Search results for 'Doing' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Christian Barry, Matthew Lindauer & Gerhard Øverland (forthcoming). Doing, Allowing, and Enabling Harm: An Empirical Investigation. In Joshua Knobe, Tania Lombrozo & Shaun Nichols (eds.), Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy. Oxford University Press.score: 24.0
    Traditionally, moral philosophers have distinguished between doing and allowing harm, and have normally proceeded as if this bipartite distinction can exhaustively characterize all cases of human conduct involving harm. By contrast, cognitive scientists and psychologists studying causal judgment have investigated the concept ‘enable’ as distinct from the concept ‘cause’ and other causal terms. Empirical work on ‘enable’ and its employment has generally not focused on cases where human agents enable harm. In this paper, we present new empirical evidence to (...)
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  2. Thomas S. Huddle (2013). Moral Fiction or Moral Fact? The Distinction Between Doing and Allowing in Medical Ethics. Bioethics 27 (5):257-262.score: 24.0
    Opponents of physician-assisted suicide (PAS) maintain that physician withdrawal-of-life-sustaining-treatment cannot be morally equated to voluntary active euthanasia. PAS opponents generally distinguish these two kinds of act by positing a possible moral distinction between killing and allowing-to-die, ceteris paribus. While that distinction continues to be widely accepted in the public discourse, it has been more controversial among philosophers. Some ethicist PAS advocates are so certain that the distinction is invalid that they describe PAS opponents who hold to the distinction as in (...)
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  3. Natascha Kienstra, Machiel Karskens & Jeroen Imants (2014). Three Approaches to Doing Philosophy: A Proposal for Grouping Philosophical Exercises in Classroom Teaching. Metaphilosophy 45 (2):288-318.score: 24.0
    Classroom teaching has two aims: learning philosophy, that is, the great philosophers, and doing philosophy. This article provides an overview of thirty exercises that can be used for doing philosophy, grouped into three approaches. The first approach, doing philosophy as connective truth finding or communicative action, is related to such philosophers as Dewey and Arendt, and is illustrated by the Socratic method. The second, doing philosophy as test-based truth finding, is related to such philosophers as Popper, (...)
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  4. Rahul Mitra (2010). Doing Ethnography, Being an Ethnographer: The Autoethnographic Research Process and I. Journal of Research Practice 6 (1):Article M4.score: 24.0
    I examine here Theory and Scholarship (taken to be formalized social scientific frameworks that seek to map out the real world and social actions in an objective fashion) via an autoethnographic lens. Chiefly, I ask how autoethnography as a research method reconfigures them: how may we extend knowledge using autoethnography? While much critique has centered on the "doing" (dispassionately?) versus "being" (going native?) of autoethnography, I argue that such a dichotomy is inherently false. Instead, doing is located within (...)
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  5. Shenbai Liao (2006). Doing Business: An Obscure Notion of the Ethics of Public Associations in Ordinary Chinese. [REVIEW] Frontiers of Philosophy in China 1 (3):325-340.score: 24.0
    Along with the notion of being a person (zuo ren 做人), the notion of doing business (zuo shi 做事) in ordinary Chinese is basically an over-all notion of the norms in the practical and associative activities, carrying typically obscure meanings on practice and association affairs in some external world. Ordinary Chinese not only distinguishes these two notions but also defines a dictionary order of them, with the affairs of the internal world prior to those of the external. The fact (...)
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  6. Jonathan Webber (2002). Doing Without Representation: Coping with Dreyfus. Philosophical Explorations 5 (1):82-88.score: 22.0
    Hubert Dreyfus argues that the traditional and currently dominant conception of an action, as an event initiated or governed by a mental representation of a possible state of affairs that the agent is trying to realise, is inadequate. If Dreyfus is right, then we need a new conception of action. I argue, however, that the considerations that Dreyfus adduces show only that an action need not be initiated or governed by a conceptual representation, but since a representation need not be (...)
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  7. Timothy Hall (2008). Doing Harm, Allowing Harm, and Denying Resources. Journal of Moral Philosophy 5 (1):50-76.score: 21.0
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  8. Stacy Lee Burns (2009). Doing Justice and Demonstrating Fairness in Small Claims Arbitration. Human Studies 32 (2):109 - 131.score: 21.0
    This paper examines the intersection of technical law and common sense reasoning in small claims arbitration, a distinctive and increasingly prevalent kind of legal work. Following (Garfinkel, Ethnomethodology’s program: Working out Durkheim’s aphorism , 2002 ), the study explores the “reform of technical reason” and what a “just outcome” means by focusing on the arbitration of actual small claims cases and how technical-legal and non-technical/informal resources are brought into alignment to produce dispute resolution. The arbitrator elicits discussions that establish consensual (...)
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  9. Liao Shenbai (2006). Doing Business: An Obscure Notion of the Ethics of Public Associations in Ordinary Chinese. Frontiers of Philosophy in China 1 (3):325-340.score: 21.0
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  10. Christian List (2014). Free Will, Determinism, and the Possibility of Doing Otherwise. Noûs 48 (1):156-178.score: 20.0
    I argue that free will and determinism are compatible, even when we take free will to require the ability to do otherwise and even when we interpret that ability modally, as the possibility of doing otherwise, and not just conditionally or dispositionally. My argument draws on a distinction between physical and agential possibility. Although in a deterministic world only one future sequence of events is physically possible for each state of the world, the more coarsely defined state of an (...)
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  11. Paul McNamara (1998). Doing Well Enough in an Andersonian-Kangerian Framework. In Paul McNamara & Henry Prakken (eds.), Norms, Logics and Information Systems: New Studies on Deontic Logic and Computer Science. IOS Press. 181-198.score: 20.0
    I recast the DWE ("Doing Well Enough") deontic framework as an Andersonian-Kangerian modal framework and explore its metatheory systematically.
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  12. Massimo Pigliucci (2012). On the Different Ways of ‘‘Doing Theory’’ in Biology. Biological Theory 7 (4):DOI 10.1007/s13752-012-0047-1.score: 18.0
    ‘‘Theoretical biology’’ is a surprisingly heter- ogeneous field, partly because it encompasses ‘‘doing the- ory’’ across disciplines as diverse as molecular biology, systematics, ecology, and evolutionary biology. Moreover, it is done in a stunning variety of different ways, using anything from formal analytical models to computer sim- ulations, from graphic representations to verbal arguments. In this essay I survey a number of aspects of what it means to do theoretical biology, and how they compare with the allegedly much more (...)
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  13. Adam Omar Hosein (2014). Doing, Allowing, and the State. Law and Philosophy 33 (2):235-264.score: 18.0
    The doing/allowing distinction plays an important role in our thinking about a number of legal issues, such as the need for criminal process protections, prohibitions on torture, the permissibility of the death penalty and so on. These are areas where, at least initially, there seem to be distinctions between harms that the state inflicts and harms that it merely allows. In this paper I will argue for the importance of the doing/allowing distinction as applied to state action. Sunstein, (...)
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  14. Wayne Wu (2008). Visual Attention, Conceptual Content, and Doing It Right. Mind 117 (468):1003-1033.score: 18.0
    Reflection on the fine-grained information required for visual guidance of action has suggested that visual content is non-conceptual. I argue that in a common type of visually guided action, namely the use of manipulable artefacts, vision has conceptual content. Specifically, I show that these actions require visual attention and that concepts are involved in directing attention. In acting with artefacts, there is a way of doing it right as determined by the artefact’s conventional use. Attention must reflect our understanding (...)
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  15. Fiery Cushman, Joshua Knobe & Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (2008). Moral Appraisals Affect Doing/Allowing Judgments. Cognition 108 (2):353-380.score: 18.0
    An extensive body of research suggests that the distinction between doing and allowing plays a critical role in shaping moral appraisals. Here, we report evidence from a pair of experiments suggesting that the converse is also true: moral appraisals affect doing/allowing judgments. Specifically, morally bad behavior is more likely to be construed as actively ‘doing’ than as passively ‘allowing’. This finding adds to a growing list of folk concepts influenced by moral appraisal, including causation and intentional action. (...)
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  16. Mohan Matthen (2008). Seeing, Doing, and Knowing: A Précis. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (2):392–399.score: 18.0
  17. Timothy J. Bayne (2004). Phenomenology and the Feeling of Doing : Wegner on the Conscious Will. In Susan Pockett (ed.), Does Consciousness Cause Behaviour? Mit Press.score: 18.0
    Given its ubiquitous presence in everyday experience, it is surprising that the phenomenology of doing—the experience of being an agent—has received such scant attention in the consciousness literature. But things are starting to change, and a small but growing literature on the content and causes of the phenomenology of first-person agency is beginning to emerge.2 One of the most influential and stimulating figures in this literature is Daniel Wegner. In a series of papers and his book The Illusion of (...)
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  18. Mohan P. Matthen (2005). Seeing, Doing, and Knowing: A Philosophical Theory of Sense Perception. Oxford University Press.score: 18.0
    Seeing, Doing, and Knowing is an original and comprehensive philosophical treatment of sense perception as it is currently investigated by cognitive neuroscientists. Its central theme is the task-oriented specialization of sensory systems across the biological domain; these systems coevolve with an organism's learning and action systems, providing the latter with classifications of external objects in terms of sensory categories purpose--built for their need. On the basis of this central idea, Matthen presents novel theories of perceptual similarity, content, and realism. (...)
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  19. Sarah K. Paul (2009). How We Know What We're Doing. Philosophers' Imprint 9 (11):1-24.score: 18.0
    G.E.M. Anscombe famously claimed that acting intentionally entails knowing "without observation" what one is doing. Among those that have taken her claim seriously, an influential response has been to suppose that in order to explain this fact, we should conclude that intentions are a species of belief. This paper argues that there are good reasons to reject this "cognitivist" view of intention in favor of the view that intentions are distinctively practical attitudes that are not beliefs and do not (...)
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  20. Edouard Machery (2010). Précis of Doing Without Concepts. Philosophical Studies 149 (3):602-611.score: 18.0
    Although cognitive scientists have learned a lot about concepts, their findings have yet to be organized in a coherent theoretical framework. In addition, after twenty years of controversy, there is little sign that philosophers and psychologists are converging toward an agreement about the very nature of concepts. Doing without Concepts (Machery 2009) attempts to remedy this state of affairs. In this article, I review the main points and arguments developed at greater length in Doing without Concepts.
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  21. Xiaofei Liu (2012). A Robust Defence of the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing. Utilitas 24 (01):63-81.score: 18.0
    Philosophers debate over the truth of the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing, the thesis that there is a morally significant difference between doing harm and merely allowing harm to happen. Deontologists tend to accept this doctrine, whereas consequentialists tend to reject it. A robust defence of this doctrine would require a conceptual distinction between doing and allowing that both matches our ordinary use of the concepts in a wide range of cases and enables a justification for the (...)
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  22. Frances Egan & Robert J. Matthews (2006). Doing Cognitive Neuroscience: A Third Way. Synthese 153 (3):377-391.score: 18.0
    The “top-down” and “bottom-up” approaches have been thought to exhaust the possibilities for doing cognitive neuroscience. We argue that neither approach is likely to succeed in providing a theory that enables us to understand how cognition is achieved in biological creatures like ourselves. We consider a promising third way of doing cognitive neuroscience, what might be called the “neural dynamic systems” approach, that construes cognitive neuroscience as an autonomous explanatory endeavor, aiming to characterize in its own terms the (...)
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  23. Fiona Woollard (2008). Doing and Allowing, Threats and Sequences. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (2):261–277.score: 18.0
    The distinction between doing and allowing appears to have moral significance, but the very nature of the distinction is as yet unclear. Philippa Foot's ‘pre-existing threats’ account of the doing/allowing distinction is highly influential. According to the best version of Foot's account an agent brings about an outcome if and only if his behaviour is part of the sequence leading to that outcome. When understood in this way, Foot's account escapes objections by Warren Quinn and Jonathan Bennett. However, (...)
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  24. Jonathan B. Beere (2009). Doing and Being: An Interpretation of Aristotle's Metaphysics Theta. Oxford University Press.score: 18.0
    Doing and Being confronts the problem of how to understand two central concepts of Aristotle's philosophy: energeia and dunamis.
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  25. Neil Levy (2011). Neuroethics: A New Way of Doing Ethics. AJOB Neuroscience 2 (2):3-9.score: 18.0
    The aim of this article is to argue, by example, for neuroethics as a new way of doing ethics. Rather than simply giving us a new subject matter—the ethical issues arising from neuroscience—to attend to, neuroethics offers us the opportunity to refine the tools we use. Ethicists often need to appeal to the intuitions provoked by consideration of cases to evaluate the permissibility of types of actions; data from the sciences of the mind give us reason to believe that (...)
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  26. Edouard Machery (2009). Doing Without Concepts. Oxford University Press.score: 18.0
    Over recent years, the psychology of concepts has been rejuvenated by new work on prototypes, inventive ideas on causal cognition, the development of neo-empiricist theories of concepts, and the inputs of the budding neuropsychology of concepts. But our empirical knowledge about concepts has yet to be organized in a coherent framework. -/- In Doing without Concepts, Edouard Machery argues that the dominant psychological theories of concepts fail to provide such a framework and that drastic conceptual changes are required to (...)
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  27. Bashshar Haydar (2010). The Consequences of Rejecting the Moral Relevance of the Doing–Allowing Distinction. Utilitas 22 (2):222-227.score: 18.0
    The claim that one is never morally permitted to engage in non-optimal harm doing enjoys a great intuitive appeal. If in addition to this claim, we reject the moral relevance of the doingallowing distinction. In this short essay, I propose a different take on the argument in question. Instead of opting to reject its conclusion by defending the moral relevance of the doingallowing distinction, we can no longer rely on the strong intuitive appeal of the claim that one is (...)
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  28. Robert A. Wilson (2006). Seeing, Doing, and Knowing: A Philosophical Theory of Sense Perception (Review). Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (1):117-132.score: 18.0
    This is a critical notice of Mohan Matthen's 2005 book "Seeing, Doing, and Knowing".
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  29. John Gibbons (2010). Seeing What You're Doing. In T. Szabo Gendler & J. Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology. Oxford University Press.score: 18.0
    Do we have privileged access to what we’re intentionally doing? Well, that probably depends on what privileged access is. One way to think about privileged access is to try to identify a true formal principle. One thing you’ll need to do when identifying the formal principle is to specify the relevant range of propositions to which you have privileged access. These ranges are usually specified by subject matter: propositions about your own current, conscious propositional attitudes, propositions about your own (...)
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  30. Gill Valentine, Ruth Butler & Tracey Skelton (2001). The Ethical and Methodological Complexities of Doing Research with 'Vulnerable' Young People. Ethics, Place and Environment 4 (2):119 – 125.score: 18.0
    In discussing methodological and ethical codes for working with children there is a danger that young people can become homogenised as a social category. In this paper we examine the way in which common methodological and ethical dilemmas, such as accessing potential interviewees or gaining consent, can become more complex and significant when the research involves work with a 'vulnerable' group of children or youth. Here, we draw on our own experience of working with self-identified lesbian and gay young people, (...)
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  31. Hugo Mercier (2010). How to Cut a Concept? Review of Doing Without Concepts by Edouard Machery. Biology and Philosophy 25 (2):269-277.score: 18.0
    As the title “Doing without Concepts” suggests Edouard Machery argues that psychologists should stop using the notion of concept because: (1) the only interesting generalizations about concepts can be drawn at the level of types of concepts (prototypes, exemplars and theories) and not the level of concept in general; and (2) competences such as categorization or induction can rely on these different types of concepts (there is not a one to one correspondence between type of concept and competence). I (...)
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  32. Stevan Harnad, Doing, Feeling, Meaning And Explaining.score: 18.0
    It is “easy” to explain doing, “hard” to explain feeling. Turing has set the agenda for the easy explanation (though it will be a long time coming). I will try to explain why and how explaining feeling will not only be hard, but impossible. Explaining meaning will prove almost as hard because meaning is a hybrid of know-how and what it feels like to know how.
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  33. Dennis Lomas (2002). What Perception is Doing, and What It is Not Doing, in Mathematical Reasoning. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 53 (2):205-223.score: 18.0
    What is perception doing in mathematical reasoning? To address this question, I discuss the role of perception in geometric reasoning. Perception of the shape properties of concrete diagrams provides, I argue, a surrogate consciousness of the shape properties of the abstract geometric objects depicted in the diagrams. Some of what perception is not doing in mathematical reasoning is also discussed. I take issue with both Parsons and Maddy. Parsons claims that we perceive a certain type of abstract object. (...)
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  34. Timothy Bayne (2004). Phenomenology and the Feeling of Doing : Wegner on the Conscious Will. In Susan Pockett (ed.), Does Consciousness Cause Behaviour? Mit Press.score: 18.0
    Given its ubiquitous presence in everyday experience, it is surprising that the phenomenology of doing—the experience of being an agent—has received such scant attention in the consciousness literature. But things are starting to change, and a small but growing literature on the content and causes of the phenomenology of first-person agency is beginning to emerge.2 One of the most influential and stimulating figures in this literature is Daniel Wegner. In a series of papers and his book The Illusion of (...)
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  35. Kevan Edwards (2011). Higher-Level Concepts and Their Heterogeneous Implementations: A Polemical Review of Edouard Machery's Doing Without Concepts. Philosophical Psychology 24 (1):119-133.score: 18.0
    Doing Without Concepts Edouard Machery New York: Oxford University Press, 2009 296 pages, ISBN: 0195306880 (hbk); $65.00 This paper offers a critical review of Edouard Machery's Doing Without Concepts, with a particular emphasis on an approach to concept individuation that is consistent with many of Machery's arguments but has the potential to avoid his eliminativist conclusion. The approach agrees with Machery's claims to the effect that prototypes, exemplars, theories (and so on) form a heterogeneous class, but construes these (...)
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  36. George J. Agich (2005). What Kind of Doing is Clinical Ethics? Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 26 (1):7-24.score: 18.0
    This paper discusses the importance of Richard M. Zaners work on clinical ethics for answering the question: what kind of doing is ethics consultation? The paper argues first, that four common approaches to clinical ethics – applied ethics, casuistry, principlism, and conflict resolution – cannot adequately address the nature of the activity that makes up clinical ethics; second, that understanding the practical character of clinical ethics is critically important for the field; and third, that the practice of clinical ethics (...)
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  37. Allen Thompson (2006). Environmentalism, Moral Responsibility, and the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing. Ethics, Place and Environment 9 (3):269 – 278.score: 18.0
    In 'Doing and Allowing', Samuel Scheffler argues that if a person sees herself as subject to norms of individual moral responsibility, then the content of her first-order substantive norms of individual moral responsibility must attribute greater responsibility to what one does than to what one could, but fails, to prevent. This paper is about how a morally responsible agent could deny the doctrine of doing and allowing, why an environmentalist should, and what this means for environmental ethical theory.
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  38. Austen Clark (2008). Classes of Sensory Classification: A Commentary on Mohan Matthen, "Seeing, Doing, and Knowing". [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (2):400 - 406.score: 18.0
    Forthcoming in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2008, A book symposium commentary on Mohan Matthen’s Seeing, Doing, and Knowing.
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  39. Fiona Woollard (2010). Doing/Allowing and the Deliberative Requirement. Ratio 23 (2):199-216.score: 18.0
    Attempts to defend the moral significance of the distinction between doing and allowing harm directly have left many unconvinced. I give an indirect defence of the moral significance of the distinction between doing and allowing, focusing on the agent's duty to reason in a way that is responsive to possible harmful effects of their behaviour. Due to our cognitive limitations, we cannot be expected to take all harmful consequences of our behaviour into account. We are required to be (...)
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  40. Ronald M. Green (1991). When is "Everyone's Doing It" a Moral Justification? Business Ethics Quarterly 1 (1):75-93.score: 18.0
    The claim that "Everyone's doing it" is frequently offered as a reason for engaging in behavior that is widespread but less-than-ideal. This is particularly true in business, where competitors' conduct often forces hard choices on managers. When is the claim "Everyone's doing it" a morally valid reason for following others' lead? This discussion proposes and develops five prima facie conditions to identify when the existence of prevalent but otherwise undesirable behavior provides a moral justification for our engaging in (...)
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  41. Barry Stroud (2013). Doing Something Intentionally and Knowing That You Are Doing It. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (1):1-12.score: 18.0
    A defence of the idea that an agent's knowledge that he is intentionally doing such-and-such is not ‘based on’ or ‘derived from’ any ‘experience’ of the agent or any item or state he is aware of in acting as he does. The explanation of agents' knowing, in general, what they are intentionally doing lies in the capacity for self-ascription and self-knowledge that is a required for being a subject of any intentional attitudes, and so for competent intentional agency.
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  42. Dawn M. Phillips, Reading Literature and Doing Philosophy.score: 18.0
    In this paper I make a comparison between the imaginative activity of reading literature and the elucidatory activity of doing philosophy. My aim is to highlight significant features of a non-traditional view of philosophical method – inspired by Wittgenstein.
     
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  43. Fiona Woollard (2012). The Doctrine of Doing and Allowing II: The Moral Relevance of the Doing/Allowing Distinction. Philosophy Compass 7 (7):459-469.score: 18.0
    According to the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing, the distinction between doing and allowing harm is morally significant. Doing harm is harder to justify than merely allowing harm. This paper is the second of a two paper critical overview of the literature on the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing. In this paper, I consider the moral status of the distinction between doing and allowing harm. I look at objections to the doctrine such as James’ Rachels’ (...)
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  44. Ian Holliday (2005). Doing Business with Rights Violating Regimes Corporate Social Responsibility and Myanmar's Military Junta. Journal of Business Ethics 61 (4):329 - 342.score: 18.0
    Whether to do business with rights violating regimes is one of many dilemmas faced by socially responsible corporations. In this article the difficult case of Myanmar is considered. Ruled for decades by a closed and sometimes brutal military elite, the country has long been subject to informal and formal sanctions. However, as sanctions have failed to trigger political reform, it is necessary to review the policy options. The focus here is on the contribution socially responsible corporations might make to change. (...)
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  45. Austen Clark (2008). Classes of Sensory Classification: A Commentary on Mohan Matthen, Seeing, Doing, and Knowing. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (2):400–406.score: 18.0
    Sensory classification is a central theme of Mohan Matthen's wonderful book, Seeing, Doing, and Knowing. ( All page references are to Matthen 2005 unless otherwise indicated.) My plan for this commentary is simple: I shall list a series of claims that Matthen makes about the classes involved in sensory classification. Each member of the series is admirable, and seems credible on its own. The question at the end is whether we can hold them all, together.
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  46. James Peterman (2008). Why Zhuangzi's Real Discovery is One That Lets Him Stop Doing Philosophy When He Wants To. Philosophy East and West 58 (3):pp. 372-394.score: 18.0
    Recent interest in the Zhuangzi by Western philosophers arises from the sense that Zhuangzi offers a form of philosophical theory, such as perspectivism. A key issue for this line of interpretation is how best to resolve alleged contradictions between the central philosophical claims of the "Qiwulun" with other claims made in the text. A more radical reading of this chapter will avoid these problems if it can find some way to understand this chapter as philosophically interesting because it scrupulously avoids (...)
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  47. Fiona Woollard (2012). The Doctrine of Doing and Allowing I: Analysis of the Doing/Allowing Distinction. Philosophy Compass 7 (7):448-458.score: 18.0
    According to the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing, the distinction between doing and allowing harm is morally significant. Doing harm is harder to justify than merely allowing harm. This paper is the first of a two paper critical overview of the literature on the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing. In this paper, I consider the analysis of the distinction between doing and allowing harm. I explore some of the most prominent attempts to analyse this distinction:. (...)
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  48. Suzi Adams (2013). Castoriadis and the Non-Subjective Field: Social Doing, Instituting Society and Political Imaginaries. Critical Horizons 13 (1):29 - 51.score: 18.0
    Cornelius Castoriadis understood history as a self-creating order. In turn, he elaborated history in two directions: as the political project of autonomy, and as the ontological modality of the social-historical. On his account, history as self-creation was only possible through the interplay of social (or political) imaginaries and social doing. Although social imaginaries are readily situated within the non-subjective field, non-subjective modes of doing have been less explored. Yet non-subjective contexts are integral to both the “doing” and (...)
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  49. John Rudisill (2011). The Transition From Studying Philosophy to Doing Philosophy. Teaching Philosophy 34 (3):241-271.score: 18.0
    In this paper I articulate a minimal conception of the idea of doing philosophy that informs a curriculum and pedagogy for producing students who are capable of engaging in philosophical activity and not just competent with a specific domain of knowledge. The paper then relates, by way of background, the departmental assessment practices that have played a vital role in the development of my department’s current curriculum and in particular in the design of a junior-year seminar in philosophical research (...)
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  50. Ming Xu (1994). Doing and Refraining From Refraining. Journal of Philosophical Logic 23 (6):621 - 632.score: 18.0
    The main purpose of this paper is to prove that in every stit semantic structure that contains a busy choice sequence, neither does doing imply refraining from refraining from doing, nor does refraining from refraining from doing imply doing.
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