Search results for 'Doing' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Christian Barry, Matthew Lindauer & Gerhard Øverland (2014). Doing, Allowing, and Enabling Harm: An Empirical Investigation. In Joshua Knobe, Tania Lombrozo & Shaun Nichols (eds.), Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy. Oxford University Press
    Traditionally, moral philosophers have distinguished between doing and allowing harm, and have normally proceeded as if this bipartite distinction can exhaustively characterize all cases of human conduct involving harm. By contrast, cognitive scientists and psychologists studying causal judgment have investigated the concept ‘enable’ as distinct from the concept ‘cause’ and other causal terms. Empirical work on ‘enable’ and its employment has generally not focused on cases where human agents enable harm. In this paper, we present new empirical evidence to (...)
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  2. Xiaofei Liu (2012). A Robust Defence of the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing. Utilitas 24 (01):63-81.
    Philosophers debate over the truth of the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing, the thesis that there is a morally significant difference between doing harm and merely allowing harm to happen. Deontologists tend to accept this doctrine, whereas consequentialists tend to reject it. A robust defence of this doctrine would require a conceptual distinction between doing and allowing that both matches our ordinary use of the concepts in a wide range of cases and enables a justification for the (...)
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  3.  25
    Thomas S. Huddle (2013). Moral Fiction or Moral Fact? The Distinction Between Doing and Allowing in Medical Ethics. Bioethics 27 (5):257-262.
    Opponents of physician-assisted suicide (PAS) maintain that physician withdrawal-of-life-sustaining-treatment cannot be morally equated to voluntary active euthanasia. PAS opponents generally distinguish these two kinds of act by positing a possible moral distinction between killing and allowing-to-die, ceteris paribus. While that distinction continues to be widely accepted in the public discourse, it has been more controversial among philosophers. Some ethicist PAS advocates are so certain that the distinction is invalid that they describe PAS opponents who hold to the distinction as in (...)
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  4.  54
    Timothy Hall (2008). Doing Harm, Allowing Harm, and Denying Resources. Journal of Moral Philosophy 5 (1):50-76.
    Of great importance to many non-consequentialists is a claimed moral difference between doing and allowing harm. I argue that non-consequentialism is best understood, however, as consisting in three morally distinct categories where commentators typically identify two: standard doings of harm, standard allowings of harm, and denials of resources. Furthermore, the moral distinctness of denials of resources is independent of whether denials are doings or allowings of harm, I argue. I argue by way of matched examples, as well as by (...)
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  5.  12
    Duncan Purves (2011). Still in Hot Water: Doing, Allowing, and Rachels’ Bathtub Cases. Southwest Philosophy Review 27 (1):129-137.
    The aim of this paper is to explain and defend a type of argument common in the doing/allowing literature called a “contrast argument.” I am concerned with defending a particular type of contrast argument that is intended to demonstrate the moral irrelevance of the doing/allowing distinction. This type of argument, referred to in this paper as an “irrelevance argument,” is exemplified by an argument offered by James Rachels (1975) that employs the Smith and Jones bathtub cases. My main (...)
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  6.  3
    Shenbai Liao (2006). Doing Business: An Obscure Notion of the Ethics of Public Associations in Ordinary Chinese. [REVIEW] Frontiers of Philosophy in China 1 (3):325-340.
    Along with the notion of being a person (zuo ren 做人), the notion of doing business (zuo shi 做事) in ordinary Chinese is basically an over-all notion of the norms in the practical and associative activities, carrying typically obscure meanings on practice and association affairs in some external world. Ordinary Chinese not only distinguishes these two notions but also defines a dictionary order of them, with the affairs of the internal world prior to those of the external. The fact (...)
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  7.  6
    Natascha Kienstra, Machiel Karskens & Jeroen Imants (2014). Three Approaches to Doing Philosophy: A Proposal for Grouping Philosophical Exercises in Classroom Teaching. Metaphilosophy 45 (2):288-318.
    Classroom teaching has two aims: learning philosophy, that is, the great philosophers, and doing philosophy. This article provides an overview of thirty exercises that can be used for doing philosophy, grouped into three approaches. The first approach, doing philosophy as connective truth finding or communicative action, is related to such philosophers as Dewey and Arendt, and is illustrated by the Socratic method. The second, doing philosophy as test-based truth finding, is related to such philosophers as Popper, (...)
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  8.  2
    Rahul Mitra (2010). Doing Ethnography, Being an Ethnographer: The Autoethnographic Research Process and I. Journal of Research Practice 6 (1):Article M4.
    I examine here Theory and Scholarship (taken to be formalized social scientific frameworks that seek to map out the real world and social actions in an objective fashion) via an autoethnographic lens. Chiefly, I ask how autoethnography as a research method reconfigures them: how may we extend knowledge using autoethnography? While much critique has centered on the "doing" (dispassionately?) versus "being" (going native?) of autoethnography, I argue that such a dichotomy is inherently false. Instead, doing is located within (...)
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  9.  56
    Edouard Machery (2009). Doing Without Concepts. Oxford University Press.
    Over recent years, the psychology of concepts has been rejuvenated by new work on prototypes, inventive ideas on causal cognition, the development of neo-empiricist theories of concepts, and the inputs of the budding neuropsychology of concepts. But our empirical knowledge about concepts has yet to be organized in a coherent framework. -/- In Doing without Concepts, Edouard Machery argues that the dominant psychological theories of concepts fail to provide such a framework and that drastic conceptual changes are required to (...)
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  10. Mohan P. Matthen (2005). Seeing, Doing, and Knowing: A Philosophical Theory of Sense Perception. Oxford University Press.
    Seeing, Doing, and Knowing is an original and comprehensive philosophical treatment of sense perception as it is currently investigated by cognitive neuroscientists. Its central theme is the task-oriented specialization of sensory systems across the biological domain; these systems coevolve with an organism's learning and action systems, providing the latter with classifications of external objects in terms of sensory categories purpose--built for their need. On the basis of this central idea, Matthen presents novel theories of perceptual similarity, content, and realism. (...)
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  11. Jonathan Webber (2002). Doing Without Representation: Coping with Dreyfus. Philosophical Explorations 5 (1):82-88.
    Hubert Dreyfus argues that the traditional and currently dominant conception of an action, as an event initiated or governed by a mental representation of a possible state of affairs that the agent is trying to realise, is inadequate. If Dreyfus is right, then we need a new conception of action. I argue, however, that the considerations that Dreyfus adduces show only that an action need not be initiated or governed by a conceptual representation, but since a representation need not be (...)
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  12.  6
    Jason Hanna (2014). Doing, Allowing, and the Moral Relevance of the Past. Journal of Moral Philosophy 11 (4):677-698.
    Most deontologists claim that it is more objectionable to do harm than it is to allow harm of comparable magnitude. I argue that this view faces a largely neglected puzzle regarding the moral relevance of an agent's past behavior. Consider an agent who chooses to save five people rather than one, where the one person's life is in jeopardy because of something the agent did earlier. How are the agent's obligations affected by the fact that his now letting the one (...)
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  13. Liao Shenbai (2006). Doing Business: An Obscure Notion of the Ethics of Public Associations in Ordinary Chinese. Frontiers of Philosophy in China 1 (3):325-340.
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  14.  54
    Marta Jimenez (2016). Aristotle on Becoming Virtuous by Doing Virtuous Actions. Phronesis 61 (1):3-32.
    Aristotle’s claim that we become virtuous by doing virtuous actions raises a familiar problem: How can we perform virtuous actions unless we are already virtuous? I reject deflationary accounts of the answer given in _Nicomachean Ethics_ 2.4 and argue instead that proper habituation involves doing virtuous actions with the right motive, i.e. for the sake of the noble, even though learners do not yet have virtuous dispositions. My interpretation confers continuity to habituation and explains in a non-mysterious (...)
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  15. Fiery Cushman, Joshua Knobe & Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (2008). Moral Appraisals Affect Doing/Allowing Judgments. Cognition 108 (2):353-380.
    An extensive body of research suggests that the distinction between doing and allowing plays a critical role in shaping moral appraisals. Here, we report evidence from a pair of experiments suggesting that the converse is also true: moral appraisals affect doing/allowing judgments. Specifically, morally bad behavior is more likely to be construed as actively ‘doing’ than as passively ‘allowing’. This finding adds to a growing list of folk concepts influenced by moral appraisal, including causation and intentional action. (...)
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  16.  25
    Terence Rajivan Edward, On a Nineteenth Century Argument Against Armchair Anthropologists Doing Fieldwork.
    In the nineteenth century, there were concerns about the reliability of the amateur sources which academic anthropologists relied on. It was proposed that such anthropologists leave their armchairs, go out and study primitive societies themselves. But an argument was also put forward against doing this. In this paper, I reconstruct the argument and defend it against one objection which is likely to be made today. But I also point out that it is vulnerable to another objection.
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  17. Massimo Pigliucci (2013). ‘On the Different Ways of ‘‘Doing Theory’’ in Biology‘. Biological Theory 7 (4): 287-297.
    ‘‘Theoretical biology’’ is a surprisingly heter- ogeneous field, partly because it encompasses ‘‘doing the- ory’’ across disciplines as diverse as molecular biology, systematics, ecology, and evolutionary biology. Moreover, it is done in a stunning variety of different ways, using anything from formal analytical models to computer sim- ulations, from graphic representations to verbal arguments. In this essay I survey a number of aspects of what it means to do theoretical biology, and how they compare with the allegedly much more (...)
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  18.  34
    José Jorge Mendoza (2015). Doing Away with Juan Crow: Two Standards for Just Immigration Reform. APA Newsletter on Hispanic/Latino Issues in Philosophy 15 (2):14-20.
    In 2008 Robert Lovato coined the phrase Juan Crow. Juan Crow is a type of policy or enforcement of immigration laws that discriminate against Latino/as in the United States. This essay looks at the implications this phenomenon has for an ethics of immigration. It argues that Juan Crow, like its predecessor Jim Crow, is not merely a condemnation of federalism, but of any immigration reform that has stricter enforcement as one of its key components. Instead of advocating for increased enforcement, (...)
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  19. Christian List (2014). Free Will, Determinism, and the Possibility of Doing Otherwise. Noûs 48 (1):156-178.
    I argue that free will and determinism are compatible, even when we take free will to require the ability to do otherwise and even when we interpret that ability modally, as the possibility of doing otherwise, and not just conditionally or dispositionally. My argument draws on a distinction between physical and agential possibility. Although in a deterministic world only one future sequence of events is physically possible for each state of the world, the more coarsely defined state of an (...)
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  20.  3
    Marcel Meyer (2015). Positive Business: Doing Good and Doing Well. Business Ethics: A European Review 24 (S2):175-197.
    This article investigates the meaning of doing good and doing well in positive business. It examines the relationship between the two expressions and discusses their relevance, shedding new light on the significance of ‘positive’ in positive business and positive organizational scholarship. Thus, this article illuminates the ultimate end of positive states and practices. ‘Positive’ primarily represents values and assumptions. These lead to the creation of beneficial situations and marked improvements, which put individuals and organizations on an upward trajectory (...)
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  21.  9
    Luca Ferrero, Intending, Acting, and Doing.
    I argue that intending and acting belong to the same genus: intending is a kind of doing continuous in structure with intentional acting. Future-directed intending is not a truly separate phenomenon from either the intending in action or the acting itself. Ultimately, all intentions are in action, or better still, in extended courses of action. I show how the intuitive distinction between intending and acting is based on modeling the two phenomena on the extreme and limiting cases of an (...)
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  22.  55
    Finn Janning (2015). Doing Business with Deleuze? Kritike: An Online Journal of Philosophy 9 (1):28-44.
    This essay has two parts. The first part gives a brief overview of the foundations of economics. The second part contains a broader outline of the way in which philosopher Gilles Deleuze thinks of ethics. In the second part, I also explore the potential connections between Deleuze's thoughts and economics. Especially, I focus on the concepts of "human capital," "empowerment," and more fruitful, the concept of "power-with" as proposed by organizational theorist, Mary Parker Follett. By doing so, I try (...)
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  23. Sarah K. Paul (2009). How We Know What We're Doing. Philosophers' Imprint 9 (11):1-24.
    G.E.M. Anscombe famously claimed that acting intentionally entails knowing "without observation" what one is doing. Among those that have taken her claim seriously, an influential response has been to suppose that in order to explain this fact, we should conclude that intentions are a species of belief. This paper argues that there are good reasons to reject this "cognitivist" view of intention in favor of the view that intentions are distinctively practical attitudes that are not beliefs and do not (...)
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  24. Fiona Woollard (2008). Doing and Allowing, Threats and Sequences. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (2):261–277.
    The distinction between doing and allowing appears to have moral significance, but the very nature of the distinction is as yet unclear. Philippa Foot's ‘pre-existing threats’ account of the doing/allowing distinction is highly influential. According to the best version of Foot's account an agent brings about an outcome if and only if his behaviour is part of the sequence leading to that outcome. When understood in this way, Foot's account escapes objections by Warren Quinn and Jonathan Bennett. However, (...)
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  25. Wayne Wu (2008). Visual Attention, Conceptual Content, and Doing It Right. Mind 117 (468):1003-1033.
    Reflection on the fine-grained information required for visual guidance of action has suggested that visual content is non-conceptual. I argue that in a common type of (...) visually guided action, namely the use of manipulable artefacts, vision has conceptual content. Specifically, I show that these actions require visual attention and that concepts are involved in directing attention. In acting with artefacts, there is a way of doing it right as determined by the artefacts conventional use. Attention must reflect our understanding of the function and appropriate ways to use these artefacts, understanding that requires possession of the relevant concept. As a result, we attend to the artefacts relevant functional properties. In these cases, attention is structured by concepts. This discussion has a bearing on the dual visual stream hypothesis. While it is often held that the two visual streams are functionally independent, the argument of this essay is that the constraints on attention suggest a functional interaction between them. (shrink)
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  26.  61
    Jonathan B. Beere (2009). Doing and Being: An Interpretation of Aristotle's Metaphysics Theta. Oxford University Press.
    Doing and Being confronts the problem of how to understand two central concepts of Aristotle's philosophy: energeia and dunamis.
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  27. Philip Charles Hebert (2009/2008). Doing Right: A Practical Guide to Ethics for Medical Trainees and Physicians. Oxford University Press.
    Doing Right: A Practical Guide to Ethics for Medical Trainees and Physicians is a concise and practical guide to ethical decision-making in medicine. The text is aimed at second- and third-year one-semester ethics courses offered in medical schools, health sciences departments, and nursing programs. By taking an applied approach rather than a theoretical approach, this text serves the needs of medical and nursing students, residents, and practicing physicians by sorting through questions of moral principles relevant to the diverse and (...)
     
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  28.  41
    Barry Stroud (2013). Doing Something Intentionally and Knowing That You Are Doing It. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (1):1-12.
    A defence of the idea that an agent's knowledge that he is intentionally doing such-and-such is not ‘based on’ or ‘derived from’ any ‘experience’ of the agent or any item or state he is aware of in acting as he does. The explanation of agents' knowing, in general, what they are intentionally doing lies in the capacity for self-ascription and self-knowledge that is a required for being a subject of any intentional attitudes, and so for competent intentional agency.
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  29.  54
    Luca Malatesti (2014). Psychopathy and Failures of Ordinary Doing. Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics (2):1138-1152.
    One of the philosophical discussions stimulated by the recent scientific study of psychopathy concerns the mental illness status of this construct. This paper contributes to this debate by recommending a way of approaching the problem at issue. By relying on and integrating the seminal work of the philosopher of psychiatry Bill Fulford, I argue that a mental illness is a harmful unified construct that involves failures of ordinary doing. Central to the present proposal is the idea that the notion (...)
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  30. Adam Omar Hosein (2014). Doing, Allowing, and the State. Law and Philosophy 33 (2):235-264.
    The doing/allowing distinction plays an important role in our thinking about a number of legal issues, such as the need for criminal process protections, prohibitions on torture, the permissibility of the death penalty and so on. These are areas where, at least initially, there seem to be distinctions between harms that the state inflicts and harms that it merely allows. In this paper I will argue for the importance of the doing/allowing distinction as applied to state action. Sunstein, (...)
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  31. Edouard Machery (2010). Précis of Doing Without Concepts. Philosophical Studies 149 (3):602-611.
    Although cognitive scientists have learned a lot about concepts, their findings have yet to be organized in a coherent theoretical framework. In addition, after twenty years of controversy, there is little sign that philosophers and psychologists are converging toward an agreement about the very nature of concepts. Doing without Concepts (Machery 2009) attempts to remedy this state of affairs. In this article, I review the main points and arguments developed at greater length in Doing without Concepts.
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  32.  17
    Jason Hanna (2015). Enabling Harm, Doing Harm, and Undoing One’s Own Behavior. Ethics 126 (1):68-90.
    Philosophers disagree about the moral status of harm-enabling, or behavior by which an agent removes an obstacle to the completion of a threatening sequence. I argue that enabling harm is equivalent to doing harm, at least when an agent withdraws a resource to which neither she nor the victim has any prior moral claim. This conclusion reinforces the common objection that deontological appeals to the doing/allowing distinction cannot easily handle cases involving the withdrawal of aid. I argue that (...)
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  33.  7
    Michel Foucault (2014). Wrong-Doing, Truth-Telling: The Function of Avowal in Justice. University of Chicago Press.
    Three years before his death, Michel Foucault delivered a series of lectures at the Catholic University of Louvain that until recently remained almost unknown. These lectures—which focus on the role of avowal, or confession, in the determination of truth and justice—provide the missing link between Foucault’s early work on madness, delinquency, and sexuality and his later explorations of subjectivity in Greek and Roman antiquity. Ranging broadly from Homer to the twentieth century, Foucault traces the early use of truth-telling in ancient (...)
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  34. John Gibbons (2010). Seeing What You 'Re Doing'. In T. Szabo Gendler & J. Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology. Oxford University Press
    Do we have privileged access to what we’re intentionally doing? Well, that probably depends on what privileged access is. One way to think about privileged access is to try to identify a true formal principle. One thing you’ll need to do when identifying the formal principle is to specify the relevant range of propositions to which you have privileged access. These ranges are usually specified by subject matter: propositions about your own current, conscious propositional attitudes, propositions about your own (...)
     
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  35.  45
    Fiona Woollard (2012). The Doctrine of Doing and Allowing I: Analysis of the Doing/Allowing Distinction. Philosophy Compass 7 (7):448-458.
    According to the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing, the distinction between doing and allowing harm is morally significant. Doing harm is harder to justify than merely allowing harm. This paper is the first of a two paper critical overview of the literature on the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing. In this paper, I consider the analysis of the distinction between doing and allowing harm. I explore some of the most prominent attempts to analyse this distinction:. (...)
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  36.  66
    Frances Egan & Robert J. Matthews (2006). Doing Cognitive Neuroscience: A Third Way. Synthese 153 (3):377-391.
    The “top-down” and “bottom-up” approaches have been thought to exhaust the possibilities for doing cognitive neuroscience. We argue that neither approach is likely to succeed in providing a theory that enables us to understand how cognition is achieved in biological creatures like ourselves. We consider a promising third way of doing cognitive neuroscience, what might be called the “neural dynamic systems” approach, that construes cognitive neuroscience as an autonomous explanatory endeavor, aiming to characterize in its own terms the (...)
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  37.  27
    Ian Holliday (2005). Doing Business with Rights Violating Regimes Corporate Social Responsibility and Myanmar's Military Junta. Journal of Business Ethics 61 (4):329 - 342.
    Whether to do business with rights violating regimes is one of many dilemmas faced by socially responsible corporations. In this article the difficult case of Myanmar is considered. Ruled for decades by a closed and sometimes brutal military elite, the country has long been subject to informal and formal sanctions. However, as sanctions have failed to trigger political reform, it is necessary to review the policy options. The focus here is on the contribution socially responsible corporations might make to change. (...)
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  38.  25
    S. Belayachi & M. van Der Linden (2010). Feeling of Doing in Obsessive–Compulsive Checking. Consciousness and Cognition 19 (2):534-546.
    Research on self-agency emphasizes the importance of a comparing mechanism, which scans for a match between anticipated and actual outcomes, in the subjective experience of doing.This study explored the “feeling of doing” in individuals with checking symptoms by examining the mechanism involved in the experienced agency for outcomes that matched expectations. This mechanism was explored using a task in which the subliminal priming of potential action-effects generally enhances people’s feeling of causing these effects when they occur, due to (...)
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  39.  50
    George J. Agich (2005). What Kind of Doing is Clinical Ethics? Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 26 (1):7-24.
    This paper discusses the importance of Richard M. Zaners work on clinical ethics for answering the question: what kind of doing is ethics consultation? The paper argues first, that four common approaches to clinical ethics – applied ethics, casuistry, principlism, and conflict resolution – cannot adequately address the nature of the activity that makes up clinical ethics; second, that understanding the practical character of clinical ethics is critically important for the field; and third, that the practice of clinical ethics (...)
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  40.  13
    Katharine V. Smith & Nelda S. Godfrey (2002). Being a Good Nurse and Doing the Right Thing: A Qualitative Study. Nursing Ethics 9 (3):301-312.
    Despite an abundance of theoretical literature on virtue ethics in nursing and health care, very little research has been carried out to support or refute the claims made. One such claim is that ethical nursing is what happens when a good nurse does the right thing. The purpose of this descriptive, qualitative study was therefore to examine nurses’ perceptions of what it means to be a good nurse and to do the right thing. Fifty-three nurses responded to two open-ended questions: (...)
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  41.  35
    Anna Alexandrova (2013). Doing Well in the Circumstances. Journal of Moral Philosophy 10 (3):307-328.
    Judgments of well-being across different circumstances and spheres of life exhibit a staggering diversity. Depending on the situation, we use different standards of well-being and even treat it as being constituted by different things. This is true of scientific studies as well as of everyday life. How should we interpret this diversity? I consider three ways of doing so: first, denying the legitimacy of this diversity, second, treating well-being as semantically invariant but differentially realizable, and, third, adopting contextualist semantics (...)
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  42. C. W. Evers (2000). Doing Educational Administration: A Theory of Administrative Practice. Pergamon.
    Doing Educational Administration is the final part in a three volume series by Evers and Lakomski presenting their perspective on educational administration. The first volume, Knowing Educational Administration , established the importance of epistemological issues in the international field of educational administration and suggested a new, post-positivist approach to research. The theoretical approach presented in the first volume was further examined in Exploring Educational Administration, where the authors' theories were considered in an applied context. In this, the third and (...)
     
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  43.  17
    S. Eriksson, G. Helgesson & A. T. Höglund (2007). Being, Doing, and Knowing: Developing Ethical Competence in Health Care. [REVIEW] Journal of Academic Ethics 5 (2-4):207-216.
    There is a growing interest in ethical competence-building within nursing and health care practising. This tendency is accompanied by a remarkable growth of ethical guidelines. Ethical demands have also been laid down in laws. Present-day practitioners and researchers in health care are thereby left in a virtual cross-fire of various legislations, codes, and recommendations, all intended to guide behaviour. The aim of this paper was to investigate the role of ethical guidelines in the process of ethical competence-building within health care (...)
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  44.  62
    Paul McNamara (1998). Doing Well Enough in an Andersonian-Kangerian Framework. In Paul McNamara & Henry Prakken (eds.), Norms, Logics and Information Systems: New Studies on Deontic Logic and Computer Science. IOS Press 181-198.
    I recast the DWE ("Doing Well Enough") deontic framework as an Andersonian-Kangerian modal framework and explore its metatheory systematically.
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  45.  60
    Ronald M. Green (1991). When is "Everyone's Doing It" a Moral Justification? Business Ethics Quarterly 1 (1):75-93.
    The claim that " Everyone's doing it" is frequently offered as a reason for engaging in behavior that is widespread but less-than-ideal. This is particularly true in business, where competitors' conduct often forces hard choices on managers. When is the claim " Everyone's doing it" a morally valid reason for following others' lead? This discussion proposes and develops five prima facie conditions to identify when the existence of prevalent but otherwise undesirable behavior provides a moral justification for our (...)
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  46.  53
    Robert A. Wilson (2010). Seeing, Doing, and Knowing. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (1):117-132.
    This is a critical notice of Mohan Matthen's 2005 book "Seeing, Doing, and Knowing".
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  47.  42
    Hugo Mercier (2010). How to Cut a Concept? Review of Doing Without Concepts by Edouard Machery. Biology and Philosophy 25 (2):269-277.
    As the title “Doing without Concepts” suggests Edouard Machery argues that psychologists should stop using the notion of concept because: (1) the only interesting generalizations about concepts can be drawn at the level of types of concepts (prototypes, exemplars and theories) and not the level of concept in general; and (2) competences such as categorization or induction can rely on these different types of concepts (there is not a one to one correspondence between type of concept and competence). I (...)
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  48.  54
    Neil Levy (2011). Neuroethics: A New Way of Doing Ethics. AJOB Neuroscience 2 (2):3-9.
    The aim of this article is to argue, by example, for neuroethics as a new way of doing ethics. Rather than simply giving us a new subject matter—the ethical issues arising from neuroscience—to attend to, neuroethics offers us the opportunity to refine the tools we use. Ethicists often need to appeal to the intuitions provoked by consideration of cases to evaluate the permissibility of types of actions; data from the sciences of the mind give us reason to believe that (...)
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  49.  89
    Stefan Hirschauer (2005). On Doing Being a Stranger: The Practical Constitution of Civil Inattention. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 35 (1):41–67.
    The article takes on a less developed aspect of the sociology of the stranger: the normalized non-relations people in urban settings establish in their effort to stay strangers for one another. How is their “civil inattention”accomplished in practice? What is the social orderliness of “asocial” relations? In order to answer these questions the article uses the elevator as a sociological research instrument allowing for a highly detailed investigation in structural problems of public encounters: bodily navigation, contact avoidance, feigned preoccupation, and (...)
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    Marion Hourdequin (2007). Doing, Allowing, and Precaution. Environmental Ethics 29 (4):339-358.
    Many environmental policies seem to rest on an implicit distinction between doing and allowing. For example, it is generally thought worse to drive a speciesto extinction than to fail to save a species that is declining through no fault of our own, and worse to pollute the air with chemicals that trigger asthma attacks thanto fail to remove naturally occurring allergens such as pollen and mold. The distinction between doing and allowing seems to underlie certain versions of the (...)
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