Search results for 'Dispositional properties' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Sungho Choi (2008). Dispositional Properties and Counterfactual Conditionals. Mind 117 (468):795-841.score: 120.0
    For the last several decades, dispositional properties have been one of the main topics in metaphysics. Still, however, there is little agreement among contemporary metaphysicians on the nature of dispositional properties. Apparently, though, the majority of them have reached the consensus that dispositional ascriptions cannot be analysed in terms of simple counterfactual conditionals. In this paper it will be brought to light that this consensus is wrong. Specifically, I will argue that the simple conditional analysis (...)
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  2. William A. Bauer (2013). Dispositional Essentialism and the Nature of Powerful Properties. Disputatio 5 (35).score: 120.0
    Dispositional essentialism maintains that all sparse properties are essentially powerful. Two conceptions of sparse properties appear compatible with dispositional essentialism: sparse properties as pure powers or as powerful qualities. This paper compares the two views, criticizes the powerful qualities view, and then develops a new theory of pure powers, termed Point Theory. This theory neutralizes the main advantage powerful qualities appear to possess over pure powers—explaining the existence of powers during latency periods. The paper discusses (...)
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  3. Herbert Hochberg (1967). Dispositional Properties. Philosophy of Science 34 (1):10-17.score: 120.0
    An analysis of problematic dispositional predicates like 'soluble' is presented. The analysis attempts to combine cogent features of opposed previous analyses of Carnap and Bergmann, while avoiding problematic features of both. The suggestion that there is an ambiguity in negations of assertions of dispositional properties, and a consequent distinction between "not soluble" and "insoluble," lies at the core of the solution.
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  4. Marco J. Nathan (2013). A Simulacrum Account of Dispositional Properties. Noûs 47 (4):n/a-n/a.score: 120.0
    This essay presents a model-theoretic account of dispositional properties, according to which dispositions are not ordinary properties of real entities; dispositions capture the behavior of abstract, idealized models. This account has several payoffs. First, it saves the simple conditional analysis of dispositions. Second, it preserves the general connection between dispositions and regularities, despite the fact that some dispositions are not grounded in actual regularities. Finally, it brings together the analysis and the explanation of dispositions under a unified (...)
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  5. Robert Schroer (2013). Can a Single Property Be Both Dispositional and Categorical? The “Partial Consideration Strategy”, Partially Considered. Metaphysica 14 (1):63-77.score: 120.0
    One controversial position in the debate over dispositional and categorical properties maintains that our concepts of these properties are the result of partially considering unitary properties that are both dispositional and categorical. As one of its defenders (Heil 2005, p. 351) admits, this position is typically met with “incredulous stares”. In this paper, I examine whether such a reaction is warranted. This thesis about properties is an instance of what I call “the Partial Consideration (...)
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  6. David Weissman (1965). Dispositional Properties. Carbondale, Southern Illinois University Press.score: 120.0
    DAVID WEISSMAN DISPOSITIONAL PROPERTIES FOREWORD BY George Kimball ...
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  7. Vassilios Livanios (2011). On the Possibility of Contigently Dispositional Properties. Abstracta 6 (1):3-17.score: 120.0
    Metaphysicians who hold that there is an ontological distinction between two kinds of fundamental natural properties assume that properties are dispositional or non-dispositional necessarily. In contrast to this, I suggest that one can admit the existence of fundamental contingently dispositional properties. After some clarifications concerning the content of the suggested view, I respond to several objections regarding its intelligibility and viability and outline two of its important consequences.
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  8. Clark Butler (2010). Panpsychism and the Dissolution of Dispositional Properties. Southwest Philosophy Review 26 (2):87-108.score: 114.0
    The article explains my third argument for panpsychism, based on disolving all properties, including dispositional physical properties like mass, energy, and force, into phenomenal properties. I thus reject a dual-property version of panpsychism. I seek to show, contrary to Paul Churchland, that the general panpsychist hypothesis has some explanatory value, and makes a cosmology consisting in comparative psychology possible. The mental life even of so-called physical particles in physics is hypothesized to help explain their behavior.
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  9. Sharon R. Ford (2010). What Fundamental Properties Suffice to Account for the Manifest World? Powerful Structure. Dissertation, University of Queenslandscore: 108.0
    This Thesis engages with contemporary philosophical controversies about the nature of dispositional properties or powers and the relationship they have to their non-dispositional counterparts. The focus concerns fundamentality. In particular, I seek to answer the question, ‘What fundamental properties suffice to account for the manifest world?’ The answer I defend is that fundamental categorical properties need not be invoked in order to derive a viable explanation for the manifest world. My stance is a field-theoretic view (...)
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  10. Tobias Hansson (2006). Too Many Dispositional Properties. SATS 7 (2):37-42.score: 108.0
    This paper identifies an overdetermination problem faced by the non-reductive dispositional property account of disposition ascriptions. Two possible responses to the problem are evaluated and both are shown to have serious drawbacks. Finally it is noted that the traditional conditional analysis of dispositional ascriptions escapes the original difficulty.
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  11. Sharon R. Ford (2012). The Categorical-Dispositional Distinction. In Alexander Bird, Brian Ellis & Howard Sankey (eds.), Properties, Powers and Structures: Issues in the Metaphysics of Realism. Routledge.score: 108.0
    This paper largely engages with Brian Ellis’s description of categorical dimensions as put forward in his paper in this volume. The New Essentialism advocated by Ellis posits the ontologically-robust existence of both dispositional and categorical properties. I have argued that the distinction that Ellis draws between the two is unpersuasive, and that the causal role of categorical dimensions—what they do—is inseparable from what they are. This observation is reinforced by the fact that absolute physical quantities permit re-interpretations of (...)
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  12. Anjan Chakravartty (2003). The Dispositional Essentialist View of Properties and Laws. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 11 (4):393 – 413.score: 96.0
    One view of the nature of properties has been crystallized in recent debate by an identity thesis proposed by Shoemaker. The general idea is that there is for behaviour. Well-known criticisms of this approach, however, remain unanswered, and the details of its connections to laws nothing more to being a particular causal property than conferring certain dispositions of nature and the precise ontology of causal properties stand in need of development. This paper examines and defends a dispositional (...)
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  13. Max Kistler (2007). The Causal Efficacy of Macroscopic Dispositional Properties. In Max Kistler & Bruno Gnassounou (eds.), Dispositions and Causal Powers. Ashgate. 103--132.score: 92.0
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  14. Benjamin Smart, Categorical Properties in Background Independent Substantivalist General Relativity.score: 90.0
    Assuming the increasingly popular background independent substantivalist interpretation of general relativity (GR), in this paper I show that the possibility of spacetime point permutations implies that the locational properties of spacetime points, and structural properties of spacetime are categorical. Categorical properties, however, are often deemed implausible by dispositional monists (Bird 2007; Mumford 2004) due to their quiddistic nature, as their primitive identity entails the unacceptable possibility of properties changing their causal role across possible worlds. The (...)
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  15. Robert Schroer (2010). How Far Can the Physical Sciences Reach? American Philosophical Quarterlly 47 (3):253-266.score: 90.0
    : It is widely thought that dispositional properties depend upon categorical properties; specifying the nature of this dependency, however, has proven a difficult task. The dependency of dispositional properties upon categorical properties also presents a challenge to the thesis of Physicalism: If the physical sciences only tell us about the dispositional properties of the objects they study and if dispositional properties depend upon categorical properties, then it appears that there (...)
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  16. Bence Nanay (2011). Do We Sense Modalities with Our Sense Modalities? Ratio 24 (3):299-310.score: 90.0
    It has been widely assumed that we do not perceive dispositional properties. I argue that there are two ways of interpreting this assumption. On the first, extensional, interpretation whether we perceive dispositions depends on a complex set of metaphysical commitments. But if we interpret the claim in the second, intensional, way, then we have no reason to suppose that we do not perceive dispositional properties. The two most important and influential arguments to the contrary fail.
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  17. Gustav Bergmann (1955). Dispositional Properties and Dispositions. Philosophical Studies 6 (5):77-80.score: 90.0
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  18. A. D. Smith (1977). Dispositional Properties. Mind 86 (343):439-445.score: 90.0
  19. John H. Taylor (2013). In Defence of Powerful Qualities. Metaphysica 14 (1):93-107.score: 90.0
    The ontology of ‘powerful qualities’ is gaining an increasing amount of attention in the literature on properties. This is the view that the so-called categorical or qualitative properties are identical with ‘dispositionalproperties. The position is associated with C.B. Martin, John Heil, Galen Strawson and Jonathan Jacobs. Robert Schroer ( 2012 ) has recently mounted a number of criticisms against the powerful qualities view as conceived by these main adherents, and has also advanced his own (radically (...)
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  20. Michael Tooley (1972). Armstrong's Proof of the Realist Account of Dispositional Properties. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (3):283 – 287.score: 90.0
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  21. Silvano Zipoli Caiani (2014). Extending the Notion of Affordance. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (2):275-293.score: 90.0
    Post-Gibson attempts to set out a definition of affordance generally agree that this notion can be understood as a property of the environment with salience for an organism’s behavior. According to this view, some scholars advocate the idea that affordances are dispositional properties of physical objects that, given suitable circumstances, necessarily actualize related actions. This paper aims at assessing this statement in light of a theory of affordance perception. After years of discontinuity between strands of empirical and theoretical (...)
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  22. J. W. Roxbee Cox (1975). Mackie on Dispositional Properties. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 26 (3):232-234.score: 90.0
  23. J. J. C. Smart (1961). Dispositional Properties. Analysis 22 (2):44 - 46.score: 90.0
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  24. John Bricke (1973). Hume's Theory of Dispositional Properties. American Philosophical Quarterly 10 (1):15-23.score: 90.0
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  25. J. W. Roxbee Cox (1964). Are There Non-Dispositional Properties? Analysis 24 (5):161 - 164.score: 90.0
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  26. George P. Klubertanz (1966). "Dispositional Properties," by David Weissman; Foreword by George Kimball Plochmann. The Modern Schoolman 43 (3):303-303.score: 90.0
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  27. John Watling (1957). Review: Gustav Bergmann, Dispositional Properties and Dispositions. [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 22 (3):322-322.score: 90.0
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  28. Ullin T. Place (1987). Causal Laws, Dispositional Properties and Causal Explanations. Synthesis Philosophica 2 (3):149-160.score: 90.0
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  29. Sharon R. Ford (2007). An Analysis of Properties in John Heil’s "From an Ontological Point of View&Quot;. In G. Romano & Malatesti (eds.), From an Ontological Point of View, SWIF Philosophy of Mind Review, Symposium. SWIF Philosophy of Mind Review.score: 84.0
    In this paper I argue that the requirement for the qualitative is theory-dependent, determined by the fundamental assumptions built into the ontology. John Heil’s qualitative, in its role as individuator of objects and powers, is required only by a theory that posits a world of distinct objects or powers. Does Heil’s ‘deep’ view of the world, such that there is only one powerful object (e.g. a field containing modes or properties which we perceive as manifest everyday objects) require the (...)
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  30. Ullin T. Place (1996). Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or Both. In Tim Crane (ed.), Dispositions: A Debate. New York: Routledge. 105--125.score: 74.0
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  31. Caj Strandberg (1999). Dispositional Moral Properties and Moral Motivation. Theoria 65 (2):171–192.score: 72.0
  32. Jan Hauska (2009). Dispositions Unmasked. Theoria 75 (4):304-335.score: 68.0
    The problem of masking is widely regarded as a grave threat to the conditional analysis of dispositions. Unlike the difficulty arising in connection with finkish situations, the problem does not involve the (dis)appearance of a disposition upon the arrival of its activating conditions. Consequently, some promising responses to the finkish cases, in particular David Lewis's reformed analysis, are ill-equipped to deal with masks. I contend that the difficulty posed by masks can be surmounted by supplementing the counterfactual at the heart (...)
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  33. D. Manley & R. Wasserman (2012). Dispositions, Conditionals, and Counterexamples. Mind 120 (480):1191-1227.score: 68.0
    In an earlier paper in these pages (2008), we explored the puzzling link between dispositions and conditionals. First, we rehearsed the standard counterexamples to the simple conditional analysis and the refined conditional analysis defended by David Lewis. Second, we attacked a tempting response to these counterexamples: what we called the ‘getting specific strategy’. Third, we presented a series of structural considerations that pose problems for many attempts to understand the link between dispositions and conditionals. Finally, we developed our own account (...)
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  34. Andreas Bartels (2013). Why Metrical Properties Are Not Powers. Synthese 190 (12):2001-2013.score: 66.0
    What has the dispositional analysis of properties and laws (e.g. Molnar, Powers, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003; Mumford, Laws in nature, Routledge London, 2004; Bird, Nature’s metaphysics, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2007) to offer to the scientific understanding of physical properties?—The article provides an answer to this question for the case of spacetime points and their metrical properties in General Relativity. The analysis shows that metrical properties are not ‘powers’, i.e. they cannot be understood as producing (...)
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  35. William A. Bauer (2012). Four Theories of Pure Dispositions. In Alexander Bird, Brian Ellis & Howard Sankey (eds.), Properties, Powers, and Structures: Issues in the Metaphysics of Realism. Routledge. 139-162.score: 66.0
    The dispositional properties encountered in everyday experience seem to have causal bases in other properties, e.g., the microstructure of a vase is the causal basis of its fragility. In contrast, the Pure Dispositions Thesis maintains that some dispositions require no causal basis. This thesis faces the Problem of Being: without a causal basis, there appears to be no grounds for the existence of pure dispositions. This paper establishes criteria for evaluating the problem, critically examines four theories of (...)
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  36. Matthew Tugby (2013). Categoricalism, Dispositionalism, and the Epistemology of Properties. Synthese 191 (6):1-16.score: 66.0
    Notoriously, the dispositional view of natural properties is thought to face a number of regress problems, one of which points to an epistemological worry. In this paper, I argue that the rival categorical view is also susceptible to the same kind of regress problem. This problem can be overcome, most plausibly, with the development of a structuralist epistemology. After identifying problems faced by alternative solutions, I sketch the main features of this structuralist epistemological approach, referring to graph-theoretic modelling (...)
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  37. Mauro Dorato, Dispositions, Relational Properties and the Quantum World.score: 66.0
    In this paper I examine the role of dispositional properties in the most frequently discussed interpretations of non-relativistic quantum mechanics. After offering some motivation for this project, I briefly characterize the distinction between non-dispositional and dispositional properties in the context of quantum mechanics by suggesting a necessary condition for dispositionality – namely contextuality – and, consequently, a sufficient condition for non-dispositionality, namely non-contextuality. Having made sure that the distinction is conceptually sound, I then analyze the (...)
     
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  38. Richard Corry (2011). Can Dispositional Essences Ground the Laws of Nature? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (2):263 - 275.score: 60.0
    A dispositional property is a tendency, or potency, to manifest some characteristic behaviour in some appropriate context. The mainstream view in the twentieth century was that such properties are to be explained in terms of more fundamental non-dispositional properties, together with the laws of nature. In the last few decades, however, a rival view has become popular, according to which some properties are essentially dispositional in nature, and the laws of nature are to be (...)
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  39. Tomasz Bigaj (2010). Dispositional Monism and the Circularity Objection. Metaphysica 11 (1):39-47.score: 60.0
    Three basic positions regarding the nature of fundamental properties are: dispositional monism, categorical monism and the mixed view. Dispositional monism apparently involves a regress or circularity, while an unpalatable consequence of categorical monism and the mixed view is that they are committed to quidditism. I discuss Alexander Bird's defence of dispositional monism based on the structuralist approach to identity. I argue that his solution does not help standard dispositional essentialism, as it admits the possibility that (...)
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  40. Mauro Dorato, Properties and Dispositions: Some Metaphysical Remarks on Quantum Ontology.score: 60.0
    After some suggestions about how to clarify the confused metaphysical distinctions between dispositional and non-dispositional or categorical properties, I review some of the main interpretations of QM in order to show that – with the relevant exception of Bohm’s minimalist interpretation – quantum ontology is irreducibly dispositional. Such an irreducible character of dispositions must be explained differently in different interpretations, but the reducibility of the contextual properties in the case of Bohmian mechanics is guaranteed by (...)
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  41. Edward Wilson Averill (1990). Are Physical Properties Dispositions? Philosophy of Science 57 (1):118-132.score: 60.0
    Several prominent philosophers have held that physical properties are dispositions. The aim of this paper is to establish the following conjunction: if the thesis that physical properties are dispositions is unsupplemented by controversial assumptions about dispositions, it entails a contradiction; and if it is so supplemented the resulting theory has the consequence that either many worlds which seem to be possible worlds are not possible worlds or some properties which seem to be identical are not identical. In (...)
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  42. Simone Gozzano (2012). Scientific Essentialism and the Mental. Rivista di Filosofia 103 (2):201-226.score: 60.0
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  43. David Yates (2013). The Essence of Dispositional Essentialism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (1):93-128.score: 54.0
    Dispositional essentialists argue that physical properties have their causal roles essentially. This is typically taken to mean that physical properties are identical to dispositions. I argue that this is untenable, and that we must instead say that properties bestow dispositions. I explore what it is for a property to have such a role essentially. Dispositional essentialists argue for their view by citing certain epistemological and metaphysical implications, and I appeal to these implications to place desiderata (...)
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  44. Rom Harré (2006). Resolving the Emergence-Reduction Debate. Synthese 151 (3):499-509.score: 54.0
    The debate between emergentists and reductionists rests on the observation that in many situations, in which it seems desirable to work with a coherent and unified discourse, key predicates fall into different groups, such that pairs of members one taken from each group, cannot be co-predicated of some common subject. Must we settle for ‘island’ discourses in science and human affairs or is some route to a unified discourse still open? To make progress towards resolving the issue the conditions under (...)
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  45. Randolph Clarke (2010). Opposing Powers. Philosophical Studies 149 (2):153 - 160.score: 54.0
    A disposition mask is something that prevents a disposition from manifesting despite the occurrence of that disposition’s characteristic stimulus, and without eliminating that disposition. Several authors have maintained that masks must be things extrinsic to the objects that have the masked dispositions. Here it is argued that this is not so; masks can be intrinsic to the objects whose dispositions they mask. If that is correct, then a recent attempt to distinguish dispositional properties from so-called categorical properties (...)
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  46. William A. Bauer (2011). An Argument for the Extrinsic Grounding of Mass. Erkenntnis 74 (1):81-99.score: 54.0
    Several philosophers of science and metaphysicians claim that the dispositional properties of fundamental particles, such as the mass, charge, and spin of electrons, are ungrounded in any further properties. It is assumed by those making this argument that such properties are intrinsic, and thus if they are grounded at all they must be grounded intrinsically. However, this paper advances an argument, with one empirical premise and one metaphysical premise, for the claim that mass is extrinsically grounded (...)
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  47. Vera Hoffmann-Kolss (2010). The Metaphysics of Extrinsic Properties. Ontos-Verlag.score: 54.0
    This book aims to develop a philosophical theory of extrinsic properties – of properties whose instantiation by an object does not only depend on what the object itself is like, but also on features of its environment. Various accounts of the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction are analysed in detail, and it is argued that the most promising approach to defining this distinction is to consider extrinsic properties as a particular type of relational property. Moreover, it is shown that two (...)
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  48. Vassilios Livanios (2010). Symmetries, Dispositions and Essences. Philosophical Studies 148 (2):295 - 305.score: 54.0
    Dispositional essentialists ultimately appeal to dispositional essences in order to provide (a) an explanation of the conservation of physical quantities and (b) identity conditions for fundamental physical properties. This paper aims to offer alternative suggestions based on symmetry considerations and exhibits their consequences for the thesis of dispositional essentialism.
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  49. Rafał Wodzisz (2011). Własności i prawa przyrody w esencjalizmie dyspozycyjnym. Acta Universitatis Lodziensis 24:121-136.score: 54.0
    The aim of this paper is to articulate dispositonal essentialism (DE) as a viable position in the discussions considering properties and laws of nature. In the first part of the article there are given several „must have” trades of properties in DE. They are followed by the conceptions themselves. The last part of the article brings a little insight about ceteris paribus laws in DE.
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