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Michael Devitt [133]M. Devitt [9]Matthew Devitt [1]
  1. Michael Devitt (1991). Realism and Truth. B. Blackwell.
  2.  16
    Michael Devitt (1999). Language and Reality: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Language. MIT Press.
    Completely revised and updated in its Second Edition, _Language and Reality_ provides students, philosophers and cognitive scientists with a lucid and provocative introduction to the philosophy of language.
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  3. Michael Devitt (1981). Designation. Columbia University Press.
  4. Michael Devitt (2006). Ignorance of Language. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
    The Chomskian revolution in linguistics gave rise to a new orthodoxy about mind and language. Michael Devitt throws down a provocative challenge to that orthodoxy. What is linguistics about? What role should linguistic intuitions play in constructing grammars? What is innate about language? Is there a 'language faculty'? These questions are crucial to our developing understanding of ourselves; Michael Devitt offers refreshingly original answers. He argues that linguistics is about linguistic reality and is not part of psychology; that linguistic rules (...)
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  5. Michael Devitt (2011). Experimental Semantics. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (2):418 - 435.
    In their delightfully provocative paper, “Semantics, Cross-Cultural Style,” Edouard Machery, Ron Mallon, Shaun Nichols, and Stephen Stich (2004),[1] make several striking claims about theories of reference. First, they claim: (I) Philosophical views about reference “are assessed by consulting one’s intuitions about the reference of terms in hypothetical situations” (p. B1). This claim is prompted by their observations of the role of intuitions in Saul Kripke’s refutation of the descriptivist view of proper names in favor of a causal-historical view (1980). The (...)
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  6.  25
    Michael Devitt (1996). Coming to Our Senses: A Naturalistic Program for Semantic Localism. Cambridge University Press.
    Michael Devitt is a distinguished philosopher of language. In this new book he takes up one of the most important difficulties that must be faced by philosophical semantics: namely, the threat posed by holism. Three important questions lie at the core of this book: what are the main objectives of semantics; why are they worthwhile; how should we accomplish them? Devitt answers these 'methodological' questions naturalistically and explores what semantic programme arises from the answers. The approach is anti-Cartesian, rejecting the (...)
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  7. Michael Devitt (2008). Resurrecting Biological Essentialism. Philosophy of Science 75 (3):344-382.
    The article defends the doctrine that Linnaean taxa, including species, have essences that are, at least partly, underlying intrinsic, mostly genetic, properties. The consensus among philosophers of biology is that such essentialism is deeply wrong, indeed incompatible with Darwinism. I argue that biological generalizations about the morphology, physiology, and behavior of species require structural explanations that must advert to these essential properties. The objection that, according to current “species concepts,” species are relational is rejected. These concepts are primarily concerned with (...)
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  8. Michael Devitt (2006). Intuitions in Linguistics. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (3):481-513.
    Linguists take the intuitive judgments of speakers to be good evidence for a grammar. Why? The Chomskian answer is that they are derived by a rational process from a representation of linguistic rules in the language faculty. The paper takes a different view. It argues for a naturalistic and non-Cartesian view of intuitions in general. They are empirical central-processor responses to phenomena differing from other such responses only in being immediate and fairly unreflective. Applying this to linguistic intuitions yields an (...)
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  9. Michael Devitt (2011). Methodology and the Nature of Knowing How. Journal of Philosophy 108 (4):205-218.
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  10. Michael Devitt & Kim Sterelny (1999). Language and Reality. John Wiley & Sons.
    Completely revised and updated in its Second Edition, _Language and Reality_ provides students, philosophers and cognitive scientists with a lucid and provocative introduction to the philosophy of language.
     
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  11. Michael Devitt (2010). Putting Metaphysics First: Essays on Metaphysics and Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
    Introduction -- Metaphysics -- "Ostrich nominalism"' or "mirage realism"? -- Postscript to "Ostrich nominalism" or "mirage realism"? -- Aberrations of the realism debate -- Postscript to "aberrations of the realism debate" -- Underdetermination and commonsense realism -- Scientificrealism -- Postscript to "scientific realism" -- Incommensurability and the priority of metaphysics -- Postscript to "incommensurability and the priority of metaphysics" -- Global response dependency and worldmaking -- The metaphysics of nonfactualism -- The metaphysics of truth -- (...)
     
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  12. Michael Devitt (2011). Are Unconceived Alternatives a Problem for Scientific Realism? Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 42 (2):285-293.
    Stanford, in Exceeding Our Grasp , presents a powerful version of the pessimistic meta-induction. He claims that theories typically have empirically inequivalent but nonetheless well-confirmed, serious alternatives which are unconceived. This claim should be uncontroversial. But it alone is no threat to scientific realism. The threat comes from Stanford’s further crucial claim, supported by historical examples, that a theory’s unconceived alternatives are “radically distinct” from it; there is no “continuity”. A standard realist reply to the meta-induction is that past failures (...)
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  13.  90
    Michael Devitt (2012). Whither Experimental Semantics? Theoria 27 (1):5-36.
    The main goal of the paper is to propose a methodology for the theory of reference in which experiments feature prominently. These experiments should primarily test linguistic usage rather than the folk’s referential intuitions. The proposed methodology urges the use of: (A) philosophers’ referential intuitions, both informally and, occasionally, scientifically gathered; (B) the corpus, both informally and scientifically gathered; (C) elicited production; and, occasionally, (D) folk’s referential intuitions. The most novel part of this is (C) and that is where most (...)
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  14.  25
    Michael Devitt (2014). Lest Auld Acquaintance Be Forgot. Mind and Language 29 (4):475-484.
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  15.  86
    Michael Devitt (2005). Rigid Application. Philosophical Studies 125 (2):139--165.
    Kripke defines a rigid designator as one that designates the same object in every possible world in which that object exists. He argues that proper names are rigid. So also, he claims, are various natural kind terms. But we wonder how they could be. These terms are general and it is not obvious that they designate at all. It has been proposed that these kind terms rigidly designate abstract objects. This proposal has been criticized because all terms then seem to (...)
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  16. Michael Devitt (1980). Ostrich Nominalism or Mirage Realism? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 61:433-449.
    In "nominalism and realism" armstrong carefully demolishes various nominalist responses to plato's "one over many" problem but simply dismissed the quinean response as "ostrich nominalism". The paper argues that plato's problem is pseudo. So to ignore it is not to behave like an ostrich. Rather to adopt realism because of this problem that isn't there is to be a "mirage realist." there are some good reasons that lead armstrong to realism but he is largely a mirage realist. Quine does not (...)
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  17.  38
    Michael Devitt (2010). Species Have (Partly) Intrinsic Essences. Philosophy of Science 77 (5):648-661.
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  18.  97
    Michael Devitt (2010). Linguistic Intuitions Revisited. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 61 (4):833 - 865.
    Why are linguistic intuitions good evidence for a grammar? In 'Intuitions in Linguistics' ([2006a]) and Ignorance of Language ([2006b]), I looked critically at some Chomskian answers and proposed another one. In this article, I respond to Fitzgerald's 'Linguistic Intuitions' ([2010]), a sweeping critique of my position, and to Culbertson and Gross' 'Are Linguists Better Subjects?' ([2009]), a criticism of one consequence of the position. In rejecting these criticisms, I emphasize that the issue over linguistic intuitions concerns only metalinguistic ones. And (...)
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  19.  6
    Michael Devitt (2007). Referential Descriptions and Conversational Implicatures. European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 3 (2):7-32.
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  20.  28
    Michael Devitt (2015). Relying on Intuitions: Where Cappelen and Deutsch Go Wrong. Inquiry 58 (7-8):669-699.
    In Philosophy without Intuitions, Herman Cappelen challenges the ‘almost universally accepted’ thesis of ‘Centrality’: ‘philosophers rely on intuitions as evidence for philosophical theories’. Cappelen takes there to be two arguments for Centrality and rejects both. According to the first, Centrality is supported by the way philosophers characterize key premises in their arguments as ‘intuitive’. Central to Cappelen’s rejection of this is his lengthy argument that philosophers’ ‘intuition’-talk is very hard to interpret, indeed often ‘meaningless’. I argue, in contrast, that this (...)
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  21.  72
    Michael Devitt (2005). There is No a Priori. In Steup Matthias & Sosa Ernest (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell 105--115.
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  22. Michael Devitt (2004). The Case for Referential Descriptions. In Marga Reimer & Anne Bezuidenhout (eds.), Descriptions and Beyond. Oxford University Press 234--260.
     
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  23. Michael Devitt (1994). The Methodology of Naturalistic Semantics. Journal of Philosophy 91 (10):545-72.
  24.  81
    Michael Devitt (1974). Singular Terms. Journal of Philosophy 71 (7):183-205.
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  25. Michael Devitt (1997). Meanings and Psychology: A Response to Mark Richard. Noûs 31 (1):115-131.
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  26.  53
    Michael Devitt (2012). Semantic Epistemology: Response to Machery. Theoria 27 (2):229-233.
    Machery argues: (1) that “philosophers’ intuitions about reference are not more reliable than lay people’s —if anything, they are probably worse”; (2) that “intuitions about the reference of proper names and uses of proper names provide equally good evidence for theories of reference”. (1) lacks theoretical and empirical support. (2) cannot be right because usage provides the evidence that intuitions are reliable.
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  27.  90
    Michael Devitt (2008). Explanation and Reality in Linguistics. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 8 (2):203-231.
    This paper defends Some anti-Chomskian themes in Ignorance of Language (Devitt 2006a) from, the criticisms of John Collins (2007, 2008a) and Georges Rey (2008). It argues that there is a linguistic reality external to the mind and that it is theoretically interesting to study it. If there is this reality, we have good reason to think that grammars are more or less true of it. So, the truth of the grammar of a language entails that its rules govern linguistic reality, (...)
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  28.  47
    Michael Devitt (2001). Incommensurability and the Priority of Metaphysics. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science 216:143-158.
  29.  48
    Michael Devitt (1998). Naturalism and the A Priori. Philosophical Studies 92 (1/2):45 - 65.
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  30. Michael Devitt (2011). Deference and the Use Theory. Protosociology 27:196-211.
    It is plausible to think that members of a linguistic community typically mean the same by their words. Yet “ignorance and error” arguments proposed by the revolution in the theory of reference seem to show that people can share a meaning and yet differ greatly in usage. Horwich responds to this problem for UTM by appealing to deference. I give five reasons for doubting that his brief remarks about deference can be developed into a satisfactory theory. But this appeal has (...)
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  31. Michael Devitt (2009). On Determining What There Isn't. In Dominic Murphy & Michael A. Bishop (eds.), Stich and His Critics. Blackwell
    In his engaging essay, “Deconstructing the Mind” (1996: 3-90), Stephen Stich raises some very good questions and gives some pretty good answers. My aim in this paper is to give some answers of my own, drawing on earlier work, and to compare these answers with Stich’s.
     
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  32.  2
    Michael Devitt (2007). Referential Descriptions: A Note on Bach. European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 3 (2):49-54.
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  33.  16
    Michael Devitt (2006). Defending Ignorance of Language. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 6 (3):571-606.
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  34. Michael Devitt (1989). Against Direct Reference. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 14 (1):206-240.
  35. Michael Devitt (1983). Dummett's Anti-Realism. Journal of Philosophy 80 (2):73-99.
    Devitt (1983) "Dummett's Anti-Realism".
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  36. Michael Devitt (2005). Scientific Realism. In Frank Jackson & Michael Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy. Oxford University Press
     
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  37.  63
    Michael Devitt (2008). Methodology in the Philosophy of Linguistics. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (4):671 – 684.
  38. Michael Devitt (1993). Localism and Analyticity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (3):641-646.
    In their discussion of semantic holism, Fodor and Lepore claim that Quine showed that any inferential properties constituting a meaning cannot be distinguished on epistemic grounds like apriority. But they often write as if Quine showed that such properties cannot be distinguished at all. The paper argues that Quine did not show the latter. It goes on to propose a criterion for distinguishing the constitutive properties: they are the ones that determine reference. Fodor is not in a position to reject (...)
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  39. Michael Devitt (2003). Linguistics is Not Psychology. In Alex Barber (ed.), Epistemology of Language. Oxford University Press
  40. Michael Devitt (2010). What "Intuitions" Are Linguistic Evidence? Erkenntnis 73 (2):251 - 264.
    In "Intuitions in Linguistics" (2006a) and Ignorance of Language (2006b) I took it to be Chomskian orthodoxy that a speaker's metalinguistic intuitions are provided by her linguistic competence. I argued against this view in favor of the alternative that the intuitions are empirical theory-laden central-processor responses to linguistic phenomena. The concern about these linguistic intuitions arises from their apparent role as evidence for a grammar. Mark Textor, "Devitt on the Epistemic Authority of Linguistic Intuitions" (2009), argues that I have picked (...)
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  41.  19
    Michael Devitt (2008). A Response to Collins' Note on Conventions and Unvoiced Syntax. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 8 (2):249-255.
    This paper takes up the two main points in John Collins “Note” (2008b), which responds to my paper, “Explanation and Reality in Linguistics” (2008). (1) Appealing to what grammars actually say, the paper argues that they primarily explain the nature of linguistic expressions. (2) The paper responds to Collins’ criticisms of my view that these expressions have many of their properties by convention.
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  42.  29
    Michael Devitt (1991). Why Fodor Can't Have It Both Ways. In Barry M. Loewer & Georges Rey (eds.), Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics. Blackwell 95--118.
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  43.  14
    Michael Devitt (2013). L5 Linguistic Intuitions Are Not “the Voice of Competence”. In Matthew C. Haug (ed.), Philosophical Methodology: The Armchair or the Laboratory? Routledge 268.
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  44.  81
    Michael Devitt (2002). Underdetermination and Realism. Noûs 36 (s1):26 - 50.
  45. Michael Devitt (2008). Ignorance of Language. Oxford University Press Uk.
    The Chomskian revolution in linguistics gave rise to a new orthodoxy about mind and language. Michael Devitt throws down a provocative challenge to that orthodoxy. What is linguistics about? What role should linguistic intuitions play in constructing grammars? What is innate about language? Is there a 'language faculty'? These questions are crucial to our developing understanding of ourselves; Michael Devitt offers refreshingly original answers.
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  46.  98
    Michael Devitt (2002). Meaning and Use. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (1):106-121.
    Part I argues that the usc theory in Horwich’s Meaning does not give sufficient attention to the relation between language and thought. A development of the theory is proposed that gives explanatory priority to the mental. The paper also urges that Horwich’s identification of a word’s meaning by its role in explaining the cause of sentences should be broadened to include its role in explaining the linguistic and non linguistic behavior that sentences cause. Part II argues that Horwich greatly overstates (...)
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  47.  24
    Michael Devitt (2014). Linguistic Intuitions and Cognitive Penetrability. Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication 9 (1).
  48.  29
    Michael Devitt (1990). Meanings Just Ain't in the Head. In George S. Boolos (ed.), Meaning and Method: Essays in Honor of Hilary Putnam. Cambridge University Press 79--104.
  49. Michael Devitt (2008). Realism/Anti-Realism. In Stathis Psillos & Martin Curd (eds.), Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Science. Routledge 224--235.
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  50.  17
    Michael Devitt (2009). Psychological Conception, Psychological Reality. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 9 (1):35-44.
    My book, Ignorance of Language, challenges the received Chomskian “ psychological conception” of grammars and proposes a “linguistic conception” according to which a grammar is a theory of a representational system. My response to Guy Longworth rejects his claim in “Ignorance of Linguistics” that there is “mutual determination” between linguistic and psychological facts with the result that both of these conceptions are true. Peter Slezak’s “Linguistic Explanation and ‘ Psychological Reality ’” is full of flagrant misrepresentations of my discussion of (...)
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