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Profile: Diana Raffman (University of Toronto)
  1. Diana Raffman, Music, Philosophy, and Cognitive Science.
    Philosophers of music (and also music theorists) have recognized for a long time that research in the sciences, especially psychology, might have import for their own work. (Langer 1941 and Meyer 1956 are good examples.) However, while scientists had been interested in music as a subject of research (e.g., Helmholtz 1912, Seashore 1938), the discipline known as psychology of music, or more broadly cognitive science of music, came into its own only around 1980 with the publication of several landmark works. (...)
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  2. Diana Raffman, Nontransitivity, Indiscriminability, and Looking the Same.
  3. Diana Raffman (2014). Unruly Words: A Study of Vague Language. Oup Usa.
    In Unruly Words, Diana Raffman advances a new theory of vagueness which, unlike previous accounts, is genuinely semantic while preserving bivalence. According to this new approach, called the multiple range theory, vagueness consists essentially in a term's being applicable in multiple arbitrarily different, but equally competent, ways, even when contextual factors are fixed.
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  4. Diana Raffman (2012). Indiscriminability and Phenomenal Continua. Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):309-322.
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  5. Henry S. Richardson, Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek, Peter Singer, Karen Jones, Sergio Tenenbaum, Diana Raffman, Simon Căbulea May, Stephen C. Makin & Nancy E. Snow (2012). 10. Douglas Portmore, Commonsense Consequentialism: Wherein Morality Meets Rationality Douglas Portmore, Commonsense Consequentialism: Wherein Morality Meets Rationality (Pp. 179-183). [REVIEW] Ethics 123 (1).
     
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  6. Sergio Tenenbaum & Diana Raffman (2012). Vague Projects and the Puzzle of the Self-Torturer. Ethics 123 (1):86-112.
    In this paper we advance a new solution to Quinn’s puzzle of the self-torturer. The solution falls directly out of an application of the principle of instrumental reasoning to what we call “vague projects”, i.e., projects whose completion does not occur at any particular or definite point or moment. The resulting treatment of the puzzle extends our understanding of instrumental rationality to projects and ends that cannot be accommodated by orthodox theories of rational choice.
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  7. Diana Raffman (2011). Vagueness and Observationality. In Giuseppina Ronzitti (ed.), Vagueness: A Guide. Springer Verlag. 107--121.
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  8. Diana Raffman (2010). Can We Do Without Concepts? [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 149 (3):423 - 427.
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  9. Diana Raffman (2009). Demoting Higher-Order Vagueness. In Sebastiano Moruzzi & Richard Dietz (eds.), Cuts and Clouds. Vaguenesss, its Nature and its Logic. Oxford University Press. 509--22.
    Higher-order vagueness is widely thought to be a feature of vague predicates that any adequate theory of vagueness must accommodate. It takes a variety of forms. Perhaps the most familiar is the supposed existence, or at least possibility, of higher-order borderline cases—borderline borderline cases, borderline borderline borderline cases, and so forth. A second form of higherorder vagueness, what I will call ‘prescriptive’ higher-order vagueness, is thought to characterize complex predicates constructed from vague predicates by attaching operators having to do with (...)
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  10. Diana Raffman (2008). 18 From the Looks of Things: The Explanatory Failure of Representationalism. In Edmond L. Wright (ed.), The Case for Qualia. Mit Press. 325.
    Representationalist solutions to the qualia problem are motivated by two fundamental ideas: first, that having an experience consists in tokening a mental representation1; second, that all one is aware of in having an experience is the intentional content of that representation. In particular, one is not aware of any intrinsic features of the representational vehicle itself. For example, when you visually experience a red object, you are aware only of the redness of the object, not any redness or red quale (...)
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  11. Diana Raffman (2005). Borderline Cases and Bivalence. Philosophical Review 114 (1):1-31.
    It is generally agreed that vague predicates like ‘red’, ‘rich’, ‘tall’, and ‘bald’, have borderline cases of application. For instance, a cloth patch whose color lies midway between a definite red and a definite orange is a borderline case for ‘red’, and an American man five feet eleven inches in height is (arguably) a borderline case for ‘tall’. The proper analysis of borderline cases is a matter of dispute, but most theorists of vagueness agree at least in the thought that (...)
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  12. Diana Raffman (2005). Even Zombies Can Be Surprised: A Reply to Graham and Horgan. Philosophical Studies 122 (2):189-202.
    In their paper “Mary, Mary, Quite Contrary” (2000), George Graham and Terence Horgan argue, contrary to a widespread view, that the socalled Knowledge Argument may after all pose a problem for certain materialist accounts of perceptual experience. I propose a reply to Graham and Horgan on the materialist’s behalf, making use of a distinction between knowing what it’s like to see something F and knowing how F things look.
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  13. Diana Raffman (2005). How to Understand Contextualism About Vagueness: Reply to Stanley. Analysis 65 (287):244–248.
    accounts in general, contrary to what he seems to think. Stanley’s discussion concerns the dynamic or ‘forced march’ version of the sorites, viz. the version framed in terms of the judgments that would be made by a competent speaker who proceeds step by step along a sorites series for a vague predicate ‘F’. According to Stanley, the contextualist treatment of the paradox is based on the idea that the speaker shifts the content of the predicate whenever necessary to make it (...)
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  14. Diana Raffman (2005). Review: Some Thoughts About "Thinking About Consciousness". [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1):163 - 170.
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  15. Diana Raffman (2005). Some Thoughts About Thinking About Consciousness. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1):163-170.
    David Papineau’s Thinking About Consciousness tells a skillful, inventive, and plausible story about why, given that the phenomenal character of conscious experience is an unproblematically physical property, we continue to suffer from “intuitions of dualism”. According to Papineau, we are misled by the peculiar structure of the phenomenal concepts we use to introspect upon that phenomenal character. Roughly: unlike physical concepts, phenomenal concepts exemplify the kind of experience they are concepts of; and this creates the mistaken impression that the physical (...)
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  16. Diana Raffman & José L. Zalabardo (2005). Externalism, Skepticism, and the Problem of Easy Knowledge. Philosophical Review 114 (1):33 - 61.
  17. Diana Raffman (2003). Is Twelve-Tone Music Artistically Defective? Midwest Studies in Philosophy 27 (1):69–87.
    Worries about the artistic integrity (for lack of a better term) of twelve-tone music are not new. Critics, philosophers, musicians, even composers them- selves have assailed the idiom with a fervor usually reserved for individual artists or works. Just why it is supposed to be defective is not entirely clear, however. I want to revisit these questions by way of putting some insights from music history and theory together with some insights from the philosophy and psychology of music. To find (...)
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  18. Diana Raffman (2000). Is Perceptual Indiscriminability Nontransitive? Philosophical Topics 28 (1):153-75.
    It is widely supposed that one family of sorites paradoxes, perhaps the most perplexing versions of the puzzle, owe at least in part to the nontransitivity of perceptual indiscriminability. To a first approximation, perceptual indiscriminability is the relationship obtaining among objects (stimuli) that appear identical in some perceptual respect—for example hue, or pitch, or texture. Indiscriminable objects look the same, or sound the same, or feel the same. Received wisdom has it that there are or could be series of objects (...)
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  19. Diana Raffman (1999). What Autism May Tell Us About Self-Awareness: A Commentary on Frith and Happe, Theory of Mind and Self Consciousness: What is It Like to Be Autistic?. Mind and Language 14:23-31.
  20. Diana Raffman (1999). What Autism May Tell Us About Self-Awareness: A Commentary on Frith and Happé. Mind and Language 14 (1):23–31.
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  21. Diana Raffman (1998). First-Person Authority and the Internal Reality of Beliefs. In C. Wright, B. Smith, C. Macdonald & the internal reality of beliefs. First-person authority (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds. Oxford University Press.
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  22. Diana Raffman (1996). Vagueness and Context-Relativity. Philosophical Studies 81 (2-3):175 - 192.
    This paper develops the treatment of vague predicates begun in my "Vagueness Without Paradox" (Philosophical Review 103, 1 [1994]). In particular, I show how my account of vague words dissolves an "eternal" version of the sorites paradox, i.e., a version in which the paradox is generated independently of any particular run of judgments of the items in a sorites series. In so doing I refine the notion of an internal contest, introduced in the earlier paper, and draw a distinction within (...)
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  23. Ruth Barcan Marcus, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Diana Raffman & Nicholas Asher (eds.) (1995). Modality, Morality, and Belief: Essays in Honor of Ruth Barcan Marcus. Cambridge University Press.
    Modality, morality and belief are among the most controversial topics in philosophy today, and few philosophers have shaped these debates as deeply as Ruth Barcan Marcus. Inspired by her work, a distinguished group of philosophers explore these issues, refine and sharpen arguments and develop new positions on such topics as possible worlds, moral dilemmas, essentialism, and the explanation of actions by beliefs. This 'state of the art' collection honours one of the most rigorous and iconoclastic of philosophical pioneers.
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  24. Diana Raffman (1995). Commentary. Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (Supplement):127-132.
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  25. Diana Raffman (1995). On the Persistence of Phenomenology. In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Ferdinand Schoningh. 293–308.
    In Thomas Metzinger, Conscious Experience, Schoningh Verlag. 1995. [ online ].
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  26. Diana Raffman (1995). Transvaluationism: Comments on Horgan. Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (S1):127-132.
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  27. Diana Raffman (1994). Vagueness Without Paradox. Philosophical Review 103 (1):41-74.
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  28. Roger Scruton, Peter Kivy, Jerrold Levinson, Malcolm Budd, Diana Raffman & Lydia Goehr (1994). Recent Books in the Philopshy of MusicMusic Alone: Philosophical Reflections on the Purely Musical Experience.Sound and Semblance: Reflections on Musical Representation.The Fine Art of Repetition: Essays in the Philosophy of Music.Music, Art and Metaphysics: Essays in Philosophical Aesthetics.Music and the Emotions: The Philosophical Theories.Language, Music and Mind.The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works: An Essay in the Philosophy of Music. [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 44 (177):503.
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  29. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Diana Raffman & Nicholas Asher (eds.) (1994). Modality, Morality and Belief. Essays in Honor of Ruth Barcan Marcus. Cambridge University Press.
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  30. Diana Raffman (1991). The Meaning of Music. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 16 (1):360-377.
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  31. Diana Raffman (1988). Toward a Cognitive Theory of Musical Ineffability. Review of Metaphysics 41 (4):685-706.
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