The traditional solution concept for noncooperative game theory is the Nash equilibrium, which contains an implicit assumption that playersâ probability distributions satisfy t probabilistic independence. However, in games with more than two players, relaxing this assumption results in a more general equilibrium concept based on joint beliefs (Vanderschraaf, 1995). This article explores the implications of this joint-beliefs equilibrium concept for two kinds of conflictual coordination games: crisis bargaining and public goods provision. We find that, using updating consistent with Bayesâ rule, (...) playersâ beliefs converge to equilibria in joint beliefs which do not satisfy probabilistic independence. In addition, joint beliefs greatly expand the set of mixed equilibria. On the face of it, allowing for joint beliefs might be expected to increase the prospects for coordination. However, we show that if players use joint beliefs, which may be more likely as the number of players increases, then the prospects for coordination in these games declines vis-Ã -vis independent beliefs. (shrink)
Human Nature After Darwin is an original investigation of the implications of Darwinism for our understanding of ourselves and our situation. It casts new light on current Darwinian controversies, and in doing so provides an introduction to philosophical reasoning and a range of philosophical problems. Janet Radcliffe Richards claims that many current battles about Darwinism, in particular about evolutionary psychology and religion, are based on mistaken assumptions about the implications of the rival views. Her analysis of these implications provides (...) a much-needed guide to the fundamentals of Darwinism and the so-called Darwin-wars, as well as providing a set of philosophical techniques relevant to wide areas of moral and political debate. It also raises philosophical problems of knowledge and certainly, free will and responsibility, altruism, the status of ethics, and the relevance of Darwinism to questions of ethics, politics and religion. The lucid presentation makes the book an ideal introduction to both philosophy and Darwinism, as well as a substantive contribution to topics of intense current controversy. It will be of interest to students of philosophy, science and the social sciences, and critical thinking. (shrink)
Banging on about Darwin: Hodge in context Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-5 DOI 10.1007/s11016-011-9550-4 Authors Evelleen Richards, Unit for History and Philosophy of Science, University of Sydney, PO Box 255, Thirroul, NSW 2515, Australia Journal Metascience Online ISSN 1467-9981 Print ISSN 0815-0796.
Considering the “Born-Alive” Rule and Possession of Sperm Following Death Content Type Journal Article Category Recent Developments Pages 323-327 DOI 10.1007/s11673-011-9324-0 Authors Bernadette Richards, Law School, The University of Adelaide, South Australia, Australia Bill Madden, School of Law, University of Western Sydney, Sydney, NSW, Australia Tina Cockburn, School of Law, Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane, Qld, Australia Journal Journal of Bioethical Inquiry Online ISSN 1872-4353 Print ISSN 1176-7529 Journal Volume Volume 8 Journal Issue Volume 8, Number 4.
Sale of Sperm, Health Records, Minimally Conscious States, and Duties of Candour Content Type Journal Article Category Recent Developments Pages 7-14 DOI 10.1007/s11673-011-9347-6 Authors Cameron Stewart, Centre for Health Governance, Law and Ethics, Sydney Law School, University of Sydney, Sydney, NSW, Australia 2006 Bernadette Richards, Law School, University of Adelaide, Adelaide, SA, Australia 5005 Richard Huxtable, Centre for Ethics in Medicine, University of Bristol, Bristol, BS8 1TH UK Bill Madden, School of Law, University of Western Sydney, Sydney, NSW, Australia (...) Tina Cockburn, School of Law, Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane, QLD, Australia Journal Journal of Bioethical Inquiry Online ISSN 1872-4353 Print ISSN 1176-7529 Journal Volume Volume 9 Journal Issue Volume 9, Number 1. (shrink)
Recent Developments Content Type Journal Article Pages 113-119 DOI 10.1007/s11673-011-9300-8 Authors Bernadette Richards, University of Adelaide, Adelaide, South Australia Bill Madden, School of Law, University of Western Sydney, Sydney, NSW, Australia Tina Cockburn, School of Law, Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane, Qld, Australia Journal Journal of Bioethical Inquiry Online ISSN 1872-4353 Print ISSN 1176-7529 Journal Volume Volume 8 Journal Issue Volume 8, Number 2.
In The Ethics of Parenthood Norvin Richards explores the moral relationship between parents and children from slightly before the cradle to slightly before the grave. Richards maintains that biological parents do ordinarily have a right to raise their children, not as a property right but as an instance of our general right to continue whatever we have begun. The contention is that creating a child is a first act of parenthood, hence it ordinarily carries a right to continue (...) as parent to that child. Implications are drawn for a wide range of cases, including those of Baby Jessica and Baby Richard, prenatal abandonment, babies switched at birth and sent home with the wrong parents, and families separated by war or natural disaster. A second contention is that children have a claim of their own to have their autonomy respected, and that this claim is stronger the better the grounds for believing that what the child's actions express is a self of the child's own. A final set of chapters concern parents and their grown children. Views are offered about what duties parents have at this stage of life, about what is required in order to treat grown children as adults, and about what obligations grown children have to their parents. In the final chapter Richards discusses the contention that parents sometimes have an obligation to die rather than permit their children to make the sacrifices needed to keep them alive, arguing that a leading view about this undervalues both love and autonomy. (shrink)
Richards's theory, then, fails on three counts. By illegitimately importing a premise from outside of the theory of evolution in order to construct a valid argument, Richards has failed to achieve his objective of deriving a moral theory exclusively from biological facts. By sliding from a causal use of “ought” to a moral one, Richards commits the fallacy of ambiguity. And by insisting that action from the motive of altruism is moral while claiming that an ethical theory (...) which justifies Hitler's camps must be judged false, Richards has falsified his own ethical theory. (shrink)
Norvin Richards, The Ethics of Parenthood Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-2 DOI 10.1007/s10677-011-9298-3 Authors Michael McFall, Department of Philosophy, Bowling Green State University, Bowling Green, OH 43403, USA Journal Ethical Theory and Moral Practice Online ISSN 1572-8447 Print ISSN 1386-2820.
As modern cultures become more secular, celebrities seem to fill the roles once occupied by the gods of old. Sometimes the differences between the two start to blur. Some people insist Elvis never died. Or was that Jim Morrison? The recent tributes to Princess Diana ten years after her death show that she is starting to ascend into the celebrity pantheon. Has Diana become a new kind of saint? If so, what does that tell us about some people’s (...) need to have someone to revere—preferably someone who did not live out a normal life-span? (shrink)
In his new book, "The Romantic Conception of Life: Science and Philosophy in the Age of Goethe," Robert J. Richards argues that Charles Darwin's true evolutionary roots lie in the German Romantic biology that flourished around the beginning of the nineteenth century. It is argued that Richards is quite wrong in this claim and that Darwin's roots are in the British society within which he was born, educated, and lived.
Ten years after her death, Princess Diana still has star power. The media are filled with tributes and retrospectives, and all over the world, the public seems to be avidly soaking it up. Has Diana become a new kind of saint, and if so, what does that tell us?
ABSTRACT On the surface, Diana Mutz's Hearing the Other Side is a work about empirical realities. But it is also an exercise in normative theory. Mutz's chief empirical findings are that people who are exposed to political disagreement tend to become less politically active and that, conversely, political activists tend not to hear views that challenge their own. These findings raise the question of whether participatory and deliberative ideals are compatible with each other, and, in addition, whether they are (...) either realistic or desirable. (shrink)
(2012). Teaching as a Design Science: Building Pedagogical Patterns for Learning and Technology. By Diana Laurillard. British Journal of Educational Studies: Vol. 60, Disciplinarity, Interdisciplinarity and Educational Studies – Past, Present and Future, pp. 448-450. doi: 10.1080/00071005.2012.742279.
Mining companies have long had a questionable reputation for social responsibility, especially in developing countries. In recent years, mining companies operating in developing countries have come under increased pressure as opponents have placed them under greater public scrutiny. Mining companies have responded by developing global corporate social responsibility strategies as part of their larger global business strategies. In these strategies, a prominent place is given to their relationship with local communities. For business ethics, one basic issue is whether such an (...) approach to corporate responsibility is likely to effectively address the development concerns of local communities in developing countries. This paper addresses this question by investigating how the corporate social responsibility agenda of a major minor company has been implemented by one of its subsidiaries in South Africa. (shrink)
In ''''A Defense of Evolutionary Ethics'''' (1986), Robert J. Richardsendeavors to explain how moral ''oughts'' can be derived from thescience of evolutionary biology without committing the dreadednaturalistic fallacy. First, Richards assumes that ''ought'' as usedin ethical discourse bears the same meaning as ''ought'' used anywherein science, indicating merely that certain results or behaviors arepredicted based on prior structured contexts. To this extent, themoral behavior of animals, what they ''ought'' to do, could arguablybe predicted by evolutionary biology as effectively as, (...) say,molecular behavior may be predicted by chemistry. But afteracknowledging that biological inferences to this limited senseof ''ought'' were never contested by Moore''s naturalistic fallacy,Richard proposes to add to evolutionary ethics a decision procedureto determine which members of a set of predicted behaviors arethose which truly ought to occur – in the genuinelyprescriptive sense intended by ethical discourse. But theprocedure which Richards fabricates for this purpose appealsto such alleged ''facts'' as cultural conventions and moral opinionpolling, hardly a secure foundation for the sort of scientific ethics promised by Richards at the outset. (shrink)