from what makes them different. If true, some similarities — imperfect similarities between simple determinate properties — are not grounded in any kind of property-sharing. I suggest that determinables are better understood as (...)
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  33. Bart Streumer (2013). Why There Really Are No Irreducibly Normative Properties. In David Bakhurst, Brad Hooker & Margaret Olivia Little (eds.), Thinking about Reasons: Themes from the Philosophy of Jonathan Dancy. OUP. 310-336.score: 18.0
    Jonathan Dancy thinks that there are irreducibly normative properties. Frank Jackson has given a well-known argument against this view, and I have elsewhere defended this argument against many objections, including one made by Dancy. But Dancy remains unconvinced. In this chapter, I hope to convince him.
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  34. Paweł Rojek (2008). Three Trope Theories. Axiomathes 18 (3):359-377.score: 18.0
    Universals are usually considered to be universal properties. Since tropes are particular properties, if there are only tropes, there are no universals. However, universals might be thought of not only as common properties, but also as common aspects (“determinable universals”) and common wholes (“concrete universals”). The existence of these two latter concepts of universals is fully compatible with the assumption that all properties are particular. This observation makes possible three different trope theories, which accept tropes (...)
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  35. Ronald P. Endicott (2007). Nomic-Role Nonreductionism: Identifying Properties by Total Nomic Roles. Philosophical Topics 35 (1&2):217-240.score: 18.0
    Inspired by recent theories of embodied cognition that emphasize matters of a mind's engineering realization, I introduce "nomic-role nonreductionism" as an alternative to traditional causal-role functionalism in the philosophy of mind. Rather than identify mental properties by a theory that describes their intra-level causal roles via types of inputs, internal states, and outputs, I suggest that one identify mental properties by a more comprehensive theory that also describes inter-level realization roles via types of lower-level engineering, internal mental states, (...)
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  36. Phil Corkum, Presentism and Distributional Properties.score: 18.0
    Presentists face a challenge from truthmaker theory: if you hold both that the only existing objects are presently existing and that truth supervenes on being, then you will be hard pressed to identify some existent on which a given true but traceless claim about the past supervenes. One reconciliation strategy, advocated by Cameron (2011), is to appeal to distributional properties so to serve as presently existing truthmakers for past truths. I argue that a presentist ought to deny that distributional (...)
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  37. Aaron Smuts (2011). Grounding Moralism: Moral Flaws and Aesthetic Properties. Journal of Aesthetic Education 45 (4):34-53.score: 18.0
    My goal in this article is to provide support for the claim that moral flaws can be detrimental to an artwork's aesthetic value. I argue that moral flaws can become aesthetic flaws when they defeat the operation of good-making aesthetic properties. I do not defend a new theory of aesthetic properties or aesthetic value; instead, I attempt to show that on both the response-dependence and the supervenience account of aesthetic properties, moral flaws with an artwork are relevant (...)
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  38. Carl Gillett & Bradley Rives (2005). The Nonexistence of Determinables: Or, a World of Absolute Determinates as Default Hypothesis. Noûs 39 (3):483–504.score: 18.0
    An electron clearly has the property of having a charge of þ1.6 10 19 coulombs, but does it also have the property of being charged ? Philosophers have worried whether so-called ‘determinable’ predicates, such as ‘is charged’, actually refer to determinable properties in the way they are happy to say that determinate predicates, such as ‘has a charge of þ1.6 10 19 coulombs’, refer to determinate properties. The distinction between determinates and determinables is itself fairly new, (...)
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  39. Helen Steward (2011). Agency, Properties and Causation. Frontiers of Philosophy in China 6 (3):390-401.score: 18.0
    The paper argues against the very commonly held view that whenever a substance may be said to be the cause of something, a fuller and metaphysically more accurate understanding of the situation can always be obtained by looking to the properties in virtue of which that substance was able to bring about the effect in question. Paul Humphreys’ argument that when a substance is said to have produced an effect, it always turns out to be an aspect or property (...)
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  40. Agustín Vicente (2011). Functions and Emergence: When Functional Properties Have Something to Say. Philosophical Studies 152 (2):293-312.score: 18.0
    In a recent paper, Bird (in: Groff (ed.) Revitalizing causality: Realism about causality in philosophy and social science, 2007 ) has argued that some higher-order properties—which he calls “evolved emergent properties”—can be considered causally efficacious in spite of exclusion arguments. I have previously argued in favour of a similar position. The basic argument is that selection processes do not take physical categorical properties into account. Rather, selection mechanisms are only tuned to what such properties can do, (...)
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  41. Wim de Muijnck (2002). Causation by Relational Properties. Grazer Philosophische Studien 65 (1):123-137.score: 18.0
    In discussions on mental causation and externalism, it is often assumed that extrinsic, or relational, properties cannot have causal efficacy. In this paper I argue that this assumption is based on a category mistake, in that causal efficacy (dependence among events or states of affairs) is confused with causal influence (persistence of and interaction among objects). I then argue that relational properties are indeed causally efficacious, which I explain with the help of Dretske's notion of a 'structuring cause'.
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  42. Michael Esfeld (2005). Mental Causation and Mental Properties. Dialectica 59 (1):5-18.score: 18.0
    The aim of this paper is to defend the causal homogeneity of functional, mental properties against Kim’s attack. It is argued that (a) token identity is sufficient for mental causation, that (b) token identity implies a sort of functional reduction, but that (c) nonetheless functional, mental properties can be causally homogeneous despite being multiply realizable: multiple composition is sufficient for multiple realizability, but multiple composition does not prevent the realizers from having their pertinent effects in common. Thus, the (...)
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  43. Alexander Paseau (2012). Resemblance Theories of Properties. Philosophical Studies 157 (3):361-382.score: 18.0
    The paper aims to develop a resemblance theory of properties that technically improves on past versions. The theory is based on a comparative resemblance predicate. In combination with other resources, it solves the various technical problems besetting resemblance nominalism. The paper’s second main aim is to indicate that previously proposed resemblance theories that solve the technical problems, including the comparative theory, are nominalistically unacceptable and have controversial philosophical commitments.
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  44. Bart Streumer (2011). Are Normative Properties Descriptive Properties? Philosophical Studies 154 (3):325 - 348.score: 18.0
    Some philosophers think that normative properties are identical to descriptive properties. In this paper, I argue that this entails that it is possible to say which descriptive properties normative properties are identical to. I argue that Frank Jackson's argument to show that this is possible fails, and that the objections to this argument show that it is impossible to say which descriptive properties normative properties are identical to. I conclude that normative properties are (...)
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  45. Frank Jackson (1998). Causal Roles and Higher-Order Properties. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (3):657-661.score: 18.0
    I discuss whether Michael Tye, in Ten Problems of Consciousness. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1966, holds that phenomenal properties are neurological properties, but that what gives them their phenomenal property names are their highly complex interconnections with other neurological properties and, most especially, subjects' surroundings. Or, alternatively, whether he holds that they are higher-level, wide functional properties in the sense of being properties of having properties that fill some specified wide or distal roles.
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  46. Vera Hoffmann-Kolss (2010). The Metaphysics of Extrinsic Properties. Ontos-Verlag.score: 18.0
    This book aims to develop a philosophical theory of extrinsic properties – of properties whose instantiation by an object does not only depend on what the object itself is like, but also on features of its environment. Various accounts of the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction are analysed in detail, and it is argued that the most promising approach to defining this distinction is to consider extrinsic properties as a particular type of relational property. Moreover, it is shown that two (...)
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  47. Michael David Kirchhoff (2012). Extended Cognition and Fixed Properties: Steps to a Third-Wave Version of Extended Cognition. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (2):287-308.score: 18.0
    This paper explores several paths a distinctive third wave of extended cognition might take. In so doing, I address a couple of shortcomings of first- and second-wave extended cognition associated with a tendency to conceive of the properties of internal and external processes as fixed and non-interchangeable. First, in the domain of cognitive transformation, I argue that a problematic tendency of the complementarity model is that it presupposes that socio-cultural resources augment but do not significantly transform the brain’s representational (...)
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  48. Harold Noonan & Mark Jago (2012). The Accidental Properties of Numbers and Properties. Thought 1 (2):134-140.score: 18.0
    According to genuine modal realism, some things (including numbers and properties) lack distinct counterparts in different worlds. So how can they possess any of their properties contingently? Egan (2004) argues that to explain such accidental property possession, the genuine modal realist must depart from Lewis and identify properties with functions, rather than with sets of possibilia. We disagree. The genuine modal realist already has the resources to handle Egan's proposed counterexamples. As we show, she does not need (...)
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  49. Benjamin Schnieder (2010). Inexpressible Properties and Grelling's Antinomy. Philosophical Studies 148 (3):369 - 385.score: 18.0
    The paper discusses whether there are strictly inexpressible properties. Three main points are argued for: (i) Two different senses of ‘predicate t expresses property p ’ should be distinguished. (ii) The property of being a predicate that does not apply to itself is inexpressible in one of the senses of ‘express’, but not in the other. (iii) Since the said property is related to Grelling’s Antinomy, it is further argued that the antinomy does not imply the non-existence of that (...)
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  50. Agustín Vicente (2001). Realization, Determination and Mental Causation. Theoria 16 (40):77-94.score: 18.0
    The by now famous exclusion problem for mental causation admits only one possible solution, as far as I can see, namely: that mental and physical properties are linked by a vertical relation. In this paper, starting from what I take to be sensible premises about properties, I will be visiting some general relations between them, in order to see whether, first, it is true that some vertical relation, other than identity, makes different sorts of causation compatible and second, (...)
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