Search results for 'Disorder' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Lubomira Radoilska (2012). Personal Autonomy, Decisional Capacity, and Mental Disorder. In Autonomy and Mental Disorder. Oxford University Press
    In this Introduction, I situate the underlying project “Autonomy and Mental Disorder” with reference to current debates on autonomy in moral and political philosophy, and the philosophy of action. I then offer an overview of the individual contributions. More specifically, I begin by identifying three points of convergence in the debates at issue, stating that autonomy is: 1) a fundamentally liberal concept; 2) an agency concept and; 3) incompatible with (severe) mental disorder. Next, I explore, in (...)
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  2. Sanneke de Haan, Erik Rietveld, Martin Stokhof & Damiaan Denys (2015). Effects of Deep Brain Stimulation on the Lived Experience of Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder Patients. PLoS ONE 10 (8):1-29.
    Deep Brain Stimulation (DBS) is a relatively new, experimental treatment for patients suffering from treatment-refractory Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD). The effects of treatment are typically assessed with psychopathological scales that measure the amount of symptoms. However, clinical experience indicates that the effects of DBS are not limited to symptoms only: patients for instance report changes in perception, feeling stronger and more confident, and doing things unreflectively. Our aim is to get a better overview of the whole variety of changes (...)
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  3.  60
    Sanneke de Haan, Erik Rietveld, Martin Stokhof & Damiaan Denys (2013). The Phenomenology of Deep Brain Stimulation-Induced Changes in Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder Patients: An Enactive Affordance-Based Model. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 7:1-14.
    People suffering from Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (OCD) do things they do not want to do, and/or they think things they do not want to think. In about 10 percent of OCD patients, none of the available treatment options is effective. A small group of these patients is currently being treated with deep brain stimulation (DBS). Deep brain stimulation involves the implantation of electrodes in the brain. These electrodes give a continuous electrical pulse to the brain area in which they are (...)
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  4.  68
    Tamara Kayali Browne (2015). Is Premenstrual Dysphoric Disorder Really a Disorder? Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 12 (2):313-330.
    Premenstrual dysphoric disorder was recently moved to a full category in the DSM-5 . It also appears set for inclusion as a separate disorder in the ICD-11 . This paper argues that PMDD should not be listed in the DSM or the ICD at all, adding to the call to recognise PMDD as a socially constructed disorder. I first present the argument that PMDD pathologises understandable anger/distress and that to do so is potentially dangerous. I then present (...)
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  5. Christopher James Ryan (2009). Out on a Limb: The Ethical Management of Body Integrity Identity Disorder. Neuroethics 2 (1):21-33.
    Body integrity identity disorder (BIID), previously called apotemnophilia, is an extremely rare condition where sufferers desire the amputation of a healthy limb because of distress associated with its presence. This paper reviews the medical and philosophical literature on BIID. It proposes an evidenced based and ethically informed approach to its management. Amputation of a healthy limb is an ethically defensible treatment option in BIID and should be offered in some circumstances, but only after clarification of the diagnosis and consideration (...)
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  6.  73
    Marga Reimer (2008). Psychopathy Without (the Language of) Disorder. Neuroethics 1 (3):185-198.
    Psychopathy is often characterized in terms of what I call “the language of disorder.” I question whether such language is necessary for an accurate and precise characterization of psychopathy, and I consider the practical implications of how we characterize psychopathy—whether as a biological, or merely normative, disorder.
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  7.  8
    Alexandre Erler & Tony Hope (2014). Mental Disorder and the Concept of Authenticity. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 21 (3):219-232.
    Authenticity has recently emerged as an important issue in discussions of mental disorder. We show, on the basis of personal accounts and empirical studies, that many people with psychological disorders are preoccupied with questions of authenticity. Most of the data considered in this paper are from studies of people with bipolar disorder and anorexia nervosa. We distinguish the various ways in which these people view the relationship between the disorder and their sense of their authentic self. We (...)
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  8. Serife Tekin (2011). Self-Concept Through the Diagnostic Looking Glass: Narratives and Mental Disorder. Philosophical Psychology 24 (3):357-380.
    This paper explores how the diagnosis of mental disorder may affect the diagnosed subject’s self-concept by supplying an account that emphasizes the influence of autobiographical and social narratives on self-understanding. It focuses primarily on the diagnoses made according to the criteria provided by the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), and suggests that the DSM diagnosis may function as a source of narrative that affects the subject’s self-concept. Engaging in this analysis by appealing to autobiographies and memoirs written (...)
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  9. Marcus P. Adams (2013). Explaining the Theory of Mind Deficit in Autism Spectrum Disorder. Philosophical Studies 163 (1):233-249.
    The theory of mind (ToM) deficit associated with autism has been a central topic in the debate about the modularity of the mind. Most involved in the debate about the explanation of the ToM deficit have failed to notice that autism’s status as a spectrum disorder has implications about which explanation is more plausible. In this paper, I argue that the shift from viewing autism as a unified syndrome to a spectrum disorder increases the plausibility of the explanation (...)
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  10.  20
    Amy White (2014). Body Integrity Identity Disorder Beyond Amputation: Consent and Liberty. HEC Forum 26 (3):225-236.
    In this article, I argue that persons suffering from Body Integrity Identity Disorder (BIID) can give informed consent to surgical measures designed to treat this disorder. This is true even if the surgery seems radical or irrational to most people. The decision to have surgery made by a BIID patient is not necessarily coerced, incompetent or uninformed. If surgery for BIID is offered, there should certainly be a screening process in place to insure informed consent. It is beyond (...)
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  11.  48
    Bengt Brülde (2010). On Defining “Mental Disorder”: Purposes and Conditions of Adequacy. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 31 (1):19-33.
    All definitions of mental disorder are backed up by arguments that rely on general criteria (e.g., that a definition should be consistent with ordinary language). These desiderata are rarely explicitly stated, and there has been no systematic discussion of how different definitions should be assessed. To arrive at a well-founded list of desiderata, we need to know the purpose of a definition. I argue that this purpose must be practical; it should, for example, help us determine who is entitled (...)
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  12.  13
    Maël Lemoine (2012). How Does a Psychiatrist Infer From an Observed Condition to a Case of Mental Disorder? Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 18 (5):979-983.
    The main thesis of this paper is that mental health practitioners can legitimately infer that a patient's given condition is a case of mental disorder without having diagnosed any specific mental disorder. The article shows how this is justifiable by relying either on psychopathological reasoning, on 'intentional' analysis or possibly on other modes of reasoning. In the end, it highlights the clinical and philosophical consequences of the plurality of modes of 'inferences to mental disorder'.
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  13.  39
    Terje Sagvolden, Espen Borgå Johansen, Heidi Aase & Vivienne Ann Russell (2005). A Dynamic Developmental Theory of Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) Predominantly Hyperactive/Impulsive and Combined Subtypes. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (3):397-419.
    Attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) is currently defined as a cognitive/behavioral developmental disorder where all clinical criteria are behavioral. Inattentiveness, overactivity, and impulsiveness are presently regarded as the main clinical symptoms. The dynamic developmental behavioral theory is based on the hypothesis that altered dopaminergic function plays a pivotal role by failing to modulate nondopaminergic (primarily glutamate and GABA) signal transmission appropriately. A hypofunctioning mesolimbic dopamine branch produces altered reinforcement of behavior and deficient extinction of previously reinforced behavior. This gives (...)
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  14.  43
    Lubomira Radoilska (ed.) (2012). Autonomy and Mental Disorder. Oxford University Press.
    Autonomy is a fundamental though contested concept both in philosophy and the broader intellectual culture of today’s liberal societies. For instance, most of us place great value on the opportunity to make our own decisions and to lead a life of our own choosing. Yet, there is stark disagreement on what is involved in being able to decide autonomously, as well as how important this is compared to other commitments. For example, the success of every group project requires that group (...)
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  15.  63
    Greg Horne (2014). Is Borderline Personality Disorder a Moral or Clinical Condition? Assessing Charland's Argument From Treatment. Neuroethics 7 (2):215-226.
    Louis Charland has argued that the Cluster B personality disorders, including borderline personality disorder, are primarily moral rather than clinical conditions. Part of his argument stems from reflections on effective treatment of borderline personality disorder. In the argument from treatment, he claims that successful treatment of all Cluster B personality disorders requires a positive change in a patient’s moral character. Based on this claim, he concludes (1) that these disorders are, at root, deficits in moral character, and (2) (...)
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  16. Jeanette Kennett & Steve Matthews (2002). Identity, Control and Responsibility: The Case of Dissociative Identity Disorder. Philosophical Psychology 15 (4):509-526.
    Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID) (formerly known as Multiple Personality Disorder) is a condition in which a person appears to possess more than one personality, and sometimes very many. Some recent criminal cases involving defendants with DID have resulted in "not guilty" verdicts, though the defense is not always successful in this regard. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Stephen Behnke have argued that we should excuse DID sufferers from responsibility, only if at the time of the act the person was insane (...)
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  17.  9
    Jane M. Ussher (2003). The Role of Premenstrual Dysphoric Disorder in the Subjectification of Women. Journal of Medical Humanities 24 (1-2):131-146.
    This paper will examine the way in which premenstrual symptomatology has been represented and regulated by psychology and psychiatry. It questions the “truths” about women's premenstrual experiences that circulate in scientific discourse, namely the fictions framed as facts that serve to regulate femininity, reproduction, and what it is to be “woman.” Hegemonic truths that define Premenstrual Dysphoric Disorder (PMDD) and its nosological predecessor Premenstrual Syndrome (PMS) are examined to illustrate how regimes of objectified knowledge and practices of “assemblage” come (...)
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  18.  90
    David Papineau (1994). Mental Disorder, Illness and Biological Disfunction. Philosophy 37:73-82.
    I shall begin with the "anti-psychiatry" view that the lack of a physical basis excludes many familiar mental disorders from the category of "illness". My response to this argument will be that anti-psychiatrists are probably right to hold that most mental disorders do not involve any physical disorder, but that they are wrong to conclude from this that these mental disorders are not illnesses.
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  19.  91
    Timothy J. Bayne (2002). Moral Status and the Treatment of Dissociative Identity Disorder. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 27 (1):87-105.
    Many contemporary bioethicists claim that the possession of certain psychological properties is sufficient for having full moral status. I will call this thepsychological approach to full moral status. In this paper, I argue that there is a significant tension between the psychological approach and a widely held model of Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID, formerly Multiple Personality Disorder). According to this model, the individual personalities or alters that belong to someone with DID possess those properties that proponents of the (...)
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  20.  6
    Thomas J. Schoeneman, Janel Putnam, Ian Rasmussen, Nina Sparr & Stephanie Beechem (2012). “A Fire in the Blood”: Metaphors of Bipolar Disorder in Jamison's An Unquiet Mind. [REVIEW] Journal of Medical Humanities 33 (3):185-205.
    Content analysis of three chapters of Jamison’s memoir, An Unquiet Mind, shows that depression, mania, and Bipolar Disorder have a common metaphoric core as a sequential process of suffering and adversity that is a form of malevolence and destruction. Depression was down and in, while mania was up, in and distant, circular and zigzag, a powerful force of quickness and motion, fieriness, strangeness, seduction, expansive extravagance, and acuity. Bipolar Disorder is down and away and a sequential and cyclical (...)
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  21. Kent Bach (1993). Emotional Disorder and Attention. In George Graham (ed.), Philosophical Psychopathology. Cambridge: MIT Press
    Some would say that philosophy can contribute more to the occurrence of mental disorder than to the study of it. Thinking too much does have its risks, but so do willful ignorance and selective inattention. Well, what can philosophy contribute? It is not equipped to enumerate the symptoms and varieties of disorder or to identify their diverse causes, much less offer cures (maybe it can do that-personal philosophical therapy is now available in the Netherlands). On the other hand, (...)
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  22.  78
    Alfredo Gaete (2009). The Concept of Mental Disorder: A Proposal. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 15 (4):327-339.
    During the last years, there has been an important discussion on the concept of mental disorder. Several accounts of such a concept have been offered by theorists, although neither of these accounts seems to have successfully answered both the question of what it means for a certain mental condition to be a disorder and the question of what it means for a certain disorder to be mental. In this paper, I propose an account of the concept of (...)
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  23. Steve Matthews (1998). Personal Identity, Multiple Personality Disorder, and Moral Personhood. Philosophical Psychology 11 (1):67-88.
    Marya Schechtman argues that psychological continuity accounts of personal identity, as represented by Derek Parfit's account, fail to escape the circularity objection. She claims that Parfit's deployment of quasi-memory (and other quasi-psychological) states to escape circularity implicitly commit us to an implausible view of human psychology. Schechtman suggests that what is lacking here is a coherence condition, and that this is something essential in any account of personal identity. In response to this I argue first that circularity may be escaped (...)
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  24.  79
    Gerben Meynen (2010). Free Will and Mental Disorder: Exploring the Relationship. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 31 (6):429-443.
    A link between mental disorder and freedom is clearly present in the introduction of the fourth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV). It mentions “an important loss of freedom” as one of the possible defining features of mental disorder. Meanwhile, it remains unclear how “an important loss of freedom” should be understood. In order to get a clearer view on the relationship between mental disorder and (a loss of) freedom, in this article, (...)
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  25.  10
    Tina Pietsch, John Wilson & Matthew McDonald (2010). Ontological Insecurity: A Guiding Framework for Borderline Personality Disorder. Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 41 (1):85-105.
    The purpose of this inquiry is to explore the experience of Borderline Personality Disorder with the aim of developing a more liberating approach to its diagnosis and treatment. Eight participants diagnosed with Borderline Personality Disorder were recruited from a psychiatric hospital operated by the Surrey and Borders NHS Trust and an outpatient daycentre based in London, United Kingdom. A narrative approach to methodology was employed to collect and analyse the participants’ life-stories. Themes to emerge from the (...)
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  26.  73
    George Graham (1999). Fuzzy Fault Lines: Selves in Multiple Personality Disorder. Philosophical Explorations 2 (3):159-174.
    This paper outlines a multidimensional conception of Multiple Personality Disorder (MPD) that differs from the 'orthodox' conception in terms of the content of its commitment to the reality of the self. Unlike the orthodox conception it recognizes that selves are fuzzy entities. By appreciating the possibility that selves are fuzzy entities, it is possible to rebut a form of fictionalism about the self which appeals to clinical data from MPD. Realism about self can be preserved in the face of (...)
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  27.  52
    Michael J. Shaffer & Jeffery Oakley (2005). Some Epistemological Concerns About Dissociative Identity Disorder and Diagnostic Practices in Psychology. Philosophical Psychology 18 (1):1-29.
    In this paper we argue that dissociative identity disorder (DID) is best interpreted as a causal model of a (possible) post-traumatic psychological process, as a mechanical model of an abnormal psychological condition. From this perspective we examine and criticize the evidential status of DID, and we demonstrate that there is really no good reason to believe that anyone has ever suffered from DID so understood. This is so because the proponents of DID violate basic methodological principles of good causal (...)
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  28. Alfred R. Mele (2004). Action: Volitional Disorder and Addiction. In Jennifer Radden (ed.), The Philosophy of Psychiatry. Oxford University Press
    Weakness of will has perplexed philosophers since Plato's time. This chapter places some of the literature on volitional disorders and addictions in a philosophical context dating back to Plato and Aristotle in an attempt to shed light on issues that a theorist who wishes to analyze the idea of a volitional disorder will face. Key here is the notion of the irresistability and resistability of pertinent desires, which is explored in relation to George Ainslie's work on the ability to (...)
     
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  29.  22
    Jukka Varelius (2009). Still Defining Mental Disorder in Terms of Our Goals for Demarcating Mental Disorder. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 16 (1):67-72.
    A response to the commentaries presented by Eric Matthews and Julian Savulescu on Jukka Varelius, 'Defining Mental Disorder in Terms of Our Goals for Demarcating Mental Disorder.’ Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 2009 Vol. 16 (1): 35-52.
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  30.  51
    Aimee Bryant (2011). Consent, Autonomy, and the Benefits of Healthy Limb Amputation: Examining the Legality of Surgically Managing Body Integrity Identity Disorder in New Zealand. [REVIEW] Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 8 (3):281-288.
    Upon first consideration, the desire of an individual to amputate a seemingly healthy limb is a foreign, perhaps unsettling, concept. It is, however, a reality faced by those who suffer from body integrity identity disorder (BIID). In seeking treatment, these individuals request surgery that challenges both the statutory provisions that sanction surgical operations and the limits of consent as a defence in New Zealand. In doing so, questions as to the influence of public policy and the extent of personal (...)
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  31.  62
    Thomas Schramme (2010). Can We Define Mental Disorder by Using the Criterion of Mental Dysfunction? Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 31 (1):35-47.
    The concept of mental disorder is often defined by reference to the notion of mental dysfunction, which is in line with how the concept of disease in somatic medicine is often defined. However, the notions of mental function and dysfunction seem to suffer from some problems that do not affect models of physiological function. Functions in general have a teleological structure; they are effects of traits that are supposed to have a particular purpose, such that, for example, the heart (...)
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  32.  23
    Patricia A. Ross (2005). Sorting Out the Concept Disorder. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 26 (2):115-140.
    . Current debates concerning the concept of mental disorder involve many different philosophical issues. However, it is not always clear from these discussions how, or whether, these issues relate to one another, or in exactly what way they are important for the definition of disorder. This article aims to sort through some of the philosophical issues that arise in the current literature and provide a clarification of how these issues are related to one another and whether they are (...)
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  33.  21
    Olof Pettersson (2013). Plato on Necessity and Disorder. Frontiers of Philosophy in China (BRILL) 8 (4):546-565.
    In the Timaeus, Plato makes a distinction between reason and necessity. This distinction is often accounted for as a distinction between two types of causation: purpose oriented causation and mechanistic causation. While reason is associated with the soul and taken to bring about its effects with the good and the beautiful as the end, necessity is understood in terms of a set of natural laws pertaining to material things. In this paper I shall suggest that there are reasons to reconsider (...)
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  34.  24
    Panagiotis Oulis (2012). On the Nature of Mental Disorder: Towards an Objectivist Account. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 33 (5):343-357.
    According to the predominant view within contemporary philosophy of psychiatry, mental disorders involve essentially personal and societal values, and thus, the concept of mental disorder cannot, even in principle, be elucidated in a thoroughly objective manner. Several arguments have been adduced in support of this impossibility thesis. My critical examination of two master arguments advanced to this effect by Derek Bolton and Jerome Wakefield, respectively, raises serious doubts about their soundness. Furthermore, I articulate an alternative, thoroughly objective, though in (...)
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  35.  14
    Fiona Probyn-Rapsey (2011). Furries and the Limits of Species Identity Disorder: A Response to Gerbasi Et Al. Society and Animals 19 (3):294-301.
    This is a response to an article published inSociety & Animals in 2008 that argued for the existence of a “species identity disorder” in some furries. Species identity disorder is modeled on gender identity disorder, itself a highly controversial diagnosis that has been criticized for pathologizing homosexuality and transgendered people. This response examines the claims of the article and suggests that the typology it constructs is based on unexamined assumptions about what constitutes “human” identity and regulatory fictions (...)
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  36.  20
    R. Cummins (1980). Culpability and Mental Disorder. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 10 (2):207 - 232.
    The "conservative" holds that mental disorder exculpates only if it is evidence of a standard excuse or justification, i.e., one that a mentally "normal" person could have. The Liberal holds that mental disorder sometimes exculpates in itself. I argue that moral culpability in the case of mental disorder is often moot, and that the real issue is what a court should be allowed to do with such individuals. This undermines the idea that culpability is a necessary condition (...)
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  37.  19
    Neil Pickering (2013). Extending Disorder: Essentialism, Family Resemblance and Secondary Sense. [REVIEW] Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 16 (2):185-195.
    It is commonly thought that mental disorder is a valid concept only in so far as it is an extension of or continuous with the concept of physical disorder. A valid extension has to meet two criteria: determination and coherence. Essentialists meet these criteria through necessary and sufficient conditions for being a disorder. Two Wittgensteinian alternatives to essentialism are considered and assessed against the two criteria. These are the family resemblance approach and the secondary sense approach. Where (...)
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  38.  21
    Christina M. van Der Feltz-Cornelis (2002). The Impact of Factitious Disorder on the Physician-Patient Relationship. An Epistemological Model. Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 5 (3):253-261.
    Theoretical models for physician-patient communication in clinical practice are described in literature, but none of them seems adequate for solving the communication problem in clinical practice that emerges in case of factitious disorder. Theoretical models generally imply open communication and respect for the autonomy of the patient. In factitious disorder, the physician is confronted by lies and (self)destructive behaviour of the patient, who in one way or another tries to involve the physician in this behaviour. It is no (...)
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  39.  7
    Avinash De Sousa & Gurvinder Kalra (2012). Drug Therapy of Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder: Current Trends. Mens Sana Monographs 10 (1):45.
    Attention deficit hyperactivity disorder is a developmental disorder with an age onset prior to 7 years. Children with ADHD have significantly lower ability to focus and sustain attention and also score higher on impulsivity and hyperactivity. Stimulants, such as methylphenidate, have remained the mainstay of ADHD treatment for decades with evidence supporting their use. However, recent years have seen emergence of newer drugs and drug delivery systems, like osmotic release oral systems and transdermal patches, to mention a few. (...)
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  40.  4
    David Gurnham (2008). “Reader, I Detained Him Under the Mental Health Act”: A Literary Response to Professor Fennell's Best Interests and Treatment for Mental Disorder. [REVIEW] Health Care Analysis 16 (3):268-278.
    This is a response to Professor Fennell's paper on the recent influence and impact of the best interests test on the treatment of patients detained under the Mental Health Act 1983 (MHA) for mental disorder. I discuss two points of general ethical significance raised by Professor Fennell. Firstly, I consider his argument on the breadth of the best interests test, incorporating as it does factors considerably wider than those of medical justifications and the risk of harm. Secondly, I discuss (...)
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  41.  11
    Simona Giordano (2012). Sliding Doors: Should Treatment of Gender Identity Disorder and Other Body Modifications Be Privately Funded? [REVIEW] Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 15 (1):31-40.
    Gender Identity Disorder (GID) is regarded as a mental illness and included in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV). It will also appear in the DSM-V, due to be published in 2013. The classification of GID as a mental illness is contentious. But what would happen to sufferers if it were removed from the diagnostic manuals? Would people lose their entitlement to funded medical care, or to reimbursement under insurance schemes? On what basis should medical treatment (...)
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  42.  5
    Paul Cefalu (2010). The Doubting Disease: Religious Scrupulosity and Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder in Historical Context. [REVIEW] Journal of Medical Humanities 31 (2):111-125.
    Psychologists and cultural historians typically have argued that early modern theologians such as Martin Luther, John Bunyan, and Ignatius Loyola exhibited behavior that the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM IV) classifies as a subtype of obsessive-compulsive disorder termed “religious scrupulosity.” This essay argues that, although early modern theologians do manifest scrupulosity, such religiosity was a culturally acceptable, even recommended component of spiritual progress, a necessary means of receiving an unmerited bestowal of God’s grace. The larger aim (...)
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  43.  3
    Ofra Koffman (2015). ‘A Healthier and More Hopeful Person’: Illegitimacy, Mental Disorder and the Improved Prognosis of the Adolescent Mother. [REVIEW] Journal of Medical Humanities 36 (2):113-126.
    This paper aims to contribute to the exploration of the shift from a problematisation of ‘unwed motherhood’ to ‘teenage motherhood’ in late twentieth century Britain. It does so by exploring the dominant social scientific understanding of ‘unwed mothers’ during the 1950s and 1960s which suggested that these women suffered from a psychological disorder. I then analyse the conceptualisation of ‘adolescent unwed mothers’ exploring why professionals deemed them to be less disturbed than older women in their predicament. This finding is (...)
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  44.  2
    Sabine Müller (2008). Body Integrity Identity Disorder (BIID) – Lassen sich Amputationen gesunder Gliedmaßen ethisch rechtfertigen? Ethik in der Medizin 20 (4):287-299.
    Unter Body Integrity Identity Disorder (BIID) versteht man das sehr seltene Phänomen, dass jemand die Amputation einer oder mehrerer gesunder Gliedmaßen oder die Beibringung einer Querschnittslähmung verlangt. Manche dieser Menschen verstümmeln sich selbst; andere fordern von Chirurgen eine Amputation oder die Durchtrennung des Rückenmarks. Von Psychologen und Psychiatern gibt es unterschiedliche Erklärungsansätze für dieses Phänomen; bisher ist aber keine erfolgreiche psychotherapeutische oder pharmazeutische Therapie bekannt. Betroffenenvertreter erklären den Amputationswunsch in Analogie zu dem Verlangen von Transsexuellen nach chirurgischer Angleichung an (...)
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  45.  4
    Wim Dekkers & Peter van Domburg (2000). The Role of Doctor and Patient in the Construction of the Pseudo-Epileptic Attack Disorder. Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 3 (1):29-38.
    Periodic attacks of uncertain origin, where the clinical presentationresembles epilepsy but there is no evidence of a somatic disease, arecalled Pseudo-Epilepsy or Pseudo-Epileptic Attack Disorder (PEAD). PEADmay be called a `non-disease', i.e. a disorder on the fringes ofestablished disease patterns, because it lacks a rationalpathophysiological explanation. The first aim of this article is tocriticize the idea, common in medical science, that diseases are realentities which exist separately from the patient, waiting to bediscovered by the doctor. We argue that (...)
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  46. James Giles (2012). Adult Baby Syndrome and Age Identity Disorder: Comment on Kise and Nguyen (2011). Archives of Sexual Behavior 41 (2):321-322.
    In Kise and Ngyuen’s “Adult Baby Syndrome and Gender Identity Disorder” (2011), the authors refer to their male subject as “Ms B” because he prefers to identify with being a female. But they do not refer to her as being a baby, even though the subject also prefers to identify with being a baby. This shows that although they respect the subject’s gender identity preferences, they do not respect the subject’s age identity preferences. One reason for this might be (...)
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  47.  72
    Nathan Stout (forthcoming). "Conversation, Responsibility, and Autism Spectrum Disorder". Philosophical Psychology.
  48. Dominic Murphy & Robert L. Woolfolk (2000). The Harmful Dysfunction Analysis of Mental Disorder. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 7 (4):241-252.
  49.  3
    David A. Katerndahl (2009). Power Laws in Covariability of Anxiety and Depression Among Newly Diagnosed Patients with Major Depressive Episode, Panic Disorder and Controls. Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 15 (3):565-570.
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  50. Jerome C. Wakefield (2006). What Makes a Mental Disorder Mental? Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 13 (2):123-131.
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