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Profile: Dirk Greimann
  1. Dirk Greimann (2014). Frege on Truth, Assertoric Force and the Essence of Logic. History and Philosophy of Logic 35 (3):272-288.
    In a posthumous text written in 1915, Frege makes some puzzling remarks about the essence of logic, arguing that the essence of logic is indicated, properly speaking, not by the word ‘true’, but by the assertoric force. William Taschek has recently shown that these remarks, which have received only little attention, are very important for understanding Frege's conception of logic. On Taschek's reconstruction, Frege characterizes logic in terms of assertoric force in order to stress the normative role that the logical (...)
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  2. Dirk Greimann (2012). A caracterização da lógica pela força assertórica em Frege. Resposta a Marco Ruffino. Manuscrito 35 (1):61-83.
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  3. Dirk Greimann (2012). A Typology of Conceptual Explications. Disputatio 4 (34).
    Greimann-Dirk_A-typology-of-conceptual-explications.
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  4. Dirk Greimann (2012). Frege's Characterisation of Logic in Terms of Assertoric Force. Manuscrito 35 (1):61-83.
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  5. Dirk Greimann (2010). Davidson's Criticism of the Proximal Theory of Meaning. Principia 9 (1-2):73-86.
    According to the proximal theory of meaning, which is to be found in Quine’s early writings, meaning is determined completely by the correlation of sentences with sensory stimulations. Davidson tried to show that this theory is untenable because it leads to a radical form of skepticism. The present paper aims to show, first, that Davidson’s criticism is not sound, and, second, that nonetheless the proximal theory is untenable because it has a very similar and equally unacceptable consequence: it implies that (...)
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  6. Dirk Greimann (2009). Contextual Definition and Ontological Commitment. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (3):357 – 373.
    In almost all of his writings on ontology, Quine celebrated the discovery of contextual definition as a milestone of the history of philosophy. The philosophical appeal of this tool resides in the hope that it allows us to reduce the ontological commitments of theories in substantial ways. The goal of this paper is to show that contextual definition does not really come up to this hope. It is argued that the material adequacy of such definitions presupposes a very (...)
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  7. Dirk Greimann (2008). Does Frege Use a Truth-Predicate in His ‘Justification’ of the Laws of Logic? A Comment on Weiner. Mind 117 (466):403-425.
    Joan Weiner has recently claimed that Frege neither uses, nor has any need to use, a truth-predicate in his justification of the logical laws. She argues that because of the assimilation of sentences to proper names in his system, Frege does not need to make use of the Quinean device of semantic ascent in order to formulate the logical laws, and that the predicate ‘is the True’, which is used in Frege's justification, is not to be considered as a truth-predicate, (...)
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  8. Dirk Greimann (2008). A Negação Fregeana Do Número 2. O Que Nos Faz Pensar:41-50.
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  9. Dirk Greimann (2008). Multiplying Entities Without Necessity: What Does “Necessity” Mean in This Context? Manuscrito 31 (1):79-94.
    The aim of this paper is to defend Ockham’s razor against the objection recently made by Oswaldo Chateaubriand that we do not know how to decide which entities are necessary and which are not. The main thesis defended is that this distinction can be adequately explained in terms of the notion of ontological reducibility. It is argued that Oswaldo’s objections against this approach are not conclusive.
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  10. Dirk Greimann (2007). Did Frege Really Consider Truth as an Object? Grazer Philosophische Studien 75 (1):125-148.
    It is commonly assumed that the conception of truth defended by Frege in his mature period is characterized by the view that truth is not the property denoted by the predicate 'is true', but the object named by true sentences. In the present paper, I wish to make plausible an alternative interpretation according to which Frege's conception is characterized by the view that truth is what is expressed in natural language by the "form of the assertoric sentence". So construed, truth (...)
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  11. Dirk Greimann (2007). Editorial. Grazer Philosophische Studien 75.
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  12. Dirk Greimann (ed.) (2007). Essays on Frege’s Conception of Truth. Rodopi.
    In his writings on the foundations of logic, Gottlob Frege, the father of modern logic, sketched a conception of truth that focuses on the following questions: What is the sense of the word “true”? Is truth a definable concept or a primitive one? What are the kinds of things of which truth is predicated? What is the role of the concept of truth in judgment, assertion and recognition? What is the logical category of truth? What is the significance of the (...)
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  13. Dirk Greimann (2007). Of Truth1. In Geo Siegwart & Dirk Griemann (eds.), Truth and Speech Acts: Studies in the Philosophy of Language. Routledge 5--90.
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  14. Dirk Greimann (2007). Regeln für das korrekte Explizieren von Begriffen. Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 61 (3):261 - 282.
    Obwohl das Explizieren von Begriffen wesentlicher Bestandteil der philosophischen Theoriebildung ist, finden sich nur wenige Arbeiten, die der Frage nachgehen, nach welchen methodischen Regeln diese Kunst auszuüben ist. Die vorliegende Arbeit will zur Schließung dieser Lücke beitragen. Es wird eine allgemeine Theorie der Begriffsexplikation skizziert, die an Vorarbeiten anknüpft, die von Geo Siegwart in neueren Schriften geleistet wurden. Die hauptsächlichen Ziele der Theorie sind: die adäquate Explikation von „Explikation“; die Bestimmung der Faktoren, von denen die Adäquatheit einer Explikation abhängt, wie (...)
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  15. Dirk Greimann & Geo Siegwart (eds.) (2007). Truth and Speech Acts: Studies in the Philosophy of Language. Routledge.
    This innovative collection addresses such themes as: the relation between the concept of truth and the success conditions of assertions and kindred speech acts the linguistic devices of expressing the truth of a proposition the relation ...
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  16. Dirk Greimann & Robson dos Reis (2006). Apresentação: Anais do I Simpósio Internacional de Filosofia Verdade como Valor. O Que Nos Faz Pensar:5-13.
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  17. Dirk Greimann (2004). Berichte und Diskussionen: Ist die Ethik Kants ontologisch unschuldig? Kant-Studien 95 (1):107-127.
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  18. Dirk Greimann (2004). Chateaubriand's View of Truth as Identification. Some Critical Remarks. Manuscrito 27 (1):79-85.
    Chateaubriand’s view of truth as identification is based on the assumption that there is a close parallelism between sentences and definite descriptions with regard to their connection with reality. The paper aims to show that this parallelism does not actually obtain.
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  19. Dirk Greimann (2004). Frege's Puzzle About the Cognitive Function of Truth. Inquiry 47 (5):425 – 442.
    The aim of this paper is to give a detailed reconstruction of Frege's solution to his puzzle about the cognitive function of truth, which is this: On the one hand, the concept of truth seems to play an essential role in acquiring knowledge because the transition from the mere hypothetical assumption that p to the acknowledgement of its truth is a crucial step in acquiring the knowledge that p, while, on the other hand, this concept seems to be completely redundant (...)
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  20. Dirk Greimann (2004). Ist Kants Ethik ontologisch unschuldig? Kant-Studien 95 (1):107-127.
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  21. Dirk Greimann (2003). Das Ontologische Dilemma der Normativen Ethik. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 34 (1):15-41.
    The Ontological Dilemma of Normative Ethics. This paper pursues two goals. The first is to show that normative ethics is confronted with the following dilemma: to be coherent, this discipline is ontologically committed to acknowledge the existence of objective values, but, to be scientifically respectable, it is committed to repudiate such values. The second goal is to assess the possible solutions to this dilemma. To this end, the following strategies are discussed: Kant’s constructive objectivism, Jürgen Habermas’ “epistemic ersatzism”, Franz von (...)
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  22. Dirk Greimann (2003). Das Wahre Und Das Falsche Studien Zu Freges Auffassung von Wahrheit.
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  23. Dirk Greimann (2003). Frege's Horizontal and the Liar-Paradox. Manuscrito 26 (2):359-387.
    According to Peter Aczel, the inconsistency of Frege’s system in Grundgesetze is due, not to the introduction of sets, as is usually thought, but to the introduction of the Horizontal. His argument is that the principles governing sets are intuitively correct and therefore consistent, while the scheme introducing the Horizontal amounts to an internal definition of truth conflicting with Tarski’s classic result on the undefinability of truth in the object language. The aim of this paper is to show that the (...)
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  24. Dirk Greimann (2003). Is Zalta's Individuation of Intensional Entities Circular. Metaphysica 2 (2):93-101.
     
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  25. Dirk Greimann (2003). „Jacksons Argument des unvollständigen Wissens und die Identitätstheorie der Wahrheit. Facta Philosophica: Internazionale Zeitschrift für Gegenwartsphilosophie: International Journal for Contemporary Philosophy 5 (1-2):87-104.
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  26. Dirk Greimann (2003). Kants Derivation of the Formula of the Categorical Imperative From Its Mere Concept. Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy 6.
    This paper aims to reconstruct Kant’s derivation with the help of the resources of speech act theory. The main exegetical hypothesis is that the derivation envisaged by Kant consists in deriving the formula from the success-conditions of giving categorical imperatives. These conditions, which are analogous to the success-conditions of giving ordinary orders, contain restrictions for the successful construction of a system of moral laws that determine what the content of moral laws must be.
     
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  27. Dirk Greimann (2003). What is Frege's Julius Caesar Problem? Dialectica 57 (3):261–278.
    This paper aims to determine what kind of problem Frege's famous “Julius Caesar problem” is. whether it is to be understood as the metaphysical problem of determining what kind of things abstract objects like numbers or value‐courses are, or as the epistemological problem of providing a means of recognizing these objects as the same again, or as the logical problem of providing abstract sortal concepts with a sharp delimitation in order to fulfill the law of excluded middle, or as the (...)
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  28. Dirk Greimann (2003). Zum Realitätsbereich der Semantik: Skizze einer Theorie der "Semantischen Verpflichtung". Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 57 (2):188 - 210.
    Nach Auffassung von Quine ist der Realitätsbereich der Semantik auf den Bereich des beobachtbaren Sprachverhaltens beschränkt. Fragen der sprachlichen Bedeutung und sprachlichen Bezugs, die über das hinausgehen, was sich durch die Erforschung des öffentlich beobachtbaren Sprachverhalten herausbekommen lässt, sind dieser Auffassung nach keine "Tatsachenfragen", d.h. sie haben kein Fundament in der Realität. Die Arbeit verfolgt das Ziel, anhand des Aufbaus einer Theorie der "semantischen Verpflichtung" zu zeigen, dass Quines Beschränkung der semantischen Tatsachen nicht akzeptabel ist. Den Kern der Theorie bildet (...)
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  29. Dirk Greimann (2002). Grundriss einer sprechaktanalytischen Theorie der Wahrheit. Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 56 (2):191 - 219.
    Es wird ein neuer Ansatz zur Analyse des Wahrheitsbegriffs vorgestellt und verteidigt, der sich von Freges Einsicht leiten lässt, dass die "Form" des Behauptungssatzes das eigentliche Mittel der Sprache ist, um das Wahrsein von etwas auszudrücken. Die Kernthesen sind: 1. die Anwendung des Wahrheitsbegriffs ist eine wesentliche Konstituente des Behauptens und anderer elementarer Sprechakte; 2. dieser illokutionäre Gebrauch des Wahrheitsbegriffs ist primär gegenüber dem prädikativen Gebrauch ; 3. Wahrheit ist das, was in der natürlichen Sprache durch die Form des Behauptungssatzes (...)
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  30. Jose L. Bermiidez, Nino Cocchiarella, Dirk Greimann, Leila Haaparanta, Ludger Jansen, Dale Jacquette, Reinhard Kahle, Franz von Kutschera, Wolfgang Neuser & Priv Doz Dr Christof Rapp (2001). Liste der Autoren List of Contributors. Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy 4:239.
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  31. Dirk Greimann (2001). Individuating Abstract Objects: The Methodologies of Frege and Quine. Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy 4.
    According to Frege, the introduction of a new sort of abstract object is methodologically sound only if its identity conditions have been satisfactorily explained. Ironically, this ontological restriction has come to be known by Quine's criticism of Frege's intensional semantics, as the precept "No entity without identity." The aim of the paper is to reconstruct Frege's methodology of the introduction of abstract objects in detail, and to defend it against the more restrictive methodology underlying Quine's criticism of the recognition of (...)
     
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  32. Dirk Greimann (2000). Explicating Truth: Minimalism and Primitivism. [REVIEW] Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 31 (1):133-155.
    This paper pursues two goals. The first is to show that Horwich's anti-primitivist version of minimalism must be rejected because, already for formal reasons, the truth-schema does not achieve a positive explication of any property of propositions. The second goal is to develop a more moderate primitivist version of minimalism according to which the truth-schema is admittedly powerless to underpin truth with something more basic but it still succeeds in giving a complete account of the necessary and sufficient conditions for (...)
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  33. Dirk Greimann (2000). "No Entity Without Identity":: A Reductionist Dogma? Grazer Philosophische Studien 60:13-29.
    Quine has persuasively shown that the empiricist "dogma of reductionism", which is the belief that each meaningfiil statement of science can be reduced to statements about immediate sense experience, must be abandoned. However, Quine's methodology of ontology seems to incorporate an analogous physicalistic dogma according to which the identity conditions of each scientifically respectable sort of abstract objects can be reduced to the identity conditions of physical objects. This paper aims to show that the latter dogma must be abandoned, too. (...)
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  34. Dirk Greimann (2000). No Entity Without Identity. Grazer Philosophische Studien 60:13-29.
    Quine has persuasively shown that the empiricist "dogma of reductionism", which is the belief that each meaningfiil statement of science can be reduced to statements about immediate sense experience, must be abandoned. However, Quine's methodology of ontology seems to incorporate an analogous physicalistic dogma according to which the identity conditions of each scientifically respectable sort of abstract objects can be reduced to the identity conditions of physical objects. This paper aims to show that the latter dogma must be abandoned, too. (...)
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  35. Dirk Greimann (1997). Die Idee Hinter Tarskis Definition Von Wahrheit. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 28 (1):121-158.
    The Idea behind Tarski's Definition of Truth. In Tarski's presentations of his truth-definition, the steps of the construction are not sufficiently explained. It is not clear, on what general strategy the construction is based, what the fundamental ideas are, how some crucial steps work, and especially how the transition from the definition of satisfaction to the definition of truth should be understood. The paper shows that the account given in the model-theoretic literature, which is supported by Tarski's lemmata A and (...)
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  36. Dirk Greimann (1996). Die impliziten Prämissen in Quines Kritik der semantischen Begriffe. Grazer Philosophische Studien 51:195-235.
    Quines Kritik an den grundlegenden semantischen Begriffen hat zwei wesentliche Prämissen: erstens daß die Linguistik als wissenschaftliche Disziplin der methodischen Restriktion unterstellt ist, empirisch sinnlose Hypothesen und Begriffe abzulehnen, und zweitens, daß die semantischen Begriffe tatsächlich empirisch sinnlos sind. Um die Überzeugungskraft der Ausführungen Quines untersuchen zu können, werden zunächst die verschiedenen Versionen von seiner Kritik analysiert, klar gegeneinander abgegerenzt und in die Form expliziter Argumentationen gebracht. Prämissen, die in die jeweiligen Versionen implizit eingehen, werden rekonstruiert und darauf hin untersucht, (...)
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  37. Dirk Greimann (1995). Reviews. [REVIEW] Logic Journal of the Igpl 3 (4):675-679.
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  38. Dirk Greimann (1994). Freges These der Undefinierbarkeit von Wahrheit. Grazer Philosophische Studien 47:77-114.
    Der erste Teil des Aufsatzes untersucht den Inhalt der These. Im Zentrum steht dabei die Frage, was Frege unter ,,Wahrheit" versteht. Das Ergebnis der Untersuchung ist, daß Freges Undefinierbarkeitsthese (entgegen der üblichen Auffassung) sich nicht auf den „Inhalt des Wortes ,wahr'" (bzw. auf das Wahrheitsprädikat) bezieht, sondern auf „die Wahrheit, deren Anerkennung in der Form des Behauptungssatzes liegt" (bzw. auf den Urteilsstrich. Das Kernstück des zweiten Teils der Arbeit ist eine Rekonstruktion der Argumente Freges für die These in drei Versionen. (...)
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