Dichotomies are ubiquitous in deliberative thinking, in decision making and in arguing in all spheres of life.[i] Sticking uncompromisingly to a dichotomy may lead to sharp disagreement and paradox, but it can also sharpen the issues at stake and help to find a solution. Dichotomies are particularly in evidence in debates, i.e., in argumentative dialogical exchanges characterized by their agonistic nature. The protagonists in a debate worth its name hold positions that are or that they take to be opposed; (...) they argue against each other’s positions; and they defend their positions from the adversary’s attacks. In some cases, this may lead to a polarization of the debate through treating it as grounded on one or more dichotomies. In others, the contenders may construe the opposition as non-dichotomous and therefore less irreconcilable. Whereas the former attitude, which leads to ‘dichotomization’, is likely to radicalize a debate, rendering it difficult – sometimes impossible – to resolve, the latter, which leads to ‘de-dichotomization’, opens possibilities of solution of the debate other than all out victory of one side and defeat of the other. In addition to its effect on the outcome of a debate, the contenders’ attitude towards dichotomies in the debate’s management has further, important implications. It is intrinsically connected with the typology of debates and their typical argumentative moves. For the appropriateness of one or the other of these attitudes for best capturing the nature of the antagonism that underlies a debate is in fact an indicator of the kind of debate it actually is or is perceived by the contenders to be. Furthermore, such ‘attitudes’ are expressed by the contenders’ preferred choices of argumentative moves; and these, in turn, can be recognized, in a given debate context, as subservient either to a dichotomizing or to a de-dichotomizing strategy vis-à-vis a dichotomy taken to be at the root of the divergence. (shrink)

In this essay I attempt to show the limitations of analytic thinking and the kinds of dead ends into which such analyses may lead us in the philosophy of sport. As an alternative, I argue for a philosophy of complementation and compatibility in the face of what appear to be exclusive alternatives. This is a position that is sceptical of bifurcations and other simplified portrayals of reality but does not dismiss them entirely. A philosophy of complementation traffics in the realm (...) of ambiguities, paradoxes, differences by degree, tendencies, mixtures, polarities, tensions, complexes, transitions and all other forms of messiness. I note that this position has been generated, in part, by work conducted in the empirical sciences and that complementation provides a paradigm that is useful across the academic disciplines. To show the ways in which analytic thinking leads to dead ends, I analyse the epistemological debate over ?broad internalism? engaged in by Russell (1999, 2004), Dixon (2003), Simon (2000, 2004) and Morgan (2004). Evidence for the claim that they reached a mostly unhelpful stalemate is based on the fact that they did not provide any third option and moreover that the analytic tools and ground rules they employ prevent its discovery. I suggest that all four authors are comfortable with the analytic tendency to bifurcate reality and require choices among exclusionary alternatives. I also claim that they treat reason as if it were generated by a ?mind from nowhere?. Philosophical anthropology, I suggest, provides much-needed somatic grounding that would reign in excessively optimistic views of reason (Dixon, Simon and Russell) or excessively plastic interpretations of mind (Morgan). It can also provide evidence that could help us understand why hominids (even modern ones) are so attracted to dichotomies and why we have so much trouble in reconciling apparent incompatibilities. (shrink)

In this reply to Professor Hookway’s lecture the comments are focused, first, on the topic of what dichotomies really are, since it is an illuminating way of understanding pragmatism in general and Putnam’s pragmatism in particular. Dichotomies are artifacts that we devise with some useful purpose in mind, but when inflated into absolute dichotomies they become metaphysical bogeys as it is illustrated by the twentieth century distinction between fact and value. Secondly, a brief comment on the so-called “thick” ethical concepts (...) and artifact terms is presented, and finally it is added a word on John L. Austin, whose approach to dichotomies is aligned with pragmatism and Putnam. (shrink)

We announce two new dichotomy theorems for Borel equivalence relations, and present the results in context by giving an overview of related recent developments.§1. Introduction. For X a Polish space and E a Borel equivalence relation on X, a classification of X up to E-equivalence consists of finding a set of invariants I and a map c : X → I such that xEy ⇔ c = c. To be of any value we would expect I and c to (...) be “explicit” or “definable”. The theory of Borel equivalence relations investigates the nature of possible invariants and provides a hierarchy of notions of classification.The following partial ordering is fundamental in organizing this study. Given equivalence relations E and F on X and Y, resp., we say that E can be Borel reduced to F, in symbolsif there is a Borel map f : X → Y with xEy ⇔ fFf. Then if is an embedding of X/E into Y/F, which is “Borel”.Intuitively, E ≤BF might be interpreted in any one of the following ways: The classi.cation problem for E is simpler than that of F: any invariants for F work as well for E. One can classify E by using as invariants F-equivalence classes. The quotient space X/E has “Borel cardinality” less than or equal to that of Y/F, in the sense that there is a “Borel” embedding of X/E into Y/F. (shrink)

We study the expressive power of independence-friendly quantifier prefixes composed of universal$\left$, existential$\left$, and majority quantifiers$\left$. We provide four quantifier prefixes that can express NP hard properties and show that all quantifier prefixes capable of expressing NP-hard properties embed at least one of these four quantifier prefixes. As for the quantifier prefixes that do not embed any of these four quantifier prefixes, we show that they are equivalent to a first-order quantifier prefix composed of$\forall x$,$\exists x$, and Mx. In unison, (...) our results imply a dichotomy result: every independence-friendly quantifier prefix is either decidable in LOGSPACE or NP hard. (shrink)

Discourses of ‘internationalisation’ of the curriculum of Western universities often describe the philosophies and paradigms of ‘Western’ and ‘Eastern’ scholarship in binary terms, such as ‘deep/surface’, ‘adversarial/harmonious’, and ‘independent/dependent’. In practice, such dichotomies can be misleading. They do not take account of the complexities and diversity of philosophies of education within and between their educational systems. The respective perceived virtues of each system are often extolled uncritically or appropriated for contemporary economic, political or social agendas. Critical thinking, deep learning, lifelong (...) and lifewide learning are heralded as the outcomes of Western education but these concepts are often under‐theorised or lack agreed meanings. Equally fuzzy concepts such as ‘Asian values’ or ‘Confucian education’ are eulogised as keys to successful teaching and learning when Asia prospers economically. They are also used to explain perceived undesirable behaviour such as plagiarism and uncritical thinking when Asian economies do not do so well. We argue that in general, educationists should be aware of the differences and complexities within cultures before they examine and compare between cultures. This paper uses the Confucian‐Western dichotomy as a case study to show how attributing particular unanalysed concepts to whole systems of cultural practice leads to misunderstandings and bad teaching practice. (shrink)

L’article traduit pour Clio HFS est le premier chapitre de Writing Women’s History : International Perspectives (1991), premier ouvrage édité par La Fédération internationale pour la recherche en histoire des femmes née en 1987. Il dissèque six dichotomies qui ont permis ou permettent encore de penser les relations entre hommes et femmes et l’écriture de leur passé. Si les trois premières (nature/culture, travail/famille, public/privé), profondément inscrites dans la culture occidentale moderne et source de hiérarchies et d’exclusions, ont été à la (...) fois utilisées et contestées par les historiennes des années 1970 et 1980, trois nouvelles ont surgi des débats intellectuels et politiques (sexe/genre, égalité/différence, intégration/autonomie). Ces nouvelles dichotomies doivent être aussi déconstruites et dépassées, pour aller de l’avant sur le plan politique et historiographique. (shrink)

L’article traduit pour Clio HFS est le premier chapitre de Writing Women’s History : International Perspectives (1991), premier ouvrage édité par La Fédération internationale pour la recherche en histoire des femmes née en 1987. Il dissèque six dichotomies qui ont permis ou permettent encore de penser les relations entre hommes et femmes et l’écriture de leur passé. Si les trois premières (nature/culture, travail/famille, public/privé), profondément inscrites dans la culture occidentale moderne et source de hiérarchies et d’exclusions, ont été à la (...) fois utilisées et contestées par les historiennes des années 1970 et 1980, trois nouvelles ont surgi des débats intellectuels et politiques (sexe/genre, égalité/différence, intégration/autonomie). Ces nouvelles dichotomies doivent être aussi déconstruites et dépassées, pour aller de l’avant sur le plan politique et historiographique. (shrink)

In this paper we use a series of examples to show how oppositions and dichotomies are fundamental in legal argumentation, and vitally important to be aware of, because of their twofold nature. On the one hand, they are argument structures underlying various kinds of rational argumentation commonly used in law as a means of getting to the truth in a conflict of opinion under critical discussion by two opposing sides before a tryer of fact. On the other hand, they are (...) argument structures underling moves made in strategic advocacy by both sides that function as platforms for different kinds of questionable argumentation tactics and moves that are in some instances tricky and deceptive. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Asian Students in Changing Australian Educational Contexts The CHC Student: From Deficit to Surplus Value The CHC Student and ‘Deep Learning’ Assumed Values of Western Education ‘Critical Thinking’ and Other ‘Western’ Values Implications for Teachers References.

We prove a strong dichotomy for the number of ultrapowers of a given model of cardinality ≤ 2ℵ0 associated with nonprincipal ultrafilters on ℕ. They are either all isomorphic, or else there are 22ℵ0 many nonisomorphic ultrapowers. We prove the analogous result for metric structures, including C*-algebras and II1 factors, as well as their relative commutants and include several applications. We also show that the CAF001-algebra [Formula: see text] always has nonisomorphic relative commutants in its ultrapowers associated with nonprincipal (...) ultrafilters on ℕ. (shrink)

Discourses of ‘internationalisation’ of the curriculum of Western universities often describe the philosophies and paradigms of ‘Western’ and ‘Eastern’ scholarship in binary terms, such as ‘deep/surface’, ‘adversarial/harmonious’, and ‘independent/dependent’. In practice, such dichotomies can be misleading. They do not take account of the complexities and diversity of philosophies of education within and between their educational systems. The respective perceived virtues of each system are often extolled uncritically or appropriated for contemporary economic, political or social agendas. Critical thinking, deep learning, lifelong (...) and lifewide learning are heralded as the outcomes of Western education but these concepts are often under‐theorised or lack agreed meanings. Equally fuzzy concepts such as ‘Asian values’ or ‘Confucian education’ are eulogised as keys to successful teaching and learning when Asia prospers economically. They are also used to explain perceived undesirable behaviour such as plagiarism and uncritical thinking when Asian economies do not do so well. We argue that in general, educationists should be aware of the differences and complexities within cultures before they examine and compare between cultures. This paper uses the Confucian‐Western dichotomy as a case study to show how attributing particular unanalysed concepts to whole systems of cultural practice leads to misunderstandings and bad teaching practice. (shrink)

Under the influence of Hilary Putnam’s collapse of the fact/value dichotomy, a resurging approach that challenges the movements of American pragmatism and discourse ethics, I tease out in the first section of my paper the demand for the warranted assertibility hypothesis in Putnam’s sense that may be possible, relying on moral realism to get rid of ‘rampant Platonism’. Tracing back to ‘communicative action’ or the Habermasian way that puts forward the reciprocal understanding of discourse instigates the idea of life-world (...) as composed of ‘culturally transmitted and linguistically organized stock of interpretative patterns’, this section looks for whether Habermas’ psychoanalysis of prolonged discussion can accord with Putnam’s thick ethical terms or not. The last section of the paper pitfalls Putnam’s stance to accepting Habermas’ ‘discourse ethics’ that centers around the context of entangling ‘rational thoughts’ to ‘communication’, but he introduces the idea of fallibilism in a rational query that also attacks the Habermasian metaphysical idea of the validity of ethical statements that goes towards the truth. My next attempt is to see whether Putnam’s objective dictum towards morality that resonates the collapse of fact/value dichotomy from a universalistic stand can successfully evade Rorty’s naive realism and Habermas’ ‘sociologism about values’ respectively. This sort of claim insists on a universalizable pattern of culture-relative value. I consider that the idea of a fact/value dichotomy engages with the inextricable entanglement between the normative and descriptive content, besides the epistemic values having exclusively intertwined with the structure of factual discourse that intends towards collapsing the fact/value dichotomy, a subjective universalizability predilection. (shrink)

In this reply to Professor Hookway's lecture the comments are focused, first, on the topic of what dichotomies really are, since it is an illuminating way of understanding pragmatism in general and Putnam's pragmatism in particular. Dichotomies are artifacts that we devise with some useful purpose in mind, but when inflated into absolute dichotomies they become metaphysical bogeys as it is illustrated by the twentieth century distinction between fact and value. Secondly, a brief comment on the so-called "thick" ethical concepts (...) and artifact terms is presented, and finally it is added a word on John L. Austin, whose approach to dichotomies is aligned with pragmatism and Putnam. (shrink)

Journal Name: Semiotica Issue: Ahead of print.

Field of education is associated with herculean task and innate responsibility of escorting societies forward. Across space and time, it has been an unambiguous synthesis that education should precede any progress or change. It helps humans to understand themselves and better their interaction with rest of the society. Hence the field of education and dissemination of knowledge is very much a pivotal entity in the evolution of human civilisation. No country in the globe over centuries could afford to flourish on (...) the paths of growth and development while ignoring the crucial role of education. Country like India where in there has been a perpetual struggle over the decades to overcome perils of colonisation and social stigmatisation reflective in terms of poverty, unemployment and illiteracy. In order to overcome these bottlenecks ‘knowledge dissemination’ must spearhead the change. Apart from other funding inadequacies, infrastructural lacunae, education sector in India has also been grappling with certain innate contradicting and counterproductive structures. Hence in this paper we have made an effort to address and assess the nature and impact of these dichotomies over the field of Education in India. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Kant-Studien Jahrgang: 110 Heft: 1 Seiten: 74-125.

The 2017 Riyadh Summit is one of the events that various media outlets densely covered. Drawing upon Van Dijk [ 53 ] Ideological Square, this study aims at identifying the in-group and out-group in ten pro-government Arab newspapers and investigating the discursive sub-strategies that were utilized in the representation of “us” and “them.” The findings reveal that most of the Arab newspapers tended to utilize a bundle of negative other-representation discursive sub-strategies to establish a dichotomy between “us” and “them” (...) and thus, construct “us” either directly or indirectly. It was found that negative lexicalization, distancing, and vagueness were the most frequently employed discursive sub-strategies in negative other-representation, while national self-glorification was the most frequently used discursive sub-strategies in positive self-representation. The study concludes by recommending other researchers to explore the same topic but in broadcast media, taking into account the prosodic aspects as well as the discourse itself. (shrink)

Purpose: The notion of dichotomy is central to Josef Mitterer’s work and he uses the term as a portmanteau. My paper characterizes the specific dichotomies he describes, uses C. K. Ogden’s work on “Opposition” to classify them, and reviews attempts to overcome incompatible oppositions in other disciplines. Approach: Conceptual analysis in an attempt to show some of the conceptual differences in the various types of opposition. A “sampler” indicates possible divisions. Findings: From the constructivist point of view, the notion (...) of dichotomy is a complex one and must be divided into separate types, not all of which can be discarded in rational discourse. Implications: From this author’s perspective, Mitterer’s publications present a powerful stand against the tradition of realism and lead one to hope that his next will be a primer of non-dualistic discourse. (shrink)

Abstract Under the influence of Hilary Putnam’s collapse of the fact/value dichotomy, a resurging approach that challenges the movements of American pragmatism and discourse ethics, I tease out in the first section of my paper the demand for the warranted assertibility hypothesis in Putnam’s sense that may be possible, relying on moral realism to get rid of ‘rampant Platonism’. Tracing back to ‘communicative action’ or the Habermasian way that puts forward the reciprocal understanding of discourse instigates the idea of (...) life-world as composed of ‘culturally transmitted and linguistically organized stock of interpretative patterns’, this section looks for whether Habermas’ psychoanalysis of prolonged discussion can accord with Putnam’s thick ethical terms or not. The last section of the paper pitfalls Putnam’s stance to accepting Habermas’ ‘discourse ethics’ that centers around the context of entangling ‘rational thoughts’ to ‘communication’, but he introduces the idea of fallibilism in a rational query that also attacks the Habermasian metaphysical idea of the validity of ethical statements that goes towards the truth. My next attempt is to see whether Putnam’s objective dictum towards morality that resonates the collapse of fact/value dichotomy from a universalistic stand can successfully evade Rorty’s naive realism (structured by linguistic representation) and Habermas’ ‘sociologism about values’ (a kind of minimalist ethics depending on solidarity) respectively. This sort of claim insists on a universalizable pattern of culture-relative value. I consider that the idea of a fact/value dichotomy engages with the inextricable entanglement between the normative and descriptive content, besides the epistemic values having exclusively intertwined with the structure of factual discourse that intends towards collapsing the fact/value dichotomy, a subjective universalizability predilection. (shrink)

A symposium with the title “Tradition, Modernity and Postmodernity: Eastern and Western Perspectives” is in need of a subtitle auch as “Overcoming Dichotomies.” Societies, as well as historical epochs, are complex and overlapping phenomena. A clash between complex civilizations will naturally be a complex encounter. The conflicting parties will always find kindred souls on the other side, motivated by converging interests and values. Modernity and secularism are not inseparable, and tradionality and secularism are not incompatible (see Confucian politology). Two main (...) philosophical reasons for the complexity of civilizations are the heterarchical structure of the human value system and the creative potential of human individuals. These highest values cannot be optimally realized at the same time. The potential for self-fulfillment that every human being has, thanks to his mental structures, excedes the potential for self-fulfillment a singular culture can provide. (shrink)

The paper explores Putnam's denial of the "fact/value dichotomy." After attempting to identify the main themes in this aspect of Putnam's thought, I explore its implications for our understanding of epistemic evaluation and also consider its relations to some similar moves by other philosophers in the pragmatist tradition. The final section examines an argument of Putnam's which is sued to suggest that such a dichotomy can be self defeating when applied to epistemic evaluation.

The article researches the historical transformation the dichotomy of civilization and barbarism, which was originally in ancient Greece without pejorative meaning. This dichotomy has become relevant today to justify the classification of states according to their degree of acceptance of “civilization standards,” which are understood as the standards of the European model of development. The main features of the stereotype of the divide between civilization and barbarism, which took shape in the Roman era, have survived to the present. (...) The premise of “civilizational superiority” of European culture is accompanied by a moral depreciation of other civilizations, turning a barbarian into an enemy of civilization with an explicit racist connotation. Civilization itself is seen as a “vaccination” in the process of missionary work. There emerges the concept of “Eastern barbarism,” coupled with the concepts of terra nullis and the innate irrational behavior of the population of these countries, which justify the seizing of territories for a “more rational” resource management. This activity is historically accompanied by colonization and, in the modern world, by forceful forms of “promoting democracy.” According to the logic of the divide between civilization and barbarism, non-Western countries are doomed to imitate and perpetually fall behind, which causes the disunity of society and internal hostility of “second-rate “Europeanized” nations. The Western mentoring has transformed from protectorate to the creation of governance structures that are headed by Western-educated local elites and are designed to change the cultural patterns of society. There was a conception that the world is divided into spheres, in the first circle of which there is a progressive civilized European world, followed by a number of countries similar in structure and values to the European model, and then there is a sphere of barbarism and backwardness. In the contemporary version, this theory presumes the division of states into “pre-modern,” modern, and post-modern states. It the conclusion, it is noted that this divide contradicts to the humane essence of culture and civilization process. (shrink)

Koriat & Goldsmith's thesis is provocative but has three problems: First, quantity and accuracy are not simply related, they are complementary. Second, the storehouse metaphor is not the driving force behind contemporary theories of memory and may not be viable. Third, the taxonomy is incomplete, leaving unclassified several extremely influential methods and measures, such as priming and response latency.

That dichotomization is, at least under certain circumstances, a bad idea is not news. A well-known, early example is the biblical story of King Solomon, who used the absurdity of the procedure to help adjudicate a dispute between two women who each claimed to be the mother of a contested child. Solomon reasoned that his proposal to split the child into two, giving half to each woman, would be abhorrent to the real mother, and when one of the women objected (...) while the other thought the proposal was "only fair," the choice between the women was made obvious.Things, however, are not always so clear-cut, and it is not difficult to find arguments that point to the advantages that accrue to those that simplify matters.... (shrink)

Strengthening known instances of Vaught Conjecture, we prove the Glimm-Effros dichotomy theorems for countable linear orderings and for simple trees. Corollaries of the theorems answer some open questions of Friedman and Stanley in an L ω 1ω -interpretability theory. We also give a survey of this theory.

Let X be a separable Banach space and Q be a coanalytic subset of . We prove that the set of sequences in X which are weakly convergent to some eX and is a coanalytic subset of . The proof applies methods of effective descriptive set theory to Banach space theory. Using Silver’s Theorem [J. Silver, Every analytic set is Ramsey, J. Symbolic Logic 35 60–64], this result leads to the following dichotomy theorem: if X is a Banach space, (...) is a regular method of summability and is a bounded sequence in X, then there exists a subsequence iL such that either there exists eX such that every subsequence iH of iL is weakly summable w.r.t. to e and QiH,e); or for every subsequence iH of iL and every eX with QiH,e)the sequence iH is not weakly summable to e w.r.t. . This is a version for weak convergence of an Erdös–Magidor result, see [P. Erdös, M. Magidor, A note on Regular Methods of Summability, Proc. Amer. Math. Soc. 59 232–234]. Both theorems obtain some considerable generalizations. (shrink)

In the presence of large cardinals, or sufficient determinacy, every equivalence relation in L(R) either admits a wellordered separating family or continuously reduces E 0.

In 1979, H. Lewis shows that the computational complexity of the Boolean satisfiability problem dichotomizes, depending on the Boolean operations available to formulate instances: intractable (NP-complete) if negation of implication is definable, and tractable (in P) otherwise [21]. Recently, an investigation in the same spirit has been extended to nonclassical propositional logics, modal logics in particular [2, 3]. In this note, we pursue this line in the realm of many-valued propositional logics, and obtain complexity classifications for the parameterized satisfiability problem (...) of two pertinent samples, Kleene and Gödel logics. (shrink)

A misleading and apparently addictive practice is now prevalent in discussions of philosophy in general, and moral philosophy in particular. This is the habit of dichotomizing. We are led to believe that we have to choose between reason and sentiment as the basis of morality, that facts and values are to be found on either side of an unbridgeable gulf, and so on. This practice is harmful because it leads philosophers to take sides in unnecessary conflicts which cannot be won (...) by either side, and thus prevents progress in the discussion of extremely important issues. (shrink)

We give an overview of a research line concentrated on finding to which extent compactness fails at the level of first uncountable cardinal and to which extent it could be recovered on some other perhaps not so large cardinal. While this is of great interest to set theorists, one of the main motivations behind this line of research is in its applicability to other areas of mathematics. We give some details about this and we expose some possible directions for further (...) research. (shrink)

The article researches the historical transformation of the dichotomy of civilization and barbarism, which originally in ancient Greece did not have a pejorative connotation. This dichotomy has become relevant today to justify the classification of states according to their degree of acceptance of “civilization standards,” which are understood as the standards of the European model of development. The main features of the stereotype of the divide between civilization and barbarism, which took shape in the Roman era, have survived (...) to the present. The premise of “civilizational superiority” of European culture is accompanied by a moral depreciation of other civilizations, turning a barbarian into an enemy of civilization with an explicit racist connotation. Civilization itself is seen as a “vaccination” in the process of missionary work. There emerges the concept of “Eastern barbarism,” coupled with the concepts of terra nullis and the innate irrational behavior of the population of these countries, which justify the seizing of territories for a “more rational” resource management. This activity is historically accompanied by colonization and, in the modern world, by forceful forms of “promoting democracy.” According to the logic of the divide between civilization and barbarism, non-Western countries are doomed to imitate and perpetually fall behind, which causes the disunity of society and internal hostility of “second-rate Europeanized” nations. The Western mentoring has transformed from protectorate to the creation of governance structures that are headed by Western-educated local elites and are designed to change the cultural patterns of society. There was a conception that the world is divided into spheres, in the first circle of which there is a progressive civilized European world, followed by a number of countries similar in structure and values to the European model, and then there is a sphere of barbarism and backwardness. In the contemporary version, this theory presumes the division of states into “pre-modern,” modern, and post-modern states. It the conclusion, it is noted that this divide contradicts to the humane essence of culture and civilization process. (shrink)

A misleading and apparently addictive practice is now prevalent in discussions of philosophy in general, and moral philosophy in particular. This is the habit of dichotomizing. We are led to believe that we have to choose between reason and sentiment as the basis of morality, that facts and values are to be found on either side of an unbridgeable gulf, and so on. This practice is harmful because it leads philosophers to take sides in unnecessary conflicts which cannot be won (...) by either side, and thus prevents progress in the discussion of extremely important issues. (shrink)

SummaryThe dichotomy between ‘scientific’ and ‘practical’ approaches to guideline development is false and divisive. Instead we should concentrate on developing mechanisms to develop and implement valid guidelines to improve patient care. The development of valid guidelines requires considerable expertise and is time consuming and expensive. It is most efficiently done at a regional or national level. The implementation of valid guidelines requires local action including the identification and modification of valid guidelines and a coordinated evidence-based implementation strategy (Grimshaw & (...) Eccles 1998). (shrink)

The debate about the nature of the representational format of concepts seems to have reached an impasse. The debate faces two fundamental problems. Firstly, amodalists (i.e., those who argue that concepts are represented by amodal symbols) and modalists (i.e., those who see concepts as involving crucially representations including sensorimotor information) claim that the same empirical evidence is compatible with their views. Secondly, there is no shared understanding of what a modal or amodal format amounts to. Both camps recognize that the (...) two formats play essential roles in higher cognition, leading to an increasing number of hybrid proposals. In this paper, I argue that the existence of those fundamental problems should make us suspicious about a modal/amodal dichotomy. Also, I suggest that hybrid approaches, as they currently stand, do not provide suitable solutions to the impasse. Instead, we should overcome the dichotomy and treat the modal/amodal distinction as a graded phenomenon. I illustrate this hypothesis with an example of a cognitive-computational model of concepts based on the Predictive Processing framework. (shrink)

In this paper we consider the normal modal logics of elementary classes defined by first-order formulas of the form \. We prove that many properties of these logics, such as finite axiomatisability, elementarity, axiomatisability by a set of canonical formulas or by a single generalised Sahlqvist formula, together with modal definability of the initial formula, either simultaneously hold or simultaneously do not hold.