Online research in philosophy

A Criticism misjudging itself too. On the Deficiency of Reflection in Formal Explications. The criticism formulated by L. B. Puntel concerning the theory of dialectic proposed by the author is rejected. Puntel's attempt at explicating predication by means of (second order) predicate logic fails: It misjudges predication being already presupposed for the possibility of predicate logic, thus belonging to the transcendental conditions of formal predicate logic, so that predication itself cannot be further explicated by means of such logic. What is (...) in fact criticized by Puntel is something like an artefact of formalization. The unreflected application of formal logic here generates problems instead of solving them. (shrink)

Summary Kant's characterization of organic inities by the principle of aninner, and that is to say, immanently natural andmind-independent purposiveness has continued to retain validity. Difficulties however exist for Kant's theory from theconditions of their realization. The following inquiry attempts to describe to what extent this difficulty has currently found asystem-theoretical solution: The realizability of cyclical causal relationships proves itself here to be a fundamental prerequisite. The possibility forself-regulating systems thus consequently ensues. Decisive for the cybernetical reconstructability ofinner purposiveness is (...) however the evidence that the principle of self-regulation — which has apparently been misunderstood in recent discussions (Jonas, Spaemann, Löw) includes not only the possibility of active goalpursuance (robots) but, additionally, the possibility forexistential self-reference (organism). This has fostered greater insight into hownormative instances can be establish upon a purely physical basis. The status ofinformation will then accordingly be questioned. This inquiry closes with a look to possibleontological consequences. (shrink)

Summary The well-knownempiristical apories of the law of nature prevent until this day an adequate philosophical interpretation ofempirical science. Clarification can only be expected through animmanent refutation of the empiristical point of view. In this sense it is proved in this paper thatHume's argumentation, paradigmatic for modern empirism, is not just one-sided, but simplyinconsistent: Anyone who claimes experience to be the basis of all knowledge (as the empirist does), and, due to this, denies that the lawlike character of nature can (...) be substantiated,has, in fact, always presupposed the lawfullness of nature, i. e. has assumed theontology of a nature lawful in itself. If this lawfullness is, more closely, understood asdependency on conditions, then the functional character of the laws of nature is involved with the consequence thatverification is not only to be understood as a mere repetition of instances of the law but as a verification of theconditional texture defined in it. Furthermore does the functionality of the law of nature also include a statement on itsinvariance (against certain transformations). This throws a new light on theproblem of induction. In this kontext it cannot be surprising that the notorious neglect of the functional aspect in the context of modern empirism has led to fundamental problems with the concept of the law of nature. (shrink)

Zusammenfassung Die strikte Trennung von Objekt- und Metasprache wird aufgrund des vorgeschlagenen Verfahrens zur Vermeidung von Antinomien nicht nur überflüssig, sondern inakzeptabel. Andererseits führt die Vereinigung eines formalen Systems mit seiner Metatheorie zum Gödelschen Unvollständigkeitsproblem. Daß dieses nicht durch Modifizierungen des Beweisbarkeitsbegriffs eliminierbar ist, findet hier, wie gezeigt wird, seine Erklärung darin, daß der zugrundeliegende Sachverhalttatsächlich nicht beweistheoretischer, sondern sprachlicher Natur ist: Reflexive Unbeweisbarkeitsaussagen sind (bei vorausgesetzter Korrektheit des Systems)stets unbeweisbar und wahr zugleich. Damit wird Gödels Problem nun in anderer (...) Weise eliminierbar; durch (axiomatische) Beseitigung eben jener reflexiven Unbeweisbarkeitsaussagen. (shrink)